The New INTERNATIONAL

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

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Editor: ALBERT GATES

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A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

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NOTES OF THE MONTH

Once Again, The Miners' Fight

At the time of this writing, the coal miners of America are still waging the struggle for their most elementary rights. In the beginning there was arrayed against them the coal operators and the reactionary and liberal press, which charged that the justified demands of the coal diggers were merely auxiliary to the ambitions of John L. Lewis. If the past two months have taught anything to the advocates and practitioners of yellow journalism, it is that the coal miners are not dupes, but the best organized and most conscious section of the American working class.

The analysis we made of this struggle in our last issue holds with even greater force as the passing weeks reveal the Administration plan to destroy the effectiveness of this great labor organization, not merely because of the requirements of the labor situation in general, but also to save its tottering structure of the War Labor Board and its entire labor policy. The element of revenge against Lewis also enters into the picture, but it is by no means the decisive aspect of this situation.

The past months witnessed the continuation of Lewis' determined refusal to submit his case before the WLB, fully cognizant that the interests of the miners would be ill served within this house. Working through Ickes, who *seemed* to be pursuing an independent policy in his own determination to bring about a solution to the coal crisis, Lewis went back into negotiations with the coal operators. The time of the second truce had already run and, without a contract in effect, the miners again went out on strike. The strike was only a few days old when it appeared likely that a contract with the operators would be signed. But in the midst of these negotiations, which both Lewis and the operators had declared were well along the road to solution, the WLB ordered them to cease, on the ground that the miners were on strike in violation of the no-strike agreement!

The third truce runs to June 20. Agreements were already reached in Illinois and central Pennsylvania. In other words, a group of operators, tired of their own stalling and fearing the consequences of an agreement which would mean paying off beginning with April 1, felt that, in their own profit interests, the signing of a contract with the miners was necessary. But the WLB is still to be reckoned with, since its heavy hand holds back any genuine progress in the settlement of the dispute.

Ickes Fines the Miners

And, finally, as if to goad the miners on, Ickes announced that he was fining the men one dollar a day each for the five days' duration of the strike. This, said Ickes, was perfectly legal since it was in accord with the old contract between the operators and the union. The action by Ickes, however, is only calculated to intensify the present situation because the miners will not and cannot take this fine lying down. It is a flagrantly illegal action! The Administration hasn't a legal leg to stand on.

The miners' contract expired on April 30. Since then, the miners have worked under the wage and hour conditions of the contract only to permit negotiations for a new one to be completed. The conditions of the old contract had expired and the miners did not understand and certainly would not accept the idea that by continuing their work for the old rate of pay they were subject to all the provisions of this expired document. What, then, is the propriety of Ickes' action? He declares that *he* has extended the provisions of the contract! By what right? Under what theory of law?

But this brings us to the whole question of the government's policy in the coal situation. Roosevelt has taken over the mines. He has declared that the miners are employees of the government. It would seem logical that the government would then negotiate a new contract with the miners. But nothing of the kind. The government orders the miners to negotiate with the operators who are, under the presidential decree, no longer the owners of the mines. Are the operators acting for the Administration? Are they merely the servants of the government? Or are they negotiating a new contract as the *legal* and *actual* owners of the mines? Merely posing the questions elicits prompt answers. The coal operators are not representing the government; they are representing themselves. The miners are not on the government payroll; the government is not the actual employer.

Government Ownership or Employer Ownership?

Roosevelt's action in taking over the mines was merely a strategical move to weaken the miners in their struggle for a decent contract to meet the rising cost of living. Furthermore, the President took this action to save his War Labor Board, a body without any statutory power, from ignominious collapse. But the action which he believed would quickly resolve the miners' dispute has only intensified and confused the struggle.

In his widely syndicated column, Drew Pearson revealed the inner struggle among Roosevelt's aides and committees. Pearson reports a meeting, called by the President, of the WLB, Ickes, Byrnes and Hopkins, at which the WLB threatened to resign unless Ickes pulled his oars out of the mine situation and permitted them to take complete charge so that they might bend the will of Lewis and the miners. It was and is the aim of the WLB to compel the UMW to pay proper obeisance to the board. The WLB feels highly insulted and its position imperilled by the refusal of the miners to permit their case to be adjudicated by them.

Ickes countered by charging the WLB with standing in the way of a settlement of the miners' dispute because of their

narrow interests. While it is reported that Roosevelt sided with Ickes, he finally gave in to the WLB because of its threat to resign. Its resignation would destroy the President's whole set-up for solving the labor problems as expressed in the present wage struggles of the working class. Since he could not permit the resignation of the WLB, he decided to go along with it.

We do not know whether or not this report is accurate. Nor is it important to this discussion, for in the last analysis the Administration will endeavor to carry out its general policy, which is inimical to the best interests of labor. But this story does show what conflicting interests stand in the way of the coal miners.

A Threatening Danger

In the welter of confusion arising from the miners' fight, one important and significant, as well as dangerous, element in the situation is the new policy developing in Washington. This policy takes the form of state interference in collective bargaining between employers and workers, which is presumably guaranteed by the Wagner Act. This is a grave danger for the union movement. Under the best circumstances of a "friendly" Administration it would cause the labor movement to rely upon "friends" in Washington, rather than upon the independent and organized strength of the working class. Under more normal conditions, it would mean that the employers have an addtional weapon in their hands with which to combat labor. Such state interference is but added expression of the increasing totalitarianization of government. It is a sign of a mounting bureaucratization which can never be of interest to the working class. An illustration of the practical consequences of such a development is found in the miners' struggle.

If the miners have held their own and even made gains, something which is good for the entire labor movement, it is precisely because they have maintained their ranks, their independence and their will to struggle in defense of their most elementary rights.

The miners' struggle reflects a new mood of American labor. Thus, its significance cannot be overestimated. This increasing will to struggle, however, is accompanied by increasing reaction in general, and in the Administration and Congress in particular. Now is the time to take inventory of this situation. The next steps of labor, both political and economic, will largely determine the character of the coming period of class relations in America.

A. G.

Stalin Dissolves the Comintern

The Climax of Nationalist Degeneration

The formal decision of the Præsidium of the Communist International to dissolve that organization which, from the point of view of revolutionary internationalism, has long been dead, brings to mind a speech by Stalin at the Sverdloff University on June 9, 1925, in which he warned of the dangers of nationalist degeneration. Stalin prepared a reply to a number of written questions drawn up by the students of the university. Coming in the midst of the struggle with the Russian Left Opposition, these questions naturally concerned matters of domestic and international policy. For the first time, the theory of "socialism in one country" was formally introduced into the Russian party and the International.

The answers made by Stalin are interesting for several reasons. They disclose his evolution as a confused theoretician and thinker inside a degenerating revolutionary party, to the leader of a new type of state and class power. They reveal that this degeneration did not take place at once, but continued for a number of years in which the characteristic line is a zigzag from left adventurism to opportunism. The end result has been a complete counter-revolutionary degeneration. The characteristics of this counter-revolutionary development are unusual, for the background to this new political phenomenon arising out of the working class movement is the Revolution of 1917. They show that Stalin himself was quite unaware of the final results of his empirical policies, his rejection of theory and principle, and his rôle as the personification of the powerful Russian bureaucracy.

The students at Sverdloff put the following question to the general secretary: *If the stabilization of capitalism should last for a long time, by what degenerations will our party be threatened?* The question was obviously a natural response to the charges levelled against the epigone leadership by the Left Opposition in their struggle against the new nationalist theory introduced into the movement. Stalin's reply is extremely interesting both in the way it aptly discloses the bases for nationalist degeneration and the inauguration of a new policy—the one which has been in effect for some years, epitomized by the recent decision to dissolve the Comintern. He said:

> Does any such danger of degeneration exist?
>
> The danger is, or, rather, the dangers are, real enough, and they exist quite independently of the stabilization of capitalism. The stabilization of capitalism makes them more tangible, that's all. In my view there are three main dangers to reckon with:
>
> a) The danger of losing sight of the socialist goal which is the aim of all the work of reconstruction in our country; this danger, therefore, is an intensification of the tendency to relinquish the conquests of the revolution.
>
> b) The danger of losing sight of the international revolutionary goal —the danger of a short-sighted nationalism.
>
> c) The danger that the party may lose its position as leader and, therewith, the possibility of the party becoming no more than a tailpiece to the state apparatus.

It would be of immense interest and importance to discuss all three dangers outlined by Stalin. But for the present discussion it is important only to be concerned with the second danger in this trinity. It must be remembered that in this discussion of nationalist degeneration, he was at the same time the advocate of a national socialist state. Yet, with seeming acuteness, he stated in reference to the second danger:

The distinguishing marks of this danger are a lack of trust in the international proletarian revolution; a lack of faith in its victory; the adoption of a skeptical attitude toward the liberationist movements in the colonial and vassal lands; the failure to understand that, in default of the support of the world-wide revolutionary movement, our country cannot make an effective stand against world imperialism ... to understand that the victory of socialism in one land alone cannot be an end in itself, but is merely a means which can be utilized for the development and growth of the revolutionary movement in other lands.

Should we follow this road, we should land ourselves in a quagmire of nationalism, degeneration and the complete surrender of the international policy of the proletariat. Those who are attacked by this sickness look upon our country not as part of a whole which goes by the name of "the international revolutionary movement," but as the alpha and omega of this movement. Such folk imagine that the interest of all other countries should be sacrificed to the interests of our country.

In view of the developments in world politics in the last decades these remarks by Stalin sound like a grim joke. But let us get on. The "genial" general secretary continues:

Now it is abundantly clear that the first proletarian state can retain its position of standard bearer of the international revolutionary movement only on condition that it retains a consistently internationalist outlook and promulgates the foreign policy of the October Revolution. It is equally obvious that the adoption of the line of least resistance and of a nationalistic viewpoint in the domain of foreign affairs will lead to the isolation and decay of the country where the proletarian revolution gained its first victory.

Thus we see that the lack of an international revolutionary outlook threatens us with nationalism and with dissolution.

Thus Stalin in 1925; an utterly different man, a man still living close to the years of the victorious revolution. Lenin had died only a short time before. The internationalist character of the revolution was still fresh in the minds of millions. Stalin has already prepared the doom of the Soviet state, but he still speaks the language of a partial internationalist; he still remembers some of the most obvious of Lenin's lessons. Eighteen years later, the final danger of which he spoke were something which had occurred. Hardly a single vestige remains of the heroic revolutionary period of 1917-24.

• • •

Of course, there are much better sources for understanding the inner significance of internationalism and the specific place of the Russian Revolution and the Communist International in history. We were prompted to go to Stalin, in order to show that even this source was fully aware, at least verbally, of the danger of national degeneration. The dire forecasts contained in his address have become the reality; its significance lies in the fact that he who warned of this degeneration has himself become the apostle of the new nationalism which has brought such ruin to the former Soviet Union and such distress to the once glorious Comintern and the international working class.

The theoretical premises contained in the statement of the erstwhile Præsidium are themselves of no great importance. What else could these little people say? They were given their orders; they carried them out. In order to dress up the dissolution in its proper "Marxistical" phraseology, we were given a miserable attempt at historical references to antecedent experiences of the First and Second Internationals. So we are told that the First and Second Internationals were born, developed and died. Conditions brought about the formation of these bodies; conditions compelled their dissolution. Thus the present misleaders of Stalin's international were merely following historical precedent. We shall return to this soon enough. First, however, let us consider the question of the action. What does it actually mean? Why did Stalin do it now?

The Degeneration of the Comintern

As an international of revolutionary socialism, the Comintern has been dead a long time. The International ceased to be that the moment that the doctrine of socialism in one country became its main theoretical premise. The degeneration, however, did not follow a single downward curve; it was a zig-zag development, itself expressive of the contradictions inherent in an international dominated by a single party which had state power and which traveled the road of nationalism and opportunism. Its primary function has been as an agency of the Russian Foreign Office, as an adjunct of Stalin's GPU. It is therefore correct to say that in reality nothing has been changed by the decision: the sections of the CI will continue to function as before.

Two obstacles lay in the path of the Stalinist betrayers: The Russian Left Opposition and the Bucharinist Right Opposition. Employing the reserves of the latter against the Left Opposition, Stalin took the offensive in the new civil war fought on Russian soil to determine whether the rising new class power would prevail over the internationalists. Having defeated the Left Opposition, Stalin next turned against the Right. In each of these struggles, the new bureaucratic power swayed left and right, depending upon the economic and political needs of the moment.

Within the period of these struggles, the Comintern had experienced a series of catastrophic defeats. Beginning with Germany in 1923, the "organizers of defeat" led the international from disaster to disaster: England, China, and the Third Period. Each defeat served to push further into the background the revolutionary elements and the revolutionary élan of the movement; conversely, it strengthened the revisionist and counter-revolutionary direction.

Stalin, it has been said, always regarded the Communist International as an expensive luxury. Quite obviously this had no bearing on the international under his domination. The international which Stalin regarded with disfavor was the Comintern under Lenin and Trotsky. His Comintern was an indispensable weapon for the defense of his new state. Stalin's Russia, as a non-capitalist state, could not meet the competition of world imperialism with weapons which are peculiarly adaptable to the needs of the bourgeois powers. Military power to offset the danger of intervention was insufficient, because Russia could not hope to cope with a united capitalist attack. Foreign policy in Russia was dictated by the necessity to maintain peace, to balance off the powers, one against the other, or to make an alliance with the strongest nation or group of imperialists. At the same time, in case none of these alternatives succeeded, Stalin would be able to use his trump card, the sections of the Comintern which were completely subservient to him, and prepared to carry out any and all policies emanating from the Kremlin. In the meantime, the Comintern parties were usefully employed in propagating the aims of the Foreign Office.

Hitler's victory in Germany, guaranteed by the policies forced on the German Communist Party, impelled the adoption of the policy of collective security. Collective security thenceforth became the main political agitational activity of the international. Collective security, the Stalinists insisted, would secure peace. Reckoning on the failure of this policy, however, Russian diplomacy was busily engaged in seeking

to obtain advantageous political and military alliances. The signing of pacts with the various powers was integral to the main foreign policy. The mounting danger of war found Russia traveling from a military alliance with France and Czechoslovakia to the Hitler-Stalin pact. Between these two poles of diplomatic achievement, Russia was near a military alliance with the Allies. Lack of faith in the prospect of the Allies in the war led to the pact with Hitler, which in turn gave the signal for the war to begin. In this way, Stalin had hoped to ward off involvement in the conflict while the imperialist powers wore themselves out in a fruitless endeavor to destroy each other. But Stalin miscalculated. When the German general staff concluded that it was impossible to storm and take the British Isles, the attack on Russia was a certainty.

During the hey-day of the alliance with fascism, Stalin embarked on his expansionist program. In rapid succession we had the division of Poland, the seizure of the Baltic countries and the war with Finland. When the Wehrmacht crossed the Russian borders, that phase of Russian diplomacy ended (in defeat) and a new one commenced. This time Stalin turned to a complete military and political alliance with Allied imperialism.

Effects of the Decision

The "dissolution" of the Comintern becomes more understandable with the foregoing background. As long as Stalin held hands with the brown-shirted murderers, the Comintern served a useful function. It must be remembered that no parties existed in the Axis countries—at best there were only the phalanxes of the GPU. Stalinist parties, however, were to be found in almost every country making up the United Nations. Their strength and influence was not great, but they had tremendous nuisance value and did, in fact, cause considerable embarrassment to the Allied war effort before Russia became a full-fledged member of the alliance. Thus, while the Stalintern had a useful job to perform in the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact, the situation was considerably altered by the logic of the war.

For Stalin, the formal dissolution of the Comintern was a cheap price to pay to the Allies for the considerable aid given him to prosecute the war on its main front. Self-interest controls the conduct of all the members of the Allied camp. Keeping Russia in the war is absolutely indispensable to the United States and Great Britain. Obtaining material aid and the opening of other fronts is the only way to take the pressure off Stalin's army. Thus the national interests of these powers dictates the policy of mutual aid.

The decision on the Comintern was therefore no loss to Stalin. On the contrary, it was of considerable gain. Since there were no organizations in the Axis countries, the decision could in no way affect events in this quarter. But he likewise has nothing to fear from the formal action as it affects matters in the Allied countries. First of all, the parties, after a decade and more of conditioning, will remain the devoted and obedient servants of the Kremlin, no matter what formal decision is taken in Moscow. Secondly, the policies of the parties are in complete accord with the needs of Stalin and they are in complete conformity with the essential interests of the bourgeois states. In a real sense, then, nothing has been changed by the decision—the commentators from all camps notwithstanding.

The Stalinist parties have received another slight impetus in their current nationalist degeneration, in pursuit of their chauvinist and strike-breaking rôles. They remain the worst enemies of the world proletariat.

* * *

The most crucial question involved in the decision of the Præsidium is proletarian internationalism. When we say that nothing has been fundamentally changed by the Kremlin action, we merely mean that its formal action will not alter the fact that Stalin will continue to control his parties, which remain consistently subservient to his interests. The need for the recreation of the Socialist International, however, has been with us for a long time. It would be foolish to say that the existence of Stalinism has not hurt the idea of internationalism; it would be just as foolish to believe that the decision of the Præsidium is not another blow against this same tenet of Marxism

For example, in its decision, the epigone Præsidium presented the following "theoretical" argumentation for the dissolution:

> But long before the war it had already become increasingly clear that to the extent that the internal as well as the international situation of the individual countries became more complicated, the solution of the problems of the labor movement of each individual country through the medium of some international center would meet insuperable obstacles.
>
> The deep difference in the historical roads of development of each country of the world; the diverse character and even the contradiction in their social orders; the difference in level and rate of their social and political development, and finally the difference in the degree of consciousness and organization of the workers, conditioned also the various problems which face the working class of each individual country.
>
> The entire course of events for the past quarter of a century, as well as the accumulated experiences of the Communist International, have convincingly proved that the organizational form for uniting the workers as chosen by the First Congress of the Communist International, and which corresponded to the needs of the initial period of the rebirth of the labor movement, more and more outlived itself in proportion to the growth of this movement and to the increasing complexity of problems in each country; and that this form even became a hindrance to the further strengthening of the national workers' parties.

Using the "language" of Marxism, the bureaucrats dress up their lies with the cloak of false objectivity and logic. But it is a lie nevertheless. It is only necessary to recall the history of the formation of the Third International to expose this new falsification. At its founding Congress, the Communist International clearly stipulated the reasons for its formation. It was based on world conditions not unlike the present. The "internal as well as the international situation of the individual countries" was "complicated," and "the solution of the problems of the labor movement of each individual country through the medium of some international center . . . (met) insuperable obstacles."

At the same time there also existed a "deep difference in the historical road of development of each country of the world." Their characters were "diverse" and even their social orders were "contradictory." The Comintern of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Rakovsky and Bucharin understood that capitalism developed "unevenly," that the degree of class consciousness and class organization of the workers in all countries were different and that their problems were different.

In his explanation of the formation of the Communist International, Lenin wrote:

> The Third International was in reality created in 1918, after the protracted struggle with opportunism, and "social chauvinism," especially during the war, had resulted in the formation of a Communist Party in various countries. The formal recognition of the international dates from the first congress of its members held in Moscow in March, 1919. The

most prominent feature of the Third International, namely, its mission to carry out the principles of Marxism and to realize the ideals of socialism and the labor movement, manifested itself immediately in that this "third international association of working men" has to a certain extent *become identical with the League of Socialist "Soviet" Republics.*

As if in anticipation of the present decision of the Præsidium of the Comintern, Lenin wrote:

Any Marxist, nay, anyone conversant with modern science, if asked whether he believed in the probability of a uniform, harmonious and perfectly-proportioned transition of various capitalist countries to the dictatorship of the proletariat, would undoubtedly answer that question in the negative. In the capitalist world there had never been any room for uniformity, harmony and perfect proportions. Every country has brought into prominence now one, then another, feature or features of capitalism, and of the labor movement. The rate of development has been varied.

In the early years of the Communist International, this was the prevailing theory. Difficulties of communication, objective difficulties of functioning, uneven development of capitalist countries, different tactics for different parties, varying rates in the growth and activities of the national parties, had nothing whatever to do with the necessity for the existence of the international organization of the revolutionary socialists of the world. It only stressed the nature of the problems which had to be overcome, and the general difficulty of ushering in the new society of genuine freedom and security for the whole of mankind.

These concepts hold true to this very day and will remain true until the final triumph of socialism.

* * *

In his criticism of the draft program of the Communist International adopted at the Sixth Congress in 1928, Trotsky spoke of the historical place of the three internationals. He wrote:

The basic principles of revolutionary strategy were naturally formulated since the time when Marxism first put before the revolutionary parties of the proletariat the task of the conquest of power on the basis of the class struggle. The First International, however, succeeded in formulating these principles, properly speaking, only theoretically, and could test them only partially in the experience of various countries. The epoch of the Second International led to methods and views according to which, in the notorious expression of Bernstein, "the movement is everything, the ultimate goal nothing." In other words, the strategical task disappeared, becoming dissolved in the day-to-day "movement" with its partial tactics devoted to the problems of the day. Only the Third International reëstablished the rights of the revolutionary strategy of communism and completely subordinated the tactical methods to it. Thanks to the invaluable experience of the first two internationals, upon which shoulders the third rests, thanks to the revolutionary character of the present epoch and the colossal historic experience of the October Revolution, the strategy of the Third International immediately attained a full-blooded militancy and the widest historical scope.

In this analysis, Trotsky has only reëchoed the thoughts contained in the Manifesto of the First Congress of the Communist International. That is, he maintained a strict adherence to the thoughts of the founders of the new world organization of which he was one of the initiating spirits. He closely paraphrased the analysis made by Lenin when the latter wrote:

The First International laid the basis for the international struggle of the proletariat for socialism.

The Second International marked a period of preparation, a period in which the soil was tilled with a view to the widest possible propagation of the movement in many of the countries....

The importance of the Third Communist International in the world's history is that it was the first to put into life the greatest of all Marx's principles, the principle of summarizing the process of the development of the socialist and labor movement, and expressed in the words, the dictatorship of the proletariat [the democratic workers' state—Editor.].

There is an interesting parallel of historical events in the case of the Comintern. The First International, which had as its task the propagation of the theoretical principles of Marxian socialism, floundered in the crisis created by the Franco-Prussian War and the defeat of the Paris Commune. The Intenational Workingmen's Association, the arena in which the theoretical struggles within the labor movement were fought out, reached its climax when the objective events had made clear that the international had outlived any further usefulness to the workers. And Marx and Engels did not hesitate to adopt a decision that led to its inevitable dissolution. While they had overestimated the rate of development of the revolutionary mass movement, they were certain that the future of capitalism must give rise to conditions demanding the recreation of an international proletarian organization.

The capitalist crisis which served as a background to the dissolution of the First International was a crisis of growth. It preceded the imperialist rise in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. The growth of mass production was accompanied by the rapid development of the national labor and socialist organizations throughout Europe and thus the reëstablishment of the international was guaranteed. This body enjoyed an enormous growth and influence, but developing in the "Victorian" era of capitalist growth, it bent before the pressures of opportunism and adaptation. Moreover, it never really embraced the internationalist doctrine of Marxism. When the crisis of the imperialist war of 1914 came, the Second International broke like a reed in the wind. The national parties of this great body rallied to the support of their respective ruling classes. The collapse of internationalism led to its death—not its formal organizational, or even political, death—as *the* international of the working class. It remained in existence, and does to this day, but its functions are not unlike those of a decade or two ago: a left prop of dying capitalism. In the post-war period, when the struggle of the classes gave abundant evidence that capitalism might be finally destroyed, when the question of state power was posed, social democracy entered into the service of imperialism for the purpose of maintaining its existence and rule.

The war was the life and death problem for the Second International. In this case, a formal adherence to the idea of internationalism was insufficient to ward off the influence of national chauvinism. The international succumbed to the virus of nationalism. Capitalist growth militated against integration of the national parties into a genuine world organization in which the interests of the international working class would be regarded paramount to the interests of any national party. This historical parallel is continued in the case of the Communist International.

The Communist International was born out of the conditions created by the First World War, the victory of the October Revolution and the chaos of the post-war period. In its unequivocal acceptance of the theory, practice and spirit of Marxism, it reacted violently to the nationalist degeneration of the Second International. Internationalism was the great spirit which emanated from the Comintern. It was fortified by Lenin's incessant hammering that under no circumstances was it permissible for the international to deviate from this unchangeable principle. That is why he always emphasized the international character of the Russian Revolution, con-

tinually stressing the point that if the international working class did not come to its aid, the new Soviet state would perish, either by the assault of imperialism, or by nationalist degeneration.

Lenin's fear, alas, did come true. The Soviet state did perish, not as a result of the direct assault of imperialism, but by nationalist degeneration which began with the adoption of the theory of socialism in a single country. If this process of degeneration and decay has taken a long time, it is to be explained by the peculiar state of international relations and the relationship of class forces in Russia and the capitalist world. The Communist International was transformed from its position as the leader of the world working class to an appendage of Stalin's régime a long time ago. But it has taken another war to disclose this fact to millions.

The present great task of the revolutionary socialists the world over is not unlike that of the internationalists in the war of 1914-18. It is to revive the spirit of socialist internationalism, to recreate the new, the Fourth International of socialism. The objective conditions for the realization of this goal are overripe. It is only necessary for the true Marxists to proceed with vigor against all the great obstacles which stand in their way. This task is the order of the day!

SAM ADAMS.

What Is Incentive Pay?

An Examination of a New Profit Plan

On April 19, *Newsweek* magazine confided to its readers: "Wage incentive plans are due for a big play. When the rank and file discovers that only through such plans can they take home fatter weekly pay envelopes, it can be expected that labor leaders will change their chilly attitude toward incentive systems."

It is true that incentive plans are getting a big play—in the journals of big business: *Newsweek* of March 15 and April 19, *Time* of March 8, *Business Week* of April 3 and May 15, *Modern Industry* of February 15, *United States News* of April 16. Doubtless there are many other endorsements in similar sources.

This flood of publicity is not accidental. *Business Week* informs us that the campaign originated in the War Production Board, that is, among the brothers and the other selves of the publishing enterprises above named. *Newsweek* further reveals that as far back as last fall C. E. Wilson, president of General Motors, wrote to the War Labor Board that incentive plans would produce more war materials, bring prices down by renegotiation of contracts, result in bigger profits for management as a reward for introducing more efficient methods, and permit the workers to take home more money.

Mr. Wilson was finding the United Automobile Workers Union unreceptive to his plans. They turned down his proposals last year (*Time,* March 8, 1943). They are still turning them down (*PM,* April 22, and *New York Times,* May 1). The *Times* report, an account of a conference of representatives of all General Motors locals of the UAW, states:

> Finally, acting on the incentive pay question, the conference adopted a resolution expressing opposition to "piece work under any name" and called upon the international board to take a "firm and decisive position against any and all form of so-called incentive pay."
>
> The resolution was construed as a criticism of the executive board's recent action in Cleveland. The board went on record against incentive pay in principle, but authorized Richard T. Frankensteen, a vice-president, to sit on a War Production Board committee studying incentive pay plans.

So Mr. Wilson went to the government for aid, to his cronies on the WPB and to the WLB. The WLB, in General Order 5 of October, 1942, obliged by exempting from the Little Steel formula "any wage adjustments that might be made for increased productivity under piecework or incentive plans." An employer could institute such plans without WLB approval. More recently the President in his "hold the line" order allowed incentive bonuses when they do not increase production costs appreciably, or provide a basis for increasing prices or resisting price reductions.

Business Week of May 15 gives the "inside dope" on the President's action and a subsequent development in the WLB. We are informed that incentive pay has been under "quiet" discussion in Washington for several weeks and that Wilson of the WPB (Nelson's second in command, not the General Motors' Wilson, just a brother-under-the-skin from General Electric) "sold" the White House on the idea. Hence the "little noticed" clause exempting incentive plans in the hold the line order. Subsequently the WLB, *at the request of the WPB,* approved a new incentive plan for Alcoa at Lafayette, Ind., despite the fact that a twenty per cent rise in wages is anticipated as a result.. The WLB stipulated, of course, that *unit* labor costs must not be increased.

The WLB and the President have provided the legal basis. The WPB, with the assistance of some labor "leaders," such as Green, Murray and Frankensteen, have assumed the pleasant task of informing the business world, and also the more difficult one of persuading the workers, of the merits of this, to use the frank language of *Business Week,* "quietly worked-up plan." *United States News* tells us that a dozen or so incentive plans have been installed in plants with the aid of WPB's labor division. These experiments are parts of the "study" being made by the WPB. Probably the "quietly worked-up plan" had to come into the open a little prematurely because of labor pressure for wage increases (ferment in the ranks of the UAW and almost every other union—and, above all, because of the demands of Lewis and his miners).

What Is the Plan?

The business magazines named above assure us with one voice that the experiments have been successful and that they are winning the favor of labor. How is this new-born love of the workers for incentive plans to be explained? To begin with, our business magazines, with a great show of frankness, admit that piecework and other incentive schemes once "added much more to corporation profits than to the workers' pay check (thus the president of the Bedaux Co.)." But now all of that is changed, of course.

In the old days, as everybody knows, piecework induced the workers to hustle until they were in danger of amassing a fortune that would enable them to retire and live on their incomes. Then the employer, to prevent this degeneration into unproductive idleness, would cut the piecework rates, and the process would start all over again. Piecework was, and is, an incentive system. However, when the term "incentive" was used, other and more subtle forms of wage-cutting were usually meant. Under them the worker was forced to cut his own wage rates, and the boss was spared the dirty and sometimes quarrelsome task. Professor Schlicter in his *Modern Economic Society* (page 697, 1936 edition) gives a good explanation of the general procedure. He begins by stating that many employers have found it unnecessary to pay such large rewards as piecework gives in order to induce a man to do his best. Instead a standard time is set for a certain job. If a worker does it in less time, the time saved is divided between him and the company, usually on a 50-50 basis. Suppose that the standard for a certain job is two pieces for a ten-hour day and that the pay for this is $5.00. At piecework, if the man did four pieces, he would receive $10.00. Under an incentive plan he would divide the extra $5.00 with the company and receive $7.50. Doing the standard two piece, he would receive $2.50 per piece. Doing four pieces he would receive only $1.88 per piece. To make $10.00 he would have to do six pieces, and this would reduce his rate per piece to $1.67. Of course, his hourly pay would increase, *but not in proportion to his increased productivity.*

The present proposals for the incentive system don't attempt anything quite so raw as this. *Newsweek* furnishes us with an example of what is intended and the other business magazines also take the same line. If, says *Newsweek,* eighty pieces are standard in eight hours and a hundred pieces are produced, the increase in output is twenty-five per cent, and the bonus should also be twenty-five per cent. In other words, the piecework principle is proposed, decorated with the verbiage about "standards" taken from the incentive plans, and also the relatively unfamiliar word "incentive." Further, the industrial engineers and the business magazines advise that this is not the time to try rate-cutting, at least of obvious kinds, every few months.

However, the WPB plan is not for piecework pure and simple, but for group piecework. It provides (*Business Week,* April 3) that "whenever a plant's output per man rises by a given per cent, the pay, but not the wage rate, of everyone in the plant, from sweeper to president, will be increased by the same per cent." Group piecework is considered more efficient by some industrial engineers, because the workers themselves, to get the group bonus, push the slow fellows who are holding down the amount of the bonus payment. This is explained more fully by David Coolidge in an article in the April 12 issue of *Labor Action.* The plan has the further attraction of giving management some share after all, even as did the old incentive schemes. *The president and all the rest of the staff of management are to get a bonus of the same per cent as the workers—as a reward for the extra effort made by the WORKERS.* Even if this pleasant detail were eliminated, even if the individual piecework principle were adopted, the workers would still be subjected, as Coolidge states, to time and motion studies and the other scientific paraphernalia of the Bedaux or other industrial engineers, in preparation for the setting up of the "standards." Labor has always found it hard to secure rates that are próportionate to the speed-up involved from such studies.

Business Week of May 15 says that the WPB still has many problems to solve before launching a full-scale campaign. How about plants where production has been poor? If percentage rises are allowed for increases over past production, the base rates will be unsound, since the workers may really get busy, work hard, get rich, and reap an undeserved reward for being lazy in the past. Horrible thought! Should the government merely spread propaganda in favor of incentive plans, or should the WPB come out more openly and offer a more or less standard plan? While the WPB favors a plant-wide basis for bonuses, on the ground that maintenance men as well as production workers should be considered, many employers feel that individual incentives are better. On the other side, the unions are suspicious. At the Gary, Ind., foundry of Carnegie-Illinois there were recently a score or more "quickie" strikes in a period of four weeks "incident to the installation of an incentive plan." The General Motors department of the United Auto Workers is dead set against all such plans. Earl Browder has to a certain extent gummed up the works, since his endorsement, while it has won over some unions, has alienated others and beclouded the "merits" of the plan by dragging in "politics." Most serious of all, according to *Business Week,* is a union demand to link up incentive pay with a guaranteed work week in order to guard workers against loss of employment which might result from a speed-up.

What Does Labor Say?

Doubtless the WPB can solve all its other "problems," once the fundamental one of labor opposition is overcome. They would probably be willing to compromise with management on the disagreement over plant-wide or individual bonuses. In fact, the Alcoa plan, mentioned above, is apparently an individual bonus plan. *Business Week* itself cites the case of the Murray Corporation to show how plant-wide application may be modified to take care of non-production workers.

But what does labor say? While labor is supposed to be undergoing a real conversion, *Newsweek* admits that labor's attitude is favorable "with reservations.." *Modern Industry* state: "Most surprising is the number of cases where unions have been the prime movers." But it lets the cat out of the bag with the following additional information: "This acceptance is most marked among the top-rank officialdom of unions —particularly in the all-out left wing (in other words, Stalinist—W. W.) unions—and diminishes at the plant level."

Earl Browder's notorious two cents' worth, *Wage Policy in War Production,* is the most enthusiastic "labor" endorsement of incentive plans. It is described as an abridgement of an address made to a meeting of production workers and trade union officials in New York on February 23, 1943. Browder pretends that big business leaders are an unpatriotic and ignorant crew who don't want to see the value of incentive pay. In six months or a year, he says, production could be doubled. (In other words, the workers are really stalling on the job in a big way.) This would double wages and more than double profits, since overhead costs per unit would fall. The only thing lacking is a willingness on the part of the employers to coöperate in this beneficent project. So the task of the workers is to talk tough and "to force better profits on unwilling employers" (page 8).

A sharp contrast to this comic treachery is to be found in the pages of the *United Auto Worker*. Here the direct voice of the rank and file is seldom heard. Yet in the May 1 issue two locals condemn incentive pay strongly: the Budd Local in Detroit, which after a bitter fight had rid itself of it, and the Detroit Steel Products Local, which still is working under such a system. In the same issue the Republic Aircraft Local of the same area reports its difficult fight to prevent the management from cutting the base rates under an incentive plan.

Indirectly, pressure "at the plant level" is more fully revealed. Secretary-Treasurer Addes, a proponent of incentive pay, early this year persuaded the CIO Executive Board to drop an endorsement from its program, on the ground that incentive plans might spread unemployment. The UAW Executive Board, formerly on record with a vague proposition in favor of increased production to further the war effort provided wages were proportionately increased—a veiled endorsement of incentives—has recently denied repeatedly, even in telegrams to all locals, any dissension in the Executive Board on this issue and has insisted, not with the utmost candor, to be sure, that the whole Executive Board opposes incentive pay in principle. Locals are allowed to adopt incentive plans only if they comply with a list of seven safeguards.

That the locals distrust the National Executive Board is shown by the recent GM national conference, referred to near the beginning of this article. The conference even rejected safeguards and treated Frankensteen, Addes and a handful of Stalinists with scant respect, booing them enthusiastically. Various regional conferences—Regions 9 and 9A in the East and the conferences of the key Michigan region—have since taken similar stands, the latter even demanding that union officials (meaning Frankensteen) should resign from government committees studying incentive plans and that locals shoud be assisted in efforts to get rid of these plans. Secretary-Treasurer Addes reported some 200,000 union members still working under bonus schemes. Before 1934, in the open-shop period, these schemes were universal in the industry; now they are the exception. Many auto workers evidently remember the abuses of the past and do not intend to revive them with union sanction, despite the efforts of Frankensteen, Addes, *et al.*

In short, *Newsweek* misrepresents the facts when it says that the rank and file will force labor leaders to change their "chilly attitude." When labor leaders assume a chilly attitude, it is from having a more than lukewarm interest on their part exposed to the frigid dislike of the rank and file. This is not to say that inexperienced workers may not be taken in by the glowing promises of the WPB, Mr. Raymond (president of the Bedaux Co.), Messrs. Frankensteen and Addes, and "Comrade" Browder. These workers will do well to learn, before it is too late, from the experienced automobile workers and from recent difficultics that workers have had with presently-functioning incentive systems: the "quickie" strikes at Carnegie-Illinois (*Business Week*, May 15), the troubles at Republic Aircraft (*United Automobile Worker*, May 1), the recent strike at Wright in Paterson over a cut in incentive bonus pay (*The Militant*, May 15), the crisis at Curtiss-Wright in Buffalo over retiming of jobs and a consequent sharp cut in bonuses (*Labor Action*, May 3).

Seldom are any two incentive systems exactly alike, and they are invariably very complicated. How difficult it would be for an ordinary worker to check on the mass of statistical data involved is well illustrated by an account given in *Business Week* of August 29, 1942, of the system at the Murray Corporation, where the UAW local is said to collaborate successfully with management in administering the plan. The management hired industrial engineers to install the system. The rank and file elected five time stewards, who were given a training course of six months by these engineers and who are paid by the management. Because of the expense of training, these stewards are elected for terms of *four years*, although their terms of office do not all begin and end at the same time. Their job is to represent the union in time-study disputes, to investigate time-study formulæ, and "to act when necessary as interpreters of the subject to their fellow workers." It should at once be apparent how open to company domination such a set-up is. There are also endless opportunities for practicing favoritism and stirring up quarrels among the union members. These, briefly, are the reasons why experienced workers do not go for such plans.

It is interesting to note that the Murray Corporation is a favorite example of union-management collaboration in the field of incentive pay. *Modern Industry* (February 15) carries a photograph of a steward's meeting, discussing time-study plans. The stewards look very happy. *Business Week* of May 15 reports that the incentive system at Murray has raised output fifteen per cent and that the workers are satisfied with the standards. Back in August, 1942, the same magazine reported that there had been no stoppages at Murray for several years and that the president of Local 2, Lloyd T. Jones, credited this largely to the time-study provisions in the contract of February, 1941. All that needs to be added to complete this happy story is the following: On March 24 of this year Lloyd T. Jones, president of Murray Local 2, sent telegrams to leaders of the UAW and to high government officials, demanding restoration of premium pay for Saturdays and Sundays and a $2.00-a-day increase in wages. The local also sent a telegram to John L. Lewis, supporting the miners' demand for a $2.00 increase (*Labor Action*, April 5). *Business Week* does not report these latter-day activities of Brother Jones and his local, and we can only hope that the magazine's enthusiasm for Local 2 will not be diminished by the news.

What Does Business Want?

We have so far seen that the incentive pay campaign originated (quietly) with big business, has been backed by the Stalinists (vociferously) and by top union leaders (somewhat cautiously) but has been rejected (with emphasis) by the experienced rank and file of the union, where it has so far become a big issue. We can get further light on the workers' interests in this situation by examining the reasons why big business has launched the campaign. Just what are the aims of the campaign? Mr. (General Motors') Wilson stated them in their noblest form in his letter to the WLB, mentioned above. The business magazines give us also some franker information. Here is some of it:

1) All the magazines set forth the obvious proposition that, if more work is produced in regular instead of overtime hours, overhead costs of running the plants are cut. Result: greater profits. To be sure, lower prices to the government and hence to taxpayers are sometimes held forth as a bait. It should be said that savings on overhead can add very considerably to profits.

2) *Newsweek* reveals (and the *New York Times* has for months been conducting a full-dress crusade on this issue in its editorial columns) that the bosses dislike paying time and

a half for overtime. They consider it almost criminal to give 1½ pay for just a standard output, when they could get 1¼ (or more) output for 1¼ pay on an incentive basis. Or even 1.1 output for 1.1 pay. The *Times* and some others claim, in justification, that increasing output to the same extent that pay is increased prevents inflation. *Time* and some others hold that incentive pay is merely *less* inflationary: since the workers' total pay would increase while available supplies of consumer goods are decreasing, there would be some inflation anyway. *United States News* agrees with *Time,* but adds the reassuring thought that "the government could take much of the workers' excess earnings through taxes." What is perfectly clear in all this is that the bosses' profits would be higher, subject only to the uncertain control of renegotiation of contracts.

3) *Business Week,* looking to the future, states that permanent changes in the wage structure (that is, a generally higher level of basic wages in the future) would not be risked. Time and a half for overtime, to be sure, is bad; but recently worse things have been developing as a result of the coal miners' demands and the response they have awakened in the ranks of labor generally. Workers want higher hourly or daily rates besides time and a half for overtime. If their demands for more pay could be satisfied by speed-up bonuses, this would be good not only for the present but also for the future. In fact, many business men, three out of five, are even saying that the repeal of the overtime provision of the Wages and Hours Law is at present impractical (*New York Times,* May 2). They would be content for the time being to keep hourly rates down. Later, when unemployment comes, the work-week can be reduced to forty hours or less, thus doing away with overtime pay; but the task of lowering base rates, once raised, would be more difficult.

4) Apart from considerations of profit in the domestic market after the war, there is the tougher competition with other countries in the world market to think of. The United States, says *Newsweek,* has always been an efficient producer. The incentive system would make her still more efficient. She would be in a "fine position to serve the great new markets for manufactured goods that are waiting in the post-war world."

It is hardly necessary to take up the above aims of management one by one from the labor viewpoint. The losses to labor from these schemes, both now and even more in the post-war period, are obvious. If management wishes now to hold down wage rates and after the war to lower them as far as possible, if management wishes now to alleviate a short supply of labor and after the war to create a greater excess supply, the interests of labor are clearly not the same. Other considerations, of little interest to management but important to the workers, such as the effect of a speed-up on health, are sufficiently obvious to workers not to need mention.

Summary

Not many months ago, labor leaders, having given up the right to strike and even their contractual rights to time and a half pay for Saturdays and double pay for Sundays, were forced to face the employers' demands for a further retreat. There arose a so-called "grass roots" campaign to abolish overtime pay altogether and to lengthen the work-week to forty-eight hours, to fifty-six hours, indefinitely. *Time* magazine during April of 1942 informed its readers that Roosevelt resisted this campaign because he saw that the cost of living was rising and that labor would not accept this further blow quietly. However, in January of this year the *American Federationist* was still arguing against this ultra-reactionary proposal.

Still resolved to do away with overtime pay, big business generously decided to offer labor something in return for surrendering overtime rates—the chance to make more money by incentives. Under this arrangement, hours could be extended without interfering with profits. If the workers couldn't keep up the pace at the end of a hard day, it would be the workers' loss. Of course, labor had a long-standing hatred for speed-ups, so the campaign had to be quietly and carefully planned. But before this proposal could make any headway, the Administration, to the dismay of some employers and their periodicals, was trying to stem labor pressure against the Little Steel formula by decreeing a forty-eight-hour week in many areas. This was a concession more apparent than real, since most war-production workers were already on a forty-eight-hour or longer week. At the same time large groups of workers were denied increases in wage rates by the WLB (The NEW INTERNATIONAL, February, 1943), and the miners' strike was already threatening. It is true that the steel industry is even now not working a forty-eight-hour week and has recently been order by Manpower Commissioner McNutt to get in line, despite management's complaints of higher costs (a prelude to a demand for higher prices). Here again is to be seen an attempt by increasing pay envelopes to woo other workers from support of the miners and to head off demands for wage increases.

Finally, as the miners' strike came closer, incentive pay started to come into the open in a new rôle. March and April, as has been pointed out above, were months of a big push for it in the business press. While its superiority to premium rates for overtime has constantly been emphasized during this campaign, it has been offered mainly as a "concession" *in addition to* overtime rates in order to stem the tide from labor's ranks for higher hourly rates, which by the way would make the overtime premiums higher yet. Seen against the above background, incentive pay is clearly another maneuver of big business and its government agents to sidetrack the unswerving movement of labor's rank and file for higher rates. Labor freezing, long discussed but again and again postponed by Roosevelt, has now been invoked to make incentive pay seem the only possible way to fatter pay envelopes—a view zealously propagated in labors own ranks by Frankensteen. The miners may yet give a serious setback to this new conspiracy against labor's interests. Yet even a success for the miners on the basis of portal-to-portal pay or some other evasion of a direct $2.00-per-day raise will probably unleash a still stronger campaign for incentive pay as a similar "indirect" method for other workers to get more money. The WPB would like to begin with the aircraft and shipbuilding industries and later to extend their plan to all the war industries. Forewarned is forearmed. Higher hourly wages alone will serve labor's true interests.

WALTER WIESS.

A New Stage for World Labor—II

Where Must the Socialist Movement Begin?

[Continued from Last Issue]

Labor Movements and the State

It was impossible for former European labor movements, insulated as they were within their respective national boundaries, to struggle for more than social-reform measures, to be achieved with the help and for the sake of their national states. The state was asked to take over industrial enterprises and to plan economic activities. But the capitalist state, surrounded by a competing and hostile world, could plan and administer enterprises only in order to strengthen itself as an international force by strong competitive power.

In countries where the bourgeois revolution was more or less "complete," democratic rights and liberties were not used by the working class for the struggle for socialism. In the new industrial countries where the bourgeois revolution had failed or was not "completed," the demand for political democracy was still combined with social demands for the protection of labor by the state. Such national reforms, where they were effected, had nothing to do with socialism. If attained, they could only be preserved to the extent to which the nation became a successful imperialist power and could exploit international monopolies. For the rest, there was an irreconcilable conflict between the state, which tried to solve its social problems on a national scale, and the necessity for imperialist expansion. This made it necessary for the state to develop its national economy on an internationally competitive basis.

The Decline of the Labor Aristocracies

The decay or collapse of the old labor movement was due mainly to the disappearance of the conditions which had enabled it to develop on a national basis. What success it had during the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was due to the ascendancy of Western European imperialism.

The trade union leaders did not understand that the fate of their organizations was tied to that of the international monopolies controlled by their respective capitalists. On the other hand, these leaders of labor, who had no or very limited political understanding and often were provincially minded, imagined that national monopolies might furnish a basis for coöperation between industrialists and labor, or even a stepping stone toward socialism, a sort of economic democracy in which the workers of a particular industry would defend the "group interests" of that industry as a partner. This illusion collapsed in Germany with the rise of fascism. The state itself became the protagonist and even the organizer of national monopolies and struck from the hands of the former labor aristocrats and the trade unions all the weapons with which they once had been able to assert their demands.

The international foundations of most Western European labor aristocracies was seriously undermined after 1918, and already lost for Germany. The temporary revival of the German trade union movement after the First World War made its internal crisis more apparent and its final destruction more dramatic. But the same trend which made the crisis of the trade union movement so fatal, operated and still operates in other countries. Britain, as well as France, will have to surrender most of its foreign possessions eventually. The social legislation which British labor has been granted or promised recently is only a political measure to win the support of the British working class for the war effort and to secure Britain's international positions in the post-war crisis. The real economic basis, however, on which the privileged position of British labor has rested is being destroyed. Meanwhile, labor on the Continent has already had the international foundation of its higher standard of living completely wiped out.

Desperately the Nazi masters of Europe attempted to create some kind of *ersatz* labor aristocracies by establishing privileged positions for German workers compared with the status of foreign, non-German workers. The international foundation for these new social privileges was not wide enough and the war effort made it necessary to increase unproductive consumption on a greater scale than production could be raised. Thus even the privileged German workers did not gain a position which would have made them satisfied with their new status. They too were subject to deprivations which made them feel more like proletarians and quite unlike real labor aristocrats. The Third Reich did not get a chance to prosper at the expense of colonial peoples. As a result, the deeply-rooted conservative labor traditions, which were still very powerful at the end of the First World War, have now had their objective justification taken away by total war and by fascism.

Thus the historical place of labor as a proletarian class has shifted and become different from what it was before. We should not be deceived by the introduction of social security systems—they do not create real economic security—or by the growth of state-capitalist authoritarian rule which is also organized on a national basis, and which is therefore also subject to the conflict between the national state and international character of the capitalist economy.

The influence of the bourgeois revolutionary movements on the working class is waning and has, as a matter of fact, become a minor factor in the most advanced industrial countries. The labor aristocracies whose traditions still prevailed at the end of the First World War have lost their international foundations. Unpolitical trade unionism, therefore, has entered a stage of acute crisis from which it cannot find a way out. Simultaneously a new process of internationalization of labor is taking place.

The Internationalization of Labor

Recent events have greatly changed the composition of the working class in Europe, and these changes deserve our greatest attention. They enable us to perceive political consequences not visible at present in the surface structure of the total state; they will be decisive in the next open political crisis, should fascist authoritarian power collapse.

The proletarian class itself has been proletarianized, reversing the process of de-proletarianization which had been operating in imperialist countries with an international foundation of a labor aristocracy. The ranks of labor have been

swollen by many millions of women who have entered the ranks of industrial labor. The quantitative growth of industrial labor is accompanied by a qualitative change. The dissolution of family life which had been halted temporarily in imperialist countries where the middle classes and a labor aristocracy prospered, is again making rapid progress. The limited satisfaction which family life gave or gives to the individual worker is swept away when women are compelled to take over the jobs of men in factories and offices. In some countries, especially in Germany, where from five to six million workers, or about one-fourth of the working class, are now foreign, the working population has been augmented by masses of labor from other nations.

Thus the German working class is being forced by circumstances to surrender its national traditions, language, etc. The Nazis have indeed tried to isolate the various national groups and play them off against each other. German workers who merely talk with their foreign colleagues are given long prison sentences. But these very punishments reveal the fear of the fascists that common fate and common experience will create social ties among workers of various countries that will erase the old national prejudices and distinctions. At the critical moment, in the event of the destruction of the Nazi régime, this unintended internationalization of labor may give proletarian action a decisively international cast.

Socialist or proletarian internationalism will, of course, have to be fundamentally different from the internationalization of labor under fascism. It will have to be based on voluntary coöperation and free decisions of the various national sections of the proletarian and proletarianized classes. They must want to join a new kind of international coöoperation after having freed themselves from fascist bondage. At the same time, the way has been paved for a new kind of internationalization based on the free decision of national groups which cannot find a solution of their social problems on a national basis.

Revolutionary Consciousness

The question arises as to how the worker who has been transformed into a kind of state-slave and taught to obey the orders of his fascist masters can develop class-consciousness. After all, there is not an inevitable development of such consciousness. A worker may live in extreme misery, yet his experience will not make him conscious of his own social status and of the necessity for class action. These ideas must be brought to him from the "outside," through labor organizations and propaganda. He can understand his own social experiences only if he has a critical understanding of social phenomena and, in this light, reëxamines his personal experiences. The "total state" has constructed gigantic organizations with minutely-detailed schedules in order to prevent any critical independent thinking. The development of the subjective factor of class-consciousness seems a hopeless task under fascism. For how can an enslaved worker develop the class-consciousness of a "free" proletarian?

The conditions under which the worker becomes more or less receptive to notions of revolutionary class-consciousness vary greatly. A worker may be a "free" proletarian and still never reach class-consciousness. Among the labor aristocracy, the influence of the middle classes usually smothers the effects of socialist revolutionary propaganda. On the other hand, the same workers may be converted into state-slaves under fascism or authoritarian rule, while losing their old aristocratic status (together with the loss of the international foundation for labor aristocracy), and by that very change be made more receptive to revolutionary ideas. For fascism came to power only when the position of the middle classes had already become extremely insecure, with a large section declining even below that of the working class. Fascism has completed the destruction of the economic foundation of the middle classes and the exploiter is no longer an individual capitalist but the "collective capitalist" which is the state. In this situation, when the worker opposes his exploiter, he also opposes the state.

Fascist education, despite its efforts to do so, has not been able to convince the state-enslaved proletarian that he is a member of a new socialist society, with the state as protector of his interests. Such a claim is too much in conflict with personal and social experience, which makes it easy to open the worker's eyes to the rôle of the state as his exploiter and suppressor. Thus he has become susceptible to revolutionary propaganda and finds it easy to see himself as part of a social class of exploited and suppressed workers.

The war has, moreover, created conditions under which the totalitarian state has become less and less able to grant the minimum necessities of life to the workers. The exploitation of foreign peoples and workers scarcely pays for the tremendous costs of the bureaucratic system of administration and the terroristic system of "order." The result is the annihilation of the social position of the middle classes and an inability to grant privileges to essential strata of the working class on a scale which would decisively influence their thinking and their social habits. Instead, a general feeling of social insecurity pervades all social strata.

The New World Crisis

At the end of this war, the proletariat will have been tremendously increased by an afflux of ruined middle class people, demobilized soldiers and even of many members of the old upper classes. Then, in that Europe which was once the industrial capital of the world and the seat of financial and labor aristocracies, we may see the proletariat become the overwhelming majority on a continental scale. This will become apparent when the fascist political superstructure breaks down, and the fiction of economic security which the fascist system of social insurance, compulsory labor, and so on, has built up, disappears over-night. Only then will the political consequences of the social changes which are occurring under fascism become fully evident.

As a result of the Second World War, there is reason to expect a resurgence of class struggle under world conditions for which no historical precedent can be found.

The causes of an approaching world crisis of a different order than the present one may be suggested as follows:

1. Elimination of the old conservative traditions among the proletariat and the middle class on the European Continent, and with this a disbelief in the possibility for a return to the *status quo*.

2. Economic ruin of the old middle class and their proletarianization on an international scale.

3. The both relative and absolute preponderance of the industrial proletariat, which will have been greatly internationalized.

4. The peoples of colonial countries will have sharpened their struggle for national independence.

5. Technical knowledge will be more widely spread and the technical intelligentsia in particular will be subjected to a process of proletarianization which will make them more sympathetic to socialist ideas.

6. The counter-revolution will take the form of an attempt to establish imperialist world-trust rule, and thereby still further decompose the elements of bourgeois nationalism.

7. The manœuverability of the old ruling classes, through economic concessions to various social classes, will have shrunk to such a degree that there is little chance for temporary compromise solutions.

8. The old ruling classes have been demoralized and are unable to restore faith in themselves among the masses.

The culminating point of the world crisis which will arise when the war between imperialist rivals becomes a final struggle for rule by a single universal trust has not been reached. It foreshadows a Third and a Fourth World War unless the present war ends with proletarian socialist revolutions. A breakdown of the old social order must be expected in many countries, especially in Europe. American and British military leaders are already taking such a breakdown into consideration and are permeated by the fear that victory over the Nazi foe may arouse revolutionary forces which they will be unable to control. Therefore, special efforts are made to take such eventualities into consideration.

An attempt to restore the *status quo ante* in Europe will be chimerical. For Western Europe in particular there will be no middle course. It will either resume the struggle for a new and better social order, in alliance with the revolutionary movements of colonial peoples, or it will sink into deepest degeneration.

World War II has ended a process which started a long time before the war began. If the Old World economic order survives, Western Europe will no longer be able to feed its peoples. The final aim of modern imperialism—world trust rule – cannot be achieved without the world-wide social changes with which we dealt in this article. The other structural changes which the imperialist struggle for world trust rule causes, its effects on the structure of world economy and the chances for "lasting peace," deserve detailed examination in another article.

PIERRE BELLASI.

Russia's Foreign Policy in War

Reviewing an Important Book

The rôle of Russia in the Second World War has been largely misunderstood. There are the superficial observers who believe that Russia has simply reverted to the policies of the old Czarist Empire. If the conversion of the Communist International into a branch of the Russia Foreign Office did not in the past fifteen years dispel the belief that Russia was continuing international socialist politics, then the formal liquidation of the Comintern should make even the blind see. There are also those self-styled Marxists who interpret Russian foreign policy as flowing from its position as a "degenerated workers' state." While they condemn the individual acts of this policy (Russo-German pact, partition of Poland, invasion of Finland, etc.) on the grounds that they were executed solely in the interests of the Stalinist bureaucracy, they nevertheless cling to the idea that the totality of this policy defends—poorly, to be sure, but defends just the same—the remaining "conquests of October." They fail to see that these remainders (nationalized property) are themselves instruments whereby the bureaucracy rules and exploits the working masses of Russia.

The present policy of Russia is as different from the policy of the workers' state as night is from day. The latter was based on the concept that only the international socialist revolution, or its success in one or more of the major countries, could save the October Revolution from attack or degeneration. As a matter of fact, it was the workers' movements outside of Russia which in the early days prevented the interventionists from realizing their plans against a weak Soviet Russia. In its early treaties with capitalist powers, the young workers' republic always made clear to the world its motives. The bourgeois signatories to the Brest-Litovsk, Polish and Esthonian treaties were never designated by the Soviets as "friends of peace" or of the Soviet Union, and these treaties were regarded not as a substitute for the support of the workers' movement abroad, but rather as a temporary breathing spell until this movement could gather strength, reorganize itself and come to the assistance of the first workers' state. Thus it was with the Brest-Litovsk peace, which an exhausted and weak workers' Russia was compelled to sign with Germany. Lenin openly and publicly called it a "Tilsit peace," "an incredibly oppressive and humiliating peace" forced upon the Soviets by an "imperialistic brigand."

"When we made our revolution," said Lenin in 1921, "we said either the international revolution would come to our assistance, and in that case victory would be assured, or we will carry on our modest revolutionary work with the firm conviction that even our defeat will clear the road for the next revolution. In spite of our clear understanding that victory for us is impossible without an international revolution, and in spite of all obstacles, we did everything in order to consolidate the Soviet system. We acted, not only for the sake of our own interests, but for the interests of the International Revolution."

This was the underlying concept which guided decisions in internal and external affairs. The Russian Revolution can live only if the workers took power in other countries. In the event of a postponement of the world revolution—then Russia is a "beleaguered fortress" holding out until the international proletariat could come to its assistance. Defense of Soviet Russia was a first duty of the international working class, but never at the expense of its class interests, never by tying the proletariat to the political kite of the bourgeoisie.

The defeats of the proletariat in one country after another came in rapid succession. The international revolution was

delayed. Lenin and Trotsky looked to socialist construction as a way of holding out until the revolutionary wave surged again. But after Lenin's death, the official state policy became "socialism in a single country." The continued defeats gave a material base to this theory and permitted its adherents to advocate it more openly. In turn, the theory became the cause for more serious and crushing defeats of the working class in China, England, Germany. The Communist International had become nothing but an instrument of Russian foreign policy. Socialism in one country led to no socialism at all—not even in Russia.

The main tenet of Russian foreign policy thenceforth changed from world revolution to the maintenance of the *status quo*. The internal changes, the result of the degeneration and finally the destruction of the workers' régime, were accompanied by corresponding changes in the aims and methods of foreign policy, which is, after all, a continuation of domestic policy, conducted by and for the new Russian ruling class. Just as in the sphere of domestic politics the bureaucracy rules in its own interests, so in the field of foreign policy it has changed from socialist politics to power politics. It is only as a logical consequence of this change that the individual acts of Russian foreign policy can be understood. Seen in this light, Russian policy is neither "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" (Churchill) nor "simple and clear" (Stalin).

Dallin's book* is the story of Russian foreign policy between 1939—the signing of the Russo-German pact—and 1942, when the Russian and German armies were engaged at Stalingrad. It is told in terms of the diplomatic struggles and maneuvers conducted by the various powers. Dallin's sources are as objective as they can be under the circumstances where most of the material is still hidden in the foreign offices of the warring governments. (One of Soviet Russia's great contributions, under Lenin, had been to end secret diplomacy and publish all treaties, agreements and pacts signed by the governments so that the working class could see how wars are made.) The chief sources are therefore the scattered diplomatic reports and notes of the Foreign Offices as far as they have been published, official documents and collections of documents, speeches and discussions on foreign policy by various political leaders; and the daily press of Russia, America and Western Europe.

In the book Dallin makes a number of observations which reveal that he has not probed very deeply into the basic causes of the war. For example, he believes that the war could have been avoided had Germany been pressed from East and West by strong military states and thus denied the elbowroom for expansion at the expense of smaller and weaker states. "Only a military alliance of Britain, France *and* Russia could successfully have opposed Germany's growing might." Dallin does not see the war as inevitably arising out of the continued existence of capitalism, but believes that it could have been avoided through collective security. Fortunately, however, his political observations comprise a very small part of the book and most of it is devoted to factual material which is exceedingly interesting and valuable. So, disregarding for the time being the inadequate and incorrect analyses, we turn to the history of Russia's diplomacy since 1939.

**Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy*, 1939-1942, by David J. Dallin, Yale University Press, New Haven: 452 pages.

Europe After Munich

Britain's policy of appeasing Hitler aimed at diverting his attention to the East. To involve Germany in a war with Russia in which both would be exhausted and thus leave Britain master of Europe was the essence of British foreign policy which culminated in the Munich agreement. If war with Germany was to come, England wished, through appeasement, to gain the necessary time for military preparations. By the spring of 1939, however, after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, British policy changed. It became clear that German expansion in Europe must be halted. To prevent Hitler from realizing his policy, Britain began to seek a rapprochement with Russia. On March 18, four days after German troops had entered Prague, the press reported that important conversations were taking place between London and Moscow which aimed at "closer collaboration between the two countries."

Following on the heels of the invasion of Prague, Hitler sent off another note to Poland with new demands for changes in the status of Danzig and for an automobile road across the Polish Corridor. These demands were accompanied by a proposal to create a German-Polish military alliance against Russia. Poland, assured of England's backing, rejected the German proposals. Although Hitler believed that Poland could be bluffed into accepting his plan, he came to see that in order to realize it he would have to resort to the use of force. In such an eventuality, it was necessary that Germany be assured at least of Russian neutrality. By the middle of April, Germany was ready to start negotiations with Russia.

In the spring of 1939, therefore, "London and Berlin were the ones who were bargaining against each other at Stalin's counter." Russia cleverly utilized one bidder against the other in an effort to extract the highest price—which Germany eventually offered.

The full account of the Anglo-Russian negotiations has not yet been given. From the available material, however, the following can be concluded. Russia preferred an alliance with Germany to one with England, because, among other reasons, she thought the democracies incapable of stopping Germany. However, in order to assure herself that Hitler was not setting a trap for Russia, she continued negotiations with London and made a proposal for a full-fledged military alliance with England. Concretely such an agreement would mean that both sides were to come to each other's aid in the event of direct or "indirect" aggression. Should Germany attack Poland, Russia would have the right to cross the Polish border. This proposal was later extended to include the Baltic states. Moscow was obviously interested in guarantees that would extend the Russian border westward. Poland would not agree to such conditions and threatened to desert to Hitler. *In less than two months more than thirty different schemes for an Anglo-Russian agreement had been considered and rejected.*

It is obvious from the proposals made by the Russians, and the concessions made by the British, that Russia was playing for time. The agreement with Germany was the preferable course for Stalinist Russia. By early August it was fairly clear that the Russo-German pacts were an accomplished fact. At that time the negotiations with Germany turned from trade matters to military matters; the generals replaced the diplomats in the Moscow conferences. The Anglo-Russian negotiations, however, continued after that as a safeguard for

the Russians, who feared that Hitler might still change his mind about concluding the pacts.

By the end of the month, negotiations between Russia and the Allied powers had all but completely broken down, although as late as August 21, two days after the conclusion of the first agreement with Germany, the Russians continued to demand of the British that in the event of war, Russia be granted the right to occupy Eastern Poland. The Allied military missions agreed to allow the Red Army to take up positions on the frontier until such time as Poland herself should request the entry of the Russian troops.

On August 19, Germany and Russia concluded their first trade agreement; on the 23rd, the military and non-aggression pacts were signed and became effective upon signature without waiting for ratification. So great was the haste created by the mutual distrust of the new partners that they would not wait for the usual procedure in which the Supreme Soviet and the Reichstag would ratify the pact. Certainly neither party expected that the pact would be repudiated by their governments, but Russia feared that Hitler, armed with the pact, might reopen negotiations with the British, while Germany, in turn, was anxious to begin the attack on Poland. Twelve hours after the signing of the military and non-aggression pacts, Germany took over Danzig through a *coup d'état*. The holocaust was soon to begin.

The Three Pacts

In the latter part of August, 1939, Russia and Germany signed three agreements—a commercial agreement, a non-aggression pact and a secret (military) agreement.

The commercial agreement obligated Russia to sell to Germany within two years 180,000,000 marks' worth of commodities and Germany extended credit to Russia in the amount of 200,000,000 marks at five per cent interest and payable over a period of seven years. Some five months later a new commercial treaty was worked out and in 1941 a third trade agreement was concluded by the two countries.

Although non-aggression pacts were by this time not novel to Russian policy, the one signed with Germany contained some very unusual terms. For example, it omitted the usual clause which stipulated that if one of the contracting parties should commit an act of aggression against a third party, the other contracting party would be entitled to renounce the pact. The coming attack on Poland, worked out and agreed to by both parties, made such a clause superfluous.

The secret treaty or treaties are the most interesting and important of all. They contained the terms which the two signatories offered each other Although their exact contents have not yet been published, some of the terms are known. On the basis of the information available and of what actually transpired, Dallin concludes that the secret pacts provided for the following:

Russia was to annex Eastern Poland outright, with the privilege of "socializing" its economy as it saw fit. Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Bessarabia were allotted to the Russian "sphere of influence." These were not to be "socialized"; their economies were to remain intact. Bulgaria and the Dardanelles were designated as a Russian "security zone." German inhabitants of these territories were to be returned to the Fatherland. The Franco-Soviet pact of 1935 was to be annulled. Russia was guaranteed participation in post-war problems. A small Polish state, under German domination, was to be created of Western Poland.

Invasion of Poland

Played up as instruments of peace by the German Nazis and the Stalinists, the Russo-German agreements released the brakes which were holding up the start of the Second World War. On September 2, Germany, assured of having to fight on only one front, invaded Poland. On September 17, the Russian troops marched into Poland from the East. The Russian people were taken completely by surprise when they heard of the mobilization of the Red Army. Few people realized that the mobilization which had taken place between the 7th and the 16th of September was intended for attack, as planned by Hitler-Stalin. Molotov's note to the Polish Ambassador contained the typical diplomatic hypocrisy: Russia was attacking to defend the rights of the Polish people, to protect the life and property of the Ukranian and White Russian minorities, "to extricate the Polish people from the unfortunate war into which they were dragged by their unwise leaders and to enable them to live a peaceful life."

Five days after the Red Army invaded Poland the new line of demarcation was announced. The German Army had apparently gone further East than had been agreed upon and withdrew when the Red Army approached. Russia annexed Eastern Poland outright. In October a mock election took place: over ninety per cent of the population voted for the single ticket run by Moscow.

Soon afterward, Russia carried through the other terms of the secret pacts. Afraid that with the close of the Polish campaign Hitler might try to offer peace to the Western powers, Stalin speeded up the diplomatic offensive against the Baltic countries. Although she did not annex or sovietize these countries, Russia obtained the right to maintain troops in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the last named country, in the city of Vilno, the working class population had hailed the Red Army as liberators from capitalism. But, writes Dallin:

> No sooner had Soviet troops entered the city when there began what is described in Communist terminology as a rapid process of socialization. To Stalin this was indeed a triumph. Then suddenly, for some inexplicable reason, Vilno was transferred to "capitalist Lithuania," which was at the same time assured of sovereignty and of economic and social inviolability. The Lithuanian Communists organized a demonstration in front of the Soviet Legation in Kaunas, carrying placards which read: "We do not want Vilno to become Lithuanian; we want Kaunas to become Soviet."

The Russians coöperated with the Lithuanian police. Arrests were made and in Vilno the GPU rounded up many socialists and revolutionists and shipped them off to the interior of Russia. Why Vilno, the ancient Lithuanian capital seized by Poland in 1920, was turned over by Stalin to Lithuania is not quite clear. It may have been agreed upon with Germany, but the answer still lies hidden in secret archives.

From the point of view of military strategy, Russia's occupation of the Baltic countries could be aimed at only one power – Germany – which dominated the Baltic Sea. Since these were the days of the honeymoon of the Russo-German friendship, Moscow indulged in its by now usual hypocrisy to explain its actions Thus, for example, *The Bolshevik*, No. 18, 1939, wrote: "Basing itself on Esthonian territory, the British fleet attempted in 1919 to attack Kronstadt. In the post-war years the British fleet held maneuvers every summer in the Baltic Sea, and there were even negotiations regarding the sale of the Esthonian island of Oesel to England." Thus, while the Baltic seizures aimed at extending the Russian bor-

der as a precaution against Hitler, Stalin carried them out under the blessing of the Russo-German pact, and dressed them up before the masses as a preventative measure against England. For reasons of his own, Hitler played along in this game.

At the Height of German-Russian Collaboration

The Polish and Baltic successes marked the high point in Russian-German relations. The conquest of Poland in less than twenty days made Germany appear invincible. The bloodless expansion of Russian territory seemed to justify Stalin's policy. It was at this time that von Ribbentrop paid his second visit to Moscow to negotiate new trade agreements and to fix the new Russo-German frontier. The reception accorded him is symbolic of the depths to which Russian diplomacy had fallen under the reign of Stalin. Dallin describes the triumphal procession which greeted the fascist Foreign Minister. When von Ribbentrop landed at the Sokolniki airdrome the Russian band struck up the *Internationale.* Next came the *Horst-Wessel* song, the Nazis' gory anti-communist anthem, which was played without a single flaw! Von Ribbentrop presented Madame Molotov with a Mercedes automobile and she thanked him in her little speech, *saying that she liked it better than the gifts presented by the French.* This was followed by sumptuous feasting, during which von Ribbentrop recited Georgian poetry which he had memorized to please Stalin. When von Ribbentrop left, the Russian guard of honor which saw him off raised their right hands in the Hitler salute!

The War with Finland

On October 5, the day Latvia signed her mutual agreement pact with Russia, Molotov called the Finnish envoy and suggested that the Finnish Foreign Minister visit Moscow to "discuss a number of concrete questions." From that date until the outbreak of military hostilities, negotiations between the two countries revolved around a number of territorial changes demanded by Russia, specifically the Karelian isthmus and the Hanko and Rybachi peninsulas. Finland's capitulation on one point after another proved unsatisfactory to the Russians, who realized that Russia would sooner or later be drawn into the world conflict. Territorial expansion had now become the strategy in Russia's maneuvering for position.

Like the Baltic seizures, the war against Finland was ostensibly aimed at the Allied powers. Again, from the point of view of military strategy, Germany stood to lose more by Russia's successful conquest of Finland than did the Allies. But the peculiar relationship of forces at the moment made the continuation of the Russo-German friendship desirable to both partners. Russia needed to maintain the pact in order to gain the necessary "breathing spell" in order to prepare for war. Under the ægis of the pact she was able to carry through her policy of territorial expansion aimed at Germany. This constituted what many called the *paradox* in Russia's foreign policy. For Germany, the pact's continuance was necessary in order to obtain supplies and raw materials and maintain her prestige, her seeming invincibility and to increase her pressure against England. To do this, Russia had to be appeased. Germany paid for Russia's support by consenting to the expansionist policy. Russia paid her price to Germany in the form of increased economic aid and *political* support. During this period the Communist Parties throughout the world concentrated their attack on the Allied imperialists and warmongers while the stability and sensibility of the German-Russian bloc was played up. Russia's war on Finland was dressed up as a defense against "the outpost of Allied capitalism," and not a few non-Stalinists fell for this line.

In expectation that a Finnish capitulation would follow in quick order, Moscow resurrected the Finnish Stalinist, Kuusinen, and set him up as the head of a farcical "people's government." After a series of initial defeats, the military superiority of a large power made itself felt, but in spite of the fact that complete victory was easily within the reach of the Russians, Moscow's attitude suddenly changed and at the end of January peace feelers were sent out.

Why did the Russians suddenly reverse their policy and decide to end the war? It certainly was not, as the Stalinists later tried to explain, that having achieved what they had originally demanded from Finland, the Russians were satisfied and desired peace. The answer lies in far less idealistic reasons. The first, but not decisive, reason was that Russia feared becoming involved in a war with the Allies, who were using Finland's predicament as a pretext to press the Scandinavian countries into permitting them to open a Northern front against Germany. Russia was also eager to start her long-planned Balkan drive. But even more important was Germany's rôle in this whole affair. While Germany was willing to allow Russia to strengthen herself in the Baltic, knowing full well that it was at her own expense—this was the price she was willing to pay for Russian neutrality and economic help—Germany did not want the Allies to open a Northern front. She would brook no interference with what was to her the main war.

At first Germany denied having started the Russo-Finnish peace negotiations, but after the treaty was signed, a well-informed German controlled newspaper commented: "Now one can reveal that Germany was in the center of all the moves which led up to the peace negotiations and to the signing of peace. During the preparatory campaign for peace, Berlin was in regular contact with Moscow."

On March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was signed, the terms of which differed little from the terms Moscow had offered Helsinki during October and November. Finland ceded to Russia the entire Karelian peninsula, parts of Rybachi and Sredni peninsulas and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland. Finland was to lease to Russia the Hanko Peninsula for a period of thirty years. In return, Russia agreed to withdraw its military forces from the Petsamo area. The peace, however, was short-lived.

The Fall of France and the Balkans

The fall of France alarmed Moscow to the point of panic. The Russo-German pact had been signed by the Russians in the hope that a long-drawn-out war between Germany and the Western powers would either exhaust both sides or, if war became unavoidable for Russia, it would at least give her sufficient time to prepare. The successes of the German blitzkrieg upset these calculations, and Russia seemed to be Hitler's next target. Between June 15 and 30, 1940, Russia therefore speeded up her westward drive. Should the war come to a speedy end, Russia wished to present the peace conference with accomplished facts. She occupied and incorporated (and nationalized) the Baltic states, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and concentrated large forces on the German frontier. Next came the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Buko-

vina, demands on Finland that the Aland Islands be demilitarized, the establishment, for the first time since the revolution, of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, mobilization of Russian economy for war, the increased work day and new, severe discipline for the workers in industry, and finally the acceleration of the reorganization of the Red Army, which had begun at the close of the Finnish war.

It is quite true that after the fall of France, Hitler faced the dilemma: which way next, East against Russia or the continuation of the war against the West, namely, England. A number of very practical military reasons underlay the decision against an immediate attack in the East, but while Hitler concentrated his military forces against England, he began a feverish campaign in the Balkans to lay the diplomatic groundwork for the anti-Russian alliance with was to aid in the future attack on Russia. Under the cloak of friendship, Germany had decided against any further expansion by Russia in Eastern Europe. Acquiescence in the case of Bessarabia was to be the last concession. Hitler's Axis partner, Italy, which viewed Russia's Balkan policy as a special threat to herself, found the new German policy particularly agreeable. Moscow recognized the significance of this change, and while keeping up the fiction of continued friendship with the Reich, pursued her own diplomatic campaign in the Balkans.

During the diplomatic tug-of-war, both sides found it to their advantage to keep up the myth of great friendship for each other. For example, Molotov declared in August, 1940, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet: *"We can only emphasize again and again that friendly relations (between the two countries) are based, not upon accidental considerations of a conjectural nature, but upon basic principles of state interests...."* Two months later, the official *Völkischer Beobachter* wrote: "Since the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact, nothing has occurred that could disturb the newly regulated relations of both states. That pact has proved so fruitful that the impetus which led to its conclusion is now stronger than ever..'

Behind this façade of declared love and everlasting friendship, the struggle continued. In November, Molotov accepted von Ribbentrop's invitation to visit Berlin for the purpose of settling a number of urgent questions. (*During this visit the Russian Foreign Minister brought greetings from the Russian Communist Party to the German Nazi organization.*) Although the true facts surrounding the conferences in Berlin have been revealed only gradually and piecemeal, it is known that Hitler proposed that Russia become a full-fledged partner in the Triple Alliance, a proposal which Molotov turned down. Germany was motivated by a desire to unify the Axis camp by (1) strengthening the rapprochement between Russia and Japan, (2) subordinating Russian economy to an even greater extent to German war needs, and (3) impressing England with Germany's military invincibility. Much as the Russians wished to maintain Russo-German collaboration, they found this step too costly and refused to join what they correctly considered a military bloc completely subservient to Germany's war needs. Thus the attempt to cement the widening cracks in Russo-German relations ended in failure.

In the diplomatic struggle which ensued, Germany succeeded in winning to the Triple Alliance one after another of Russia's small neighbors: Hungary, Bulgaria (bribed with the cession of Southern Dobrudja, an act forced on Rumania by Germany) and Finland. Yugoslavia, which attempted to resist German encroachments, was overrun in eleven days and its government sent into exile. Here an interesting development occurred. *As late as May, 1941, Russia, trying to appease Hitler, withdrew recognition from the Yugoslav government in exile, in violation of the treaty she had signed with that country.* Only in August, after the break with Germany, did Russia announce that the Russo-Yugoslav pact of April 5 remained in force.

The End of the Hitler-Stalin Pact

By the end of April, 1941, war between Russia and Germany seemed inevitable. Every attempt to patch up the differences between the two countries ended in failure—Germany demanded what Russia could not give, namely, complete subordination to the war needs of the Reich through German control over Ukrainian heavy industry, demobilization of the Red Army, and, thirdly, agreement by Russia to work on military orders to Germany and to increase the export of Russian raw materials to Germany?

Why did Hitler suddenly change his strategy? In the first place, the war with England had lasted much longer than he had calculated, and the British, by expanding their industry and with increased aid from the United States, were rapidly overcoming the superiority which Germany had initially enjoyed. Hitler understood that as the United States threw more and more of her weight into the war, he would need a strong naval power to counterbalance it, namely, the active intervention of Japan. Relations between Tokyo and Moscow were such that the former wished to be assured of complete Russian neutrality before becoming involved in the conflict. Russia's resistance to joining the Triple Alliance, however, was anything but reassuring to Japan. As Dallin puts it:

> To fight England, Germany needed Japan's active aid. Japan, in turn, needed the certainty of Soviet neutrality; to assure this neutrality, Germany found herself at war with Russia.

It is not true, as the Stalinist bureaucrats claim, that the German attack took Russia completely by surprise. In the first instance, Russo-German collaboration had been on the downgrade for some time and the aims of each of the partners were becoming more and more divergent. Secondly, Germany had given numerous hints that she was willing to make peace with England in order to turn to the East. In this way, Hitler was ready to betray his Japanese ally, but honor counts for little where more imperialist interests are involved. It was not love of the Russian people that prompted England to reject Hitler's proposals, but rather that his terms, mastery of Europe, were unacceptable to John Bull. Hess' mission to England, while it did not have official German sanction, at least had Hitler's sympathy.

In May, von Papen approached the Turkish Foreign Minister, Saracoglu, with a request that he act as intermediary between England and Germany. These, and numerous other German proposals, were forwarded to Moscow by London through Ivan Maisky. From Berlin, Russian diplomats and correspondents informed Moscow of the exact date of the coming German attack. As a matter of fact, by the end of May and in early June, the Red Army had begun large-scale maneuvers in the entire Western zone, and was later concentrated along the Russo-German border All leaves were cancelled, the Baltic fleet was mobilized, all roads leading to Rumania were mined, bridges on the Lithuanian border were destroyed and entire villages evacuated.

Russia in the Camp of the Allies

Hitler's attack in June, 1941, catapulted Stalin into the camp of the Allies. It is not, as Dallin states, the realization of the "most realistic policy of all," but rather a continuation of Russian foreign policy in the Stalinist era. This policy is not altered by a change in alliances. Only superficially is there a difference. Instead of "Anglo-American imperialism" there is now "Nazi barbarism." But the motivation of Russian policy remains the same.

Inside the Allied camp, Russia again plays the rôle of a subordinate partner seeking to enhance her independence and position with relation to her allies. In spite of Stalin's statement during the early months of the war to Russia does not aim to destroy the German state and that she will content herself with driving the invaders from her soil, the appetites and ambitions of Moscow have scarcely been concealed. With every favorable turn in Russia's military situation, Moscow's demands for territorial annexations grow. Moreover, Stalin's declarations with respect to Germany are contradicted by the Kremlin propagandists, who promise that the proper *revenge* will be taken on the Reich. Under cover of complete understanding and friendship with England and the United States, Russia continues to jockey for position, playing off the differences and disagreements between the two major partners within the United Nations. Moscow wants at least part of Finland, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, parts of Rumania, part of Manchuria, access to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Both England and America are already considering the "justice" of some of Russia's territorial claims!

Each member of the Allied coalition, therefore, is trying desperately, while coöperating in the main war against the Axis, to improve its own position at the expense of the others. For the question of who shall control Europe is an acute matter to all the powers. In the long run, each one knows that it is economic and military force alone that will decide. In the meantime, diplomacy is the means by which each partner tries to maneuver into the most advantageous spot. Russian diplomacy can be understood only in this light. Its whole foreign policy must be evaluated against the background of what the Russian state is, who rules within and who conducts its foreign affairs.

REVA CRAINE.

What Are the Prospects for Socialism?

Experiences of the First World War

> "If the war got beyond the control of the Second International, its immediate consequences will be beyond the control of the bourgeoisie of the entire world. We revolutionary socialists did not want the war. *But we do not fear it.*"

Leon Trotsky wrote these words in the early part of the First World War, in the midst of a general popular approval and enthusiasm for the war such as no country today experienced from the very beginning of the conflict. More, far more than today, he could look about him and all was social peace; nobody was revolting, preparing to revolt, or even thinking of revolution, with the exception of a small band of intransigeants scattered over Europe: a very stubborn Russian named Lenin, barely known outside the Russian cities; an "uncontrollable" named Liebknecht in Germany; a few others.

Was it sheer optimism or blind fanaticism which made these isolated individuals "ignore the realities" of the actual present, and speak as though in a couple of years millions of small men would shake their heads, straighten their backs, and send dynasties, governments, all-powerful statesmen and monarchs rolling in the gutters? Who were these people who went around predicting unprecedented revolutions in the midst of an unprecedented abandonment of the class struggle by the working class?

It was the Marxists alone who looked behind the current scene into the social forces that were even then at work on changing it. The philosophers would put it this way: from an examination of "what is," they went to an analysis of "what is becoming." An old steel girder, full of flaws and internally groaning with stresses, appears as strong as ever to the naked eye; but when it cracks all at once, the effects are more devastating than the obvious rotting of a wood shingle.

Today it is possible to read historians' post-mortem analyses of why the First World War exploded in the First World Revolution of 1917-21. The best historians understand the past. Revolutionary Marxists are different: they seek to be historians in the present tense. Today we ask: What are the social forces which are at work making for revolution out of *this* war?

We have a competitor in this field: the class-conscious capitalists and their political agents in the governments of the world. And it is a confirmation to know that these are the people most thoroughly convinced of the inevitability of revolution as the consequence of the war. The degree of their conviction is measured by their fear.

This explains one difference between the road to World War I and the road to World War II. Before 1914, the statesmen—Sazanov, Lord Grey, Poincaré, Delcassé—laid a deliberate course toward war for imperial ambitions with a set of calculations which well-nigh excluded the revolutionary intervention of the proletariat as a factor to be considered.

But before 1939 there is no doubt that the most important considerations in the minds of the war leaders was the revolutionary threat of the working class. The peace protestations of Chamberlain had that much truth to them. The "Munichmen's" slogan was: "Reek the consequences of war! Beware the threatened collapse of (capitalist) civilization!" This was the express burden of Roosevelt's public notes to Mussolini in the Munich crisis, with the addition that Roosevelt spoke more plainly of the threat of global war to "our economic system." If Hitler was inexorably *driven* into war policy by the necessity of cementing his home front—satisfying his capitalist masters with the expectation of imperial gains and doping the workers with nationalism—it was still with the margi-

nal hope that his forays into Europe could be limited, each at its time, short of a general war. For over twenty years, press interviews and memoir writers have freely disclosed of the world's statesmen that, like a conditioned reflex, a new world war was associated in their thoughts with memoirs of the Czar, the Kaiser and the Hapsburgs.

From where we small people are, the capitalist governments seem fixedly stable and solid; but up there, with a bird's-eye view, they see the widening cracks heralding the trembling of the earth. Down here we need a compass and a map: a Marxist analysis of social forces and the experiences of modern history.

For we too remember the last period of war and revolution. We remember that two months before the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, Lenin was speaking with unaccustomed pessimism of the prospect of seeing the socialist revolution in his lifetime. And that on November 2, 1918—*one week* before the Kaiser abdicated in the face of mutinous sailors and soldiers with red arm-bands—the German Spartacists met in conference with the leaders of the revolutionary shop stewards of Berlin around Richard Müller and Georg Ledebour . . . and decided that the time was not yet ripe for the launching of the revolution which they planned. (The famous Kiel mutiny took place before they got in two nights' sleep.)

So it was that only a small band of revolutionary "optimists" could see farther than their noses. From 1917 on, revolutions broke out all over Europe. Successful in Russia, on the brink of power in Germany and Italy, barely restrained in Austria, successful again in Hungary and Finland, sweeping through a series of Baltic and Balkan states. For four years running, the overwhelming majority of the workers and peasants of war-ravaged Europe had as their popular cry: Socialism! The dictatorship of the proletariat! Soviet power!

And that was after only four years of a war which had been preceded by what? Decades of social peace and calm, practically unmarked by any upheavals—so lulling to a whole generation of workers that "the revolution" was nearly forgotten. It became a sentimental phrase; a monstrous step into the unknown, even for those who called themselves socialists.

This war broke over the heads of a world proletariat that has been brought up in a quite different world. It broke out after twenty years of periodic and constant revolutionary uprisings and upsurges..

We have referred to the First World Revolution of 1917-21. In 1923 came another revolutionary upsurge in Germany. In 1925-26, the revolution in China. In 1926, the British general strike. In 1927, a revolutionary uprising in Austria. In 1929 came the most catastrophic collapse of capitalist economy that had yet occurred, as a result of which the "social prestige" of capitalism went down to a new low and remained there until the outbreak of the war. In February of 1934 an unprecedented day dawned: it witnessed three nation-wide general strikes going on simultaneously in three different countries of Europe! In France, the wave of sit-down strikes, to be repeated in 1936. In Austria, the civil war and barricade-fighting against Dollfuss' fascists. Then came the Spanish civil war and revolution. This is far from a complete roll-call.

Packed into these twenty years has been more revolutionary activity of the masses than in the whole history of the world since the fall of the Roman Empire.

This is what led up to this war which all the imperialists feared, under conditions of the most deep-going and chronic breakdown of capitalism's economic machinery. *These are the times we live in.*

"Twenty years of revolution—twenty years of *defeats.*" There actually are people who think that this is a more fitting summary of the present era, and cause enough to eliminate the revolution from consideration for the future. What deep thinking!

The history of every social revolution is a history of defeats . . . followed by only one victory.

So it was with the social revolution of the bourgeoisie against feudalism in Europe—beginning with the sporadic revolts of the towns against the lords in the late Middle Ages, and even after the French Revolution, the defeats of 1830, 1848, 1905, etc. Even in its revolutionary days, the bourgeoisie was not notable in the qualities of self-sacrificing daring, recklessness of consequences and fighting vigor. Yet feudalism was finally overthrown in all advanced countries, after two centuries of bourgeois struggle, and the complete power of capitalism was established. The working class is not less bold and persistent in its fighting qualities, but a million times more so. It has passed through more defeats because it has engaged battle a hundred times more often.

Is it not clear that only a class with immense recuperative powers could have gone to the assault as often as the revolutionary working class has done? One section is defeated and sinks back; another advances to the fight, and kindles the others. An individual may be exhausted by setbacks; the many-headed masses have shown themselves to be *collectively* inexhaustible. The most serious defeat of the working class was that of 1917-21; yet it only served to open up the most revolutionary decades in history. It is especially true of the proletarian revolution that it is a course of many defeats and one victory. The basic strength of the capitalist class lay in its economic power, its ownership of property; they were able to advance to full power by stages in many countries. But with the proletarian revolution, different from the bourgeoisie, it is all or nothing—including the whole world or nothing, as has been demonstrated by the defeat of the Russian Revolution at the hands of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

It is no accident that, since the days of the Paris Commune of 1871, the greatest uprisings of the laboring masses have followed the wars of the bourgeoisie.

The hammer is wrenched out of the worker's hand and a gun put into his hand instead. And the worker, who has been tied down by the machinery of the capitalist system, is suddenly torn from his usual setting and taught to place the aims of society above happiness at home and even life itself. With the weapon in his hand that he himself has forged, the worker is put in a position where the political destiny of the state is directly dependent upon him. Those who exploited and scorned him in normal times flatter him now and toady to him. At the same time he comes into intimate contact with the cannon, which Lassalle calls one of the most important ingredients of all constitutions.

Follow further along Trotsky's thought. A war is the boiled-down essence of the proposition that Might is Right —that is, that physical force is the basis of law. This proposition has a second barrel: Right is *not* Might, unless backed up by *power*. This is how the school of war refutes the nonsense of bourgeois moralism. This is how the working class gets its indispensable education in the meaning and necessity of *class* power.

The school of war teaches that bourgeois legalism is not derived from heavy books, but from the struggle of opposing *powers*. "The great guns are hammering into their heads the idea that if it is impossible to get around an obstacle, it is possible to destroy it." Dignified statesmen revile each other and expose each others' motives, lies, chicanery and methods of ruling. People learn to think casually—naturally—of the fall of governments as the result of armed force. The worker at his bench, who up to now thought of his labor only as a means of supporting himself and his family, is insistently instructed that this is not so—that *all* society is dependent on his labor and on labor in general, and no evidence appears that it is at all dependent on the profiteering coupon-clippers who own his instruments of labor. It is dinned into him that he must sacrifice for his convictions. A hundred times more than in peacetime, his attention is forcibly arrested and held by *politics, economics, international affairs*—an interest notably lacking heretofore especially among American workers. The government, especially the national government, becomes less far-away, inviolable and beyond-the-horizon-of-daily-life. It becomes a very concrete institution which intrudes itself upon his affairs, rights, livelihood and life more and more.

Change, change and change—that is the main lesson of the school of war. This world is not fixed and stable; boundaries, laws, lifetime habits, opinions, rights, governments, methods —everything tends to approach the fluid state of a newspaper headline. The tempo of thought and action becomes immeasurably accelerated. No class and no people can pass through the school of total war without a profound change in mental attitudes and psychologies—that is, a profound shake-up of human nature. This is what happened from 1914 to 1923. It is happening now.

An analysis of the revolutionizing forces abroad in the world today does not start from scratch. It can and must start with an understanding of, and contrast with, what happened in World War I. The revolutionary wave that swept over Europe then was not fomented by the revolutionary socialists. It began to swell out of four deep-set causes, and only in its final breaking did the red crest of socialism appear. *These four forces were sufficient then to awaken the whirlwind of the revolution.* Where are they now? Only to list them—we can do no more without a more detailed history of the anti-war movement during that war—is to give the answer.

PAUL TEMPLE.

[Continued in next issue]

The West Indies in Review

Recent Developments in the Caribbean Colonies

The discovery of the West Indies by Christopher Columbus at the end of the fifteenth century speeded the development of the world market and aided in the creation of capitalist society. From that day to this, the islands have been an epitome of capitalist development. The expropriation of the laborers, the rise of commercial capitalism, the transformation to industrial capitalism, the law of uneven development, monopoly capitalism and imperialism; the accumulation of vast capital and vast misery; the necessity for socialism; the growing discipline, unity and organization of the masses; the proletariat leading the peasantry and preparing unconsciously for the seizure of power; all this supposed to be a teleology imposed upon historic chaos by Marxian schematism, all this unrolls before us in unbroken sequence in this packed, incisive study by Prof. Eric Williams of Howard University.* It is as if in these islands history had concentrated in tabloid form the story of four hundred years of capitalist civilization.

The evidence is all the more valuable because Williams is no Marxist. But approaching the facts from the point of view of the Negro, i.e., from the point of view of labor, his mastery of his material forces upon him an inevitable pattern, economic necessity, class struggle, etc. He is sure of the past, clear as to the present, but the future demands more than Williams has. It needs a conscious theory. He is a sincere nationalist and a sincere democrat, but after so sure a grasp of historical development as he shows in this history of four centuries, he displays an extreme naïveté in his forecasts of the future. He seems to think that the economic forces which have worked in a certain way for four hundred years will somehow cease to work in that way because of the Atlantic Charter and the warblings of Willkie and Wallace. What makes the sudden slide downward so striking is that the whole book is a refutation of just such expectations.

"Capitalism" in Early Agriculture

Williams' method is strictly historical and we shall follow him.

For three centuries the sugar economy and the slave trade dominated the West Indies and the world market. Together they formed one of the twin foundations of the glory and the greatness of Britain. A few years ago Churchill stated: "Our possession of the West Indies, like that of India, ... gave us the strength, the support, but especially the capital, the wealth, at a time when no other European nation possessed such a reserve, which enabled us to come through the great struggles of the Napoleonic Wars, the keen commerce in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and enabled us not only to acquire this appendage of possessions which we have, but also to lay the foundations of that commercial and financial leadership which, when the world was young, when everything outside Europe was undeveloped, enabled us to make our great position in the world" (page 14). Churchill's words are literally true, and for a considerable period of time those islands were of far greater importance to Britain than the thirteen colonies which later became the United States of America.

Such is the unevenness of capitalist development. The reason is not generally recognized. It was not because so many

**The Negro in the Caribbean*, by Eric Williams: Associates in Negro Folk Education, Box 686, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D. C. Fifty cents. Bronze Booklet No. 8. Introduction by Alain Locke.

people consumed sugar and rum. It was the other way about. Sugar production demanded from the start the application of machinery to raw material on the spot and this soon expanded on a scale far surpassing the application of machinery not only to agricultural but to many contemporary manufacturing processes as well.

The great commerce built up on the slave trade and slavery had its foundation in a very highly advanced and essentially capitalistic mode of production, although this was in the colonies. The Indians were expropriated and the importation of Negroes followed; they were slaves, but slaves in the large-scale production of the cane fields and slaves in the machine production of the factories. Marxism would profit by a study of this highly important phase of capitalist development which Marx did not treat in *Capital.*

Williams does not quite grasp the full economic significance of this phenomenon. Disdaining a clutter of qualifications, he boldly bases his whole thesis on the indisputable fact that: "The black man, emancipated from above by legislation or from below by revolution, remains today the slave of sugar." But he misses the point when he says: "To free the Negro it was necessary not so much to alter the method of production in the sugar industry itself." To alter the method of production! But you could not alter the method of production in 1833, because it was already capitalistic in essence, large-scale production by machinery and production for the world market. Nor could it ever be altered except in one direction: socialism. The French peasant in 1789 could get the land and improve on feudal agriculture. The Russian peasant could get the land and be more or less collectivized. When the West Indian slave was emancipated he found himself free in a highly capitalized agricultural industry. What was to be done with him? On that rock humanitarianism has broken its head for a century, and Williams breaks his also. There has been no other industrialization of any scope to offset, even for a time, this domination by sugar. The sugar problem must be solved in terms of sugar.

Monopoly Capitalism at Work

From their heritage of slavery the islands have never recovered. The capitalistic production not only created a large mass of landless laborers. It had made the islands subservient to the one-crop system. It was cheaper for the slave-owner to import food for the slaves, as it is cheaper for the capitalist to import food for the wage-laborers. Thus the slaves starved during the Seven Years War (1756-63) owing to the depredations of the French privateers, just as the workers suffer today owing to the depredations of the German submarines. At the mercy of the capitalist oligarchy, the Negro laborer works sometimes for as little as twenty-five cents a day, three days a week. As in all economies dominated by a single crop, that crop sets the standard of living and the working conditions for all the others.

With the development of imperialism, the West Indian laborers were at the receiving end of this most cruel of all exploitations. In a few years, American finance-capital accomplished in Puerto Rico a devastation which had taken centuries in the other islands. Ten millions of American money are invested in Haiti, forty-one millions in the Dominican Republic (three-fourths of this in agriculture), six hundred and sixty-six millions in Cuban enterprises. Some of these islands are self-governing, such as Cuba; others are plain colonies, such as Puerto Rico, Martinique and Trinidad. In some, e.g., Jamaica, new agricultural industries, such as the banana industry, have developed Haiti produces coffee. But over all the islands, taken as a whole, hangs the pall of the sugar industry, now in advanced stages of that world-wide disease—monopoly capitalism.

Helpless before the absentee owners and soulless corporations of London and Wall Street, without democratic rights until in very recent years he fought for and won a few, the laborer combines in his fate the worst features of capitalist production in its early unregulated days, of capitalist production in its latest stages unmitigated by progressive legislation, with the special vices of industry in agriculture. Williams' chapter entitled "The Condition of the Negro Wage Earner" is a masterpiece of compression, a compendium of workers' misery and capitalist callousness marshalled with apparent dispassion but with a suppressed indignation visible between every word. Quotation or abstract is unnecessary. The chapter should be read. Sufficient to say that some fifteen years after America had taken over the tiny Virgin Islands, 951 of the burials in one year were pauper burials.

The Nature of Imperialist Rivalry

The future of these islands has been complicated by the entry of America as a contender for the islands now owned by Britain and France. The American proletariat thus has a direct interest in their fate. Today, as Lenin pointed out, imperialism has passed beyond the stage of grabbing territory only for purposes of direct economic exploitation. It grabs for strategic reasons and sometimes for the mere purpose of keeping out other imperialisms. The islands are Britain's last outpost in the New World, invaluable as air bases (both military and commercial) and as ports of call for ships. America wants them for precisely the same reason and a tenacious under-cover struggle is going on for control of these economically bankrupt islands. The Negro wage earner is for the time being the focus of imperialist attention. This is why.

In 1937 and 1938 a series of riots broke out in Trinidad, followed by similar revolts in Barbados, Jamaica and other islands. They were suppressed with great difficulty and the British government sent out two commissions, the Trinidad Commission of 1937, and the West Indies Royal Commission of 1938-39 under Lord Moyne. The Moyne Commission wrote a report which was suppressed by the British government. Suppression was superfluous. To take one example: In 1897 the Norman Commission (also Royal) had written: "the existence of a class of small proprietors among the population is a source of both economic and political strength." Mayor Wood (now Lord Halifax) had written what amounted to the same in 1922. Lord Olivier had written the same for the Sugar Commission of 1929. Williams does not quote but obviously anticipates the recommendations of the 1938-39 commission, which have been published. Here is an extract: "The improvement of existing land settlements and the establishment of new settlements." (Recommendations, Cmd. 6174, His Majesty's Stationery Office. Page 23.) For forty years British commissioners have recommended the break-up of some of the large estates and the settlement of a substantial peasantry. Nothing has been done for the simple reason that the economic and political power is in the hands of the white merchants and the plantation owners. They are supported by the mulatto middle class, which fills the government offices and the professions.

The commissions report, some speeches are made, and then everything goes back to where it was, to become progressively worse. However, in 1937 and 1938, the revolts had been powerful, the people were determined, labor organized itself and, to complete the awakening, American imperialism demanded and received military bases in Trinidad, Jamaica and other islands.

The entry of American imperialism accelerated the political development. The Americans saw that defense of islands composed of a population sullenly hostile to the existing government was dangerous from a strictly military point of view. It needed the islands to complete its mastery of North American water and especially in their relation to the Panama Canal The ruling classes were strongly pro-British and the mulatto middle classes more so, particularly because of their fear of American race prejudice. The Negro masses might be weaned over from Britain. Whereupon, with the report of the Royal Commission still hidden in a closet of the British government, Roosevelt appointed yet another commission, this time an Anglo-American commission on which the English personnel once more set out to tour the long-suffering West Indian Islands. In Trinidad, one of the American members of the commission stated that the commission had come to repair the economic and social grievances of the West Indian people. The speaker was Rex Tugwell, who is now busy repairing the social and economic ills of West Indians as Governor of Puerto Rico. It seems agreed on all sides that one of the first conditions of repairing Puerto Rican ills is that Rex Tugwell should leave, and should have no American successor. Meanwhile the BBC bombards the islands nightly with propaganda and OWI does the same for Washington in propaganda which subtly aims at making the masses feel that they will at last get some redress of their wrongs from America. With such a base established, America can then give Britain the works. Thus the "United" Nations.

Imperialist Bankruptcy

In reality, imperialism, of whatever stamp, short of abolishing itself, can do nothing except grudgingly subsidize these islands. On a few pages Williams tackles the fundamental problem of the Caribbean, the Negro wage earner's future. Is his future peasant proprietorship? Williams gives arguments to show that as far as the production of the sugar cane is concerned, peasant proprietorship has not been proved to be economically less productive than large-scale ownership. In his admirable articles on Puerto Rico in *Labor Action* recently, V. Segundo has tackled the same problem.

The writer of the present article has for many years carefully studied contradictory arguments by learned economists and tendentious politicians on this question, and can here merely state his own considered opinion. The break-up of the large estates would be economically a reactionary step, i.e., in its historical sense. But the political class relations, the needs of the masses, require another yardstick. If the masses want land, then they should have the right to decide and break up the estates. The economically progressive growth of large-scale production has been characteristic of sugar production in the West Indies from its very inception. What is needed is expropriation of the sugar proprietors and absentee landlords and capitalists and collective production by the laborers themselves—in other words, the socialist revolution. It will be the task of the Marxists to patiently explain, if it is at all necessary, the economic superiority of large-scale collective production.

Williams agrees that whatever reorganization takes place internally, the fate of West Indian sugar depends upon the world market. But without the socialist revolution in Europe and America the world market will still be the world market of old, dominated by American imperialism. Against that monstrous octopus, the West Indian laborer will be as he has always been, the miserable victim of a power which will continue to grind the life out of him as mercilessly as the mills grind the juice from the cane. That, as Williams so conclusively shows, has been his fate for four hundred years. What reason is there to think that without a revolution there will be any change? Williams' whole book refutes the possibility of any such peaceful change. If America takes over, the laborer will change masters. That's all. Puerto Rico is the proof.

The Proletariat Takes Charge

Is the idea of socialist revolution for these islands remote? No more than elsewhere; in fact, it is nearer there than for many other places. The recent history of these islands shows this. In 1938 Ormsby Gore reviewed the colonial empire in the House of Commons on the single day allotted per year to this task by that "democratic" body. He stated that $110,000 had been spent on land settlement in Jamaica. One week-end some months after, the Colonial Office received a cabled message from the Governor of Jamaica, Sir Edward Denham. It was an urgent message, for the British officials broke up their indispensable week-end. They cabled back to Sir Edward that he was to announce immediately to the Jamaica people that the sum of two and a half *million* dollars would be appropriated for land settlement. The excitement was too much for Sir Edward and he died that very week-end. The report is that his stomach tied up into a knot. Well it might. The stomach of a West Indian Governor is usually much more pleasantly employed than trying to digest a mass revolt of the Jamaica people.

The series of revolts in both Jamaica and Trinidad began with organized labor, the dock workers in Jamaica and the oil workers in Trinidad. Thence they spread to the population. In Trinidad the strike was general and lasted fourteen days. Though the people are not yet thinking in terms of socialism, they are travelling fast. Labor has organized trade unions and formed a trade union federation in certain islands. In Trinidad and Jamaica, national parties have been formed which are pledged to national independence. The Jamaica stevedore union, which led the revolt there, was stimulated and materially aided by the sailors of the American Maritime Union. When British troops landed in Trinidad in 1937 some of them told the people: "Go ahead. We don't want to shoot you." The people now have a passionate interest in foreign affairs and in the history and development of the trade union and labor movement *abroad.*

The stay-in strike in Trinidad in 1937 was directly inspired by the sit-down strikes in America which ushered in the CIO. The British, blind as only the doomed are blind, fought to retain all possible political power. But in the fall of 1942 the British Under Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Washington. At this gentleman's press conference, Roosevelt, who sat with him, declared himself to be in favor not only of compulsory education but of universal suffrage

for the West Indies. Caught between the revolting masses and the rival imperialism, the British in February, 1943, "granted" universal suffrage to one island, Jamaica. On the ground that the laborers were not yet fit for this, they had opposed the measure for twenty-five years. And now Roosevelt would get the credit. Roosevelt, on the other hand, in typical British fashion, carefully explains to Puerto Ricans that they are not yet fit for their demands. Even in Jamaica the concession, extorted at the point of the bayonet, so to speak, has only whetted the political appetite.

In Puerto Rico, in Jamaica, in Trinidad, in Barbadoes, behind all the complicated forms and stages of constitutions, the imperialist Governor governs in the interests of imperialism and its local representations. The West Indian masses today know this and are determined to put an end to it. They need all the help they can get. And none so deserve help. During the last six years they have travelled further politically and organizationally than they did in the whole century since emancipation. This they have done practically unaided, being swept into the current of the modern proletarian movement by their suffering at the hands of capitalism at home and the chaos of capitalism abroad. They still have their chief experiences before them. But this much is certain: that as soon as the proletariat of America, in particular, gives them the signal, they will seize power and put an end to the economic system which has choked them for so long. With increasing political power and labor organization, they have great battles ahead of them. They may even find it necessary to create peasant proprietors, and would be most eminently justified in demanding large subsidies for the purpose from the people who have leeched away their lifeblood for so many generations.

It is precisely by vigorous struggle for immediate needs that they have progressed so far, and the same course followed, in coördination with labor abroad, will ultimately bring them inevitably to the struggle for socialist power. Capitalism will see to that. Williams' immediate demands, federation, national independence, political democracy, are admirable, but he commits a grave error in thinking, as he obviously does, that these will end or even seriously improve West Indian mass poverty and decay. But for this lapse, his book it a little triumph, admirably planned and very well written. It should be read not only by those specially interested in the Negro problem or in the West Indies. It is in its bourgeois way a short but instructive study of capitalist beginnings, maturity, decline; and, most important today, of the way in which it generates, out of its own bosom, the forces which are to destroy it.

W. F. CARLTON.

Discussion on the National Question:

Issues on the National Question

For some considerable period the pages of The New International have been open to a discussion of the national question in Europe, forcibly introduced by the specifically new conditions created by the war. The discussion is meritorious because it is concerned with the concrete question: What is the main task of the revolutionary socialists on the Continent and what is the attitude of the international Marxist movement to the European problems? The discussion reached its high point with the publication of the resolution of the Workers Party, "The National Question in Europe."

"The Way Out for Europe," by J. R. Johnson, which appeared in the April and May issues of this magazine, published in keeping with the discussion policy of this Marxist journal, contributes a number of views which, in the opinion of the writer, are extremely confusing, unreal and totally at variance with the actual situation in Europe today. For a number of reasons, which are the subject of this article, they can completely disorient a reëstablished and revitalized revolutionary socialist movement.

The idea that capitalism has long ago outlived its progressive functions has been propagated for several decades by Marxian socialists. It has been the central theme of their world program described by the graphic term: capitalist barbarism or socialism. By capitalist barbarism is understood a condition where the social order, in a state of decay and disintegration, continues to exist without the prospect of its replacement by a new and higher order of society, namely, socialism. By counterposing these alternatives, revolutionary socialists placed on the order of the day the socialist revolution as a practical international goal.

Thus, Lenin characterized the present epoch as a period of "wars and revolutions." In this way he succinctly described the chaos of imperialist capitalism. The concept was thereafter embodied in all the writings and in the thinking of the modern generation of revolutionary socialists. Moreover, it has been and continues to be the central thesis of any Marxist analysis of the objective world situation which predetermines the active program for the realization of socialism.

How Lenin's Comintern Viewed the Question

On the basis of the above conception of modern capitalism as an outlived social order, the internationalists of the heroic period of the Communist International developed the slogan of the Socialist United States of Europe. This was the socialist solution to the impasse of European society in the 1914-18 post-war period. The slogan, adopted by the Comintern in 1923, was thereafter incorporated in the programs of the individual revolutionary parties. In this way was presented the progressive socialist way out of the morass of European society, in opposition to the bourgeois continuation of the chaos.*

*The slogan was adopted after considerable dispute inside the Comintern. Lenin, for example, hesitated for a long time before he assented to the adoption of the slogan into the program because, under the conditions which existed at the time, he feared that the slogan might cause the revolutionary parties to overlook, modify or weaken their activities in their respective countries which were directed toward the organization of the masses with the specific aim of establishing the workers' power in the intensely revolutionary European situation which then existed. Lenin also feared, as a result of Bukharin's concept

The Russian Revolution was the first successful evidence of the new order emerging from this chaos. The Socialist United States of Europe would have marked a higher stage in the development of the new society; it would have insured the victory of world socialism. With this in mind, the Communist International during the years 1919-24 developed a strategy and series of tactics designed to win for it the support of the majority of the masses, to bring into harmony the activities of its affiliated parties with the revolutionary possibilities latent in the objective conditions of a moribund European capitalism. If the Comintern of Lenin and Trotsky failed, it was due, not to the absence of the historical stage, "barbarism or socialism," or the lack of the essential complementary objective conditions, but solely to the failings of the revolutionary parties.

In consequence, Allied imperialism was able to create its reactionary system of small states, not only to establish a certain delicate balance between the capitalist powers in Europe, but equally to establish a barrier against the development of the indispensable Socialist United States of Europe.

The logic of the crisis of capitalist society, however, was so powerful that even sections of the bourgeoisie, their politicians and theorists, developed and advocated programs for a United States of Europe (naturally, not a *socialist* United States), which in their minds implied a "unification" under the domination of one or a set of imperialist powers. This idea, in its variegated forms, persists to this day. The inability of the democratic bourgeoisie to realize its program resulted from the specific relations between the national states and the fact that *its* kind of United States depended on a military struggle for power. Hitler, in form at least, has established a "unified" Europe: the unification of the sword and flame, wherein Germany, as the one economic, political and military power, exploits the Continent in the interests of the Reich's imperialist ruling class.

Objective Conditions and the Vanguard

It is important to bear in mind that, however overripe the objective conditions of European capitalism have been for socialism, they did not automatically mean the *victory* of socialism. For, in the final analysis, the factor which is *all-decisive* is the *subjective* force—the organization, strength, intelligence and will to power of the revolutionary socialist parties, equipped with an unassailably correct program. It was this element in the situation which was lacking. The reasons for this are not essential for the present discussion. But it will readily be seen that, for the proletariat to realize its goal, the requirements are altogether different from those which are sufficient for the bourgeoisie.

One important distinction must be borne in mind even when recognizing the fact that the Socialist United States of Europe was a central thesis of the Marxist program: this end aim for Europe was itself contingent upon the national victories of the parties of socialism. Even in the good days of the Comintern, the slogan of the Socialist United States of Europe was not the main active slogan of the revolutionary parties. It was a programmatic and ultimate European goal. Yet the necessity of the slogan and its urgency were just as valid and historically correct as they are now, even when wrongly posed by Johnson. Moreover, the Communist International had something with which to give substance and power to the slogan. But a fundamental distinction between the concept of the old days and the concept of Johnson is that the Comintern did not view the slogan as being achieved automatically, spontaneously and simultaneously. In the concept of Lenin, the Socialist United States of Europe would be inevitable only after the victory of the workers in a number of European countries. Again, in the minds of the Marxists, the subjective factor, in view of the decline and decay of capitalism, became in turn an objective factor of inestimable significance, nay, *of decisive importance.* This is a change from quantity to quality. For this reason, the question of the vanguard organization, its program and its transitional policies, its tactics and their application, was and remains today the fundamental problem of the epoch.

In "The Way Out for Europe" everything is stood on its head. Johnson shows by the development of his thesis that he has no comprehension of the main problem which the Marxist movement is confronted with in the present period of capitalist decline. The fact that the working class has suffered a series of uninterrupted and paralyzing defeats for twenty-five years, the fact that the working class movement as an *organized political force* in Europe does not exist, has completely passed him by, as we shall demonstrate by Johnson's own words.

Johnson believes that the important problem in assessing the current European situation is *not* to determine the relationship of class forces and the concrete program for socialist emancipation, but to analyze the historical epoch of capitalism. Thus, for the most part, his contribution to a discussion of the national question is a wordy essay entitled: barbarism or socialism. He is wasting his time. That characterization was fully established by an older generation of Marxists; it has become the flesh and blood of the present generation. For this reason, his elaboration of an old theme, which is basic and integral to our thinking, is rhetorical generalizing which has completely missed the core of the problem as it exists *concretely* in Europe today.

The Views of the Workers Party Resolution

In the resolution of the Workers Party (The NEW INTERNATIONAL, February, 1943), there is indicated the kind of epoch in which we live. It is upon this concept that the entire resolution is predicated. In proceeding on this basis, the resolution is in keeping with the tradition of Marxism.

What is new in this resolution? That the "unification" of Europe under German fascism, i.e., its conquest, which has reduced the European nations and the European masses to the state of oppressed and conquered peoples, has revived the national question on the Continent. This "unification" of the Continent by German arms has reintroduced the problem of national liberation as a burning question and need for the nationally oppressed European masses. The resolution points out that the "mass movements" in Europe today are largely movements which have been born around the single issue of

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of the permanent revolution as a simultaneous European process in which the workers would seize power at once on a continental scale, that the entire international might become disoriented by the slogan. Bukharin's views had, at that time, great popularity. Once adopted, however, it was put in its proper place as outlined in this article.

Why, then, was the slogan adopted in 1928? Because it was the belief and hope of the Comintern that a victory in Germany was virtually assured and therefore the whole question of the socialist reorganization of Europe would instantly become an *aktuel* question for the working class. It was the immediate possibility of state power in the West which made the slogan a reality in 1928. The defeat in Germany did not alter the programmatic place of the slogan, since it held true as long as decadent capitalism existed. But its utilization depended upon how close the proletariat, through its parties, was to *soviet* state power.

national freedom from the yoke of a foreign oppressor; that this struggle for national liberation will rekindle the whole struggle between the classes for power, "for the old order or the new"; that there is a possibility of recreating the vanguard party through the instrumentality of these national movements; that these movements are plebian movements which, in the context of the European situation, are basically progressive; that national liberation, when and if realized, no matter if only for a few days, or a few months, can only pose the question of the workers' power; that revolutionary socialists must support these movements, integrate themselves in them, in order not to lose contact with the masses and to prevent these movements from becoming the instruments of an unchallenged imperialism; that the national movements are transitional in nature, and the participation of socialists in them is part of a transitional program leading to the struggle for socialism; that before the slogan of a Socialist United States of Europe can become a reality and an action slogan, we will see the reëstablishment of the national states, and, more important, this development will be necessary to reëstablish the International of Socialism as a genuinely functioning organization composed of a number of revolutionary socialist parties in the leading European countries, finally, that the Socialist United States of Europe remains a *central,* programmatic concept and slogan for revolutionary socialists.

How does Johnson react to this concept and series of ideas? By accepting *and* rejecting the main idea contained in the resolution, by creating a barrier between the slogan for national liberation and the Socialist United States of Europe; and finally, by mixing up the two, thereby disorienting himself on what is the essential, immediate and active problem for the European working class now.

A Strange Stew

In the very first paragraph of "The Way Out for Europe," the author declares that the slogan of national liberation is correct, but immediately qualifies and negates this by saying: "Yet never has the slogan of the Socialist United States of Europe been so urgent as it is today." However, "the slogan is a propaganda, not an action, slogan." Again: "Yet the socialist slogan has its place." From merely having its place, we are treated to a vigorous argumentative denunciation of somebody, because "any political orientation which seeks to place it further away and not nearer to the day-to-day political slogans rests on a deep, a profound, miscomprehension of the European crisis."

There are many things mixed up in this very first paragraph. First, the impression is created that someone other than the bourgeoisie and their Stalinist lackeys is opposed to the slogan of the Socialist United States of Europe. Secondly, this quoted tautology says that those who place the slogan further away and not nearer (whatever that means), "rest on a deep, a profound, miscomprehension of the European crisis." What does that mean? Do those who advocate the main action slogan of national liberation rest on these serious miscomprehensions? Or does Johnson disagree with this slogan, to which he at least gives lip service?

If the slogan of the United States is a propaganda slogan, no matter how urgent (!), that means it cannot be used as an agitation slogan. It means that some other slogan must take its place as the day-to-day slogan around which the socialist movement, and through it the working class, is mobilized for action. While implicitly recognizing this, Johnson demonstrates that recognizing the problem, if only in part, does not mean that he understands it, i.e., understands the difference between a partial, agitational slogan, and a programmatic, final, ultimate demand or slogan. A programmatic, propaganda slogan cannot at the same time be a partial and agitational slogan (national liberation).

The truth of the matter is that Johnson's support of the slogan of national liberation is unclear and not at all motivated, for his emphasis is always on the "concrete" character of the slogan of the Socialist United States.

This point is strengthened by Johnsons query: Is that slogan nearer or further away? Nearer or further away from what? one might well ask. The resolution of the Workers Party says that the "democratic interlude" cannot last very long; that the issue of workers' power will arise directly from the struggle for national liberation; that the struggle for national liberation will *immediately* create a dual power; and, finally, the question of a socialist solution will of necessity emerge out of the struggle for national liberation. Further, the resolution records that under the *given circumstances* it is impossible to set a time, or a date, on the passage of one phase of the struggle into another. It is enough to be aware that the change will be certain and swift, in order to be properly oriented. For the resolution views the whole situation as a dynamic one, *its outcome dependent upon the organized strength of the proletariat.*

What Does "Urgent" Mean?

Therefore, to pose the question "nearer or further away" is a totally fruitless proposition, since it is based upon a "feeling" about the situation and not upon the actual relation of forces. Nevertheless, the whole system of ideas developed by Johnson rests upon the tenuous foundation: he believes it is nearer, not further away. The argument is without a measuring point; it has no relation to time and space. It is in the realm of fantasy, where belief is substituted for reality.

Who is opposed to the "propaganda" slogan of the Socialist United States of Europe? The resolution contains a section on it, properly relating it to the agitational slogan, and fixing its place in the socialist program. Why, then, does Johnson repeatedly declare: the slogan is more urgent today! More urgent than before the war? More urgent than twenty years ago? Wasn't European capitalism ripe for socialism before the war? How much more urgent is it, then? How much nearer than is stated in the resolution? How much further away (from *what,* nobody can tell, not even Johnson) than is stated in the resolution?

No matter. Johnson writes (page 149, May issue, *NI*):

> To think that in this continent, today, the slogan of the Socialist United States of Europe has less urgency than it had because Europe is divided into one national state and several subordinate ones (even this is not accurately stated—A.G.), that is a proposition drawn entirely from superficial forms, and devoid of any content whatsoever.... To push into the background or to moderate the slogan of the Socialist United States of Europe... is completely false. *Exactly the opposite must be done.* (If that means anything, it means making it the *chief* slogan, the fighting, agitational slogan—A. G.)... If you grasp the basic fact of degenerating capitalism, grasp it in its concreteness, the slogan can be seen here in this true relation, nearer, not further away." "...living truth is that the slogan is now more concrete than at any time since 1933" (page 153). (Emphasis mine—A.G.)

Yet Johnson repeatedly says that he is for the slogan of national liberation. But if what he says above is true, then he

must state very bluntly that the slogan of national liberation is false; that we must make the propaganda slogan the active, agitational slogan of the day. Is this unfair? Why, then, does the author of "The Way Out for Europe" develop this argument? Better yet, we have it in his own words.

One Reference to Trotsky and One to Lenin

In one place in his article he makes reference to Trotsky for the purpose of proving that the national question in Europe does not exist. The case in point is an article written by Trotsky on the occasion of the Czechoslovakian crisis (The NEW INTERNATIONAL, November, 1938). Trotsky stated that the German seizure of the Czech Republic would not cause the working class movement to raise the slogan of national independence and organize for the defense of the bourgeois state. Johnson continues to quote Trotsky to the effect that there is no national question in Europe, ... unless a new war ends in a military victory of this or that imperialist camp, if the war fails to bring forth the workers' power, if a new imperialist peace is concluded, etc. In other words, Trotsky posed a number of *ifs* in a changing world situation. The war has not yet ended, but the conditions created by the conflict, the unforeseen Hitlerian sweep over the Continent have given rebirth to the national question. Trotsky, five years ago, dismissed these possibilities. And Johnson, not in 1938, but in 1943, says that none of these probable conditions posed by Trotsky have occurred. For emphasis, he adds: "Most obviously not."

Elsewhere he writes: "Behind any proposals to make a change (what kind of change, and who proposes it?—A. G.) in the application of the socialist slogan undoubtedly lurks some variant of the idea that Lenin put forward in 1915. Given certain conditions of continued reaction (!) and domination of Europe by a single power, a great national war is once more possible in Europe. *No such situation as Lenin envisaged is visible in Europe today.*" As clear as crystal; and therefore we shall return to this crucial selection from the Johnson contribution.

In his article, "The Pamphlet by Junius," Lenin takes up the question of a probable return to national wars in Europe. What he says is also clear:

> It is highly improbable that this imperialist war of 1914-16 will be transformed into a national war.... Nevertheless, it cannot be said that such a transformation is *impossible: if* the *European* proletariat were to remain impotent for another twenty years; *if* the present war were to end in victories similar to those achieved by Napoleon, in the subjugation of a number of virile national states; *if* imperialism outside of Europe (primarily American and Japanese) were to remain in power for another twenty years without a transition to socialism, say, as a result of a Japanese-American war, then a great national war in Europe would be possible. This means that Europe would be thrown *back* for several decades. This is improbable. But it is *not* impossible, for to picture world history as advancing smoothly and steadily without sometimes taking gigantic strides backward is undialectical, unscientific and theoretically wrong. (Emphasis in original—A. G.)

It has not happened *exactly* as Lenin said, yet several important conditions cited by him have indubitably occurred. But Johnson says: "No such situation as Lenin envisaged is visible in Europe today." We have merely to ask: if this is so, why, then, do you say that you support the slogan of national liberation? Obviously, Johnson's support is merely formal. It has no great significance to him. He does not understand his responsibilities to such a slogan. For this reason, the agitational slogan and the programmatic slogan are consistently counterposed throughout his article. Wherever he declares the correctness of the slogan of national liberation, it is qualified by the declaration that the slogan of the United States is "on the order of the day," and all the emphasis is on the necessity of a *"ceaseless pounding, day and night, of the slogan, the Socialist United States of Europe."* (Emphasis mine —A. G.)

"The Abstract and the Concrete"

Because Johnson is completely absorbed in a programmatic question, over which there is no *fundamental* dispute, and in which there is nothing new, he has failed to absorb the significance of the reintroduction of the concept of a struggle for national liberation in Europe. On the basis of a completely one-sided approach and his inability to understand the revolutionary consequences of this fighting slogan, Johnson's only effort to deal concretely with the question has led him into a hopeless quandary. He has addressed a leaflet in the name of the French workers to the German conquerors, the occupying troops, admonishing them to leave the territory of France. The leaflet is a compound of bourgeois nationalism in the tradition of de Gaulle, with the programmatic slogan of the Socialist United States tacked on at the end. Everything is mixed up in this leaflet, which ends with the de Gaullist slogan: "Long Live Free France." Despite the fact that only a page afterward he writes that the "powerful barriers between the workers of Europe so elaborately organized by bourgeois society have been destroyed by declining capitalism itself," he says to the German soldiers: "All Europe hates you and is aching to destroy you." Then, after pleading with the Germans to leave the country or become friends with the French, to cease being oppressors, he warns that "we shall fight against you and do our best to kill everyone of you." "Long Live Free France."

Is this leaflet the product of some hypothetical group of revolutionary workers? Then it is not a leaflet written in the spirit of socialism. If it is a leaflet written by "raw" workers, then the tacked-on slogans, "Long live the power of the workers! For the Socialist United States of Europe," are a gratuitous contribution, not by the hypothetical authors of the leaflet, but by the author of the article, "The Way Out for Europe." There is not the slightest harmony between the content of the leaflet and the slogans attached thereto.

The source of Johnson's errors is to be found in his inability to understand the rôle of the subjective factor in world and European politics, the need of a revolutionary socialist party and the *indispensability* of such a party to a solution of any class problem. Instead, we are treated to generalities which in themselves are wrong because they have no relation to any vital concrete situation. He concerns himself with the end-aims, without resolving the many steps that must necessarily be traversed before the proletariat can be emancipated. In his presentation, everything is telescoped.

Three Revealing Errors by Johnson

For example, the resolution of the Workers Party argues that there are powerful national barriers between the masses of Europe which must be overcome. Johnson says: "Today these powerful barriers ... have been destroyed by declining capitalism." Under the subhead in his article, "The Abstract and the Concrete," the author commits three grievous errors, which explain a great deal about the whole contribution. In

one place he writes in support of the argument that the Socialist United States is more urgent than ever that: "The most dangerous enemies of the militancy of the workers, the flourishing Social-Democratic and Stalinist bureaucracies, no longer exist." Whatever world he is writing about, it is certainly not our world, not on this planet. He adds to this erroneous statement another: "Our hypothetical half a dozen revolutionaries (in Lyon) have an opportunity *a hundred times greater than in 1939, so long as they do not counterpose theories and slogans to action.*" Against whom is Johnson polemizing? Against the workers who might "counterpose theories and slogans to action"? Obviously, Johnson does *not* mean the workers! And what theories and slogans should not be counterposed by the workers? Is it perhaps the slogan for national liberation? If it is not that slogan and the theory behind the slogan, what is the meaning of the sentence? The author of "The Way Out for Europe" unwittingly supplies the answer.

To say that the workers of Lyon have "an opportunity today a hundred times greater than in 1939," means that the possibilities of socialism are *today* a hundred times greater than in 1939, and that the power, strength and organization of the workers are a hundred times greater than in 1939. For the word "opportunity" has no meaning if organization, program, strength, tactics and strategy are not part of the concept of opportunity. The workers have an opportunity *in general,* in an *historical* sense. But the opportunity can never be realized unless it is fortified by the mass organization of the working class, by the existence of the revolutionary vanguard, by the existence of a correct program, and the proper application of this program! This is the idea, above all, which needs to be hammered home incessantly.

As if in anticipation of this argument, he says, in his third error, on page 153: "But, it is urged, the proletariat in the occupied countries is sluggish, it is not organized; the revolutionary movement is non-existent, etc. *But how much bigger was the revolutionary movement yesterday than it is today?*" Here again, Johnson has missed the whole lesson of the meaning of the fascist victories in Europe and their effect upon the proletariat and its organized movements. It seems odd to have to answer such an argument ten years after Hitler seized power, after the defeats in Spain and France, the victory of Stalinism and the realities of the Second World War.

Prior to the war, a large part of the European labor movement existed. Today it does not exist! Prior to the war, working class fraternal organizations were in existence. Today they have been wiped out. Prior to the war, there were large cooperative organizations. Where are they to be found on the Continent today? Prior to the war, there were revolutionary organizations in existence. Where are they today? Their size, their influence, their weight in the labor movement varied. It is true, they were not strong. But under the conditions of prewar Europe, they *existed* and *functioned* and had the possibilities of enjoying growth and influence. Today, they do not exist!

The problem, to repeat, is one of reconstituting the workers' movement in Europe, and through it to reëstablish its organized revolutionary socialist wing. This the resolution of the Workers Party seeks to do. Johnson has an entirely different conception.

Spontaneity Versus the Organized Party

The theory which is implicit in his entire analysis of the historical epoch is not a new theory. It is as old as the socialist movement. I have already indicated what it is by saying that he visualizes the development in Europe on the basis of the "spontaneity of the masses." Otherwise, what is the meaning of the long, involved and stratospheric discussion of the general historical stage of present-day capitalism? To show that the crisis of capitalism must drive the masses along the socialist road. While this is true, *in general,* it is only the *beginning* of the problem. But for Johnson it is the *end* of the problem. To him, the process is *automatic*: the workers *must* become revolutionized! The workers *must* take the socialist road!

Yet between the compulsions created by the crisis of capitalism, which makes life for the masses a hellish nightmare, and the organization of the masses for the struggle for power, is a long road. It is the road of organization, education, training and preparation. Without the existence of strong mass parties of socialism, the working class is hopelessly doomed. Even a correct program is not enough. A correct program can *make it possible* to reach the masses, to win them to socialism, to organize them for the struggle. But the *vanguard party* is the indispensable link between the objectively ripe conditions for socialism and the establishment of socialism in one or more countries.*

Johnson's views are sectarian. In practice, they can never solve the one great problem of this stage, the reorganization and revitalization of the working class movement for socialism. That decisively fundamental idea does not become an integral element in his schema of the European situation.

Johnson has sought to create the impression that the position embodied in the resolution of the Workers Party means postponing the struggle for socialism for an impossibility: national liberation. He is for a Socialist United States of Europe *now.* What he does not comprehend is that the present situation in Europe has created a condition where the struggle for national liberation becomes interlinked with the struggle for socialism; that revolutionary socialists must be *in this movement* to lead on the high road of socialism.

ALBERT GATES.

*In his *Strategy of the World Revolution,* Trotsky wrote: "Politics considered as a historical factor, has always remained behind economics." This observation has been accepted by all Marxists as an unassailable truth. It reveals why economics and politics do not develop simultaneously, why the economic collapse of capitalism does not bring about an automatic and immediate corresponding political response on the part of the masses. For the latter an additional series of experiences are necessary, plus an unprecedented activity by the vanguard socialist party to close the gap between "economics and politics."

Manifesto of the First Congress of the Comintern

There is no better time than now, following the announcement of the Præsidium of the Stalinist International for the liquidation of the Comintern—which it in truth destroyed many years ago—to reprint selections from the Manifesto adopted by the First Congress of the Third International meeting in Moscow, March 2-6, 1919. It should be recalled that the victory of the October Revolution and the rise of the revolutionary movements outside of Russia were the background to the formation of the new international. Bourgeois society in Europe was indeed in a state of disintegration. The ruling régimes in a number of countries were in a state of disintegration; the proletariat, driven onward by the effects of a devastating economic and political crisis, was seeking a way out through the seizure of state power and the establishment of Soviet republics. The victory of the workers in Russia, under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, gave a tremendous impetus to this revolutionary development of the masses.

On the other hand, the Second International, which lay in ruins as a result of the policy it pursued during the war, decided on a course of defending bourgeois society in seeking to found democratic capitalist states as a means of preventing the outright state power of the workers. Thus it was true that the struggle between the Second and Third Internationals was only another form of the struggle between capitalism and the rising socialist order. The necessity of the formation of the Third International arose out of this situation: that no genuine proletarian world organization existed. The formation of the Third International thus served to fill an imperious historical need—Editor.

TO THE PROLETARIAT OF ALL COUNTRIES:

Seventy-two years have gone by since the Communist Party proclaimed its program in the form of the Manifesto written by the greatest teachers of the proletarian revolution, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Even at that early time, when communism had scarcely come into the arena of conflict, it was pursued by the lies, hatred and calumny of the possessing classes, who rightly suspected in it their mortal enemy. During these seven decades communism has traveled a hard road; of ascent followed by periods of sharp decline; successes, but also severe defeats. In spite of all, the development at bottom went the way forecast by the Manifesto of the Communist Party. The epoch of the last decisive battle came later than the apostles of the social revolution expected and wished. But it has come.

We, communists, representatives of the revolutionary proletariat of the different countries of Europe, America and Asia, assembled in Soviet Moscow, feel and consider ourselves followers and fulfillers of the program proclaimed seventy-two years ago. It is our task now to sum up the practical revolutionary experience of the working class, to cleanse the movement of its admixtures of opportunism and social patriotism, and to unite the forces of all the true revolutionary proletarian parties in order to further and hasten the complete victory of the communist revolution.

I. Now that Europe is covered with burning ruins, the most ruthless of the incendiaries are searching for someone to blame for the war, aided by their professors, politicians, journalists, social patriots, and other supporters of the bourgeoisie.

For a long span of years socialism predicted the inevitability of the imperialist war; it perceived the essential cause of this war in the insatiable greed of the possessing classes in both camps of capitalist nations. Two years before the outbreak of the war, at the congress of Basel, the responsible socialist leaders of all countries branded imperialism as the instigator of the coming war, and menaced the bourgeoisie with the threat of the socialist revolution—the retaliation of the proletariat for the crimes of militarism. Now, after the experience of five years, after history has disclosed the predatory lust of Germany and has unmasked the no less criminal deeds on the part of the Allies, the state socialists of the Entente nations, together with their governments, are still continuing their revelations about the deposed German Kaiser. And the German social patriots, who in August, 1914, proclaimed the diplomatic White Book of the Hohenzollern as the holiest gospel of the people, today, in vulgar sycophancy, join with the socialists of the Entente countries in accusing as the arch-criminal the deposed German monarch whom they formerly served as slaves. In this way they hope to erase the memory of their own guilt and to gain the good will of the victors....

The contradictions of the capitalist system were converted by the war into degrading torments of hunger and cold, epidemics and moral savagery for all mankind. Thereby the academic quarrel among socialists over the theory of increasing misery, and also of the undermining of capitalism through socialism, is now finally determined. Statisticians and teachers of the theory of reconciliation of these contradictions have endeavored for decades to gather together from all countries of the earth real and apparent facts to prove the increasing well-being of the working class.

But we are faced today with the harrowing reality of impoverishment which is no longer merely a social problem, but a psychological and biological one. This catastrophe of an imperialist war has with one swoop swept away all the gains of experts and of parliamentary struggles. It has also come into being from the inner tendencies of capitalism as well as from the economic bargains and political compromises now engulfed in a sea of blood....

As during the decades which preceded the war, free competition in the chief domains of economics was replaced as regulator of production and distribution by the system of trusts and monopolies, so the exigencies of the war took the regulating rôle out of the hands of the monopolies and gave it directly to the military power. Distribution of raw materials, utilization of petroleum from Baku or Rumania, of coal from Donetz, of cereals from the Ukraine; the fate of German locomotives, railroad cars and automobiles, the provisioning of famine-stricken Europe with bread and meat—all those basic questions of the economic life of the world are no longer regulated by free competition, and not yet by combinations of national and international trusts, but through direct application of military force.

Just as the complete subordination of the power of the state to the purposes of finance-capital has, through this mass slaughter, completely militarized not the state alone but itself also, it can no longer fulfill its essential economic functions otherwise than by means of blood and iron....

II. The national state, which was given tremendous im-

pulse by capitalist evolution, has become too narow for the development of the productive forces. This is making more and more untenable the position of the small states, adjacent to the great powers of Europe and in other parts of the world. Those small states came into existence at different times as fragments split off the bigger states, as petty currency in payment for services rendered, to serve as strategic, buffer states. They, too, have their ruling gangs, their imperialist pretensions, their diplomatic machinations. Their illusory independence had until the war precisely the same support as the European balance of power; namely, the continuous opposition between the two imperialist camps. The war has destroyed this balance....

Only the proletarian revolution can secure the existence of the small nations, a revolution which frees the productive forces of all countries from the restrictions of the national states, which unites all peoples in the closest economic coöperation on the basis of a universal economic plan, and makes the smallest and weakest peoples able freely and independently to carry on their national culture without detriment to the united and centralized economy of Europe and of the whole world.

III. The last war, after all a war to gain colonies, was at the same time a war with the aid of the colonies. To an unprecedented extent the populations of the colonies were drawn into the European war. Indians, Arabs, Madagascans battled on the European continent. What for? For the right to remain slaves of England and France. Never did capitalist rule show itself more shameless, never was the truth of colonial slavery brought into such sharp relief. As a consequence, we witnessed a series of open rebellions and revolutionary ferment in all colonies. In Europe itself it was Ireland which reminded us in bloody street battles that it is still an enslaved country and feels itself as such.... In this manner the colonial question in its entirety became the order of the day, not alone on the green table of the diplomatic conferences at Paris but also in the colonies themselves. The Wilson program, at the very best, calls only for a change in the firm-name of the colonial enslavement. Liberation of the colonies can come only through liberation of the working class of the oppressing nations.... Capitalist Europe has drawn the backward countries by force into the capitalist whirlpool, and socialist Europe will come to the aid of the liberated colonies with its technique, its organization, its spiritual influence, in order to facilitate their transition into the orderly system of socialist economy.

IV. The whole bourgeis world accuses the communists of destroying liberties and political democracy. That is not true. Having come into power, the proletariat only asserts the absolute impossibility of applying the methods of bourgeois democracy and creates the conditions and forms for a higher working class democracy. The whole course of capitalist development undermined political democracy, not only by dividing the nation into two irreconcilable classes, but also by condemning the number of petty bourgeois and semi-proletarian elements, as well as the slum-proletariat, to permanent economic stagnation and political impotence....

If the financial oligarchy considers it advantageous to veil its deeds of violence behind parliamentary votes, then the bourgeois state has at its command in order to gain its ends all the traditions and attainments of capitalist technique: lies, demagogism, persecution, slander, bribery, calumny and terror. To demand of the proletariat in the final life and death struggle with capitalism that it should follow lamb-like the demands of bourgeois democracy would be the same as to ask a man who is defending his life against robbers to follow the artificial rules of a French duel that have been set by his enemy but not followed by him.

In a realm of destruction, where not only the means of production and transportation, but also the institutions of political democracy are scattered and bleeding, the proletariat must create its own forms, to serve above all as a bond of unity for the working class and to enable it to accomplish a revolutionary intervention in the further development of mankind. Such apparatus is provided by the workers' soviets. The old parties, the old unions, have proved incapable, in the person of their leaders, to understand, much less carry out, the task which the new epoch presents to them....

V. By means of these soviets the working class will gain power in all countries most readily and most certainly when these soviets gain the support of the majority of the laboring population. By means of these soviets, the working class, once attaining power, will control all the field of economic and cultural life as in Soviet Russia....

The outcry of the bourgeois world against civil war and the Red terror is the most colossal hypocrisy of which the history of political struggles can boast. There would be no civil war if the exploiters who have carried mankind to the brink of ruin had not prevented every forward step of the laboring masses, if they had not instigated plots and murders and called to their aid armed help from the outside to maintain or restore their predatory privileges. Civil war is FORCED UPON the laboring classes by their arch-enemies. The working class must answer blow for blow, if it will not renounce its own object and its own future, which is at the same time the future of all humanity first....

VI. Conscious of the world historic character of their mission, the enlightened workers strove from the very beginning of the organized socialist movement for an international union. The foundation stone of this union was laid in the year 1864 in London, in the First International. The Franco-Prussian war, from which arose the Germany of the Hohenzollerns, undermined the First International, giving rise at the same time to national labor parties. As early as 1889 these parties united at the Congress of Paris and organized a Second International. But during this period the center of gravity of the labor movement rested entirely on national ground, confining itself with the realm of national parliamentarism, to the narrow compass of the national state and national industries. Decades of organizing and labor reformism created a generation of leaders, most of whom gave verbal recognition to the program of social revolution but denied it in substance.

They were lost in the swamp of reformism and adaptation to the bourgeois state. The opportunist character of the leading parties of the Second International was finally revealed and led to the greatest collapse of the movement in all its history, when events required revolutionary methods of warfare from the labor parties. Just as the war of 1870 dealt a deathblow to the First International by revealing that there was not in fact behind the social-revolutionary program any compact power of the masses, so the war of 1914 killed the Second International by showing that above the consolidated labor masses there stood labor parties which had converted themselves into servile organs of the bourgeois state....

Humanity, whose whole culture now lies in ruins, faces the danger of complete destruction. There is only one power

which can save it—the power of the proletariat. The old capitalist "order" can exist no longer. The ultimate result of the capitalist mode of production is chaos—a chaos to be overcome only by the great producing class, the proletariat. It is the proletariat which must establish real order, the order of communism. It must end the domination of capital, make war impossible, wipe out state boundaries, transform the whole world into one coöperative commonwealth, and bring about real human brotherhood and freedom.

World capitalism prepares itself for the final battle. Under the cover of the League of Nations and a deluge of pacifist phrase-mongering, a desperate effort is being made to pull together the tumbling capitalist system and to direct its forces against the constantly growing proletarian revolt. This monstrous new conspiracy of the capitalist class must be met by the proletariat by the seizure of political power of the states, turning this power against its class enemies, and using it as a lever to set in motion the economic revolution. The final victory of the proletariat of the world means the beginning of the real history of free mankind.

Signed: CHRISTIAN RAKOVSKY,
N. LENIN,
GREGORY ZINOVIEV,
LEON TROTSKY,
FRITZ PLATTEN.

March 10, 1919.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

A Study of Japan

MODERN JAPAN AND SHINTO NATIONALISM,
by D. C. Holtom. University of Chicago Press.

Dr. Holtom has written an interesting and well documented book on the relation between the Japanese state and the state religion, Shinto. But, like all studies dealing with a very specific phase of the life of a nation, while presenting a picture factually and theoretically correct, it does so only from the texts and documents of the religions involved, leaving the reader without a picture of the relationship between the life of the Japanese and his religion.

Today, when the Japanese is being pictured as a religious fanatic, a study of religion in Japan as a living force would be a very valuable contribution. In that sense, Helen Mears' book, *The Year of the Wild Boar,* while not the scholarly, well-thought-out book that Dr. Holtom's is, gives one a much clearer and realistic picture of the actual and living effect that Shinto has on the life of the people. It would be well for one interested in the question to read both books for a more rounded view.

Modern Shinto, regardless of the supernatural powers with which Dr. Holtom endows it in the first chapter of his book, is but another weapon of Japanese imperialism to keep a poverty-stricken nation duped, spread the infallibility of the Emperor and make the imperialism of the nation more palatable. While the origins of Japanese religion are fascinating, and read like a fairy tale, its purpose in our generation is very practical.

CAPITALISM, THE STATE AND RELIGION

It is interesting to note that directly after the restoration of the Emperor Meiji to power (1868) and the beginning of capitalist development, the emphasis of the state on religion was not great. As a matter of fact, in 1873 the official ban against Christianity was repealed. This was done to make it easier for Japan to deal with Western powers. But in 1890, reaction set in. In the twenty-odd years of its new life, Japan was constantly in fear of domination by the Western powers. In the early years of her capitalist existence, she was forced to toady to the Western powers. Coinciding with the rise of imperialism in the West, the Japanese embarked on a program of national consolidation to defend their independence through the newly-acquired knowledge and techniques from the West. In this manner, she would be better able to meet the Western powers on an equal footing. An offshoot of this anti-foreignism were the decrees on education, which called a halt to the cultural westernization of Japan and a return to the "old-fashioned virtues."

Preceding this the government had withdrawn the right of unrestricted religious instruction in the schools and introduced instruction in state Shinto—"the meaning of its rites and ceremonies, the nature of its deities, the relation of all these to loyalty and patriotism and the subject's duty of participation," were all carefully established as foundation courses in the national instruction. This was a blow at all existing religions.

With the close of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the second period of foreign influence opened and with it "a wave of fascination for Marxism swept over the land, especially in university and higher school circles, and leftist social theories became popular among students and professors as well as in labor groups. Even communism dared to raise its head (in 1905?). All sorts of isms had vogue in groups here and there and the authorities looked on in growing alarm. Police measures were, of course, applied with characteristic thoroughness, but these did not touch the social and psychological roots of the malady. In searching about for means wherewith to check the infatuation with 'dangerous thoughts,' the directors of the national life now turned to the examination of the resources of religion as a thought-control agency. The record of Christian opposition to Soviet atheism (in 1905?) and the Roman Catholic position on Marxism were plain before them. Christianity now basked in official favor, so much so that representatives of Buddhism and Shinto complained to the government that they were being discriminated against in favor of a foreign religion. Christianity was presented with an opportunity for an impressive apologetic that it immediately seized upon. The gospel of Christ was portrayed as the faithful mongoose that killed the communist viper; it was the devoted watchdog that kept away the burglar of radicalism; it was the guardian angel that protected the citadel of the national life against the demons of unsocial license. It inspired a true religious faith that brought the blessings of Good upon the soldiers that faced ungodly forces across the Siberian border."

BUREAUCRATIZED RELIGION AS A CLASS WEAPON

Christianity has made its peace with the régime. In 1918, the Bishop of Nagasaki declared that the Catholics could not accept the shrine worship. In 1936, Rome reversed the decision.

Christianity in Japan is very weak. There are only about 340,000 members of the Christian church in a total of 70,000,000 people for Japan proper. Under the circumstances, the church in Japan has two paths open to it: "persecution and martyrdom or compromise and accommodation. The Japanese Christian church has chosen the latter."

Buddhism with its doctrine of pacifism, everlasting peace, compassion, etc., like Christianity, has made the necessary "practical adjustments." Both Confucianism and Buddhism have been twisted and turned into conformity with state Shinto.

Whereas Christianity never played a dominant rôle in the life of the people, Buddhism has. It is the religion of the people and has the largest number of followers. It was therefore impossible for the government to treat it as it did Christianity.

Zen Buddhism has found great following among the military because of its closeness of Confucianism. "Zen stresses arduous physical and mental discipline, unyielding moral force, indomitable spirit, and courage that faces death with resignation. In all these ways Buddhism fosters the qualities of spirit that make for strong soldiers."

Buddhism's adherence to its pacifist philosophy under the stress of Japanese national needs and policy has become mere verbiage, which they explain in long-winded tracts that probably preoccupy the professors considerably.

Because of the cloistered character of Dr. Holtom's book, it lends itself very easily to the picturization being propagated of the Japanese as religious fanatics. Needless to say, the fact that the government finds it expedient to foster state Shinto, gives shrine worship, government-sponsored pilgrimages and government-sponsored festivities a greater national prominence than we are accustomed to in the Western world. Religion under those circumstances becomes a matter for government bureaus and state policy. It ceases to be the "personal" affair it is supposed to be in the Western world. Without a doubt the average Japanese attends the religious festivals, and in the farming regions religion takes on a more primitive and necessary character, as the gods are associated with the needs of life, water, sun and rain. But it would be erroneous to assume that the average Japanese lives only for a chance to die for his Emperor.

The greatest preoccupation with dogma and doctrine takes place in petty bourgeois circles. Here not only religion, but such ancient customs as the Tea Ceremony and Flower Arrangement have become compensation for not being able to think or say anything on subjects more vital. Similarly in the Army, the officer caste and a whole layer of lower officers have without a doubt been filled with a messianic nationalism as keen as Hitler's Elite Guard. This nationalism finds a perfect expression in state Shinto.

But for the mass of the people, workers and farmers, all evidence leads to the contention that in their lives religion plays much the same rôle as it would to any people with a low cultural level and weighed down by a bureaucratic police state. In the last analysis, religion can be as much an opiate to a people who pray to one kind of god as to a people who pray to another.

SYLVIA MERRILL.

A Brief Review

THE CONSUMER GOES TO WAR, by Caroline F. Ware, Ph.D. Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York, publishers; 300 pp., $2.00.

Inevitably in a book of several hundred pages, some important and interesting facts are given as, for instance, anent rationing in England, where at one time three out of five persons could not get their allowed ration of bacon because they were too poor to pay the high price. However, even such or similar information the fairly careful reader of the daily press already has, and does not need to wade through Dr. Ware's book.

Dr. Ware describes well enough the war problems facing the consumer. Her solutions, however, are the routine, inadequate variety submitted by all capitalist apologists whose thought does not break through the confines of the *status quo*. For instance, the threat of inflation is to be met by "saving instead of spending."

Naturally, Dr. Ware is as concerned about "winning the peace" as about winning the war. According to her, this is not merely a World War but—*à la* Wallace—a "world revolution." However, Marx has made no contribution to the bright new world envisaged by Dr. Ware because—alas!—"He identified the public interest with the self-interest of the industrial worker."

SUSAN GREEN.