

The New
INTERNATIONAL

WAR IN KOREA

By Jack Brad

Asia Enters World History

By Jack Brad and Henry Judd

The Nature of Titoism

An Exchange of Views

Science in a Time of Terror

By Carl Darton

Four Portraits of Stalinism – IV

By Max Shachtman

Recollections of Maxim Gorki

By Victor Serge

EDITORIALS

BOOK REVIEWS

35¢

July-August 1950

MEMO

NOTICE TO NI SUBSCRIBERS

IN THE EARLY MORNING of July 1 a fire broke out in the building which houses the business office of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL at 4 Court Square, Long Island City, N. Y.

The fire was brought under control soon enough to prevent serious damage to the offices of the Independent Socialist League and to the bound volumes of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL and other socialist literature kept in storage in an adjoining loft.

However, records of subscriptions sent to THE NEW INTERNATIONAL since May 25 were destroyed.

All persons who have subscribed to THE NEW INTERNATIONAL during the past two months are urged to send in their names and addresses at once, as well as a statement on the length of time for which they subscribed and whether their subscription was accompanied by payment.

Financial records were saved and can be checked against such subscriptions. However, these records do not contain the addresses of subscribers.

Persons who indicated their intention to resubscribe to the magazine but did not send payment are urged to do so, as we now have no way of billing them.

Finally, and very important: as a result of the fire, we must move to a new office at once. We urge all readers of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL to send a substantial contribution to help us to restore losses due to the fire and to help us to move. The need is very great, and we are sure that your response will be commensurate with it.

L. G. SMITH, *Bus. Mgr.*

LEON TROTSKY

—will be the subject of several special features in the next issue of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the great revolutionist's assassination. We are particularly proud to announce a memoir especially written for this issue by Trotsky's co-worker, Albert Rosmer, "Trotsky in Paris During the First World War."

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

An Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

An Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

Vol. XVI, No. 4 JULY-AUGUST 1950 Whole No. 143

EDITORIALS

Whose War Is It?

THE WAR IN KOREA IS A WARNING SIGNAL to all the peoples of the world who long for nothing more than an assurance of peace.

In every part of the world, the imperialist powers that triumphed in the Second World War laid the powder barrels for the explosion of the Third World War. Now one of these powder barrels has exploded. If the war in Korea does not immediately touch off the Third World War, it is only because neither of the two rival imperialist blocs is as yet prepared for it.

But now that shooting has started in Korea, the conquest of this small country is precisely one of the steps needed in the preparations for the world war, and the conflict in that country does and can do nothing but bring the world closer to the outbreak of the global war.

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR IN KOREA does not fall upon the shoulders of the Korean people. It is not their war. They and their land have been made the pawns in a bigger war, its innocent and helpless victims.

It is not our war, either, the war of the people of this or any other country. The responsibility for it falls entirely upon the shoulders of the two big powers in whose interests it is being fought. It is these two powers, the United States and Russia, with their allies and satellites as accomplices, which committed the great crime against the Korean people at the Yalta and subsequent conferences.

The black history of imperialism contains no episode that surpasses the partition of Korea in the cynicism with which the interests and opinion of a people were ignored by their foreign traducers. A knife was drawn through the living body of Korea at the 38th parallel. Neither of the two powers that thus divided the spoils even pretended that this division was needed by the Korean people or corresponded to any interest they might conceivably have.

The line arbitrarily cutting the country in two parts, each capable of living without the other, was drawn with the shameless proclamation that the mutilation of this country was required by the interests of two other countries. It is only a logical development that today the war in Korea is not in the interests of its people, its national sovereignty and democratic aspirations, but is required only by the conflict of interests between the powers that cut it in two.

The country once divided, both the United States and Russia installed puppet regimes over the people, in the South and the North respectively. Struggle between them for supremacy was as inevitable as the division of the country was unendurable. But the war that broke out and is now raging is not

a war of or for the Korean people or for its national unification and freedom. It is nothing but a continuation, in the open military field, of the struggle for supremacy in Korea particularly and Asia generally between American and Stalinist imperialism.

THE SO-CALLED NORTHERN GOVERNMENT is not a government of the Korean people and in no way represents its interests. It is a totalitarian quisling regime installed by and completely in the service of the Moscow empire. The victory of its arms would mean nothing but the extension of the slave power of Stalinism over the whole territory of Korea, and therefore a disastrous blow to the people of Korea and the cause of democracy and socialism everywhere else.

IF the government of Southern Korea were an independent one enjoying the support of the people, then, even if it were a conservative regime, its resistance to the Northern invasion would be a defense of the sovereignty of Korea from an imperialist assault by Russia. Every politically educated person knows that the Northern regime moved upon the South not simply after consulting its Russian masters but only after instructions from them.

However, it required only a few days of fighting to show how the people of South Korea regard the Rhee government. Neither the Southern army, specifically, nor the people in general have given any support to the Rhee government.

This is now involuntarily acknowledged by Rhee's patron, the United States, in the decision it has found itself obliged to adopt in taking over virtually all of the responsibility for combating the militarized tools of Russia. It is now perfectly clear that behind the disguise of a war for Korean independence, which both sides hypocritically proclaim, stands the reality of a war between two foreign imperialist powers over a pawn on the bloody chessboard of the coming Third World War.

The Truman administration, unitedly supported by both capitalist parties, has now committed this country fully to an undeclared war, without even bothering to comply with the constitutional requirement for official authorization by Congress. By this undeclared war, docilely endorsed by the United Nations, which was established ostensibly but futilely to assure a durable peace, capitalist imperialism again emphasizes its inability to offer an effective democratic political alternative to Stalinist totalitarianism, and accordingly, its ability to deal with Stalinism, in every decisive test, only by purely police and military means.

Any victory gained in Korea on such a basis can only have reactionary consequences.

Far from ensuring the independence of Korea, it will guarantee its utter dependence upon, if not permanent occupation by, American imperialism.

Far from ensuring world peace, it will only bring closer the date of the Third World War, of the decisive conflict for world dominion between the capitalist and Stalinist blocs in which the peoples of this globe will be at least as much threatened by utter devastation as by imperialist conquest.

Far from encouraging the peoples to resist the ravages of totalitarian rule by their own democratic strength, it will stimulate the chauvinistic madmen

who are already urging that a preventive war be launched against Russia by inundating it quickly with atom bombs.

THE INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST LEAGUE, therefore, protests against the ravishing of Korea by the two imperialist rivals. We urge the labor movement of this country, which has remained disgracefully silent in face of the Korean events, to proclaim its complete independence from the imperialist policy of the American government, as it has already rightly proclaimed its complete hostility to the policy of the Stalinist regime, and to renounce all responsibility for the course of either camp in the Korean war.

The program of social legislation which the labor movement has made the center of its political fight will necessarily be undercut as the war situation develops, along with democratic and civil liberties, as long as labor subordinates its own interests to U. S. foreign policy. The "fair deal" which labor has dreamed of establishing under capitalism cannot even be fought for successfully while labor has no policy independent of the existing "Fair Deal" of the Truman administration, which has steered the country into the present conflict.

Unless the powerful labor movement adopts an independent policy of its own, based upon militant opposition to all imperialism and an aggressive championing of a genuinely democratic policy all over the world, peace will remain the precarious interlude that it is today, and the Third World War, with all its horrors and barbarism, will prove to be inevitable.

If it does adopt and pursue such a policy, it can become the rallying center of all the peace-loving peoples of the world and a powerful guarantee of that peace which we must have in order to solve the problems that face us all.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE, INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST LEAGUE

The BLP and the Schuman Plan

THE FIRST GREAT FLURRY OVER THE SCHUMAN PLAN for pooling the coal and steel production of Western Europe, announced initially as a Franco-German endeavor, has now subsided. One cannot blame the outbreak of war in Korea alone as the principal reason for the sudden quietus that has replaced the early fever. The fact of the matter is that when the French sponsors of the plan, in the person of M. Monnet, presented details, the representatives of the six nations participating in the conference to put the finishing touches on this new "miracle" of bourgeois political science, called a halt to the proceedings in order to consult their respective governments.

The plan as enunciated by M. Monnet called for the pooling of the two most basic industries of Western Europe under the direction of a "high authority" set up by the six-nation conference. This "high authority" would consist of from six to nine members chosen from lists of nominees of each nation. Next would come the common or parliamentary assembly, which would have the power to force the resignation of the high authority at the end of each year. This would require a two-thirds vote. To supervene in difficult and seemingly unbridgeable conflicts would be a third structure, the court of arbitration.

IT BECAME CLEAR TO THE REPRESENTATIVES of the governments of the other nations that this body would be an extra-governmental body beyond the reach of the existing parliaments. Here, then, arose the first major obstacle. There is no doubt that the smaller nations felt that they would be at the mercy of the Franco-German power in the proposed scheme. But they also saw in the proposal a series of conflicts that would inevitably ensue because the pool would in one way or another exercise inevitable pressure on the remaining economy in which their governments played an active and often determining role.

The plan itself, as M. Monnet explained to the delegates, was essentially political, to create a new relationship among the Western European states by establishing a "community of interests." But precisely this "community of interests" came into conflict at once. It was not merely as a concession to the British Labor Party's opposition to the whole business that the French modified their proposals so as not to invade the province of national sovereignty. This concession consisted in the readiness to subject the decisions of the "high authority" to parliamentary as well as judiciary review. This "national sovereignty" would remain inviolate. If any parliament decided that the decisions of the "high authority" violated their national interests, that would mean that the protesting nation would or could turn its back on these decisions.

The conference, which met at the end of June, reconvened on July 3 to hear what the representatives would bring back from their respective governments. Yet the plan is no further ahead than when first presented because these nations are still trying to determine the precise meaning of the plan as it affects the over-all economies of the participating nations, and the extent to which the member nations must surrender their independence in the fields of coal and steel.

All of this, from the point of view of socialism, is, however, quite secondary. The most important thing that arose out of the Franco-German proposal was the reaction of the British Labor Party and the attacks which were launched against it, especially by the United States. The argumentation that the Schuman Plan was the first great step in the unification of Western Europe met a doubtful response. As a matter of fact the scheme is similar to the pre-war cartels, and in this instance the dominant economic weight of France and Germany would prevail.

No nationalization, it goes without saying, is contemplated. No real improvement of the conditions of the workers in these industries is under consideration. The problem of employment is likewise one not within the purview of the plan. And most important of all, there are no provisions whatever for the intervention, supervision or control, in any fashion, by the workers themselves or their unions. The very same financial and industrial owning groups who control the industries today would control tomorrow. The main aim? Well, there are several. One, to strengthen the structure of these industries and guarantee a continuous and high rate of profit, which undoubtedly can be achieved by the plan. Second, to coordinate production as part of a general scheme to fit in with U. S. aid and the future market; and finally, the preparations for a third world war.

For any one and all of these reasons, socialists could not sympathize with,

endorse or support this product of Western capitalist "planning." The way out is in another direction, which we shall indicate in a moment.

THE MOST INTERESTING ASPECT of the whole situation is the way in which the British Labor Party struck out against the whole proposal. Much has been said about the fact that there is a distinction to be found in the position of the government and the party itself. But the distinction is too fine. Actually, the government and the party agree on the basic question involved.

It is true that the opposition of the Labor Party is both imperialist and socialistic. This is unavoidable because the British Labor Party and its government are a unique thing. The Labor government pursues a dual course: socialistic on the domestic front, empire imperialistic in foreign policy. At home it has struck fundamental blows at capitalist society, producing a mixed economy in which large segments of industry have been nationalized. In this respect its policy is socialistic. At the same time in its efforts to preserve the empire and to direct the economy on the basis of the commonwealth and empire preference, it must pursue policies which are anti-socialist.

Thus, while it argues most cogently against the Franco-German scheme and shows that this scheme opposes socialism, and while it argues successfully that this is not really a "unification" proposal, it mixes good socialist arguments with rotten imperialist ones. For example, one of the sharpest criticisms it makes is that this unification proposal does not take into consideration the necessity for a permanent European alliance with the U. S. A large part of the Labor government's foreign policy is predicated on such an alliance with the United States.

This was the occasion for a real exposition of what genuine Western union means. The Labor Party, were it internationalist and more socialist, rather than nationalist and less socialist, could have used this occasion for an immense appeal to the vast numbers of peoples in Western Europe, based upon the conception of creating a genuine third force in a world divided by two imperialist blocs. The argument made by the Laborites that they are alone and therefore cannot risk their nationalizations and their "socialism" overlooks the essential point that as long as they continue in their national socialist manner they will never help to bring about a real change in world relations.

Even so, it is still possible for it to retrieve this loss. It is still possible for it to become a champion of genuine Western union, not of the imperialist variety, organized for the purpose of waging war, but of internationalism and solidarity and for an end to war and imperialism.

"Balanced Collective Forces"

THE CONCLUDING STATEMENT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's report to Congress on the conference both emphasized the principle of "balanced collective forces" for the defense of the "Atlantic Community" which had been accepted at the conference. Acheson stated that this principle "... was the only principle which could reconcile the resources available with the demands upon them. It is the only way in which forces can be developed to meet successfully any initial attack," etc.

Acheson recognizes that the concept is revolutionary in scope, at least as it has been presented in theory. In his same address, he remarked that, "This principle of balanced collective forces is of great and perhaps revolutionary significance. It demonstrates that each country will rely on every other member of the community, and that the community will look to each country to contribute what it is best able to contribute to the common defense in accordance with a common plan." The *New York Times* points out that this amounts, in effect, "... to an international army based on a division of labor and military functions among the nations signatory to the pact."

Acheson hastily added, of course, that the leading role must be played by America. "The United States... has necessarily a leading role in building balanced collective forces." This speech was quickly followed by presentation of the Truman proposal for the shipment of arms totaling \$1¼ billion over the next fiscal year to the twelve Atlantic Pact nations, making a total of \$2½ billions *so far* (with many more billions clearly on the way). But the fact remains that American imperialism is now launching its supreme and decisive effort to mobilize and rally the nations of Western Europe so as to make them "impregnable against attack" on the part of Stalinist Russian imperialism.

IN THE CONCEPT OF BALANCED FORCES is likewise involved the concept of national sovereignty, or rather, its relaxation and partial abandonment. In some form or other, the tendency is toward the economic and social integration of Western Europe, and the real issue is: under whose leadership, and for what purposes?

The intentions of America are clear enough in this respect. The first phase of the Marshall Plan saved Europe from economic disintegration beyond the point of recovery; the second phase sought the expansion of European productivity and a partial renewal of its productive capital; the third phase, now begun, will attempt to integrate Western Europe into an economic whole, with stable currencies, high production, and a free exchange of goods. But this third phase goes hand in hand with the military mobilization of Western Europe which, in reality, will extend beyond the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952. French military manpower, British naval forces, American planes, guns and equipment—these are the "balanced forces" in view, integrated into a powerful military whole by the gears of American dollars. Although the ultimate phase is far from practical, this will unquestionably be the day when the "Atlantic Community" feels capable of assuming the offensive against the "Russian-Eastern Europe Community."

Will this concept of "balanced forces" advance very far? Can Western Europe, under American leadership, actually unify itself? Even the bare fact that twelve sovereign powers got together and announced their willingness to make such an effort should indicate that these questions exclude any dogmatic answers. Under the pressure of necessity, and in the struggle for survival, capitalism can exercise a certain flexibility never before seen and never expected. But true integration and true unification are excluded, since this requires the free and conscious participation of the national masses of all countries involved. At best, a division of military labor and military forces can take place, but it is doubtful if it will go much beyond preliminary and upper level measures.

We see, for example, the sharp struggle which has already begun over the Schuman proposal for a pooling of Western Europe's coal, iron and steel industries. The British have indicated their refusal to participate in such a measure, based upon their justified suspicions that French capitalism is intent upon organizing some kind of a Franco-German cartel combine, aimed both at a future nationalized British steel industry, and at America. Substantial sectors of European capitalists (particularly the Ruhr bourgeoisie) see the possibility of reviving Western Europe as an independent "third bourgeois force" by following the road of integration, as they understand it. Now, how can one speak of "balanced forces" if heavy industry, required to supply these forces, cannot unify and planify? The fact is that each time a serious act of "integration" is proposed, it is either rejected or modified by the other nations, beyond recognition. If this does not occur, its motivation is quickly revealed as nationalistic and imperialistic in content, and a rapid alignment of blocs takes place. Although we must see what happens as plans for building the "balanced forces" grow, it is not too difficult to predict far more struggle and conflict than harmony and integration.

FURTHERMORE, HOW SHALL AMERICAN IMPERIALISM attempt to exert its leadership? Will it demand an increasing share of Western Europe national budgets be set aside for war production purposes? How shall it persuade France that the scores of divisions to be raised and mobilized must come primarily from her manpower? What effect will the conclusion of economic aid have upon the "guns or butter" issue which will shortly confront all Western European nations? And will America's "division of labor" in the joint effort include a willingness to increase its imports from Europe, thus reducing the present export-import gap? These are but a few of the unanswered questions.

Nevertheless, the issue of Western European unity remains a living one, and revolutionary socialists of Europe again have the opportunity to present their counter-proposal for unification to that of the combined imperialists. To tell the full and rounded truth about the American-London proposal includes the necessity of presenting a counter-program. We are for a stand of Western Europe against Stalinist imperialism—and U. S. imperialism as well; the kind of effective stand an independent Western Union could make. The Acheson stand cannot beat Stalinism, but it can bring Europe to military vassalage.

The Political War for Korea

Korean Clash Tests U. S. Position in Far East

After only four or five days of war, it has become painfully apparent that Stalinism has won the political war for Korea. Whatever one thinks or speculates about the Russian timetable in military terms, they certainly never limited their objectives to military conquest. The Russians must have calculated on the minds and wills of the twenty millions of South Korean people. This is now assured them by the sheer emptiness of the alternative. The Koreans will not fight or wish success to a foreign army

which is already tainted with Syngman Rhee, and whose aims are, at the minimum, restoration of this decrepit police-state and the establishment of permanent military occupation.

This aspect of the war will become more apparent in coming months. It will come to haunt the State Department, frustrate the military and make ridiculous the entire American intervention. For the U. S. has presented no program for South Korea other than military re-conquest so that this area can be retained, for the moment only, in its Pacific strategic plan. And it is stuck with just that. It can win mountains, valleys, towns, or even Seoul itself, without having won anything but space.

If the U. S. entered the war because South Korea needed to be defended from brutal and planned aggression, it now finds that this South Korea hardly exists. If it came to the aid of the army of Syngman Rhee, it now has become the substitute for it since that army has disappeared. If it came to salvage the helpless Rhee state, this state is now only a tiny clique of frightened men without the ability even to call upon its people to defend it. If Rhee was formerly alienated from the people, he is today isolated from them and this isolation is deepened by the American army. For if Rhee was formerly stigmatized as a U. S. puppet, he is now completely identified with the U. S. since it is clear he has no other way to defend himself or reestablish his power save through the U. S.

This being so, the chief outcome of the first week of war was not so much military reversals, but the fundamental American defeat on the political field—and, whereas new battles may reverse earlier military trends, there is little prospect of recovery in politics.

Those sad liberals and non-Stalinist-Leftists who rationalized their latest rush to the colors by accepting the United Nations facade for the real thing will have ultimately to face their embarrassment. One cannot indefinitely support a war for "principle" if that principle somehow becomes increasingly elusive, and never becomes clothed in the flesh and blood that can only be acquired by support from the people involved. The liberal critics of Washington's foreign policy had been most righteous in denouncing its Korean policy. And correctly so. Five years of bolstering the most hated and anti-popular regime in all Asia, outside of Stalinland itself, are now bearing fruit.

BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES collaborated in reducing the Korean people to pawns in their global contest. Both viciously mocked the deep desire for independence and national unity in that land. But with some very important differences in the two policies: Russia's puppet in the North revolutionized social relations, distributed the land to the landless and created a new class of privileged bureaucrats who preyed on the peasantry. Through "mixed companies" Russia penetrated all the more productive areas of the economy, coordinated it with its North Manchurian and Siberian structure. But in the process it restored industry, increased the number of workers, and granted them special privileges, abolishing the millenium-old Asiatic society.

Stalinism substituted its own modern despotism which, because it is totalitarian, demands of every one a total transformation, demands that every Korean accept the new gospel without hesitation or question. How successful Stalinism has been in these

five years, it is hard to say. Certainly there is evidence that the unruffled surface covered an accumulation of discontent, particularly among the peasants. Millions of Northerners fled their homes, or were driven out, and came South during this time. But, by all these means, modern Stalinism created for itself a relatively wide base of support and reduced the opposition to an ineffectual force.

The clearest example of the Russian method is, of course, the Northern army. This is an elite corps, well-fed and clothed, trained in the use of the latest weapons. An integral part of Russia's Far Eastern legions, it is equipped as befits an adjunct, albeit a minor one, of a great power. Beneath these accoutrements, and making them effective, is the heavy indoctrination of the soldiers, the constant propaganda, the ever-present political commissar—all of which supply morale, purpose and confidence in the leadership.

BY CONTRAST, CONSIDER the former Southern army: inferior in numbers and equipment and training it was the nucleus for a police force rather than an army. Its armaments consisted of rifles and some light artillery; no planes, tanks or heavy guns. It could not defend the country because it was not even a well-rounded military force, other considerations aside.

One must ask how this came to be: that the creation of the enormously powerful U. S. should be so poor indeed. The whole answer is not yet clear, but the fact that it is so is damning enough. For the fact is that neither the state nor the U. S. military mission has any faith in their own army and, therefore, hesitated to equip it. This absence of faith is no secret. It has been freely expressed and was based on the reality that the

army was honey-combed with dissenters. Desertions were frequent. On many occasions whole battalions, with their officers, went over to the North. Last December, an entire garrison went over to rebellion. This revolt was suppressed by a bloody terror which turned the former rebels into guerrillas. The army was a constant source of manpower and arms for the guerrilla forces. Corruption, which is the normal life of the state, was the code of the officer corps. The army had no morale because it had no faith in its leaders or their regime or its very own purpose. It knew that its main function was to suppress popular movements. It was an arm of the hated police. Above all, every soldier knew that Syngman Rhee was not depending on him, but that the regime's defense program depended on speedy U. S. intervention.

But an army can only reflect social origins. On the heels of Japanese collapse the entire nation had risen in an explosion of freedom. A political movement embracing all classes except the tiny collaborationist aristocracy arose out of this jubilation to form the first people's republic. The U. S. occupation suppressed this really popular movement out of fear and ignorance. Once the harm was done the occupation had to lean more and more heavily on the most reactionary groups. As U. S. world policy became oriented toward the cold war it sought in Korea such support as would be most adequate to its strategic needs there against Russia. That is, the U. S. had to lean on those groups which sought to maintain the social order and thereby, presumably, social peace. Since the U. S. feared the people, because of the danger to law and order, it became allied to those Koreans who feared the people. The U. S. became the sustaining prop

to the crumbling Asiatic medievalism whose native Rhee government remained in power through constant terror, kidnappings, arrests, murder—and a ubiquitous police operating without legal restraint.

Intolerable as political condition were, the economy was worse. Inflation became so rampant that Ambassador Jessup demanded some definite steps against it early in 1950 or else ECA funds would be withheld. Industry was at a standstill. The division of the country, the heavy state bureaucracy's drain on agriculture on top of that of the landlord's, added to the growing military establishment, lay like the proverbial albatross about the neck of the people. The point was that South Korea, no more than the rest of Asia, could remain aloof from the need for deep-going change in order to survive in the modern world. North Korea made its own reactionary adaptation. But in the south, U. S. policy supported those who stood for the ancient and impossible order.

That is why the regime was so hated, as the U. S. also came to be, by indentification. Its every act had to be one of restraint against the inevitable desires of the people for change. The popular volcano was kept from eruption by sitting on it. Even so Seoul reported 19,066 killed, 3,281 wounded, 7,140 captured and 2,144 surrendered in its chronic anti-guerilla war in 1949 alone. According to northern reports these skirmishes took place in all 8 of the south's provinces, in 7 out of 15 cities, 119 out of 133 counties. It was estimated that in spite of constant suppression campaigns, the army's chief function, guerillas grew from 16,000 in April 1949 to 90,000 in October, 1949. That is what South Korea looked like on the eve of war.

Since U.S. policy in Korea was no different from its Chinese policy, it is

now suffering the same consequences. Washington has not got any program to fight Stalinism. Its intervention in Korea by force after 5 years of failure through politics will be noted by all Asiatic peoples, as well as by the Koreans, as failure.

An American military victory will achieve what? It cannot simply restore the old regime because that regime is in ribbons; it barely exists at all. And besides, it would be only a matter of time before it again succumbs to revolt or invasion. Can the U.S. introduce needed reforms? That is the Chinese dilemma all over again. The old regime has too many supporters in Washington who would shout communist at such effort. Besides, it would require swapping horses in the midst of war and who in the South can really trust such sudden new blandishments—that is, among those opponents of Rhee who are not in jail? Rhee has proved his ability to take care of his enemies even when U.S. courted them just as Chiang did with the Democratic League. And the largest consideration of all is that Washington has dropped pretenses about reform in favor of all-out strategic and military considerations. That is the meaning of the Korean act itself, not to mention Formosa, Japan and Indo-China.

The American program in Korea must be one of permanent military occupation. The Korean people sense this and are forced into the arms of Stalinism thereby. The plain fact is that the U.S. has not offered the Koreans anything but a battlefield to fight for. This, and not Stalinism's armies, is the source of its victories.

July 5, 1950

JACK BRAD

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

Asia Enters World History

New Forces Challenge the Old Problems of the East

It is commonplace knowledge that the Asiatic world, with its countless masses, has undergone a most profound transformation since the Second World War. Just as acceptable is the proposition that this transformation will continue into the indefinite future and the fluidity of the Asiatic world will remain. With varying degrees of skill, a dozen authors, journalists and historians have furnished the details of this historic change and described the men and forces at work. It is no longer possible, however, to refer simply to a "state of flux," and let matters go at that, as so many have done.

Whatever validity there may have been to former concepts of the timeless and all-absorbing Asia, which occupied the role of static subject in world history, it is no longer possible to accept such premises. The only possible approach to a reunderstanding of the Asiatic and colonial world is the concept of an Asia now, for the first time, entering world history as a positive factor. Otherwise, the new driving forces which have arisen in post-war Asia cannot be understood. Much more than Japanese occupation and colonial rule has been cast aside in the great revolt that has disturbed the East since the end of the war. All traditional concepts of Asia have been violently overthrown and a number of new concepts, proposed in place of the old, now struggle for authority and power. These new and unexpected forces demand critical examination. They are responsible for the fluid situation in which, at best, one can point to certain tendencies and directions, without the

possibility of stating with any degree of certainty or accuracy what ultimate form that may settle down to.

NATIONALIST INDIA, finally freed from British rule, and Stalinist China, ruled by a new conqueror and a new social force, represent the two clearest paths yet to be seen in the entangled Asiatic world. Both have emerged, after long gestation, as expressions of revolt against Western imperialism. But both have absorbed so much of what was backward in the old Asia and so much of what is backward in the world as a whole, with its drift toward totalitarian decay, that—in different ways to be sure—Nehru's India and Mao Tse-tung's China must be considered deformations of the freedom and social resurrection so desired by the Asiatic masses.

The wide and sweeping torrent of the Asiatic freedom movement has been diverted and divided into rival channels; Indian capitalism, largely influenced by both Britain and America; and Chinese Stalinism, largely dominated by the Stalinism of Russia. Neither can be instruments for Asiatic self-realization and liberation.

If the significance of the struggles of the colonial peoples may be given a single and central objective, we would describe it as the desire to create a democratic and radical society, moving toward socialism and vigorously attacking the thick crust of accumulated backwardness and social misery. They desire the application of the most advanced social theories to meet the needs and desires of a billion colonial people. The central problem of Asia is still the problem

of land relationships, the peasantry, of agrarian economic and social relations.

FOR WIDELY DIVERGENT REASONS, which require separate and distinct analysis, neither Nehru nor Mao Tse-tung can offer a rounded and consistent solution to the agrarian revolution. Further, such problems as industrialization, trade and commerce, the formation of fresh capital, social emancipation and education, have different meanings to different social orders. It cannot simply be said that Asia must catch up with a Western world now in decline and in chronic distress any more than the example of Russia, whose totalitarian form becomes ever clearer, can be held up as a model.

In this sense, both Chinese Stalinism and Indian national capitalism are reactionary solutions for Asia. Both are as much products of a general world decline, and the specific evils this decline has produced in Asia itself, as they are products of national movements for liberation from Western domination. It would be more accurate to say that both are distortions of the Asiatic freedom movements.

Given their present regimes, democratic socialism cannot hope for a bright future in either China or India. Those who divorce the sweeping social upheaval in China from its actual Stalinist leadership are in serious error, for the ruling Stalinist class, limited though it may be by the concrete material circumstances, represents a power conscious of its objectives and capable of manipulating the raw material it controls. Aside from their vastly different social and historic origins, both regimes have bureaucratic ideologies, reject democratic approaches and solutions and tend to-

ward employment of totalitarian and authoritarian methodologies.

In India, this has been most clearly illustrated in dealings with other nations and peoples (Pakistan, Hyderabad, Kashmir, etc.); in China, by internal economic and social practices of the regime in relationship to the peasantry and working class. Reactionary and tyrannical practices, originating in the deep past of an Asia that has been feudal or semi-feudal within and ruled by imperialism from without, may easily be found in both lands. Similar tendencies may be found in all the newly-awakened lands of Asia: Indonesia, Viet Nam, Korea, etc.

EACH COUNTRY OF ASIA has broken sharply with its historic past, but all to one or another extent—are threatened with the same crisis and decline so familiar in European and Western history. To this must be added the threat of national-Stalinist regimes, a recognized trend in world decline. This truth is basic for understanding the circumstances surrounding Asia's entrance into world history.

Marxism is obligated to examine carefully the basic reasons for this unexpected outcome to the collapse of Western rule over Asia. It must examine, in detail, why the end of imperialism has not ushered in the glorious Asiatic renaissance so desired by supporters of the colonial freedom movements. This is a task for extensive research and analysis, but we should like to suggest, in summary form, some basic reasons for this situation:

(1) Liberation has been interpreted by bourgeois-nationalist, Stalinist and non-socialist forces alike, as being synonymous with nationalism at a time when the nation, considered as a progressive concept, has already had its

day. The act of becoming a nation is, for a colonial land, filled with revolutionary content. But subsequent stabilization and consolidation, under the type of regime represented in China or India, or any of the reactionary forms of present society, quickly drains this revolutionary content away. Instead the birth of the nation degenerates into tragedy, and progress is halted.

(2) The decline of Western imperialism and Western empire has occurred in an unforeseen manner. As a corollary to this, the effort of world Stalinism to fill this gap was not expected. The conflict between Russia and the United States has created a new framework which acts as a vise strangling the entire world, including those colonial areas already free and those still struggling for freedom. Although the "cold war" offers no possible benefit to the people of Asia, it tends to subordinate their own needs to the struggle; it narrows down world development and makes it possible for Asia to break out into world history only under most unfavorable circumstances.

(3) The specific and peculiar manner in which the British Empire exploded, expressed by the sudden relaxation of its hold over huge colonial areas and the creation of working agreements with the native bourgeoisie in India, Ceylon, Burma, etc., had the effect of decreasing the power of the colonial people to struggle independently on their own behalf since little or no popular mobilization was required. By the same token, the dependency of colonial landlord and capitalist classes, particularly in the case of India, upon their own masses lessened considerably, in proportion with the catastrophic tempo of British decline. This same national ruling class, shifting steadily to the right,

unexpectedly received the welcome gift of political and social power, which it now employs against its own masses, as it fell heir to the retreating English.

(4) In the past, a deceptive and misleading force, but one of powerful magnetic attraction, existed in Russia. Today, this force has been largely replaced by that of Stalinist China, whose upheaval and appeal directed to impoverished and backward masses has an even more dynamic attractive power than that of Russia, the world power. It is perhaps correct to state that the Asiatic world now sees Russia *through* the China of Mao Tse-tung, where the universally hated regime of Kuomintangism has been destroyed. It is worthy of note that the attitude of Asiatic socialists and revolutionaries who are highly critical of the Stalin regime is considerably softer and more sympathetic toward that of Peiping.

(5) Democratic socialism, independent of foreign influence and acting as a genuine expression of popular needs, has as yet failed to develop as a serious force in any Asiatic or colonial land. Together with this, the fact that the working class has nowhere played a specific or leading role has contributed to a situation in which Marxist theory and practice have failed to advance or to challenge Stalinist leadership anywhere.

THE END OF COLONIAL EMPIRE is now a well advanced process. The question is, what shall take its place? It is most unlikely that the United States will be able to re-establish a new empire system, either on a colonial basis or through the medium of sweeping economic domination. If we leave aside those areas in Asia which border directly upon Russia, it would appear equally impossible for that

country to summon up the required strength to create its own, specifically Russia, Asiatic empire.

Thus the end of empire leaves the whole question of Asia unresolved. It likewise places a question mark over that sector of world economy represented by Western Europe, which became the most powerful concentration of world economy because of its orientation toward, and relationship with non-capitalist, undeveloped areas. Those nations constituting the imperialist sector of world economy now have the problem of existing in a world in which their economy and technology have lost both meaning and purport. How shall France, England, Holland, Belgium, Italy, etc., reorient their empire-founded economies? Again we see the link between Eastern and Western worlds, in terms of historic perspective.

This same problem of economic orientation is crucial for the colonial world. How shall the dependent colonial economies exist in this new world without their old supports? The answer to such questions will determine the basis of Asia's future political divisions. In China alone the problem is somewhat different since Stalinism has had a relatively independent development and its actual relationship with Russia is far from determined. In every other part of Asia where it has acquired political power (Manchuria, Korea, etc.), Stalinism has wholly and directly been dependent upon Russian power.

Of the capitalist powers still involved in Asiatic affairs, only the future of the United States is not yet determined. The British cling to Malaya and the island rock of Hong Kong, but these are, at best, last outposts on the continent. The U. S. *White Paper* on China is a relevant

case history of our relations with all of Asia and, examined from this standpoint, we see how the U. S.'s prime concern with strategic considerations resulted in an essentially negative and self-defeating policy. The Point Four proposal of President Truman, still in an anemic form, deserves to be analyzed as an example of both the difficulties inherent in establishing imperial power today, and the state-directed character of modern ventures into colonial development. But all this together hardly makes a vigorous or clear-cut policy!

Within the nationalist movements throughout Southeast Asia we see today the creation of a new and dynamic force in the form of popular socialist parties. Its hostility toward both its own national rulers and toward Asiatic Stalinism is a distinguishing feature of this movement, which is both democratic and socialist in origin. Is this the true heir of militant, revolutionary nationalism? Does this force perhaps presage an all-Asia political development historically somewhat akin to the Labor and Social-Democratic movement in Europe and the Western world?

While it is true that a reformist movement in the classic European sense is unlikely (this would contradict our viewpoint that Asiatic capitalism has a dim and crisis-ridden perspective), it would be a gross error, in our opinion, to deny the possibility of a mass, popular movement in Southeast Asia bearing many resemblances to European Social Democracy. We know how powerfully European reformism came back in post-war Europe, despite the absence of what had generally been considered economic prerequisites. Its revival, although temporary and already past its peak, fulfilled a *political* need, created

by the absence of a mass revolutionary movement and the presence of the Stalinist movement. Essentially the same kind of vacuum now exists in Southeast Asia, with the additional factor that such a movement would necessarily rise on a program much to the left of its European counterpart because of the fact that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not completed in the Southeastern Asiatic lands.

Such a development would be highly welcome to revolutionary socialists for obvious reasons. It would revive the flagging spirits of broad masses who are beginning to succumb to the same lethargy-producing confusion so clear in Europe. It would provide a "new way" to those who spurn both the Stalinist and pro-American paths. Yet it would be premature at this time to predict confidently such a formation, and it would further conceal the fact that these democratic, socialist groups (the Socialist Party of India is the leading element of such a tendency) have nowhere reached full maturity. They must fight for their life against persistent Stalinist penetration, while conducting an equally bitter struggle against reactionary and conservative nationalism. It must also be pointed out that the acquisition of national independence more or less by default, without any decisive struggle, as in the case of India, has meant that great masses of people have still to become involved in some kind of fresh and current public action, the only experience capable of developing a spirit of initiative and autonomy.

Thus an Asiatic expression of social democracy or democratic socialism runs the risk of being born without wide mass support. Of necessity it must create such support. Its test will be its attitude toward the social ques-

tions and the practical solutions it proposes; together with its attitude toward the struggle of the "cold war." With understandable, realistic and drastic answers, the submerged peoples of Asia will remain indifferent and political struggles will continue to have their present abstract character of maneuvers among top leaders; not to mention the attractive force Stalinist China will exert on Southeast Asia.

FROM AN INTERNATIONAL POINT OF VIEW, and just as decisively from an internal standpoint, we thus discover three forces at work in the struggle for mastery of the Asiatic world: expanding Russian and world Stalinist power; expanding American economic and strategic power, allied with conservative and reactionary nationalist classes (Philippines, India, Korea, etc.) whose stated objective it is to form a Pacific counterpart of the North Atlantic bloc; and, finally, loosely organized socialist and democratic movements, as well as militant nationalist forces, which, in a timid and hesitant fashion, project the concept of an independent South Asiatic Federation of Peoples, free from Russian, American and imperialist influence.

Just as the slogan of an independent Western European Federation could, if correctly applied, advance the socialist and democratic cause in Europe, so it is our opinion that the concept of a Southeast Asiatic Union (India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma, etc.) could serve socialist and revolutionary objectives throughout all of Asia. Here again we see that intimate tieup of world problems, serving as further evidence of Asia's lasting involvement in world history. The conference organized in 1949 by Nehru did not advance the cause of Asiatic

unification, but rather pushed it back. Nehru and his equivalent in other countries conceive of such a union only in terms of *American organization and backing*, something for which they are not yet prepared to commit themselves openly. When socialists speak of such a union, they place emphasis upon its independence and self-reliance.

Basically, all the arguments advanced for the concept of an independent Western Union apply to an independent Southeast Asia Union. This idea must be developed and elaborated by the socialists and democratic elements of Asia itself, so that it becomes a living part of their program, as well as a living counter-slogan to the Stalinist program of unification under Russian-Stalinist domination. It would appear of vital urgency for independent revolutionists in Asia to discuss this question if they are not to be swamped between the American and Stalinist waves.

To CONCLUDE THEN, the continent of Asia is in a highly fluid state and no one can foresee what ultimate

forms the present transition will lead to. We must examine, analyze and describe, but understand that as yet no fixed or determined direction can be seen. Old states and old ruling classes, as in the rest of the world, have been upset, together with old social forms.

But the revolt of Asia is part of a world process and must be viewed as such. For the first time in many hundreds of years, Asia has re-entered the main stream of world history. It can now help in determining the future, and no one would dare attempt to calculate the future without giving Asia a major place in his calculations. For the moment, large sections of Asia remain outside of the political and social battleground on which the "cold war" between Russia and America is being waged, although the latest example of Viet Nam indicates how this "war" is spreading and devouring everything.

Nevertheless, there is a respite for Asia. It is Asia's opportunity.

JACK BRAD
HENRY JUDD

The Scientist in a Time of Terror

A Discussion of Science and Social Responsibility

Scientists desiring a quiet life would have done better to live in the 19th rather than the 20th century. For, like it or not, science today is intertwined with politics, and scientists cannot separate themselves from social conflict. The only question is: shall they consciously enter into the struggle or continue to be the dupes of prescientific forces? If scientists wish to live up to the best tradition of their profession they will seek to

understand their times and the social and political role they can best play.

During the continued growth of capitalism in the 19th century, a scientist could, consciously or unconsciously, play a progressive role. Rene J. Dubos in his biography of an outstanding scientist of the 19th century, *Louis Pasteur* (Little, Brown & Co., 1950), writes of the hope then that man "would soon complete his mastery over nature." As a result of this

hope there was faith and enthusiasm in science throughout the Western World. To quote Dubos further: "the 19th was a wonderful century. Its scientists were masterful practitioners of the experimental method and, at the same time, they knew how to integrate their efforts into the classical ages. . . . In their hands, science was not only a servant of society, an instrument for the control of the physical world, but also an adornment of our Western culture." During this period, though many evils of capitalism were apparent, the bourgeoisie could still point to the hope that science would provide plenty for all in the future.

Following World War I, which more than the calendar marked the end of the "wonderful century," science still remained on the sidelines, away from the main flow of politics. But one important change had taken place since the 19th century: science had at last matured to the extent that its material benefits could be given to all, politics allowing. During the depression of the Thirties, production was curtailed, and the food, clothing and shelter which science and technology had made available were allowed to waste. We heard then of the "Frustration of Science," and "Science in an Irrational World," but saw little activity from the scientists to implement this mild intellectual protest.

TODAY THE EFFECT OF SCIENCE ON our lives is such that the problem can be avoided by no one. As James B. Conant, president of Harvard University, writes in the January, 1950, issue of *Foreign Affairs*: "The advent of the scientist into the news and the growing interest of the nation in science are the direct consequence of World War II. But quite apart from the fact

that certain new tools of war, notably the atomic bomb, the proximity fuse and radar, were products of scientific laboratories, there has been a growing appreciation in the last 50 years of the national importance of scientific progress. Today a government official or an elected representative in Washington thinking in terms of either increasing the military potential of the country or the industrial capacity will wish to consult both scientists and engineers."

Aside from the increased military, governmental and industrial influence on his activities, the scientist is also greatly influenced by the fact that he no longer works as an individual. Modern science is elaborate and expensive. A single piece of equipment such as a cyclotron may cost a million dollars. As a result, scientists find that they can achieve better results when they are organized in "teams" with large and extensive laboratory facilities at their disposal. Abstractly, such organization, if properly carried out, need not restrict the intellectual freedom necessary for a scientist's best work.

It is small wonder, then, that scientists can no longer be aloof to the outside world. The manner in which the scientist feels the impact of events on his activities can be summarized by two words: freedom and responsibility.

The meaning of freedom to the scientist is indicated by P. W. Bridgeman (*Reflection of a Physicist*—Philosophical Library, 1950): "there is no scientific method as such, only the free and utmost use of intelligence. In certain fields of application, such as the so-called natural sciences, the free and utmost use of intelligence particularized itself into what is popularly called the scientific method." Most

scientists feel that in a rational society which is becoming increasingly complex, any necessary organization of science should be in a manner which will not destroy its creative function. Above all they feel that the inherent freedom of the individual or the scientific method must not be impaired. The crux of the situation is that scientists cannot be half free. Freedom in thinking, intellectual honesty, cannot be turned on and off like a faucet. This is why the demand of any government for secrecy in research, lack of intercourse between scientists of different countries, loyalty checks and clearances, and direct interference in a scientific theory are so oppressive to the letter and spirit of science. It is small wonder then that "Freedom in Science" has become a rallying point in the current rebellion of scientists.

Aldous Huxley, though not a scientist, has summed up well the question of responsibility in *Human Rights* (Columbia University Press, 1949): "The time has surely come when scientific workers must consider, individually and collectively, the ethical problem of 'right livelihood.' How far is a man justified in following a course of professional action which, though involving no immediate wrong-doing, results in social consequences which are manifestly undesirable or downright evil? Specifically, how far is it right for the scientist or technologist to participate in work, the outcome of which will be to increase the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling minority and to provide soldiers with the means for wholesale extermination of civilians?" Many of the American scientific journals have been thrown open to all viewpoints in an effort to obtain a collective answer to these questions.

Over the past several years the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* has done an excellent job in reviewing these discussions. The reactions of the scientists can generally be classified into four viewpoints:

(1) The traditional or conservative—that scientists have no more concern about the social and political implications of science than other "citizens." These scientists invariably end by supporting the dominant political and military policy.

(2) The renunciation of war research, but with no other social or political reaction.

(3) The utopian, pacifist, world government response—that scientists should seek to maintain the freedom of science from oppression from all sources. This they propose to do by international cooperation of scientists, and politically by agitating for "One World."

(4) An attempt to find a satisfactory social and political answer—as among those scientists who, basically dissatisfied with all conventional approaches, have joined the Federation of American Scientists or the Association of Scientific Workers.

THE CONSERVATIVE POSITION has been expressed by P. W. Bridgeman, Nobel prize winner in physics (1946), in the March, 1947, issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Bridgeman poses the question of responsibility correctly: "does each and every scientist have a moral obligation to see to it that the uses society makes of scientific discoveries are beneficent?" For a positive answer Bridgeman feels that there would have to be something special and exceptional in the position of the scientist. Otherwise, by the same token, the miner of iron ore would be obligated to see that no iron

scrap was sold to Japan. (Apparently Bridgeman is not aware that at times miners and other workers have taken collective action for political and social purposes.)

Bridgeman admits that because of special abilities scientists might be expected to exercise more social responsibility than others. But he feels it would be wrong for society to expect this of them since it is an erroneous social philosophy which says that "the community has a right to exact disproportional service from special ability." Bridgeman then proceeds to claim that it is wrong for society to impose such responsibility on scientists since society itself has not been successful in overcoming its problems. Thus, scientists have no particular responsibility since society has not as yet matured sufficiently to abolish war.

That the idea of lack of responsibility can only result in acquiescing to the dominant political position of the day is seen in an article, "Physicists and the Cold War," by Frederick Seitz in the March issue of the *Bulletin*. Seitz sees the present world crisis as a struggle between the ideals of the "East and West" for supremacy. He calls upon physicists and scientists to devote a greater fraction of their time to research of military interest which was "so successful during the recent war." Edward Teller also directs the scientists "back to the laboratories," stating "it is *not* the scientist's job to determine whether an H-bomb should be used, or how it should be used." Rather the scientist should contribute "by making the country strong." In typical unscientific confusion, Teller advises the scientist to do good "by explaining this dangerous world to his fellow citizens."

THE FACT THAT MOST SCIENTISTS

think otherwise is indicated by the general aversion among them to military research. The trend, where possible, is into peaceful and more useful pursuits. This viewpoint was clearly upheld by Cuthbert Daniel and Arthur Squires, former Manhattan Project scientists, in the October 1948 issue of the *Bulletin*. Addressing themselves to American scientists and engineers working on weapon projects, they write: "Scientists are not automatons; their sincerity and fundamental decency cannot be called into question. And yet, under far less compulsion than the German scientists they engage in the business of preparing death for millions of innocent people. It is the situation that is wrong." Since scientists generally are not evil men, many are leaving weapon projects. A few scientists may enjoy the increase in power they have gained but most do not like the course that science has been forced to take.

Some scientists confuse the claim for freedom of science with the freedom from responsibility. Daniel and Squires deny that the search for truth of whatever nature is always justified. Obviously it is wrong to conduct painful or lethal experiments on human beings. Likewise there is no justification for every research in "pure science" simply on the basis that it may appear to be separate from technology. Much of "pure science" today is pointed toward fields that can lead to improved methods of destruction. As a guide for scientists in the exercise of responsibility, Daniel and Squires suggest discussion of the social consequences of their activities and refusal to engage in these activities if discussion reveals the consequences to be evil.

Norbert Wiener, the authority on cybernetics, is an excellent example of

an outstanding scientist who has publicly renounced all war work. Dr. Wiener has repeatedly refused to do any scientific work, especially military, which he does not consider will be used for the best interests of science and of humanity. Such an individual acceptance of moral responsibility and forthright refusal to participate in the world's crazy rush to destruction can only receive the highest moral commendation. Furthermore, conceivably, if sufficient numbers of scientists, accepted this, a strike against work on war weapons could go far toward ensuring peace.

Realistically, however, what can be expected of the outright renunciation of scientific war work? Theoretically, each scientist who walks away from destructive work decreases the number of new weapons produced. However, even if all additional scientific war work would stop today an extremely destructive war could result by using weapons now available. No additional scientific work is necessary to stockpile an immense quantity of A-bombs. Actually, the greatest limiting factor today on increased scientific work is not the actual number of scientists available, but money, time and organization. And though we should like to consider it in the best tradition of science to scorn war work, we must realize that many scientists, now and in the future, will be willing to engage in destructive scientific activity. They, as well as others, can be sold on "one more war to save democracy." Even Hitler was able to obtain scientists of a sort. We can expect then that the effect of the individual scientist's renunciation of war work on the military machine will be minor.

This renunciation cannot be considered only abstractly as above but

also relative to war resistance in general. If a few very prominent scientists or a mass movement of scientists would denounce destructive research, a great "lift" might be given to those who "oppose the manufacture and the politics of the H-bomb." Using these terms, R. Fahan (*THE NEW INTERNATIONAL*, March-April, 1950) feels that the anti-war sentiment of the scientists should be combined with other "anti-bomb" elements into an attempt at a mass anti-war movement. I will leave a detailed political consideration of an anti-bomb movement to others. I feel, however, that emphasis upon such a movement will fail in preventing World War III just as much as an "anti-poison gas" movement would have failed to have prevented World War II. The imperialist powers can still have a "pretty damn good war" without A- or H-bombs—a war which would set back humanity and the working class movement tremendously. The fact that the use of such bombs would cause greater mass destruction is in my opinion a quantitative, not a qualitative, difference. Undoubtedly both imperialist powers would be glad to buy a "safe war" without atomic bombs if, by foregoing such weapons, they could win the support of all their national and international sympathizers (including the "anti-bomb" movement).

TO ASK: HOW SHOULD A SCIENTIST REACT "as a scientist," that is, should he or should he not engage in war work as a physicist or a chemist, is too limited an approach. Scientists, in the best meaning of the term, will, without question, disengage themselves as much as possible from objectionable or distasteful activity. The major question is where do they go

from there? And far more important than their function as physicists or chemists is their reaction as scientists in the broad concept of the term.

The main characteristic of the scientist is that he attempts to be a rational being. If he is a successful scientist or engineer he has achieved this in his own specialized field of professional endeavor. It is not too much to expect that if he turns consciously to political and social matters the *tendency* will be for him to continue to act in a rational manner. Many scientists have accepted irrational social, religious and political beliefs merely because they have accepted without thinking the dominant beliefs of the day. By and large most scientists and engineers have accepted such positions by "default." It is our opinion that scientists and engineers today, because of the objective cultural situation in which it becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile the aims of science with capitalism, will take off their blinders and tend to revolt against the misuse of science.

Unfortunately, so far, the revolt has many "utopian" aspects. This results in campaigns to scare the world into a renunciation of war, agitation for a world government, and activity in the United Nations, particularly in Unesco. Foremost among the scientists seeking a solution through a "world government" is Albert Einstein. Einstein has long been known as a Utopian Socialist and in his latest writings (*Out of My Late Years*, Philosophical Library, 1950) pleads for a planned economy in which the democratic rights of the workers will not be overshadowed by a centralized bureaucracy. He calls for a "supranational political force as protection against fresh wars of aggression." How such a force can emerge from the na-

tionalistic conflicts of today remains unanswered.

The United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) serves as a focal group for those scientists who hope that international cooperation in science will lead the way to "One World" of peace and goodwill. Insofar as such groups seek to maintain the rights of science they serve a useful purpose but it is likely that the main result will be only lengthy documents from Lake Success.

In the August-September 1949 issue of the *Bulletin*, Julian Huxley and Bart Bok write of the "Freedom of Science" and the "Charter for Scientists" which resulted from the Committee on Science and its Social Relations of the International Council of Scientific Unions meeting in Paris, June, 1948. This document calls for honesty and integrity among scientists and asks that they endeavor to guide science to useful ends and to seek international cooperation. To fulfill these obligations, scientists would claim the right to participate in the activities open to all citizens; to know the purpose of their research, and full rights of publication and discussion.

BECAUSE THE ABOVE APPROACHES are unsatisfactory to many scientists, they have organized into such groups as the Federation of American Scientists and the Association of Scientific Workers. The efforts of these scientists toward political and social action have been reviewed in recent issues of *Labor Action*. The ASW as part of the World Federation of Scientific Workers has perhaps gone farther than any other group in making the correct analysis of the problem. In the January, 1949, issue of *Science and Mankind*, the preamble to "A Charter for Scientific Workers" states:

The primary responsibility for the maintenance and development of science must lie with the scientific workers themselves, because they alone can understand the nature of the work and the directions in which advance is needed. The responsibility for the use of science, however, must be a joint responsibility of scientific workers and of the people at large. Scientific workers neither have nor claim to have control over the administrative, economic and technical powers of the communities in which they live. Nevertheless they have a special responsibility for pointing out where the neglect or abuse of scientific knowledge will lead to results detrimental to the community. At the same time, the community itself must be able and willing to appreciate and to use the possibilities offered by science, which can be achieved only through the widespread teachings of the methods and results of the natural and social sciences.

In even the most progressive of the scientist's viewpoints today there appears to be "something more" needed. This is hinted by Eric Ashby, who pleads for a broader viewpoint in the October, 1948, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* by saying: "if the scientist combines with the man who grows his bread and the man who digs his coal, in a common assault on the problem, he may have some chance of making an impression on governments and influencing the course of diplomacy."

LET US CONSIDER this possibility of scientists, technologists and engineers moving toward collaboration with organized labor. Since scientific workers are basically skilled workers both by the nature of their own psychological approach and their contribution to production, it is not utopian to expect their revolt to develop along the same lines as workers in general. Certainly the movement of scientists into such groups as the FAS and the AASCW is a healthy trend in that direction. And since they are intellectuals, they can be expected to do more consciously what the mass of workers are driven

to by the course of events. A scientists' movement against the main current of capitalism, however, will be motivated not only by their short term economic and social interests, but also by their moral concern over the misuse of science.

Scientists and workers alike are oppressed by nations preparing for war with loyalty checks, guilt by association and other attacks on civil rights. Scientists wishing to educate the people in the implications of science will find an excellent opportunity through the organized educational programs of the labor unions. The details and technicalities of any science are tortuously involved; but properly taught, the meaning and use of the scientific method can be grasped by most people. The association of the scientists with mass production workers would be mutually stimulating and give new meaning to each group's activities. It is not too much to expect that further development of the FAS and the AASCW combined with organizational drives by the AFL and the CIO could lead to additional unions of scientists, engineers, and other intellectual workers. Large unions of intellectual workers would do much to bring all white collar workers into the mainstream of American labor.

Finally, we can be sure that scientists will really be acting "as scientists" when they see their own problems as part of the larger struggle of masses of people to control their own economic, social and political destinies. When scientists, labor unionists, and the working people in general realize that "Capitalism made science possible, and science today makes capitalism superfluous," the main problems of today will be well on their way to solution.

To the conscience stricken scientist,

who because of pacifist or "scientific" convictions, is considering the resignation of his job, the socialists might say: "We admire your sensitivity, your social awareness, and courage and would defend your right to make such a decision regarding your employment. However since you, as a worker, no matter how highly skilled, are replaceable, your resignation is at best

a temporary retarder on the destructive scientific development on which you are employed. Insofar as your resignation frees you, objectively and *subjectively*, for greater participation in ideas and movements dedicated to the constructive use of all natural and human resources, then to that extent only is your resignation a desirable action." CARL DARTON

Four Portraits of Stalinism—IV

Concluding an Examination of Wolfe's Book

It is hard to say who has written more absurdities about Lenin's "organizational principles": the Stalinists who seek to prove that their totalitarian party regime conforms identically with the views set forth by Lenin or the modern anti-Bolsheviks who argue that if the two are not quite identical it is nevertheless Lenin's views and practises that led directly to the present Stalinist regime. They represent complementary and mutually parasitic parts of a division of labor which has successfully devastated the thinking of millions of people, with one saying that the totalitarian tyranny leads to (or is!) socialism and the other that socialism can lead to nothing but this totalitarian tyranny.

Either as perpetrators or victims of falsification, both are so thoroughly and extensively wrong that it would require volumes just to exhumate and properly correlate the facts. It is not merely a matter of setting the historical record right—that is of secondary importance. It is above all a matter of resuming the lagging fight for socialism, which a Stalin abandoned so completely to pursue one reactionary course and a Wolfe has abandoned

just as completely to pursue a different reactionary course.

In Lenin's conception of the "party machine," of its role in relationship to the working class, Wolfe finds (as what popular writer nowadays does not?) "the germ of a party dictatorship over the proletariat itself, exercised in its name," that is, the germ of Stalinism. It is out of this feature of Bolshevism that Wolfe erects the third pillar of his analysis. He reminds us that at the beginning Trotsky warned against the inevitable outcome of Lenin's conception:

The organization of the party will take the place of the party; the Central Committee will take the place of the organization; and finally the dictator will take the place of the Central Committee.

"Was ever prophecy more fatefully fulfilled by history?" exclaims Wolfe. The truth is that if prophets had no better example than this of how they are confirmed by history, the profession would be in sorry shape. With due respect to Trotsky, it can be said that to find in Stalinism a fulfillment of Trotsky's "Cassandra-like prevision" (Wolfe's phrase) of Lenin's conception requires a well-trained capacity for superficiality assisted by an elaborate ignoring—we will not say man-

ipulation—of the historical facts. The “prevision” was not fulfilled *at all*, and Trotsky himself was not the last to understand this.

But before this is established, let us see what it is that makes Lenin’s views so reprehensible in Wolfe’s eyes. Rather, let us try to see, for on this score Wolfe is either ambiguous or obscure, or just plain silent. He makes the task of the reviewer almost baffling. Attentive reading of page after page of Wolfe fails to disclose exactly what it was in Lenin’s ideas about the “party machine” that led to Stalinism.

WAS IT LENIN’S CONCEPTION of who is entitled to party membership? Wolfe describes the dispute at the party congress in 1903 on the famous Article I of the party constitution. Lenin’s draft defined a party member as one “who recognizes the party’s program and supports it by material means *and by personal participation in one of the party organizations.*” Martov, leader of the Mensheviks-to-be, proposed that the phrase in italics be replaced entirely by the following: “and by regular personal assistance under the direction of one of the party organizations.” Martov’s formula was supported by the majority of the delegates.

Wolfe describes Lenin’s view unsympathetically, which is his God-given right. But what was wrong with it? Wolfe’s answer is a significant wink and a knowing nod of the head, as if to say, “Now you can see where Lenin was heading from the very start, can’t you? Now you know what Bolshevism was at its very origin. If you really want to trace Stalinism to its historical roots, there indeed is one of the sturdiest and most malignant of them.”

But wink and nod notwithstanding, all that Lenin proposed was a provision that had been and was then and has ever since been a commonplace in *every* socialist party we ever heard of, namely, that to be considered a party member, with the right of determining the policy and leadership that the membership as a whole is to follow, you have to belong to one of the units of the party. That would seem to be, would it not, an eminently democratic procedure, to say nothing of other merits.

By Martov’s formulation, the policy and leadership of the party to one of whose branches you belong are determined for you by persons who are given the title of party members in exchange for “assisting” it *without* the obligation of belonging to any of its established branches. It is the thoroughly bureaucratized bourgeois political machines that are characterized by the kind of party “membership” that Martov’s draft proposed, and it is one of the ways in which leadership and party policy are divorced from control by the ranks. But what socialist party, regardless of political tendency, does Wolfe know that has ever adopted a party statute such as Martov defended? The Social Democratic Federation of August Claessens and Algernon Lee is not entirely corroded by Bolshevism, it is said. But suppose someone were to advocate that membership in the SDF be extended to persons who assist the Federation under the direction of one of its branches without actually joining a branch. These nonagenarians would immediately summon every remnant of their remaining muscularity to crush the hardy advocate as a madman who threatens the integrity of the SDF and the “Leninist organizational principle” which they take even more for

granted than they do the atrocity-stories about the history of Bolshevism.

Or suppose the roles had been reversed, and it was Lenin who had advocated the Martov formulation in 1903. Just imagine the speed with which heads would bob knowingly and eyes blink significantly, and how profound would be the conclusions drawn about the sinister character of Bolshevism as far back as the date of its birth! And the whole joke is that there *was* a reversal, at least on the part of Martov! Wolfe is oblivious to it; but in his history of the Russian Social Democracy Martov reminds us that under the influence of the 1905 revolution, the Mensheviks, at their Petersburg conference in December of that year, “abandoned Paragraph I of the old party statutes [that is, the Martov formula of 1903] which weakened the strict party-character of the organization in so far as it did not obligate all the members of the party to join definite party organizations.” So, about two years after the London debate, the Mensheviks themselves adopted Lenin’s definition of party membership and there is no evidence that they ever altered it subsequently. From then on, at least, Lenin’s view was never *really* in dispute. It is only in our time that it is splattered across the pages of anti-Bolshevik literature, with all sorts of dark but always undefined references to its ominous overtones, undertones and implications.

WAS IT LENIN’S INTOLERANCE toward difference of opinion within the party, his conception of a party monolithism that allowed only for obedience to a highly-centralized, self-appointed and self-perpetuating leadership, his autocratic determination to have his own way regardless of the consequences, with a penchant for

splitting the movement when he did not get his way? These are familiar charges against Bolshevism, and against Lenin in particular. Wolfe might have made an original contribution to these charges by providing some facts to sustain them. Instead he preferred to repeat them, and more than once.

We feel neither the desire nor the need to canonize Lenin as a saint, or to regard his works as sacréd texts. He was the greatest revolutionary leader in history, and that is more than enough to assure his place against both detractors and iconographers. If we knew nothing at all about him, it would be safe to assume that he had his faults, personal and political; learning about him only confirms this innocent and not very instructive assumption. He was devoted to the cause of socialist freedom and his devotion was durable and passionate. As an adversary, Paul Axelrod, said, “there is not another man who for twenty-four hours of the day is taken up with the revolution, who has no other thoughts but thoughts of the revolution, and who, even in his sleep, dreams of nothing but revolution.” This made him, in the eyes of dilettantes and philistines, let alone defenders of the old order, a fanatic. It was his strength. He was, in consequence, a passionate partisan of the instrument he regarded as indispensable for the revolution, the party, of the sharpness and clarity of its thought. This necessarily brought him into conflict with others, and not only with dabblers but with revolutionists no less devoted to socialism than he. In polemic and in factional struggle generally (neither of which was really invented by Lenin, and which can be avoided only by eschewing politics altogether), he was resolute, self-confident and uncompromising. It is easy

to think of worse qualities. But they were qualities that made him incomprehensible or insufferable in the eyes of tergiversaters and cobwebheads. If, as was often the case, he exaggerated or overreached himself, it was generally because nobody helped him by inventing a method of carrying on polemical and factional struggle without risk of exaggeration. (Reading Wolfe, for example, shows that such a method has still to be invented. Only, for his exaggerations there is not even that excuse.) But all this about Lenin, and a good deal more, does not begin to prove the "standard" charges against him.

Take splits. Wolfe says that "in the matter of splitting, Lenin was invariably the aggressor." It is a categorical statement—one of the few made by Wolfe who generally prefers indirection. To illustrate how much dehydrated bunk there is in the statement, we can take the famous 1903 party congress which split the Russian Social Democratic Party. There was a furious fight over the above-mentioned Paragraph I of the party statutes. Lenin was defeated after a two-day debate. But he did not bolt the congress or the party. Earlier in the sessions, however, the delegates led by Lenin and Martov, Axelrod, Trotsky and Plekhanov, overwhelmingly defeated the position of the Jewish Bund on the question of autonomy. The Bund, refusing to bow to the majority, split from the congress. No sermon from Wolfe on the virtue of unity and the vice of splitting.

Then the congress, Lenin and Martov included, voted against the separate organization around the "Economist" journal, *Rabocheye Dyelo*. Whereupon, two Economist delegates split from the congress. Still no sermon from Wolfe. Then the congress,

by a slender majority but nonetheless a majority, adopted Lenin's motion for an *Askra* editorial board of Plekhanov, Lenin and Martov, as against the outgoing board which had included old-timers like Axelrod and Zasluchich. Whereupon Martov announced his refusal to abide by the decision—to serve on the board—and the split between the now-named Mensheviks (Minority) and Bolsheviks (Majority) became a fact. Conclusion? "In the matter of splitting, Lenin was invariably the aggressor."

Of course Lenin was responsible for a split here and a split there! To deny it would be absurd; to feel apologetic about it, likewise. But it is interesting to see how Wolfe applies different standards in different cases—so sternly moralistic toward the Bolsheviks and so maternally tender toward their opponents. He quotes Lenin as writing that he could not understand why the Bund split from the congress since "it showed itself master of the situation and could have put through many things"; and then observes with haughty severity:

Since, all his life, Lenin attached a feeling of moral baseness to "opportunism," he found it hard to understand that these men of the Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo* could have firm convictions, principles of their own, and, defeated on them, would not content themselves with "putting through" what he regarded as opportunistic measures.

Happy Bundists to have so sympathetic an advocate! Lenin found it hard to understand, but he, Wolfe, he understands. After all, if people have firm convictions and principles, they will not, if defeated in their own organization, consent to forego them just for the sake of unity. They will not and they should not. Better a split than that! All this applies to Bundists, Economists, Mensheviks and other opponents of the Bolshe-

viks. But not to the Bolsheviks themselves. Even though their principles and convictions were no less firm, they deserve no such affectionate consideration. Why not? Because... because... well, because in the matter of splitting Lenin was invariably the aggressor.

THE TALE OF LENIN'S "INTOLERANCE" toward opponents inside the party has been told in a dozen languages. In the best of cases (they are rare enough), the record is seen through the completely distorting glasses of the present-day Stalinist regime; in the worst of cases (that is, as a rule), the record is falsified in whole or in part. At least nine times out of ten, Lenin's "intolerance" consisted, for the opponents, in the fact that he refused to accept their point of view on a question.

The phenomenon is familiar to anyone who has been active for any length of time in politics, especially in those working-class movements where politics is not an intellectual pastime but is taken most seriously. A man who puts forward a point of view on some question, but adds that his opponent's view is probably just as good if not better—there is a tolerant man for you. If he says that it really doesn't matter much whether the organization adopts his view or not—there's a tolerant man. If he is not so impolite as to try vigorously to win supporters for his view and to plan, with his initial supporters, on how to win a majority for it—he is tolerant too. Or if his point of view miraculously wins the support of, let us say, the organization's convention, and he then announces that he is ready to concede the leadership to his opponents who are against his position and who, with the best will in

the world, could not carry out the adopted policy with enthusiasm or understanding—there is a most tolerant man. He is not at all like Lenin, granted. He differs from him in that he does not take his views or his organization—or himself—very seriously. He is in politics for a week-end, warmed by the sunny thought that after he has returned to his normal pursuits he will have left behind a memory unmarred by the tiniest Leninist stain.

The references generally made to Lenin's "intolerance" are actually calculated to convey the impression that he imposed upon the Bolsheviks a uniquely dictatorial regime in which his word, or at best, the word of his Central Committee was law that could be questioned only under penalty of the severest punishment. The unforesighted reader tends to think of Lenin's organization in terms of Stalin's—not quite the same, to be sure, but as an only slightly modified version.

The comparison is utterly monstrous. Up to 1917, the Russian revolutionary movement was an illegal, underground movement, working under the onerous conditions of czarist autocracy. In spite of that, the Bolshevik movement had, on the whole, more genuine democracy in its organization, more freedom of opinion and expression, a freer and healthier internal life, than at least nine-tenths of the other socialist or trade-union organizations of Europe, most of which enjoyed legality and other facilities beyond the dreams of the Russians. This was true not only of the relations between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks when they represented only contending factions within a more-or-less united party, but likewise true among the Bolsheviks them-

selves, first as a faction and, after 1912, as an independent party. The hideous monolithism of Stalin's regime was entirely unknown—it was not even dreamed of—among the Bolsheviks. Political tendencies were formed without let or hindrance, and if they dissolved it was not under compulsion of any kind. The official leading committee always had its central organ—the spokesman of the faction or the party—but time and again periodicals would be issued on their own responsibility by political groupings or tendencies inside the party and even (or rather particularly!) inside the Bolshevik faction (later inside the Bolshevik Party) itself. Even after the Bolsheviks took power, this tradition was so strong and normal and deeply-rooted that, in the most perilous period for the new Soviet regime, it was possible for groups of dissident Bolsheviks not only to publish newspapers and reviews of their own independently of the Central Committee but to attack that committee (and of course Lenin!) with the utmost freedom and . . . impunity.

These separate organs of tendencies or groups or factions discussed all questions of party theory, party policy, party organization, and party leadership with a fullness, a freedom and an openness that was known to no other working-class organization of the time and has certainly had no equal since the rise of Stalinism. The idea of "secret" or "internal" discussion of political or theoretical questions of the movement, introduced by Zinoviev and Stalin in the period of the revolution's decline and now considered perfectly good "Bolshevik" practise, alas, even by self-styled Marxist organizations, was simply not known among the Bolsheviks—mind you, among the Bolsheviks even while

they were an illegal, police-hounded and police-infiltrated movement! Lenin's collected works, which are composed largely of open "inner-party" polemics and the files of a dozen different factional papers and pamphlets provide inundating evidence of this rich, free and open party life. In this respect, no other socialist organization of those days could even *equal* the Bolsheviks.

Even in its best days, the German Social Democracy did not have anything like so free and democratic an organizational-political life, while it was an outlawed party or afterward in the period of legality. Why, even Marx and Engels sometimes had to fight to get their views published in the German party press and their fight was not uniformly successful. Among the Bolsheviks, such a thing was unheard of, and not just with respect to a Marx or Engels or Lenin, but also to the spokesman of some unpopular grouping in the party or faction.

READ, OR REREAD, all the anti-Bolshevik histories or commentaries with the closest care, and see what *facts* are related about how Lenin's "organizational principles" worked out in party practise. You will find all sorts of hints, suggestions, innuendo, clouded allusions, grunts, grimaces, pursed lips, winks and nods; you will find gossip, chit-chat about factional excesses which are "normal" in heated factional fights, titillating tales about the "dubious" sources of Bolshevik funds calculated to shock the sensibilities of our pious business and trade-union circles and of course a lot of plain kiln-dried falsification without filler, shellac or varnish. But it would be astounding if you found even one fact about the regime in the

Bolshevik party or fraction that contradicts the record cited here about what the regime actually was. And it is this regime, as it really existed, that is supposed to have led to Stalinism! This is the tradition that is said to have helped Stalinism appear and triumph! Stalinism rests upon it exactly the same way a stiletto rests on the heart it has stabbed.

Or just suppose that, in the search for facts about Lenin and the old Bolshevik movement, Wolfe or any other anti-Bolshevik writer had discovered about them the things that are known about other leaders and other political groupings. For example, in the early *Iskra* days, Plekhanov, in order to assure his domination of the editorial board that was evenly divided between the "old" and the "young," was given *two votes* as against one for all the other members! If that had happened with Lenin—then or at any other time in his life—can you imagine the pages—no, the chapters—filled with outrage in every line, that would be written to argue that this was the very essence of Bolshevism, the core itself of Leninism, the proof positive and irrefutable of how it was pregnant with Stalinism from the day it was born?

Or take the party of Rosa Luxemburg, who was, writes Wolfe generously and rightly, "the outstanding advocate of revolutionary policy and the outstanding defender of democracy within the labor movement." Yet, she shared the theory of the permanent revolution which, says Wolfe, led to Stalinism; her party was opposed, and not on very democratic grounds, to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the revolution of 1905; she and her party were opposed to the democratic slogan of the right of self-determination and on grounds that were, objec-

tively, reactionary; her party (we refer to the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania) was opposed to the idea of mass, formally non-party trade unions and insisted that the unions must declare their allegiance to the revolutionary party; and in spite of her criticisms of Lenin's "organizational principles," the regime in her own party in Poland was exceptionally factional, narrow, super-centralistically disciplined and far more "bureaucratic" than anything the Bolsheviks were ever guilty of.

The anti-Bolsheviks, who have exactly nothing in common with Luxemburg, ghoulishly drag her into court against Lenin, but if that record were to be found in the history of the Bolsheviks, can you imagine the uproar in twelve languages?

Or take the Narodniks (Populists) for whom Wolfe has such an extravagant reverence. In their early days, these spiritual (and political) ancestors or the Social Revolutionists, convinced but primitive revolutionists, exploited—with the best intentions in the world—the anti-Semitic pogrom feelings of the Russian peasants and even issued leaflets spurring them on. Can you imagine what the anti-Bolshevik professionals would make of such a thing if it could be found in the record of the Bolsheviks or their forebears? Or what they would say if some Bolshevik argued that Kerensky's role in 1917 "flowed from" the anti-Semitic aberrations of the Narodniks four decades earlier?

Such examples could be cited almost indefinitely—but not with reference to Lenin and the Bolsheviks. If they and they alone are the targets today, it is not as a result of objective historical re-examination but because of the frenetic campaign against socialism by a desperate and dying bour-

geoisie and by disoriented and disillusioned ex-revolutionists. And by the same token, if we defend the Bolsheviks today it is in the interest of historical objectivity but also because we remain loyal to the emancipating fight for socialism.

WOLFE DOES DEAL WITH TWO ASPECTS of Lenin's "conception of the party machine" that are indeed of decisive importance. He separates them when they should be connected. Properly connected and focussed, they would throw a most revealing light on Bolshevism, the Russian Revolution, its decline and on the rise and meaning of Stalinism. Right here, perhaps, is Wolfe's most glaring failure. He fumbles the problem helplessly and hopelessly, where he is not utterly oblivious to its significance. You cannot help asking yourself what in heaven's name this man learned about Marxism during his long years in the communist movement—or since.

First, Wolfe finds in Lenin's views on the interrelations between the revolutionary movement, socialist consciousness and the spontaneous struggles of the workers, as he expressed them early in the century, the

... dogma, obscure as yet in its implications, [that] was at the very core of "Leninism." From it flowed an attitude toward the working class, toward its ability to think for itself, to learn from experience, toward its capacities and potentialities for self-rule, toward its "spontaneous" movements such as might take place without orders and control from the party of socialist theoreticians and professional revolutionaries. From it would spring a special attitude toward trade unions, toward the impromptu strikers' councils or Soviets, even toward two revolutions—in 1905 and the spring of 1917—that would come not on order but by surprise.

Elsewhere, Wolfe finds something else that makes up "the real core of

'Leninism,' separating him by an abyss from the Mensheviks, and blurring to the vanishing point the dogmatic line which divided him from Trotsky." The "core" is this:

In short, Lenin's real answer to the question: what happens after we get power? is *Let's take power and then we'll see.*

This "core" separated Lenin not only from the Mensheviks but from Marx as well, and Wolfe argues the point with a brevity, if not erudition, which merits full quotation:

To Marx it might have seemed that "the forms of the state are rooted in the material conditions of life," that "the economic structure of society... independent of men's will... determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes," and that "no social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there are room in it have been developed." But to Lenin's political-power-centered mind, for all his Marxist orthodoxy, such formulae were intolerable fetters unless subject to the proper exegesis. And the exegesis literally turned Marx on his head until the Marxist view that "in the last analysis economics determines politics" became the Leninist view that, with enough determination, power itself, naked political power, might succeed wholly in determining economics.

Wolfe has more to say about these two points, but very little more.

Lenin's ideas about socialist consciousness and the struggle of the working class were not invented by him nor were they uniquely his own. They are nothing less than the intellectual underpinnings of any genuinely socialist party, and it is inconceivable without them. In an even deeper sense they underlie the very conception of a rationally-ordered socialist society. No one developed these ideas more sharply and profoundly, even if with polemical vehemence, than Lenin, and that was his special contribution. But the ideas themselves go back to the beginnings of the scien-

tific socialist movement, back to Marx and Engels. A serious examination of Lenin could not have failed to establish this fact and draw conclusions that it indicates. Wolfe cannot help but know that Lenin's views were an almost literal copy of those expressed earlier, just as the century turned, by Karl Kautsky. And his present-day ven-erators would be horrified to hear that, by virtue of what he wrote at that time, he was the fountainhead of what was inevitably to become Stalinism! Kautsky, before Lenin, wrote:

Many of our revisionist critics believe that Marx asserted that economic development and the class struggle create, not only the conditions for socialist production, but also, and directly, the *consciousness* of its necessity. . . . In this connection socialist consciousness is presented as a necessary and direct result of the proletarian class struggle. But this is absolutely untrue. Of course, socialism, as a theory, has its roots in a modern economic relationship in the same way as the class struggle of the proletariat has, and in the same way as the latter emerges from the struggle against the capitalist-created poverty and misery of the masses. But socialism and the class struggle arise side by side and not one out of the other; each arises out of different premises. Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. Indeed, modern economic science is as much a condition for socialist production as, say, modern technology, and the proletariat can create neither the one nor the other, no matter how much it may desire to do so; both arise out of the modern social process. The vehicles of science are not the proletariat, but the *bourgeois intelligentsia*: It was out of the heads of members of this stratum that modern socialism originated, and it was they who communicated it to the more intellectually-developed proletarians who, in their turn, introduce it into the proletarian class struggle where conditions allow that to be done. Thus, socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without, and not something that arose within it spontaneously. Accordingly, the old [Austri-

an] Hainfeld program quite rightly stated that the task of Social Democracy is to imbue the proletariat with the *consciousness* of its position and the consciousness of its tasks. There would be no need for this if consciousness emerged from the class struggle. (Kautsky's emphasis.)

To this should be added: neither would there then be any need for a distinct, separate political movement of socialism—a socialist party—except, perhaps, to fulfill the not very useful function of passive reflector of the welter of ideological and political confusion that, to one extent or another, will always exist in the working class, at least so long as it is a class deprived of social power and therewith of the means of wiping out its own inferior position in society. It is kept in this inferior position under capitalism by force—but only in the last analysis, only at times of crisis. As a rule, be it under democratic or even under fascist capitalism, the ruling class maintains or seeks to maintain itself by ideological means.

The whole of capitalism's "head-fixing industry," as one Marxist wittily called it, is directed toward keeping the working class in ignorance or confusion about its social position, or rather about the purely capitalist reasons for its position, toward concealing from the working class the emancipating historical mission it has and the road it must travel to perform it. So long as the workers do not acquire an understanding of their social position and their social task, their battles against the ruling class, be they ever so militant or massive, can only *modify* the conditions of their economic subjugation but not *abolish* them. Indispensable to their abolition is the *socialist consciousness* (an exact mathematical formulation of which is neither possible nor necessary) of the working class, which means nothing

more and nothing less than *its* realization of *its* position in society today, of *its* power, and of *its* obligation and *its* ability to reconstruct society socialistically.

NOW, THE DISPUTE OVER THE IDEAS of Kautsky-Lenin on the subject boils down to this: either the working class, organized in its elementary trade-union organizations or not, acquires this consciousness by spontaneous generation in the course of repeated struggles for the improvement of its conditions—or in its decisive section, it acquires it, in the course of these struggles, to be sure, with the aid of those who already possess this socialist consciousness and who are banded together (in a group, a league, a movement, a party—call it what you will) in order more effectively to transmit it, by word of mouth and by the printed page, to those whose minds are still cluttered up with bourgeois rubbish, that is, the products of the “head-fixing industry.”

Between these two, there is not a single person today who calls himself a socialist of any kind who would venture to defend, flatly and frontally, the former conception. All you get from the anti-Bolsheviks is, as in Wolfe's case, murky reference to the “special attitude” that flowed from Lenin's formulation of the position, in which the only thing definite is a sneer at the very conception of a socialist party—the “socialist theoreticians and professional revolutionists.” The reformists who distinguish themselves from Lenin by saying that while they too are for a socialist party, they look upon it as a “servant” of the working class and not as its “master” or “dictator”; as a means of the “socialist education” of the working class in whose “ability to think for itself”

they devoutly believe and not for the purpose of “ordering and controlling” it from above—are either hypocritical or inane. Their daily practice, inside the labor movement and in politics generally, would indicate that it is less the latter than the former.

The question of socialist consciousness which Lenin developed has wider implications. Wolfe sees in it only the source for establishing a new slavery for the working class, the Stalinist tyranny in the name of the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The truth is not merely different, but in this case it is the exact opposite!

Workers' democracy and, indeed, that complete realization of democracy which inaugurates the socialist society, are not only inseparable from Lenin's ideas on socialist consciousness but, without them, become empty words, unattainable hopes, illusions at worst.

What was the obvious meaning of Lenin's insistence that the specific rôle of the socialist movement was to “introduce” a socialist consciousness into the working class? What, for example, was the clear implication of Lenin's “Aside from the influence of the Social Democracy, there is no conscious activity of the workers,” which Wolfe quotes as a sample of that “dogma [which] was at the very core of ‘Leninism’ ” and from which “flower an attitude toward the working class”? It *should* be obvious. The “party of socialist theoreticians and professional revolutionaries” was not assigned thereby to trick the incurably blind and incurably stupid workers into lifting it to power so that it might establish a new kind of dictatorship over them. That makes no sense whatsoever. It was assigned the job of making the workers aware of the fundamental reasons for their exploited and

subjected position under capitalism; of making the workers aware of their own class strength and having them rely only upon their class strength and independence; of assembling them in a revolutionary party of their own; of making them aware of their ability to free themselves from all class rule by setting up their own government as the bridge to socialist freedom. Without a socialist consciousness, there would be working-class activity but the workers would continue to remain the ruled and never become the free. For the workers to rule themselves required conscious activity toward socialism.

What is Wolfe trying to convey with his suggestive prose? That Lenin dwelled so emphatically upon the need for the party to instill socialist consciousness or stimulate it in the working class because he did not believe in “its ability to think for itself, to learn from experience”? Or because he was skeptical about “its capacities and potentialities for self-rule”? Did Lenin expect to imbue the unable-to-think-and-lead proletariat with socialist conceptions by intravenous hypodermic injections? Or is Wolfe just a little . . . careless with his innuendoes?

LET US GO FURTHER. Lenin knew—he referred to it often enough and nowadays it is especially necessary to emphasize and elaborate it—one of the most basic and decisive differences between the bourgeois revolution and the socialist revolution. One of the outstanding characteristics of the former was that it could be carried through without a clear ideology, without an unequivocally-formulated consciousness on the part of the bourgeoisie whose social system it was to establish. In fact, not only could it be

carried out in this way, but generally speaking that is how it was carried out.

The greatest bourgeois revolution, the French, was carried out by plebians, without the bourgeoisie and in part against it; and it was consolidated by Napoleon, in part without the bourgeoisie and in part against it. In Germany it was carried out, that is, the supremacy of capitalism over feudalism was assured, in the Bismarckian or Junker way—again, in part without the bourgeoisie and in very large part against it. The passage from feudalism to capitalism in Japan is only another example of the same phenomenon. Yet, in all these and other cases, including those where the bourgeoisie was not raised to political power, the bourgeois revolution was nevertheless effected, consolidated, guaranteed. Why? As Lenin once wrote, in 1918:

One of the main differences between the bourgeois and the socialist revolution consists in this, that for the bourgeois revolution which grows up out of feudalism the new economic organizations, which continually transform feudal society on all sides, gradually take form within the womb of the old society. The bourgeois revolution faced only *one* task: to throw off and destroy all the fetters of the former society. Every bourgeois revolution that fulfills this task, fulfills everything that is demanded of it: it strengthens the growth of capitalism.

But if the bourgeois fetters upon production are thrown off and destroyed, that alone does not and cannot assure the growth of socialist production. Under capitalism, production is assured by the irrepressible tendency toward accumulation of capital which is dictated primarily, not by the will of the capitalist, but by the blindly-operating market as the automatic regulator of capitalist production. Socialist production is incompatible with market relations.

It is production for use and therefore planned production, not automatically regulated by a blind force. Given a certain level of development of the productive force available, *everything* then depends upon planning, that is, upon the *conscious* organization of production and distribution by human beings.

Now, under capitalism, what and how much is produced is determined by the market, and the distribution of what is produced is determined basically by the relations between the class that owns the means of production and exchange and the class that is divorced from them. Overturn capitalism, and it is found that there is no market to determine what is produced and in what quantities, and there is no class that owns private property.

Until the distant day when all classes are completely abolished and socialism fully established, the conditions of production and distribution must necessarily be determined by politically-associated human beings—no longer by the blind market but by the state.

In other words, where the state becomes the repository of all the means of production and is in complete control of them, economy is for the first time subject to planned and conscious control by those who have the state in their hands. In this sense, *politics determines economics!* This may sound startling to Wolfe, as well as to all sorts of half-baked half-Marxists. But if this simple and irrefutable fact is not understood, then the whole idea of the working class taking power in order to organize a socialist society becomes absurd and even meaningless. In revolution, but above all and most decisively in the socialist revolution, the relationship between economics and politics is not only re-

versed, turned upside-down, but it *must* be reversed!

BUT IF POLITICS NOW DETERMINES economics (again, within the limits of the given productive forces), or to put it differently, if the conditions of production and distribution are now determined by politically conscious individuals or groups, the question of the nature of the determining politics is immediately thrown open. What assurance is there that the politics will be socialist in nature, so that production relations are socialist or socialistic (by which is meant socialist in tendency or direction) and that distribution corresponds to them, so that what is produced is for the use of the people and not of a small privileged group?

To rely for that on the good will, the honorable intentions or the socialist past or professions of faith of a group of planners who hold the state power to the exclusion of the rest of the people, is naive, where it is not reactionary. In any case, it is not a socialist idea and certainly not Lenin's. A *socialist* development of the economy can be assured only by those who are to be its principal beneficiaries, the working class, and only if it has the power to make the decisions on production and distribution and to carry them out, hence only if it holds the power of the state. For politics now determines economics! And it cannot acquire this power or wield it unless it is permeated by a *socialist consciousness*, which means, among other things, an understanding of the *decisive* role it has to play in the new state, and *therefore and only by that means*, the role it has to play in assuring a socialist direction to the operation of the economy.

That is why Lenin, in distinguishing between bourgeois and socialist

revolutions, underlined the fact that the Bolshevik revolution "found at hand" not *socialist economic relations* that had developed under capitalism as capitalist economic relations had developed under feudalism, but rather a *democratic political factor*: "victory depended solely upon whether already finished organizational forms of the movement were at hand that embraced millions. This finished form was the Soviets." The same thought was in his mind when he urged that every cook should become an administrator, so that with everyone exercising the power of "bureaucrat" no one would be a bureaucrat. And the thought was even more pregnantly expressed in his famous saying that "Soviets plus electrification equal socialism." (It is impossible even to imagine Lenin saying that a totalitarian prison for the workers plus nationalized property equals a degenerated workers' state!)

The Soviets, before the Bolsheviks took power, were acclaimed by every Menshevik and Social Revolutionist as the "revolutionary democracy." That was right. What is more, the Soviets were a magnificent example of a spontaneous movement of the workers and peasants themselves, not set up by order of any party or according to its plan. Wolfe finds that from Lenin's "dogma" about socialist consciousness "flowed" an attitude toward the working class which was uncommendable because, it would seem, it was most undemocratic and even contemptuous toward the working class, including "its 'spontaneous' movements such as might take place without orders and control from the party..." Like the Soviets of 1917, for example? Then how explain that every party in Russia, except the Bolsheviks, fought to keep the Soviets (the "revolutionary democracy") from

taking over all power, and worked to keep them as a more or less decorative appendage to the never-elected but self-constituted Kerensky regime?

True to Lenin's "dogma," the Bolsheviks alone strove to imbue the Soviets with a genuinely socialist consciousness, which meant concretely that the workers (and even the peasants), more democratically and representatively organized in the Soviets than ever before or ever since in any other movement in any country of the world, should take command of the nation and therewith of their own destiny.

This example of what really was the "attitude" of Lenin and his party toward the "spontaneous" movements of the workers, their ability to think and learn for themselves, and their capacities and potentialities for self-rule—not in some thesis or polemical article or speech, but in one of the most crucial periods of history—is so outstanding, so overshadowing, so illuminating about Lenin's "conceptions" that Wolfe passes it by. We will not ask what this historian would have said about Lenin's "dogma" if the Bolshevik attitude toward the "revolutionary democracy" in 1917 had been the same as, let us say, that of Kerensky. But we wonder what he will say in succeeding volumes about the Menshevik and SR "attitude" toward the Soviets and the "dogma" from which it "flowed."

THE REVOLUTION OF 1917 was the decisive test for all political parties and groups. In spite of conservative trends in the ranks (all parties tend toward conservatism about some of their "dogmas"), Lenin showed that he had been able to build and hold together a party which proved, in this most critical hour, to be the only consistent champion of revolutionary de-

mocracy and revolutionary socialism, and the only "political machine" ready and able to lead both to victory. This is what brought Trotsky to the side of the Bolsheviks and caused him to "forget" his "Cassandra-like prevision" about how "the dictator will take the place of the Central Committee" and the party itself.

If Wolfe finds that Trotsky's prediction was "fatefully fulfilled by history," it is primarily because of his method of separating the history of the conflict of social forces from specific political events, or worse, of simply ignoring the former. The fact is that whatever grounds there may have been or seemed to have been in 1903-04 for Trotsky to utter his warning the main tendency of the development of Lenin's group or party, particularly from 1905 onward, was in an entirely opposite one from that feared by Trotsky. The apparatus did not replace the party, nor the Central Committee the apparatus, nor the dictator (Lenin!) the Central Committee. The inner party democracy and freedom of opinion and discussion of the Bolsheviks as an *illegal movement*, it is worth repeating, can be matched, without apology, against the regime of virtually every other working-class organization, legal or illegal, that ever existed.

Here, too, the decisive test was 1917 itself. At least, you would think so, on the basis of almost universal experience in such matters. A working-class movement which is suffering from a fatal disease—opportunism, let us say, or bureaucratism—does not usually reveal it, not clearly, at any rate, in normal periods, in periods of social calm or political decay. It shows it, and most disastrously for itself and its followers, in the most critical and troubled periods of society, above all

in the crisis of war and the crisis of revolution. But precisely in the critical period of 1917, the Bolshevik party passed the test, and so well that Trotsky found it possible to abandon his early apprehensions about it.

Now, why didn't Lenin's conception of organization, which was one of the "roots of Stalinism," manifest itself in 1917 in a way that would cause the Bolshevik party to play a conservative or reactionary role in the revolution, to be a brake upon the workers and peasants? The question is of first-rate interest. Therefore, Wolfe passes it by.

Did the Bolshevik party measure up to its task early in 1917? Of course not! But that was not because Trotsky's prophecy about Lenin's conception of organization had been fulfilled, fatefully or otherwise. It was an entirely different prophecy of Trotsky's that was fulfilled—or almost. Years earlier, Trotsky had written that the Bolshevik formula of "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" had its revolutionary side, as opposed to the Menshevik conception of a revolution in which it would be the role of the proletariat to bring the bourgeoisie to power. But, he added, if the Bolsheviks persisted in this formula, the coming revolution would reveal its reactionary side, that is, that which inhibited the proletariat from carrying the democratic revolution through to proletarian power and the inauguration of socialist measures. Steeped in Lenin's old formula, most of the party leaders in 1917 adopted a position which paralyzed the revolutionary possibilities of the party. It took a furious fight by Lenin, after his arrival in Russia in April, to effect that "rearmament" of the party which finally assured the victory in October. But, *this* "prophecy" of Trotsky's—or rather, Len-

in's rearming of the party in the direction of Trotsky's theory—is regarded by Wolfe as one of the three sources of . . . Stalinism!

Important is the fact that Lenin did not replace the Central Committee as dictator in any sense indicated by Trotsky. He enjoyed, justly, immense authority among the Bolsheviks, but he had won it and kept it to the end of his life by his intellectual ability and character as a leader and not by any dirty manipulation or usurpation.

In 1917, most of the party leadership opposed his famous "April Theses." He was not only unable to dictate to the others, but did not dream of it. He won them over, one by one, partly by the pressure of the party ranks whom he convinced and partly by convincing the leaders as well. In 1917, or before, when his point of view won, it was not because the dictator had replaced the Central Committee; and when his point of view lost, as was more than once the case, it was not because the apparatus had replaced the party.

YET, THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY did degenerate; Soviet democracy was replaced by a unique Bonapartist dictatorship. But the process did not conform with Trotsky's prediction, which Wolfe transforms into an abstraction raised to the *n*th power. Reading Wolfe, you would think that the Bolshevik party was a sort of supra-mundane evolving out of some purely internal mechanism, unaffected by the strains and influences exerted by terrestrial forces.

It is only necessary to read what the Bolsheviks said and wrote in the period of the revolutionary upsurge to see what their real attitude was toward Soviet and socialist democracy, what ideas of working-class self-rule they sought with all their strength to

instill into the Russian people. The bureaucracy rose not because of these ideas, but in spite of them. The revolution was soon plunged into a fierce civil war, and if it had not been for the Bolsheviks, including their "machine," the Soviet power would not have lasted 48 hours, to be replaced, in all likelihood, not by bourgeois-democrats but by the czarist reaction which Anglo-French imperialism was sponsoring.

Civil war, unfortunately, is not the ideal culture for the growth of the democratic bacillus. The days of War Communism were harsh and stringent. At the front and at home, command inevitably took the place of free discussion and voting. The tendency to bureaucratic command gripped and held not only Bolshevik leaders, but rank-and-file militants, Bolshevik and non-party, as well.

Even so, Soviet democracy could have been restored after the civil war if the accursed backwardness of Russia had been overcome rapidly by the aid which a successful revolution in the advanced West could have contributed on a grand scale. It could have been maintained if, to start with, the Menshevik and SR parties had allied themselves with the "revolutionary democracy" in the civil war and not with the monarchist reaction. A Russian Populist of the old days once exclaimed: "Never will history forgive the autocracy for making terrorists out of us." With far more justice the Bolsheviks might have declared: "Never will history forgive the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionists for joining the war against the Soviets and forcing us to substitute our party for the Soviets."

Soviet democracy might have been restored by another road, the redemocratization of the Bolshevik party itself. And here it is interesting to note

that the big fight for party democracy was launched by an outstanding section of the Old Bolsheviks who rallied to Trotsky's position; in fact, by the time Zinoviev broke with Stalin and joined the Trotskyists, it can be said that the bulk of the militants who had been most thoroughly trained in the old school of Bolshevism and in Lenin's "conception of organization," lined up against the Stalinist bureaucracy, which was represented primarily by comparatively recent members or by obscure personages who had never played an important part in the life of the party. Well or badly, consistently or not, the old Bolshevik cadres resisted the rise of the new Stalinist bureaucracy. If they failed, it was not due to the overpowering force the Lenin's organizational principles, but to an overpowering force of a radically different kind.

In passing, Wolfe writes:

Nineteen five and nineteen seventeen, the heroic years when the machine was unable to contain the flood of overflowing life, would bring Trotsky to the fore as the flaming tribune of the people, would show Lenin's ability to rise above the confining structure of his dogmas, and would relegate Stalin, the machine-man by antonomasy, to the background. But no people can live forever at fever heat and when that day was over and Lenin was dead, the devoted machine-man's day would come.*

Just in passing! But these two sentences contain more insight than can be found in any two chapters of Wolfe's book. Revolutions are periods

*Then why the title "Three Who Made a Revolution"? Up to now, only Stalinist forgers have presented Stalin as one of those who outstandingly led the revolution. The facts presented by Wolfe show this to be a falsification and the above quotation confirms it. The title he gives his book is therefore utterly misleading. It would of course be very awkward to load a book with a title like "Two Who Made a Revolution and One Who Made a Counter-Revolution," but one merit it would have: it would be accurate.

of turbulence precisely because the people are so free to choose their course and their leaders for themselves and so hard to control by any machine. Wolfe merely sets down these two deeply significant sentences and then goes on as though they were no more than a chance collection of words. He seems to shy away from matters and statements of *social importance* spontaneously, without special effort, as if by instinct. But the sentences are important regardless of Wolfe. When the masses were free to choose democratically in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, Trotsky and Lenin were lifted to power. (Their names can be used here as symbolic of Bolshevism as it really was.) And it is only when the masses were exhausted or apathetic or prostrate, that is, when revolution was succeeded by reaction, that the Stalinist counter-revolution could triumph over the masses and over the Bolshevik party.

THERE IS THE "CORE OF STALINISM," indeed! The Stalinist bureaucracy did not grow out of an organic evolution of the Bolshevik party, as was implied by Trotsky's "prophecy." Its growth paralleled and required the destruction of that party. And its destruction, root and trunk and leaves and branch, until absolutely nothing is left of it today except the plagiarized name. This fact, too, is of such capital importance that the anti-Bolshevik writers pass it by. Destroyed: the principles of Bolshevism, its program, its tradition, its history, its personnel down almost to the last man, including (how significant this is!) even those Bolsheviks who tried to capitulate to Stalinism, and yes, including even the big bulk of the *original* Stalinist faction of the old party! Preserved: the name of the party and a few renegades from the second and

tenth ranks of the old Bolshevik party—that and nothing more.

The destruction of the Bolshevik party meant the destruction of *socialist consciousness*. The measure of the growth of the Bolshevik party was the growth of this consciousness among the workers it influenced; and in turn it grew among the workers to the extent that the party remained attached to the ideas which Lenin most conspicuously advocated. It is of tremendous interest that for the Stalinist faction to extend its initial victory inside the party apparatus (that's where its first victory occurred) to a victory inside the party generally, it had to *flood* the party. The first big public step, so to speak, taken by the Stalinist bureaucracy was the notorious Lenin Levy organized right after Lenin's death. Hundreds of thousands of workers were almost literally poured into the party. Who were they? Generally speaking, the more conservative workers and employees, people who had not shown any interest in joining the party in the tough days of the revolution and civil war but who could, in 1924-25, be persuaded to join it now that its power seemed consolidated, now that membership seemed to guarantee employment, privileges, a career. Almost to a man they could be counted on by the bureaucracy in the fight against the Opposition, against the Bolsheviks, their principles, their revolutionary and socialist and democratic traditions. It was Stalin's first and not least important step in literally *dissolving* Lenin's "machine" in order to substitute a despotic police regime that was utterly alien to it. This first step was typical of those that followed.

There is as much justification, then, for the theory that Stalinism was rooted in the Bolshevism which it ex-

tirpated, as there is, for example, in the kindred theory that the socialist movement, its methods and its theories in general form the roots of the fascist movement and its methods and theories. The anti-Bolshevik democrat would feel outraged at seeing the latter argument put forward. He would declare indignantly that to explode such nonsense, nothing more is needed than the fact that Hitlerism crushed the socialist organizations, imprisoned or killed their leaders, outlaw their ideas, and so on and so forth. Yet the argument that Hitlerism had its authentic roots in the German Social-Democratic Party is advanced in all coolness by so eminent an anti-socialist as Frederick von Hayek, and with the same reasoning, with the same analogies, with the same cavalier attitude toward decisive facts as is displayed by those who argue that Stalinism is rooted in Bolshevism. Hayek is a defender of the capitalist status-quo-ante-state intervention and a sworn foe of socialism, and he has his means of discrediting its good name. The aim of the democratic or reformist anti-Bolsheviks is somewhat loftier, as it were, but the means they employ to discredit Bolshevism are *in no essential* different from Hayek's.

* * *

THE READER IS DUE AN APOLOGY for the extraordinary and unforeseen length to which this review of portraits of Stalinism has stretched out. He must be asked to indulge his patience a little longer, for there remains the tragic work of Isaac Deutcher to deal with in the next issue. In extension, only the crucial importance of the subject matter can be pleaded. We consider ourselves defenders of a cause who have an elementary duty to perform. On the flyleaf of his book,

Wolfe quote, for his motto, the noble words of Albert Mathiez:

The historian has a duty both to himself and to his readers. He has to a certain extent the cure of souls. He is accountable for the reputation of the mighty dead whom he conjures up and portrays. If he makes a mistake, if he repeats slanders on those who are blameless or holds up profligates or schemers to admiration, he not only commits an evil action; he poisons and misleads the public mind.

The Nature of Titoism

An Exchange of Views on Tito's Yugoslavia

Comrade Hal Draper, in his articles on Titoism (in the December issues of *Labor Action*), has written that "Titoism is spreading as a disintegrative force in the Russian empire *not because it is ceasing to be a form of Stalinism*, but precisely because it is a form of Stalinism." Furthermore, he wrote that Titoism "spreads as a disease of Stalinism." In my opinion, a disease in a living organism (cancer in human beings, for example) is never of the same form or nature as the threatened organism. Titoism, it may be, is a "cancer" in the "organism" of Stalinism, and only thus might it be said that it is the beginning of its end. But in spite of this simple logic Comrade Draper wants to assure us that the cancer and the human body are of the same essence, form and nature, that Titoism is a form of Stalinism, that it is the same social system of bureaucratic collectivism.

For the most part I agree with Comrade Draper that all wish-fantasies must be left aside. But just because of that agreement, I want to draw our joint attention to several facts which gainsay his conclusions.

Mathiez devoted much of his great work to defending the great French Revolution and its Jacobins from detractors. The socialist today has the duty to defend the great Russian Revolution and its Jacobins in much the same spirit. As to how faithfully Wolfe has heeded the injunction of Mathiez, the reader of his book will judge for himself.

MAX SHACHTMAN

Is TITOISM the same social system as Stalinism? My answer to this question is: *As yet, it is not.*

There are the following facts:

(1) In its historical social progress, Stalinism is an accomplished, completed social system; it is state-capitalism. Titoism is only seven years "old"; it has reached its present stage only four years after the revolution in Yugoslavia. In such a short time, no definite social system could be constructed, except on paper.

(2) Stalinism is a new class society with an upper exploitive class of party magnates and bureaucrats who possess, *de facto*, the right of collective property and of exploiting all the means of production and all labor power. There is no individual private property in the means of production. Titoism, on the contrary, in its present stage is a social system with a mixed economy of private capitalism, and partially nationalized means of production. The petty-bourgeois peasantry, which is about 90 per cent of the whole population, has the means of production in its own individual private possession. To be sure, a bureaucracy exists (as in every other

state), but it is not yet a social class as it is in Russia.

(3) Stalinism is a totalitarianism in which the dictatorship of a single party and the police has been brought to the highest extreme. In Yugoslavia the dictatorship of the CP is based on a larger part of society which is united in the People's Front. Inner-party democracy has existed hitherto, and that could be proved, for instance, by the lively discussions in the party press. Besides, nobody can affirm, especially after his break with Moscow, that Tito's regime has no support from the side of the Yugoslav workers and peasantry.

(4) The organizational forms of a new state-capitalist society in Russia are wholly completed. In Yugoslavia they are not. There are still several possibilities open for that or for another direction of development and progress. Indeed, Titoism tries to find this other direction; this could be proved through examining the direction of the collectivization of agriculture, which is really different from the Stalinist development. For instance, in a single Russian collective farm (kolkhoz) 73 per cent of production is taken away by the state; in a Yugoslavian cooperative farm only 5 per cent of production is bought in accordance with the plan (but not confiscated!) by the state, and the rest of the produce is subject to the free will of the cooperative members. In a Yugoslav cooperative farm with 1000 members there are only two administrative employees (bureaucrats); in a Russian kolkhoz there are at least 25! The plan of agricultural work in every farm in Yugoslavia is being prepared by the cooperative farmers themselves; in Russia, "the vanguard of the world proletariat," the Central Committee of the CP every year dic-

tates the day and the distance for the weeding of the sugar beat crop. One says nothing about *forced* collectivization in Russia and the *voluntary* process in Yugoslavia, etc. Similarly in the case of organizational forms in industry, in the trade unions, in the carrying out of the administration of the plants, etc.

Thus, the facts assert that Titoism and Stalinism are not the same social system. Unfortunately, this is not the place to discuss these facts more broadly, and also not the place to consider the *social origin* of Titoism which is, by the way, different from Stalinism too.

Comrade Draper says that Titoism is "national-Stalinism." In that case, one could say that Russian Stalinism is a national form of Titoism, is it not?! Surely Russian Stalinism is much more nationalistic than mere Yugoslav Titoism! But, taking the problem seriously, one could agree that TITOSIM is, *in a certain degree*, the pure national manifestation of Yugoslav nationalism. But as such it is not a new phenomenon in history. For instance, in the Russian Ukraine in the 1920s and early 1930s there were Ukrainian national "Titos" in the persons of several prominent Bolsheviks, members of the Ukrainian Communist Party—a party which was later liquidated by the Stalinist "Communist" Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine—such as Skrypnyk, Shumsky, Volobuyiv, Khvylovy and others. But they really were only a national manifestation, an opposition to Stalinist Russia's imperialistic national policy; and just because of this fact they were unsuccessful in their struggle.

If Titoism were only a nationalist phenomenon, I surmise it would follow its Ukrainian "predecessors" in not too long a time. But just as we saw

above that, in my opinion, it is not as yet the Stalinist social system, so also would it be risky to affirm that it is only the pure manifestation of Yugoslav nationalism. We must not forget that Yugoslav at present consists of six federated national republics, the national aspirations of which are not always the same.

WHAT ARE THE PERSPECTIVES of Titoism in Yugoslavia? In Comrade Draper's consideration they are very vague. I have no taste for telling fortunes, anymore than for being led by wish-fantasies, but in my opinion it is possible to mark specified perspectives of development in a given direction. This direction, about which one can speak more or less surely, will be clearer if the question asked above is reformulated: what are the perspectives for the degeneration of Titoism? As I stated above, Titoism is not yet the completed new social system; it is not yet Stalinism. One can therefore ask: when and under what circumstances could Titoism become Stalinism, degenerate into it? The analogy with the historical development of Stalinism can help us to answer that question.

The existing Tito dictatorship is really the regrettable, but at the same time also inevitable, factor. It is inevitable because any relaxation of it could lead inevitably to Stalin's victory. On the other hand, we know that every dictatorship can lead to totalitarianism, and totalitarianism in its turn lead to the degeneration of society. It is precisely the Stalinist totalitarianism that has led the Russian Revolution to degeneration. The Tito dictatorship today is not yet totalitarianism. It is very similar politically to Kemal Ataturk's dictatorship in Turkey in the 1920s. But it is a left

dictatorship. This "left Kemalism" of Tito's is needed and inevitable in the face of the existence of tasks which are of the highest importance in present-day Yugoslavia: the struggle against the remnants of capitalism and the struggle against Russian-Communist imperialism.

And here we approach a very interesting conclusion. If there were no Stalinism in Russia, Tito's "left-Kemalist" dictatorship would gradually degenerate into totalitarianism. But it is precisely the nearness of Stalinist Russia which makes the degeneration of Titoism into totalitarianism (into Stalinism!) quite impossible, because every manifestation of totalitarian degeneration in Titoism (for instance, forced collectivization of agriculture) would inevitably be followed by sharp inner contradictions in society, stimulated by Stalinist propaganda, and possibly even military "liberation" of the workers. Sooner or later it would end with the complete destruction of Titoism and Yugoslav independence. In this way Stalinism itself compels Tito not to become a Stalinist. Logic says, therefore, that Tito is compelled to liquidate capitalism but not in the same way as Stalin did. About this "other way" we cannot here elaborate; but one must assume that Tito is not so politically blind as not to look for this "other way" and not to wish it. The conclusion is just the opposite of Comrade Draper's conclusion that Tito "wants to be like Stalin."

But in spite of all, my views do not mean that there are no other possibilities of degeneration in Titoism. There are. For instance, degeneration is possible if Titoism should close itself behind the frontiers of Yugoslavia only; that is, if it does not become an international and

revolutionary phenomenon, etc. But this is not the subject I wish to speak of; I have concerned myself with the possibilities of the Stalinist degeneration of Titoism only. I do not consider Titoism "on our side" or myself "on his side," but in my opinion it would be much better not to hurry to condemn this new experience

of struggle against capitalism and Stalinism, not to place a taboo on it, but on the contrary to give more solid and objective information about the inner and outer situation of Titoist Yugoslavia.

January 1950

H. F.

(Comrade H. F. is a European friend who writes from Germany.)

Pro-Titoism and Democracy

In replying at some length to Comrade H. F.'s letter, I am frankly taking the opportunity to discuss a viewpoint on Titoism which is evidently quite widespread among left and socialist groups in Europe. It is a viewpoint which raises what I think is the most important question of our day for socialist reorientation: the question of socialism and democracy. And it is a viewpoint which I believe is filled with risks and perils for such a reorientation of socialism.

It is not necessary to exaggerate the effects which a species of pro-Titoism has already had in the anti-Stalinist left in order to warn and argue against it, given the convictions which we hold. The sorriest example is to be found in the Fourth International-Trotskyists, whose line on Tito has long since ceased to resemble anything like Marxism. There are individuals outside that group who could be mentioned, especially in France. But it is not a question only of these. Comrade H. F.'s letter shows what the Tito question can mean for the fate of socialist clarification.

THE QUESTION OF RUSSIA is the touchstone of socialist policy and theory today even more than when Trotsky used to insist that this was so. Attitude toward the Russian Revolution was

in its day a dividing line between the revolutionary socialists and the reformists. A counter-revolution took place in Russia; the Stalinist monstrosity thereby born became the biggest single contributor to the present-day crisis of the socialist and Marxist movements. Attitude toward the Russian counter-revolution is still the big dividing line. It is the question of Stalinism.

Without a clear and consistent analysis of Stalinism one cannot hope to deal effectively with the problems of our epoch. I do not at all mean to imply that the possession of such a clear and consistent analysis is any automatic guarantee of forward movement or success. In the first place, a theoretical analysis is only an initial step. In the second place, though indeed "clear and consistent," the analysis may be quite wrong! Very true, but what of that great majority of socialists today who are still trying to "fly by the seat of their pants" (as the early pilots had it) without any theoretical compass at all?

The Independent Socialist League has over a number of years developed such a clear and consistent analysis of Russia and Stalinism—based on the "theory of bureaucratic collectivism," for short. There are not a few, even friends and comrades in the European

socialist vanguard, who disagree with it or with this or that aspect of it; but there are fewer, I venture to say, who do not recognize the fact itself. *It is because of this that we have approached the analysis of Titoism with a certain amount of confidence.*

To Comrade H. F., this looks like "hurrying to condemn" Titoism. It is a harsh phrase but not a very helpful one. Certainly Trotsky and the Trotskyist movement, including many of us, did not "hurry to condemn" the Russian workers' state as dead, killed by Stalinism. The official-Trotskyists of the Fourth International are still in no "hurry" to do so. I would not boast of this lack of "hurry," which meant that it was not until 1941 that even we of the ISL officially broke with the sterilizing workers'-state theory of Russia. Nor would I condemn it. And those comrades who still lack a clear and consistent theory of Stalinism—whether ours or another—are not to be "condemned" either for their "sin." But I venture the opinion that it is *this* lack and no other which persuades Comrade H. F. "not to hurry to condemn" Titoism as a form of Stalinism.

A "let's wait and see" attitude is excellent—when there is no alternative. There were, not long ago, not a few liberals who manifested their liberalism by insisting on viewing Russian Stalinism as a "noble experiment": maybe this "form of socialism" will work, maybe it won't, meanwhile it has all our sympathy and hope. Not a few of them had nothing but scorn and even hatred for the "anti-Soviet" Trotskyists who had already "hurried" to condemn the Stalinist regime on the basis of a theoretical analysis of "socialism in one country" and other such "sectarian" views.

There is, I repeat, nothing wrong

with "let's wait and see"—it is a necessity when one does not see now. But I would urge friends like Comrade H. F. not to make a virtue of necessity nor to look with a jaundiced eye on those whose developed analysis of Stalinism also points to a definite view on the nature of Titoism.

But if there is no sin in *marking time* to wait-and-see on Titoism, what is more alarming is the way in which seduction by Titoism threatens to lead to a *retrogression* in political thinking about Stalinism on the part of some in the anti-Stalinist socialist left. As I pointed out last year in the NI, the Fourth International has fled back to the Left Opposition days when it was just born—a retreat to the womb in the face of its insoluble dilemma. I think another form of political retrogression is also to be seen as the outstanding feature of Comrade H. F.'s letter.

But let us first consider Comrade H. F.'s "facts," upon which he seems to lay such great store. The use of that word for the four points which follow it seems to be a matter of inaccurate language. Certainly it is only in point 4 that Comrade H. F. even purports to adduce "facts" as distinct from asserting and arguing his political views.

Now it is fortunate indeed that we do *not* have to argue over these "facts" as presented in point 4. I do *not* have to ask where Comrade H. F. got these statistics; nor to point to the hazards of accepting the Tito government's statistics at face value, any more than those of any other of the East European dictatorships; nor even to point to the pitfalls of attempting to develop reliable over-all economic statistics for these lands from scattered non-governmental sources and reports. (That

problem is bedeviling more expert economic analysts than either Comrade H. F. or myself.) Nor do I have to make a big debaters' point about this: that the only statistic in his letter which is *checkable* at all—is wrong. (This is his figure for the proportion of the peasantry, which is a full 10 per cent too high—but like the other statistics the mistake has no bearing on the argument one way or another.)

So we shall assume the accuracy of his statistics in point 4. The Yugoslavs take away a much smaller proportion of the production on the collective or cooperative farms than do the Russians. What is taken by the Yugoslavs is paid for, "not confiscated" (at prices fixed by the state—what prices? but we have promised not to quarrel about these "facts"). The Russian kolkhoz has far more bureaucrats than the Yugoslav cooperative farm. In Russia the state dictates the plan of work; the Yugoslav farmers decide their plan of work themselves. There is no forced collectivism in Yugoslavia, as there was in Russia. . . .

And these "facts" about agriculture, he writes, prove that "the *direction* of the collectivization of agriculture" is "really different" in Yugoslavia as compared with Russia.

This is exactly what they do not even begin to prove at all; the *direction*. In two ways: (1) the direction of Titoist agrarian policy; (2) the direction of Titoist social development.

That Tito *must* try to keep peasant antagonisms to his regime at a minimum is a platitude known even to American newspaper correspondents who understand little else. That much would have to be understood no matter whether Comrade H. F.'s views or ours are accepted on the nature of this Titoism. A "fact" which is equally an integral part of two different analy-

ses does not point to the truth of one or the other by itself.

That is the first trouble with Comrade H. F.'s "facts."

Only a regime with the Russian power behind it could afford, in Yugoslavia, to begin by pushing the vast peasant majority (80 per cent of the people!) to desperation—and then only because it would openly become a proconsular regime nakedly ruling over a satrapy. Any attempt at a national-Stalinist course, breaking with Moscow, for a whole period *must* entail placating the peasantry—going slow with the peasantry—ensuring their toleration at the least.

But not even the satellite regimes still under Moscow's thumb have acted much different to date. Comrade H. F., who himself emphasizes the newness of Tito's power, compares his policy only to that of the "wholly completed" Stalinist regime in Russia! But if he is interested in testing Tito's Stalinism, why not the much more meaningful comparison with the other *new* regimes?

As Comrade Rudzienski has emphasized in his articles in *Labor Action*, the Stalinist power in Poland has been treading eggshells—in its peasant policy especially. Where so far has there been a wave of forced collectivization in the Stalinist satellites?

The Stalinists are only biding their time in those satellites? Why, certainly! But for the reason pointed out above, their satraps in the satellites can afford to put on the squeeze a thousand times more than Tito. Tito will have to bide his time much longer. In any case, what do Comrade H. F.'s "facts" prove about *direction*?

TAKE COMRADE H. F.'S THESIS point by point and apply it—not to Yugo-

slavia which has broken with Moscow—but to Poland, to Czechoslovakia, to the other satellites, which are Moscow's puppets: to what conclusion is he led?

Comrade H. F.'s very first argument against considering Tito's regime to be Stalinist is the fact that it is only seven years old and that is too short a time to construct any definite social structure. Obviously, the same applies to the Stalinist satellite states; and so if it proves anything, it would prove too much for Comrade H. F.'s purposes.

But secondly, his argument imperceptibly has changed the question at issue. The primary question is not that of a scientifically rounded definition of the *social structure* of Yugoslavia but of the Yugoslav *state power*. Seven years is a very short time to bring any new social structure to completion. But what is the nature of this *state power* which is seven years old?

Neither in Yugoslavia nor in any of the Stalinist satellites is Stalinism as a social system (bureaucratic collectivism) "wholly completed." Just to demonstrate that I am perfectly aware of this, I made a bit of a point of just that idea in the NI last year. But where does it leave Comrade H. F.'s argument? It is the Titoist *state power* which is leading Yugoslavia's social development in a given direction, and it is the Titoist state power which has to be examined.

The Tito bureaucracy, says Comrade H. F., is not yet a social class as it is in Russia. As mentioned, I have also made the point that the Tito bureaucracy is not yet a "wholly completed" social class. This is indeed one of the roots of the Titoists' frenetic drive for industrialization. The bureaucratic-collectivist rulers, by their

very nature, cannot develop as a *social class* before taking power, and the Yugoslav Stalinists are faced with the task of rooting themselves as a native ruling class in a very backward country, economically ill adapted to bureaucratic collectivism as a social system.

But again: it is not a question of conjuring up a "wholly completed" social class any more than of insisting on a "wholly completed" social system. It is the nature of the state power which is or should be under discussion.

If Comrade H. F.'s view is to be followed, *what is the ruling class of Yugoslavia today*, "wholly completed" or no? What is the class nature of the state?

More than that, in view of the kind of arguments given by Comrade H. F., we have to ask: What is the ruling class in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, et al.? What class society, what social system obtains there? Surely not a wholly completed one—but what? What is its direction, and by what standards does one judge? Comrade H. F. cannot use one set of standards for Yugoslavia, and a different one for the Stalinist satellites on a free-wheeling basis.

"Stalinism," writes Comrade H. F., "is a totalitarianism in which the dictatorship of a single party and the police has been brought to the highest extreme."

Not at all. Here it is he who is in a hurry to put a period too soon. Russian Stalinism is a totalitarianism which has been brought to the highest extreme so far seen in the world—that is all. It did not begin that way and we have perhaps not seen all it can do.

Fifteen or so years ago, the Marxist had to ask himself in what *direction* this society was evolving, not merely: *Where is it now?* He could answer only

by attempting to analyze the nature of Stalinism, and the alternative to answering anything was "Let's wait and see." The same is true now for the new totalitarianisms. But now we have what we did not have then: one developed Stalinist state which points to the others their own future.

Throughout Comrade H. F.'s letter is the implicit assumption that unless a regime today looks, in degree, like Stalin's it can not be called Stalinist. No reason is given for this assumption; it is simply there behind his arguments and "facts." But not even Stalin's regime always looked like Stalin's regime of today, and even his regime of today may show a degree of difference from his regime of tomorrow.

Two other preliminaries have to be cleared out of the way to get to the heart of the matter. Is Titoism "only the pure manifestation of Yugoslav nationalism"? What confuses me about this passage is that Comrade H. F. writes as if he is discussing something he thinks I wrote. I don't recognize the baby. Titoism is *not* "only a nationalist phenomenon." It is a *national-Stalinist* phenomenon. This is what we have been stressing in every possible way. And as such it is "a new phenomenon in history." Comrade H. F.'s reference to the Ukrainian old Bolsheviks who opposed Stalin's un-Marxist anti-national policy is so much beside the point that there is obviously a misunderstanding on his part somewhere.

What are the "perspectives" of Titoism in Yugoslavia? "In Comrade Draper's consideration they are very vague," writes Comrade H. F. I do not understand this. Since he specifically excludes fortune-telling, I assume he is not asking for a prediction on the fate of the Tito regime, with or with-

out dates. He himself poses several possible alternative developments. In any case, all that Marxists necessarily ask from an analysis is to point political directions and to chart the political line which can best further socialist victory ("perspectives," in other words). This we have done in several places, including the ISL's 1949 convention resolution.

But after a remark like that by Comrade H. F., one has perhaps a right to expect something better than vagueness from the critic. Comrade H. F.'s perspective is: The threat of Stalinism "makes the degeneration of Titoism into totalitarianism (into Stalinism) quite impossible . . . Logic says, therefore, that Tito is compelled to liquidate capitalism but not in the same way as Stalin did. About this 'other way' we cannot here elaborate; but one must assume that Tito is not so politically blind as not to look for this 'other way' and not to wish it."

Now there may be "other ways" to liquidate capitalism, but the only other way I know of is—the socialist way, Lenin's way. Is this Comrade H. F.'s "other way"? There are two difficulties for anyone who rushes to this conclusion. One is the fact that he indicates it is not something so simple; it would seem to require some exposition. The other is the fact that he does "not consider Titoism 'on our side.'" But if Tito is oriented toward revolutionary socialism, Leninism, or whatever one wishes to call it, *why not?* If Titoism is not Stalinism, if indeed it is virtually impossible for it to degenerate into Stalinism, if it is . . . everything else he claims for it, then *why not* openly recognize that it is coming over "on our side," and that at any rate we certainly have to be "on its side"? That is, why not give Titoism our political support?

But if Comrade H. F.'s "other way" of liquidating capitalism is neither the Stalinist way nor roughly "our way," but something else, then Comrade H. F. seems to be in a fair way to incubating a major contribution to Marxism. If this is the case, then his passing sentence is a tantalizing way of announcing the birth.

II

Perhaps there is another assumption in Comrade H. F.'s thinking. Perhaps it is this: that the *mere fact* of a break with Moscow calls into question the Stalinist nature of Tito's regime. The assumption would be: If Titoism is really Stalinism, it would not break with the homeland of Stalinism.

I should like to hope that merely putting this assumption into black on white is enough to convey its shallowness. In any case, we have elsewhere often explained not only why such a break is possible but why the national-Stalinists are *driven* toward a break with Russian imperialism. This explanation was based on our view of Stalinism as a new type of social system. Contrariwise, the assumption can be based only on the view of Stalinism as a *specific Russian peculiarity*, inapplicable elsewhere.

Now this view exists, but in all fairness it must be pointed out that Comrade H. F. seems to repudiate it. "Stalinism," he says, "is a new class society." It is a "social system." If he calls it "state-capitalism," still we take it that by this he means a *new* social system different from unhyphenated capitalism. That is enough for the moment. It is, at any rate, a social system in its own right and presumably, like other social systems, it is not historically confined to the borders of one state.

Stalinism is a social system based on

the state ownership of the decisive means of production *and* the uncontrolled domination of the state machine by the bureaucracy, *not* by the working people. The state owns industry and an uncontrolled bureaucracy "owns" the state.

Socialism, on the other hand, is the collective ownership of the decisive means of production under the democratic control of the working people themselves. The vast difference is determined by the existence of *democracy* for the mass of people.

This is so because of the very nature of the working class as a class. Unlike the bourgeoisie, which is by nature a property-owning class, it does not develop its economic and social power within the womb of the old society. The bourgeoisie could do this under feudalism because *its* social power is expressed in the first place through its ownership of the private property on which the wealth of society rests. The working class, which owns no property, can "own" and control the means of production only through a political intermediary, the state. And it can "own" and control the state only through democratic participation. Without democracy, statification points not to socialism but to what we know as Stalinism.

Democracy, therefore, is not merely of sentimental or moral value for the Marxists, nor is it merely a preference. It designates the only way in which the rule of the working class can exist in political actuality.

Take now Comrade H. F.'s two sentences: "The existing Tito dictatorship is really the regrettable, but at the same time also inevitable, factor. It is inevitable because any relaxation of it could lead inevitably to Stalin's victory."

Here we have *exactly* the rationale

with which the more conscientious neo-Stalinist defends the *Russian* dictatorship. Wishing "not to hurry to condemn" Titoism as Stalinism, Comrade H. F. finds himself accepting the heart and soul of the Stalinist apologetics.

That sounds harsh, especially when directed to anyone whose hatred of Stalinism is demonstrably beyond dispute—but that is exactly the point to be made about the retrogressive effect of pro-Titoism on anti-Stalinism.

TITOISM IS A ONE-PARTY dictatorship. No party can exist other than the CP and its controlled "People's Front." No opponent of the regime can speak, write or present his views to the people. These are not accusations; this is proclaimed by Tito. No organization or group opposed to the regime can exist. This is proclaimed as a *principle* by the Titoists in full conformity with their teachers. Rankovic's secret police operate on principles and in a manner no whit different from the GPU.

This is the regime which, says Comrade H. F., is "not yet totalitarianism." What does it lack? Is it the existence of slave-labor camps which defines totalitarianism? Does he mean that it is not (yet) as bad as Russia's? (Neither is the regime in Poland, *et al.*) Is it forced collectivization which is part of the definition of totalitarianism, as he seems to indicate in a parenthesis?

The Titoists believe in controlling, and do try to control, from above, *every* avenue of opinion, expression, social action and thought: what can Comrade H. F.'s definition of totalitarianism possibly be?

"Inner-party democracy had existed hitherto," he asserts, "and that could be proved, for instance, by the lively

discussions in the party press." Democracy inside this totalitarian movement but none outside it—that would be a sight to see. But imagination need not stagger before the idea, because it is not true.

During the wartime guerrilla fighting, there was of course a fair amount of looseness (the Trotskyists among the Partisans were not shot *right* away), but presumably Comrade H. F. is speaking of the Titoist party in power. This party called its first congress in *twenty* years only under the impact of the Cominform's denunciation. "This is a unique example in the history of the working-class movement," were Tito's unique opening words at that Fifth Congress.

I would be interested to learn what Comrade H. F. considers to be the "inner-party democracy" manifested by *what* "lively discussions" in the party press. Discussions on what? Criticism of Tito and/or the Yugoslav CP leadership—and criticism on what? I have read literally reams of English translations of the daily broadcasts of the Yugoslav radio, much of it being long quotations and summaries of the press—especially for the months after the break and including the day-by-day reports of the discussions at the Fifth Congress; and Comrade H. F.'s offhand reference remains mysterious. Not a word can be found outside of or against the Yugoslav party line. If Comrade H. F. has any other kind of lively discussion to offer in evidence, it would, at least, be news.

But while Titoism is "not yet totalitarianism," admits Comrade H. F., it is a "dictatorship"—regrettably. As we have seen, this dictatorship is totalitarian enough, despite Comrade H. F.'s verbal distinction, to permit no political life or expression outside the ruling party machine. The mass of

workers and peasants have no democratic control over the regime. They are not "united in the People's Front"—this is an expression taken straight from the Stalinist lexicon in all of Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia; they are imprisoned in the People's Front, which is the only official avenue of totalitarian politics.

All this, we are told, is a regrettable but inevitable *necessity*. If it is "inevitable," then *any* government at the head of Yugoslavia in this situation would have to be as much of a dictatorship, even a government headed by you, or us—or H. F.

Why? Because Yugoslavia is beleaguered on the east by Russia and on the west by capitalism. It cannot afford democracy, which would weaken it before Russia. . . .

Obviously a basic issue is joined here, for I would maintain the diametrical opposite: that a democratic socialist regime would be Yugoslavia's strongest defense against both Russian and Western imperialism, because socialist freedom and only socialist freedom could make that appeal to the peoples of both West and East which could bring the *only* real ally a revolutionary Yugoslavia could rely on—the revolutionary working class.

And if I did not think so, I would know of no *political* reason for opposing Stalinism, however much I might be outraged by humanitarian, moral or personal objections to that regime. For the Stalinist dictatorship established itself in Russia as the "practical" answer to the beleaguering of the revolution.

Stalinist Russia is beleaguered today. It is menaced by a whole world of capitalism around it. The talk about the coexistence of the two systems is simply diplomatic doubletalk. There is scarcely an intelligent Stalinist I

have ever met who will not give precisely this rationale for the political regime in Russia (while denying that it is totalitarianism): Russia cannot afford democracy "in the Western sense." By this is meant democracy in any sense, including and most especially the Marxist sense.

Has Stalin less "right" to a one-party dictatorship than Tito? Was it any less "inevitable"—while "regrettable" for Stalin?

Yes, yes; in the midst of a bloody civil war, ringed by fourteen invading armies, as was Russia's situation during the interventionist civil wars after World War I, emergency restrictions on democracy may be "regrettable" and "inevitable"—but even in the midst of that hell revolutionary Russia was a utopian democracy compared with Tito's Yugoslavia. And the "emergency restrictions" and bureaucratism which took root in this period in Russia played no small part in laying the juridical and psychological basis for Stalin's developing counter-revolution. With the defeat of the revolutionary wave in Europe by 1923 and the damping of the revolutionary élan of October, they flowered into—inevitable dictatorship. Inevitable not because of its necessity for defending the revolution, but an inevitable product of the *counter-revolutionary* degeneration.

BUT WHAT A COMPARISON we are anticipating! There are no fourteen enemy armies rampaging over Yugoslavia—not even one. There is no civil war burning red over the land. There is not a single class or social grouping in Yugoslavia sympathetic to the Russian enemy—as there were whole classes and social strata and parties inside revolutionary Russia anxious to aid the interventionists. (Even the leaders

of the Yugoslav Socialist Party in exile are for supporting Tito as against Russia.) There are only Cominform agents and hirelings and malcontents. For this a dictatorship is necessary, not to speak of totalitarianism!

If Yugoslavia, virtually united against the enemy to whom Comrade H. F. points, Russia, cannot afford democracy—who can? Not Russia, as we have seen. Turn the tables: neither can the capitalist states, on the basis of H. F.'s implicit views on the impotence of democracy. The tensest non-shooting war in history engulfs Europe; the world is at stake. What right has H. F. to demand that France, for example, allow itself the "luxury" of democracy? Or Western Germany, right on the front? Or for that matter the United States? Do we make this demand, and become indignant at its increasing violations, only because we are not interested in the victory of capitalist France or capitalist America? But then, besides the fact that we are at least as much against its defeat *by Russia*, the capitalist rulers would have a perfect right to say to us: *You socialists, who demand that we commit suicide by relaxing in democratic luxuries while you tell Tito that HIS dictatorship is necessary to survival, you are not partisans of democracy, as you claim to be; you are only enemies of capitalism. To defend ourselves—and surely you do not become indignant because we want to defend ourselves—your own teachings show us the way. Democracy is impotent to defend us, you say; ergo, we shall be as smart as Tito.*

And the bourgeois liberals would have an equal right to say to us: *You hypocrites with your talk of socialist democracy as the alternative to both capitalism and Stalinism! Suppose you take power: all you need is serious*

threat of war and a threat to your regime and you inevitably embrace dictatorship!

That on the negative side. But it is not a question of winning an argument in debate with either the capitalist rulers or the bourgeois liberals. What is at stake is only indicated by that. It is the conception of socialism and its very reason for existence.

Only the widest democratic involvement of the masses into the life of the state, making it *their* state in very truth, can guarantee the defense of a revolution. When a socialist revolution has to choose between democracy and defense—as the Russian Revolution did or thought it did—it is *already* and by that very token balanced on the brink of disaster—as the Russian Revolution was. Lenin and Trotsky did not expect the revolution to survive unless the European-wide revolution were victorious. But that victory did not come; and it was first its delay and then its defeat which posed or seemed to pose that dilemma before the beleaguered Russian fortress of the proletariat: democracy or defense. That, at any rate, was the way the developing bureaucracy saw it. They found the means to avert the overthrow; the revolution did not survive the means.

Comrade H. F. writes: "It is precisely the Stalinist totalitarianism that has led the Russian Revolution to degeneration." Diametrically wrong. It was the degeneration of the Russian Revolution which led to Stalinist totalitarianism. Here again he writes as if Stalinist Russia *started* as a totalitarianism. But even as late as 1927 when Trotsky was expelled from the party, there was more democracy still left inside and outside the party than there is under Tito today!

WHAT WAS THIS DEGENERATION OF

the Russian Revolution which led to totalitarianism? It was, in a few words, the process whereby the working masses were gradually separated from all democratic control over the state. It took many forms and had many effects—including under given circumstances the bloody period of forced collectivization—but that is what it *was*. It was not inevitable nor inherent in the nature of totalitarianism that every one of the manifestations of Stalinization in Russia (including forced collectivization) had to happen the way it did. But Comrade H. F. will be in no hurry to condemn Titoism as Stalinism until it too has a forced-collectivization massacre! And he will not be convinced it is a form of Stalinism *until* it is as totalitarian as Russia—nothing less will do!

There is another thing to be kept in mind in comparing the development of Stalinist power in Russia and in Yugoslavia. Paradoxically worded as it may seem: Stalin did not *begin* by being a Stalinist; Tito did.

Since we Marxists do not view Stalin as the personal devil of the drama, we have no difficulty in admitting—nay, proclaiming—that doubtless Stalin started on his course in the sincere belief that his way was the only one to preserve the revolution. It is entirely true that the end justifies the means, but the end justified only those means which *really* can effectuate *that* end. Stalin's means of preserving the revolution meant the degeneration of the revolution and finally the abandonment of the socialist end. The bureaucratic suppression of the masses, the crushing of democratic initiative, was first conceived as an emergency measure, generalized in the name of regrettable necessity as a means of preserving the beleaguered fortress of the revolution, and finally

institutionalized as an end in itself for the benefit of an entrenched bureaucracy. Thus Stalin became a Stalinist, as we know Stalinism today.

In 1927 it would have made sense to ask: *Will* Stalinism degenerate *into* totalitarianism? It was coming from a *different* past. But it is in 1950 that Comrade H. F. poses the question: *Will* Titoism degenerate *into* totalitarianism, that is, Stalinism? As if Tito's political career and ideas have lately begun!

This leader of the Yugoslav dictatorship—about whom Comrade H. F. asks: will his regime *become* Stalinist? has been a Stalinist hatchetman, agent and GPU operative, for most of his political life. Up to yesterday, so to speak, he was as true-blue a model of a Stalinist as Moscow had to offer, steeped in its ideology, firmly convinced of its every essential tenet, from socialism-in-one-country to the saving grace of GPU thought control.

This is no revolutionary leader faced with the danger of *becoming* a Stalinist. The poison is in every nerve cell of his political thinking. It would at least make sense to ask: can Tito, under the impact of the break, divorce himself from Stalinist ideology? I am merely noting that this is not the way Comrade H. F. thinks to put it.

Nor is it a question of Tito the individual head of state. Will Titoist Yugoslavia *become* Stalinist? Here again: what was it only yesterday so to speak, before the break, if not a Stalinist regime? But I have already asked a similar question before, and it comes up again only because Comrade H. F. refers to the "social origin of Titoism which is, by the way, different from Stalinism too."

What Comrade H. F. means, I do not pretend to know. (He cannot surely be referring to the "social origin"

of Titoism in the wartime nationalist struggle or "revolution," because Stalinism also came to power by bridling a revolution.) But whatever it is he has in mind, it is precisely the social-political origin of Titoism I am here discussing. Whatever Titoism may be claimed to be now, it *was* Stalinism only a little while ago, it arose out of Stalinism, and if it is touted as being something different from Stalinism now, something more substantial will have to be said in favor of the view.

III

The way in which wishes (or "wish-fantasies") can shape political thinking is frequently enough seen but unfortunately is not susceptible to political proof. I cannot and need not seek to prove it against Comrade H. F. One should, however, be aware of the sources of the powerful pull of pro-Titoism on the socialist ideology of the anti-Stalinist left.

The background is the state of the Marxist movements today, hurled back by the outcome of the imperialist war, hurled back by the rise and growth of Stalinism, to a low point of weakness and organizational ineffectiveness. And in the face of this, what tasks! Over us hover the two world-threatening scourges, the war of the atoms and the barbaric night of Stalinism. *Something must be done! A way out must be found! There must be a new road! A power must be wielded to break the slide to doom!*

I shall not speak about the impulse to grasp at straws. Titoism is not a straw. It is a power in the world—that is precisely one of its attractions for those oppressed by present powerlessness. Moreover it arises as the enemy of our enemy. Maybe this is the way . . . At any rate, how can one "hurry to condemn" it? Let us rather fix our eyes upon its virtues. . . . How thank-

less a task it is to convince the thirsty man in the desert that the gleam of water is a mirage!

Politically speaking (since we shall not speak of "wish-fantasies") what results is a double standard of judgment. We are familiar with the Stalinoids (not to speak of the Stalinists) who are wound up automatically to denounce any beam in the eye of capitalism and to justify any mote in the eye of Stalin—and with the American apologists who reverse the field. This question of the double standard is not a simple one, of course: it is obviously true that superficially similar *acts* in different social contexts cannot be equated, but the standards by which the acts are judged cannot be arbitrarily shifted to suit one's wishes. There is no evidence in the world which can convince the believing devotee of the Kremlin that Russia is neither socialist nor "progressive." He *knows* that the evidence is crooked, or out of context and one-sided, or that there must be some good socialist reason for the proved fact. He knows this because he wishes to believe, and he wishes to believe because the end of faith would deprive him of his only hold on the conviction that there is a power on his side. Hence the double standard.

Let the Czech Stalinist regime announce that candidates can run for election by getting petition signatures, and no one pays any attention, except those who were already convinced that democracy reigns there—like Konni Zilliacus. Let, however, Tito announce the same, and from the New York Times to the Fourth International-Trotskyist press, articles get written about the trend toward democratization in Yugoslavia. The electoral "reform" turns out to be pure fakery, but enthusiasm is scarcely

dampened. Has not Tito announced the decentralization of industry? Hasn't he set up "workers' committees" in the plants? The announcement of "workers' committees" in a Russian satellite would bring unmerciful heehaws from some of the same people who become entranced by each propagandist blast from Belgrade.

FOR OVER A YEAR before the break the Titoists spoke among themselves about the "degeneration" of the Russian leaders and party. Now Kardelj makes speeches along the same lines, about the bureaucratization of Russian "Bolshevism," about the "crisis of socialism" in Russia, and sundry harsh attacks on the Russians—most of them entirely true. Ah! one sees how "theoretical clarification" is proceeding apace among the Yugoslavs!

The limit is far from having been reached to the pretty (and also true) things which can be poured out in speeches by the Yugoslav Titoist leaders. They may even discover tomorrow that this Russian imperialist against whom they have to mobilize their people is no longer socialist; that—lo!—Yugoslavia alone upholds the banner of socialism and people's democracy in the world. True, this seems some distance from happening yet, but such a turn may be easier than to try to convince the Yugoslav people that the enemy which is seeking to enslave them is still the hearthland of socialism in the world.

Let those who will search the speeches by Djilas, Kardelj, Pyade and Tito (Rankovic is less interested in making speeches) for new evidence that they are devoting their spare moments to diligent perusal of Trotsky's "The Third International After Lenin." Comes the day when Moshe Pyade denounces the Stalin regime as "Bonapartist"—why not?—hats will fly

into the air.

Our own standards of judgment, founded on our own understanding of Stalinism, will not depend on the latest handouts from the Tanjug Agency. As long as the Yugoslav people are excluded from all control over the state, held in subjection by the totalitarian vise of the Titoist dictatorship, denied every real vestige of democratic control over their destiny, the regime that reigns is national-Stalinism. *The test for Stalinism in Yugoslavia is the internal political regime.*

Statification plus totalitarianism equals Stalinism. Collective ownership plus democracy equals socialism. The equations are shorthand and curt and do not pretend to include all the wisdom about Stalinism which will some day be the property of the historian, but that is where to start.

Nowhere more than in Eastern Europe, the fight for socialism is the fight for democracy. The world socialist movement cannot even hope to be reborn without this on its banner. Its edge is directed equally against capitalism and Stalinism. And because it is so crucial, apologies for Tito's dictatorship as a regrettable necessity can be the beginning of the end of socialist reorientation.

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Recollections of Maxim Gorki

Pages from the Diary of Victor Serge—V

Fedin and Gorky

July 10, 1945. A certain period of my youth comes to life in me again as I read Constantine Fedin's *Gorky in Our Midst*, published in Moscow in '43. It is remarkably well done; Gorky is living, natural; Blok¹ also, and even Zamyatin²—portrayed in a few lines. I knew Gorky well during this period. That endangered Petrograd, polar and with such a tragic internal richness, had been mine. I can follow the recollections of Fedin (1919-21) step by step. F. himself I got to know only years later when I reviewed his books *Cities and Years*, *The Brothers*; I saw in him a young Russian Romain Rolland preoccupied by human problems in an inhuman epoch; full of a hardly voiced but very profound protest against all that was stifling mankind, incapable of understanding the revolutionists who knew and felt all of that but, out of necessity, adopted surgical measures. . . .

Fedin related the remark of Gorky to me: "The party commissar is at one and the same time policeman, censor and archbishop: he grabs hold of you, blue pencils your writings, and then wants to sink his claws in your soul." Fedin had a handsome thin face, a broad forehead, thin lips, penetrating gray eyes, an air of self-effacing discretion—and great confidence in himself. (Married, two children.)

He must have suffered unbelievably

1. Alexander Blok, the Russian symbolist poet. Died in 1921.

2. Eugene Zamyatin, pre-revolutionary Russian satirist. After 1917 formed part of the "inner emigration" within Russia. Was able to leave Russia for France in 1931, where he died in 1937.

and if a free Russian literature some day becomes possible no one will be able to explain better than he the nature of that suppression under the terror. He has survived, and even in becoming a master craftsman of that flexible and docile special literature which accumulates such enormous silences, has manifested a minimum of the indispensable conformity necessary to exist and still in occasionally producing worthwhile works. For example, this *Gorky*. The young and uninformed reader, foreign or Russian, will finish reading this book enriched and even enthusiastic. He will see a great man close up, he will be initiated into a powerful form of love for mankind, and into an art which basically manifests itself as a form of love for mankind.

However, if the book is judged with an objective severity, what indignation! The lying in it—through omission and silence—is infinitely greater than the truth. Everything is truncated. To all that I have just noted there is not a single allusion. To the grumbling and sometimes vehement bitterness of Gorky, to his constant struggle against the terror and the abuse of authority, a struggle which made him ill, there is not an allusion. That Gorky spent more time intervening with the Cheka in order to save intellectuals and other victims than with writers cannot be denied. That he had confidence in Lenin because his intercessions were customarily crowned with success cannot be learned. (One day I brought a message from Zinoviev to G. in his apartment on Kronversky Prospect—Zino-

view had censored an article by G. He received me with fury. "These bolsheviks—you don't know them! How many crimes and stupidities! Tell Z. that I've had enough of them!" etc. I had to tone down the violence of the message and G., moreover, yielded and his article went through censored.)

The lie by omission sometimes produces an enormity. Beautiful and true to life portrait of Alexander Blok, but "he (A. B.) never says that he was reduced to silence." A. B. is depicted as a rallier to the regime. He was a revolutionist, a stubborn though discreet protestor. He never said that he was suffocating. Allied with the destroyed and persecuted Left Soc.-Rev. Party, he maintained a friendship with Ivanov-Razumnik³ and Andrei Biely⁴; he was put in prison and a moving essay on A. B. in a cell of the Cheka was published. He died in good part from sadness and privation, with the beginnings of scurvy. C. F. describes the funeral of Blok. I was there. He is silent about its being a double demonstration of mourning and of silent protest: in the first row of his friends, not far from Liubova Dmitrievna Blok, walked Olga Gumileva, with her big brown eyes in a child's emaciated face, the widow of the great poet Nicholas Stepanovitch Gumilex, who had just been shot. . . . C. F. is silent on Gumilev, silent on that execution which shocked Petrograd, silent on Ivanov-Razumnik, one of the stimulating forces in Russian thought, because I.-R. disappeared in '33. What abominable silences!

A few lines on the defense of Petrograd—but not one allusion to Trotsky who saved the doomed city. A scene

3. Literary historian and critic.
4. Brilliant poet, novelist, critic and essayist of the pre-Stalinist period.

from the second congress of the CI in the Tauride Palace, at which Lenin spoke, is well described, but not a word on the friends who surrounded Lenin in an affectionate circle and who did not leave him during the entire day—Zinoviev, Bakayev, Eudokimov, all three of them shot. An absolute prohibition against mentioning those who were shot! I am uneasy over not finding the name of Vsevolod Mikh. Eichenbaum⁵—and reassured to find that of Nicholas Nikitin,⁶ who has disappeared from the literary scene. Can this be an act of courage? (N. N. is mentioned only incidentally.) The remarks of G. upon Lenin are faithfully reported but not the remarks of G. upon Trotsky, whom he admired without liking and whom he often criticized. In general I recognize G.'s style and the themes upon which he often spoke to me: "No phosphorous for the mind," the mysterious, contradictory, elementary strength of the mouzhik—the drama of the city devoured by the country—the mission of intellectuals—Russian incompetence, Russian anarchy—the beginning of new times. One word is missing, the word "planetary" which G. freely used, the "planetary transformation"—and an essential motif, the *bezozrazia* [god-awful mess], the abominations which G. collected and denounced with a tireless bitterness.

C. F. visited Gorky while the canons were thundering on Kronstadt. That provides a guarded page where the anxiety of Gorky can be glimpsed. I saw him several times during that period and I once met him at the Cheka, Godokhovaya 2; he was tak-

5. Author of works on Lermontov and Tolstoy.
6. Novelist, author of *The Crime of Kirik Rudenko*, a study of factory life in a Russian village.

ing steps on behalf of the prisoners; he was gray and taciturn. I spoke to him about the case of R. Abramovitch and Thodore Dan,⁷ both of them arrested, and whom the president of the Cheka, Semyonov, a narrow-minded red-head wished to shoot. Zinoviev perhaps might have let it be done. G. promised me to intervene with Lenin and the preservation of the threatened men was doubtless due to this. There is not an allusion in C. F. to the terror and moreover Petrograd was living under the terror even more than it was under conditions of famine or of literary experiences. Is it now forbidden to speak of the "red terror"?

I again ran across the remarks of G. on the tortures which the Siberian peasants inflicted upon their prisoners, Communists for the most part. (G. had been informed about them by Vsevolod Ivanov.⁸) One day I asked G. where this tradition of refined torture, which it is difficult to invent, came from. "From the Golden Legend,"⁹ he replied.

Still another enormous omission—in order to cover up a state crime—Boris Pilniak is not mentioned.

And Fedin writes: "Art consists in expressing sensations as well as possible; and the most lucid sentiment—that is to say, the truth—is the one which can be expressed with the most perfection."

He shows G.'s attitude toward the mission of the writer very well, an attitude which G. passionately inculcated in the young. Literature was a calling, a method of serving humanity

7. Abramovitch was a Menshevik-Internationalist and Dan a Menshevik during the revolution. Both were well-known figures, leaders in the Second International following their expulsion from Russia.
8. Protégé of Gorky. Novelist and playwright.
9. The reference is probably to early chronicles of saints' martyrdoms.

which engaged the personality totally and permanently, demanded honesty, conscientious craftsmanship. G. liked to call himself a craftsman *masterovoy* [master craftsman]. Such has been the guiding idea of several great schools of Russian writers. Literature contributes to the elevation of mankind from obscurity to consciousness; it has the mission of saying to men the truth about mankind.

I once asked Yuri Tynyanov¹⁰ (whom C. F. said so greatly resembled Pushkin, and who also resembled a rabbi born old) why, with such a profound spirit of opposition, writers proved so unwilling to struggle. "Because," he said to me, "each one thinks he has something important to do; and therefore is afraid to take risks, prefers to humiliate himself and gain time." I admire Fedin for having swallowed so many humiliations, known so many hideous things without losing faith in himself—the feeling of his dignity—the will to create; and of knowing how, with cynicism and sadness, to be able to adapt himself so as to be able to write a little book which is, *in spite of everything*, living, moving, human, precious in several senses, like a gem from the Urals mounted in mud.

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VICTOR SERGE

(Translated and annotated by
James M. Fenwick)

10. Writer of historical novels dealing in particular with the Decembrist uprising in 1825.

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

Dubious History

AN ESSAY FOR OUR TIMES, by H. Stuart Hughes. Alfred A. Knopf, 1950. 196 pp., \$2.75.

Not the least impressive aspect of the national and world crisis which began in 1929 and has continued up to the present has been the almost total incapacity of the United States professoriat to predict it, analyze it after it has occurred, or propose a defensible way out.

The professors whose helplessness was rudely revealed by the depression had been pretty generally shaped by the idyllic 'twenties. It is only now that a second generation, molded by depression, war, and the post-war insecurity, is making its voice heard. It is a lamentable fact that these events have only made the confusion worse confounded.

H. Stuart Hughes, now an assistant professor of history at Harvard, begins his book with a description of the successive environments which he, as a typical member of the most intellectually sophisticated of his generation, was subjected. A socialist of the Popular Front persuasion during the 'thirties, he was able to justify the war as a "war for socialism—a democratic socialism which (in a phrase now worn and nearly meaningless) would serve as a bridge between the Communist East and the liberal West." During the war our Harvard Horatius, like so many bright young men, was to be found defending the bridge to socialism in the field artillery, the OSS, and the State Department, it is almost needless to remark.

Unfortunately, almost "before we knew what had happened, we found two embattled forces, opposed both nationally and ideologically, facing each other across continents, oceans, and polar icecap. The prospect left the most stout-hearted at a loss." Despite everything, however, he is still able to say today that more "of the underlying assumptions of this essay derive from Marx than from any other source."

"The new irrationalist temper in

thought," Hughes states in beginning his analysis of the modern dilemma, "the doubts as to the future of our civilization and the capacity of Western man to cope with his spiritual environment—these have set off our time rather sharply from its predecessors. We shall find traces of this mood of doubt and uncertainty in a wide variety of fields."

This malaise was variously expressed in the thinking of such social analysts as Henry Adams, Freud, Jung, Adler, Fromm, Toynbee, and Spengler. It also found expression in the novel—in its purest form in the works of Kafka, of whom Sartre said, "But what we were particularly sensitive to was that in this trial perpetually in session, which ends abruptly and evilly, whose judges are unknown and out of reach, in the main efforts of the accused to know the leaders of the prosecution, in this defense patiently assembled which turns against the defender and figures in the evidence for the prosecution, in this absurd present which the characters live with great earnestness and whose keys are elsewhere, we recognize history and ourselves in history."

So far, so good, and even comfortably platitudinous.

Platitudinous, but not comfortably so, is the rest of the book. Hughes begins with a rousing demonstration that none can be so brave under Stalinist totalitarianism in Russia as an assistant professor of history comfortably resident in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

"Since the middle thirties," he booms, "the Soviet Union has been a socialist state—within the usual definition of the term. The chief means of production have been nationalized . . . if every Soviet citizen were to receive the same wage, in a country with as low a standard of living as the USSR all would live in virtual squalor, and there would be no margin for the cultivation of the arts or even for maintaining a decent showing before the outside world. . . . Perhaps we should consign the whole notion of equalitarianism to the disrepute of that utopianism which Marx and Engels never tired of attacking."

"We may surmise," says Hughes, "that

in its original and reformist guise Marxism was too rationalistic to enroll overwhelming popular support, too theoretical to formulate a concrete, unquestioned plan of action. . . . As a late product of Western rationalism, it remained closed to the unfolding spirit of our era." Faced with the "almost primitive force" of the Russian peasant it "was up to Marxism to take the place that the Orthodox Church had forfeited. . . ."

The resultant society has its values, however much we may deplore some of its aspects. "In the East the rulers of the Soviet Union have thought in terms of 'doing things,' of collective enterprise, of shared work and enjoyment. Certainly the consciousness of participation in building a socialist society—however infrequently it may be felt with any real understanding — represents a civilized value."

We must therefore work for a peaceful co-existence of the United States and Russia, for "a clear victory for either side, particularly a military victory, would mean the destruction of something precious in terms of civilized values." Hughes is himself dubious of the possibility of such a solution.

That even such a solution can be envisaged is possible in the first instance only by a total absence in the book of an analysis of the economic dynamics underlying the cold war and in the second by a bland idealization of the political realities at home and abroad which underly the cold war.

That Hughes can propose the freezing of the *status quo*, with all the economic, political, and social inequities current in the world today, not only reveals a bureaucratic temper bearing a strong Stalinoid cast but also identifies him as an example of the regression from the nineteenth century rationalism which he dwells upon so patronizingly throughout the book.

JAMES M. FENWICK

War Strategy

THE SECOND WORLD WAR, by J. F. C. Fuller. Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York, 1949. \$2.50.

THE INVERSION OF CLAUSEWITZ'S most well-known dictum which is now current, "Politics is war carried on by other means," is something more than

a facile witticism. It accurately describes the situation in the world today.

Prior to World War II large-scale wars could plausibly be considered as relatively rare aberrations in the evolution of society. Since that time war has generally come to be accepted as a normal mode of existence and peace as an interval in which new wars are prepared.

This change in attitude is probably most obvious in the United States, where the military factor heretofore has been only a minor part of the social structure. Today military considerations based on an orientation of war with Russia are major determinants of almost all aspects of national policy.

They lie behind economic aid to Europe, the political evolution permitted Germany and Japan, the current attitude toward Yugoslavia. At home they are reflected in the huge military establishment and its research program, the stockpiling of raw materials, the decentralization of production and government offices which is beginning, the drive against the Communist Party and the attack on civil liberties. The character of United States capitalism is making a huge and sometimes lumbering change.

What would Engels say today, that acute analyst of military phenomena, who in commenting on the Franco-Prussian war could write in 1878 that "this war compelled all continental powers to introduce . . . a military burden which must bring them to ruin in a few years. The army has become the main purpose of the state, and an end in itself. . . . Militarism dominates and is swallowing Europe"?

The whole emphasis of Marxist analysis has shifted. Russia, Germany and the United States have each in their own way long since demonstrated their ability to weather economic and social stress greater than Engels ever dreamed of. Where in the socialist movement, taken in its broadest sense, can a serious discussion be aroused on, say, Luxemburg's theory of capitalist crisis, at a time when Einstein announces that with the discovery of the H-bomb the destruction of all human life has become a technical possibility?

The Marxist who does not today devote the most serious attention to the study of the military problem runs the

grave risk of becoming disoriented. There are two phases to it: a study of the military aspects of World War II and a reassessment of our former political estimates in the light of this information; and an application of these lessons to our current analyses.

With important exceptions, World War II is already the best documented conflict in history. The best analysis of the war to come to the attention of this reviewer is that of J. F. C. Fuller, a retired English major-general, was one of the earliest proponents of tank warfare, has written numerous informative books on military subjects, possesses an objective interest in his craft, is not uncultured (he quotes freely in his works from Marx, Engels and Lenin—as well as from Petrozius Arbiter, St. Augustine and Adam Smith, among others)—and was a supporter of Oswald Mosley's fascist movement. The balanced tensions implied by these facts have by and large permitted him to produce a critical and objective book.

On some future occasion it will prove useful to extend Fuller's analysis and to relate his main conclusions to World War III. For the time being we shall content ourselves with noting a few of his leading observations from among a larger number of very provocative judgments:

The Maginot Line concept was not bad in itself. But France had neither the matériel nor the manpower to equip a mobile reserve to operate behind it.

Hitler's failure to invade England was a crucial mistake. He never realized the importance of seizing the Mediterranean in this respect.

The invasion of Russia was "one of the greatest strategical blunders in history."

That the "invasion of Russia came as a political surprise to the Kremlin is unlikely, but that it was a tactical surprise is all but certain."

The causes of the German defeat in Russia were: massive Russian reserves, an ultimate five-to-one preponderance in matériel by the Russians over the Germans, long lines of communication, poor roads, too few tracked vehicles, an early winter in '41, trained partisans and the Hitler policy of lastditch stands.

The initial Japanese victories, in which an area one-half the size of the United States was conquered, showed

the value of preparedness under modern conditions of waging war.

The Pacific island assault tactics were probably "the most far-reaching tactical innovation of the war."

The slogan of unconditional surrender "trapped the British and Americans into tactically the most absurd and strategically the most useless campaign of the whole war"—the Italian campaign.

Strategic bombing was not only ineffective militarily, it diverted production facilities from landing craft, the absence of which unduly prolonged the war. It also made the establishment of post-war peace difficult: "... cities and not rubbish heaps are the foundations of civilization."

In sum, says Fuller, neither side had a viable over-all strategy. Hitler improvised from year to year. The aim of the allies was to defeat Hitler. The limitations of this concept are visible today. Does the United States currently have an over-all strategy? Obviously not; the problems of material and manpower are immense. Hence the current hesitations. What if the United States should win the war? But who dares think ahead that far? But does Russia have such a strategy? More than the United States, obviously, since she wields political movements in other countries. But even in these movements resides the menace of Titoism. Viewed realistically, her chance of knocking out the United States and still being strong enough to capitalize on it are slim.

This absence of a long-term strategy on the part of the major contestants is no accident—it is simply one more demonstration of the frightful—and frightening—impasse into which modern society has driven itself.

JAMES M. FENWICK

"Don't Shoot the Piano Player, He's Doing The Best He Can!"

The following is the COMPLETE text of an article which appeared in the June 24 New Leader, called "Speaking of Trotskyites," by James T. Farrell. James T. Farrell is the author of the "Studs

Lonigan" trilogy and "The League of Frightened Philistines."—ED.

A FRIEND OF MINE has told me an anecdote concerning a fairly recent discussion with a leader of the Shachtmanite-Trotskyite movement. This leader was close to a state of depression: he almost admitted that his own organization might not know all the correct answers to the questions posed by the current crisis. However, just when this leader was at the point of making his despairing admission, he began to speak positively and dogmatically: he stated that if the masses didn't agree with the Shachtmanite program, then the masses were wrong.

This anecdote brings to mind a second one. About five years ago in the Midwest, I was with a group of Trotskyites. I remarked to them that they all seemed to me to be generals. One of the group was then in a state of dialectical suspension between Cannonite Trotskyism and Shachtmanite Trotskyism. Taking offense at my remark, this man angrily attacked me on the grounds that I understood neither Arthur Koestler nor literature.

Then I remember the time a Cannonite functionary solemnly told me that the leaders of his party constituted the advance guard of the human race, and that the fate of humanity literally depended on the political decisions which these leaders would make.

And speaking of the American Trotskyites, I recall a Greenwich Villager I knew some years ago. During the worst days of the depression he made a fabulous fortune, millions on millions of dollars, by playing the stock market—*solitaire*. Every morning, his wife got up and cooked breakfast for both of them. Then she went to work in an office, where she earned something like twenty or twenty-five dollars a week. This lad did his daily work at home. He sharpened pencils. He arranged sheets of paper on the table in an orderly manner. Some of these sheets had numbers and dollar signs on them, some of the sheets were blank. He opened the newspaper to the pages containing the stock market news and reports. He added up the sums he had won investing, in *solitaire*, on the previous day. Then he made his daily investments of thousands and even mil-

lions. He worked at this game all day. At about six o'clock, his wife came home with the groceries and cooked supper. He usually enjoyed his meals, especially because of his success with his investments for the day. He rarely made a bad investment.

All of these anecdotes cause me to wonder about tragedy and comedy. And in his introduction to the second and third volumes of *The History of the Russian Revolution*, Trotsky wrote that "A failure of correspondence between subjective and objective is, generally speaking, the fountain-source of the comic, as also the tragic, in both life and art." Because of this failure of correspondence in 1792, the Girondins were, according to Trotsky, "pitiful and ludicrous beside the rank-and-file Jacobins." Also, declaring that "People and parties are heroic and comic not in themselves but in their relationship to circumstances," Trotsky compared the Jacobins of 1792 and the Bolsheviks of 1917. In his opinion, both groups "were adequate to the epoch and its tasks: curses in plenty resounded in their direction, but irony would not stick to them—it had nothing to catch hold of."

Well, I wonder how all of the foregoing relates to the Shachtmanites and the Cannonites? Are they like the men of 1792? Or the Bolsheviks of 1917? Or are they like my Greenwich Village friend who played the stock market, *solitaire*, with such success?

It is obvious that here, in the American Trotskyites, we have a question in correspondences.

JAMES T. FARRELL

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