

RUSSIA'S PATH TO COMMUNISM

By
G. ZINOVIEV

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
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RUSSIA'S PATH TO COMMUNISM *by* Zinoviev
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FOREWORD

The present pamphlet contains the speech delivered by comrade Zinoviev to the Fraction of the Russian Communist Party at the Third Soviet Congress of the Union of Soviet Republics on May 20th, 1925, and printed in the Russian press under the title "The Main Features of the Present Period." As the title indicates, the speech deals with the most important problems of the home and foreign policy of the Union of Soviet Republics. The bourgeois and Social-Democratic press has recently abounded in statements to the effect that the Third International has "admitted" the final stabilisation of capitalism, has renounced the revolution, and in internal politics has drawn its conclusions from what is called "Neo-nep." Nothing is better adapted to expose the falsity of these assertions than the speech of comrade Zinoviev here published.

The Editors.



Russia's Path to Communism

" . . . The crux of the matter lies in the alliance between the proletariat and the broad mass of the peasantry."—V. I. Lenin.

1. The Necessity for a Clear Revolutionary Perspective.

THERE can be no doubt that the decisions adopted by the recent session of the Plenum of the Executive Committee, the Fourteenth Party Conference and two of our Soviet Congresses are bound by an international unity and together represent a definite chapter in our politics, Our home and foreign problems under present conditions are closely bound up together and, indeed, to such an extent as almost to become identified with each other.

It appears to me that these decisions, taken together, sum up a definite political tendency on the part of our Party during the recent period. Furthermore, I think that they to a certain extent put an end to the serious differences which have existed within our Party recently.

Our international Party differences were in the majority of cases associated with political crises within the country and usually manifested themselves at a time when it became necessary to solve new and important political problems. It could not be otherwise. It is now perfectly clear that the disputes within our Party in recent times have

been influenced by the peasant question. And now that we are definitely concerning ourselves with the solution of a number of problems associated with that central question, it may be said that an end has been put to the important differences which have recently existed within our Party.

I do not propose to recite the actual decisions adopted. Each in itself represents a bulky document which must be carefully studied and re-studied. All that I can offer here is certain commentaries on, and a certain conspectus of, these decisions.

Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin taught us to fight against what he called "narrow-browed practicalism." He taught us to associate political questions, place them within the general political framework and not to lose our perspective among the mass of practical questions. The worst thing that can happen to a revolutionary Party is to lose its perspective. We have adopted a number of extremely important decisions. Every point in the resolution on, let us say, the immediate tasks of Soviet structure or the improvement and strengthening of peasant agriculture is in itself of tremendous political importance. Nevertheless, we must maintain a general direction in the mass of practical decisions and be clear as to what those decisions, taken together, signify politically.

There is the devil of a to do in the camp of our opponents. One need only read the S.R. and Menshevik press, "The Sozialistichesky Vestnik," the "Revolutsionnaya Rossia," or the "Dni," and the rest of the White Guard and bourgeois press abroad, to see how very interested they are in our decisions.

They prowl around our congresses on tiptoe, peer through cracks in the wall and comment in their own fashion upon what is taking place. The Mensheviks howl about "economic failure"; the British bourgeois press proclaim that we are about to introduce "political Nepism" and so forth. Recently comrade Bukharin and I were glancing through a copy of Miliukov's "Novosti," and laughed till we were sore over a leading article written by so intelligent an opponent as Miliukov. According to him some sort of terrible international struggle is going on among us. They seem to be almost certain that they will be recalled to Russia, sooner or later. "It is a pleasant thing to see that your enemy is a monster." But it is also pleasant to see your irreconcilable class enemy falling wide of the mark and making a fool of himself. But when he makes an utter ass of himself it is pleasanter still.

The late leader of the Mensheviks, Martov, used to say that our concessions to the peasantry were "Zubatovism." The Socialist Revolutionary paper "Dni" now writes: "Famine fed you, but plenty will throttle you." (No. 761, May 10, 1925). How awful! We remember the famine years when these gentlemen hoped that the bony fingers of hunger would overthrow the Soviet Government; we remember the notorious "Prokukish (Prokopovitch, Kuskova and Kishkin) who hoped, with the support of the Western Imperialists and the food crisis, to overthrow the Soviet Government. Their only hope now is that "Plenty will throttle them." It seems to me that we shall somehow cope with the "danger" of plenty. We managed when the country was starving, so perhaps we shall manage when there is plenty. Famine

did not please them, plenty does not please them; to satisfy them we must be neither starved nor satiated; if possible semi-starved.

Their prophecies are not worth an addled egg. We remember how they prophesied the fate of the monetary reform. When we introduced the reform they prophesied its inevitable collapse and with it the collapse of the Soviet Government. Nevertheless, we managed to stabilise the currency in spite of their dismal howlings. They now hope for the "ruin" of the Soviet Union from "economic failure," "Zubatovism," "political NEP," etc., in other words, from the very measures of the Soviet Government which will help to make the dictatorship of the proletariat still more invincible, since they are directed towards strengthening the alliance between the workers and peasants.

The prophecies of our opponents only deserve to be laughed at, of course. But we ourselves must be clear as to the meaning of the present chapter in the policy of the Party and of the Comintern generally.

There is no need to conceal from ourselves that these decisions represent certain concessions. We must remember how Lenin once said, in reply to Martov's accusation of "Zubatovism," "Every concession we make, we make within the limits of what will support and strengthen the power of the proletariat, which undeviatingly, and in spite of all difficulties and obstacles, is making for the annihilation of classes and the realisation of Communism."

Is it true that the concessions marked out by our recent Congresses will result in the strengthening

of the power of the proletariat and in still further winning the peasantry for the proletariat? We must now more carefully than ever lend ear to what is going on in the "depths of the peasantry," to the slow but systematic movements which are taking place in the sphere of economics. We must lay our ear to the ground. Our Party is now in a situation when it must literally listen to how "the grass grows," when it must foresee the phenomena which are still only in process of formation and which are expressing only the beginning of a tendency. Armed with Leninism I think we shall be able to cope with this task.

2. Our Policy and the World Revolutionary Movement.

The first question we have to answer is whether any connection (and if so, what?) exists between the present chapter in our policy and the international situation and the struggle of the world proletariat.

Is there such a connection? There is. We are a section of the international revolution and for that reason we find not merely a chronological but also a logical connection between the decisions of the Comintern and those of our Party.

Was there any connection between NEP in general and the slowing down of the world proletarian revolution? Undoubtedly there was.

As early as 1918, Lenin established a connection between the concessions then made and the slowing down not only of the world revolution in general, but also of the revolution in one particular country, namely, Germany. He wrote: "If the

revolution in Germany is delayed, it is our task **to learn State capitalism from the Germans, to apply it by every means in our power, not sparing even dictatorial methods in order to accelerate it.**"*

The connection was more logically and politically obvious in 1921 at the beginning of NEP. Lenin then said at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party:

"There can be no doubt that the Socialist revolution, in a country where the vast majority of the population belong to the petty agricultural producing class, can only be possible by the help of a number of special transitional measures, which would be entirely superfluous in countries where capitalism is developed and where the wage workers in industry and agriculture represent the vast majority . . .

"In a number of writings, in all our speeches and in our press, we have emphasised the fact that is now the position in Russia, that in Russia we have a minority of industrial workers and a vast majority of small agriculturalists. **In such a country a social revolution can be definitely successful only under two conditions. The first condition is that it be supported by a modern social revolution in one of the several advanced countries. The other condition is an agreement between the proletariat which is exercising its dictatorship, or which holds the power of the State in its hands, and the majority of the peasant population.**

"We know that only an agreement with the peasantry can save the Socialist revolution in Russia

* "The present economic situation in Russia," from the pamphlet on the Food Tax, 1918.

until such time as the revolution takes place in other countries.”*

Thus, in a country like ours, where the small agriculturalists predominate, final victory is possible only under two conditions. **Our task is not simply that of a Workers' Party, but of a Workers' Party in a PEASANT COUNTRY.** The possibility of final victory in such a country depends on the fulfilment of two conditions, one of an international, and the other of an internal character. The first condition for the **final** victory of the Socialist revolution in a country like ours, is the timely support of a Social revolution in one of the various advanced countries. The second is an agreement with the peasantry.

Neither of these conditions can replace the other ; for complete victory both are essential. Comrade Lenin never asserted that the peasant is the substitute for an ally, that he is so to speak “unwillingly our ally.” We always realised that for complete and final victory the fulfilment of both these conditions was necessary. The fulfilment of one could not replace the other, although it might **modify** it. The early triumph of the proletarian revolution in a number of countries would not relieve us of the necessity (or the desirability) of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, but would only change the conditions of that alliance. On the other hand, the closest union would not relieve us of the necessity of fulfilling the **second** condition in order to make **final** victory possible. In order to save our revolution from the

* V. I. Lenin, “The Food Tax,” a speech delivered to the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party on March 15th, 1921.

danger of bourgeois restoration, a Socialist revolution in one or several other countries is essential. A firm alliance between the working class and the peasantry in our Union only **changes** the circumstances of the first condition (namely, revolution in other countries) in the sense that it gives us more time and the possibility of waiting and fertilising the developing proletarian movement in other countries.

In what way can the rapid development of the Socialist revolution in other countries alter the circumstances in the agreement and alliance between the working class and the peasantry in the U.S.S.R.?

I think that here, too, the answer can best be given in the words of comrade Lenin. I refer to his speech at the Ninth Congress of Soviets and his article on "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Triumph of Socialism." Lenin said that in order that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry in our country should become absolutely stable, that it should rest on firm ground and that it should lose the doubtful aspects it now has—direct taxation of the peasants, etc.—it is necessary to adopt a direct exchange of the products of large industry against the products of agriculture. That cannot now be done in our country. Why? Because economic conditions do not permit it, since in the first place our large industry is extremely weak. Does that mean that the whole of our October policy was wrong? Does that mean that the Mensheviks were right when they asserted that in an economically undeveloped country the proletariat cannot take power and that the conditions for Socialism generally have not matured? No, it does not.

Lenin said :

“ If we refer to a flourishing large industry capable of satisfying the peasantry with all the products it demands, then that condition exists. **If the question is regarded from a world point of view, such a flourishing large industry capable of supplying the world with all necessary products does exist**, but it cannot be set going except in order to produce guns and shells and the other weapons which were used with such great success in 1914-18.

“ Nevertheless we should be justified in saying that from the world point of view such an industry does exist. There are countries with such developed large industries as may at once satisfy the needs of hundreds of millions of backward peasants. That we must make the basis of our calculations. . . .

“ But if, owing to the backward conditions with which we entered the revolution, the stage of industrial development we require does not yet exist, does that mean that we must renounce the revolution? No. We go confidently forward to a difficult task because the path we have adopted is the true path. There can be no doubt that a union of the masses of the population is the only way by which the toil of the peasant and the toil of the worker will be toil for themselves and not for the exploiter.”*

In his article on “ The Importance of Gold,” Lenin develops these ideas in the following way :

“ **On a world scale this “ if” has already been**

* Speech delivered at the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

realised, this condition is already fulfilled; but an isolated country, indeed one of the most backward of capitalist countries, attempted to carry into immediate and direct effect a new and practical alliance between industry and agriculture; **it was unable to fulfil this task by a 'storm attack' and must now attempt to fulfil it by a series of slow, gradual and cautious siege conditions** (black type ours, G.Z.)*

That, then, is the reply to the question as to how in one of a number of countries the victory of the proletarian revolution will be modified by the second condition, which is essential for our final victory in the U.S.S.R., namely, by facilitating a close alliance between the working class and the peasantry of the U.S.S.R. If there had been victory in those decisive countries to which comrade Lenin refers, then, if not on a world scale, at least in several countries we might use large industry as a factor lending a better form and providing more favourable conditions for our alliance with the peasantry.

To this extent the triumph of the revolution in one or several countries, although it would not have altered the real necessity for an alliance with the peasantry, would nevertheless have modified the conditions of that alliance, would have lent it a far greater stability and a far better material basis.

But the fact remains that such a triumph has not yet occurred and hence follows the necessity for a more cautious approach to the question of the alliance with the peasantry. We know that as long as revolution has not taken place in other countries

* V. I. Lenin, "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Triumph of Socialism."

only an agreement with the peasantry can save the Socialist revolution in Russia. Therefore, only a strike-breaker, only a "Socialist" who regards things not from the point of view of the proletariat, but from the point of view of his enemies, can regard the concessions made by the triumphant working class to the peasantry as "Zubatovism."

The proletarian who supports our class will say: If the revolution on a world scale has been delayed it is a bad thing for our class and therefore the greater is the need for an agreement with the peasantry and for making concessions to the peasantry. A strike-breaker, or a semi-Socialist, semi-bourgeois who has a muddled idea of the present situation, at the very moment when the revolution has begun to slow down throughout Europe, acts like Shylock and presents us with his bill; he advocates "class purity," he dubs "Zubatovism" the attempt of the triumphant proletariat to secure an alliance with the peasantry at all costs, an attempt which is indeed necessary in order to gain time until the world revolution triumphs.

Bolshevism does not regard the peasantry as an unwilling ally; it regards it as the second class in importance (the first being the proletariat) for the triumph of Socialism, not only in our country, but throughout the whole world. I refer here to the resolution of comrade Lenin at the Second World Congress of the Comintern, where he lays down the policy of the proletariat with regard to the peasant question on a world scale. Comrade Lenin explains in detail that **in every country in the world** there are three sections of peasants which we must partly win over and partly neutralise. They represent

the majority of the peasant population and only in conjunction with them can a final victory on a world scale be obtained.*

The central point in this resolution is the statement to the effect that it is necessary to distinguish the role of the peasantry before the triumph of the proletariat, during the triumph, **and after the triumph**, i.e., after the conquest of power by the proletariat. **After the triumph** of the proletariat an epoch begins during which the efforts made to bring the peasantry over to our side are particularly successful, for then the peasants can convince themselves that they have a powerful ally in

* "The toiling and exploited masses of the countryside which the town proletariat must lead into the struggle, or at least win over to its side, consist in all capitalist countries of the following groups:

"First the agricultural proletariat, the hired labourers. . . .

" . . . Secondly, the semi-proletarians, or small peasants, i.e., such as seek their livelihood partly as hired labourers in capitalist agricultural and industrial undertakings and partly by labouring on their own or hired piece of land which supplies them only with a portion of the articles of food required for their family. . . .

"Thirdly, the small peasantry, i.e., the small land-owners who either own or hire small portions of land which supply the needs of their family and husbandry and do not resort to the hiring of the labour power of others. This section will undoubtedly gain by the victory of the proletariat. . . .

Taken together, these three groups in all countries represent the majority of the rural population. The final success of the proletarian revolution is, therefore, guaranteed both in the town and the countryside." (Thesis on the Agrarian Question adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern.)

the triumphant working class, the proletariat, which is properly exercising its dictatorship.*

It is then that the crushed and suppressed peasantry will lift its head; it feels the power of its alliance with the proletariat; in the proletariat it sees its strong and powerful leader and follows it. That is why we must not for a moment forget that the peasantry from a world point of view is the second class in the revolution. In our country, indeed, where the peasantry is in such a numerical majority, where the tasks of the Workers' Party have to be adapted to **an agricultural country**, it is still clearer that the peasantry does in fact represent the class first in importance after the proletariat. The forces of the peasantry can and must be used not only for overthrowing the landowner, but also for the construction of Socialism.

Now, in order to appreciate the path traversed by Russia and the Russian peasantry, it is well to compare two dates. The first date is 1847-48, when the sons of the Russian peasant serfs, one feudal army, were used against the Hungarian revolution and the bourgeois revolutions in general, which were then common in Europe. Our peasant-

* "The agricultural population which is unbelievably crushed, disintegrated, suppressed and in the most developed countries of the world condemned to semi-barbaric conditions of life, while economically, socially and culturally interested in supporting Socialism, is capable of giving decisive support to the revolutionary proletariat only **after** the latter has conquered political power, only **after** it has dealt with the large agriculturists and capitalists, and only **after** these crushed people are able to see in **practice** that they have an organised leader and defender powerful and firm enough to support and lead them and to point out the true path." (V. I. Lenin. Thesis on the Agrarian Question adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern.)

try was then an arch-reactionary factor in European history. The second date is the date of our revolution, 1917-25. In 1925 the position is such that the Russian peasantry and the peasantry of the whole Union of Socialist Soviet Republics not only is no longer the reactionary factor it was in 1848, but is objectively a powerful factor for world Socialist revolution.

It is not that our peasantry is already Socialistic. I should not like to say that; it would be an exaggeration. Naturally, our peasantry in the mass has the psychology of petty proprietors. We realise that. But the point is not that our peasantry already subjectively feels itself to be in the mass a Socialist factor. That is not the case and cannot yet be the case. But **objectively**, owing to the fact that the proletariat has triumphed and now for eight years holds power in its hands, that it is conducting a true policy and is able to gain the following of the second class in importance, owing to the fact that an agreement between the proletariat and the peasantry in our country is giving us time in which to fertilise proletarian movements in other countries and to await its victory—as a result of all that, the peasantry of the Soviet Union objectively represents a factor of world Socialist revolution.

“Periods have turned out to be longer than we expected,” wrote comrade Lenin in his pamphlet, “The Food Tax,” “and that is not surprising; but the fundamental elements of our economics remain the same.”

That is the point we must start from to-day. Periods have proved to be longer than we expected.

Hence many difficulties. There is no chronometer which can exactly indicate the periods of revolution, and never has been, even during the life of Lenin. There could not be, because periods and speed are determined by historical experience. Mistakes regarding periods have been made by our Party and the Comintern generally. But our judgment of **direction**, of general policy, is still absolutely correct, and the decisions we have taken confirm their correctness.

Therefore, I hold, the first thing we must achieve is close reciprocity and contact between the new phase of the policy of the Russian Communist Party, which we have laid down during the last few weeks at a number of Congresses, and the position of the world revolutionary struggle of the working class.

I repeat that, in 1918, comrade Lenin said to the Russian Bolsheviks: "If the proletarian revolution is delayed in Germany, you in Russia must learn State capitalism." In 1925 this inter-dependence has become clearer. NEP in general, which was a concession along the whole front, was connected with the slowing down of the world proletarian revolution. The chapter of our policy which we are now beginning, and which is not a concession of the same magnitude, is also logically and politically bound up with the slowing down of the world revolution.

Two fundamental conditions must be borne in mind. The first is the condition of our final victory and the complete removal of the danger of the restoration of bourgeois relations, namely, the triumph of the proletarian revolution in one or

several decisive countries. The second is an alliance, and **stable** alliance at that, between the working class and the peasantry.

3. Present Revolutionary Policy.

In international politics we are now passing through a phase which is not without dangers. We have read a statement made in the English press and confirmed to-day (although it is partly denied) to the effect that the British Government is endeavouring to create a united front against the U.S.S.R. in connection with the demand for the expulsion of the Comintern from Moscow. The Executive Committee of the Communist International, as we know, is not averse to a change of headquarters under certain conditions. Indeed, what is the good of sitting all the time in Moscow? To judge by the frame of mind of the Executive Committee of the C.I., it apparently would not be averse to setting up its tent in London. But I think that in any case such a decision should be taken by the Comintern independently of the bare-faced demands of capitalist governments. When they put forward that demand during the famine period they received from the Soviet Government the reply they deserved. Now that affairs with the Soviet Government are more favourable, there can be no doubt as to the reply to their insolent demand they would receive from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics if they decided to advance such.

Nevertheless, I think that we should reflect well on the following circumstance. There can be no doubt but that international capitalism regards the present moment as very favourable for driving a

wedge between the working class and the peasantry. That is partly the reason for their attack on the Comintern. The imperialists would like to imbue the Russian peasant with the idea that he, the Russian moujik, is being menaced by a new war on account of the Comintern. That is their real plan. If the imperialists decided to start a new conflict with the U.S.S.R. they would most likely seek that pretext. They believe that would make them popular with our peasants.

A certain section of imperialists would like to conduct a preventive war against the U.S.S.R.

From the time when the beginnings of an economic revival in our country became evident, it was clear that very little time remained for the bourgeoisie. It is clear to all that within three, four or five years, the U.S.S.R. will become invincible. However, it must not be forgotten that modern capitalism is torn by internal contradictions. Competition is inevitable. The capitalist world is disintegrated; it must be from its very nature; the economic political contradictions in it are growing. We have an alliance within every bourgeois state.

The more our economic development proceeds the greater will be the attempt to drive us from the position we have adopted, the closer will the bourgeoisie organise against us and the more frequently will they test our strength. If they were absolutely united, if they were not torn by the contradictions which are an essential part of the capitalist order, if there had not been an Anglo-Soviet Trade Union alliance, and if the Social-Democratic workers had not been heart and soul in our favour, the capitalists would, of course,

make that attempt at once. But the conditions necessary for a war by world imperialism upon us do not exist, and it seems to me that it will have to confine itself to "agitation," which I trust will meet with no worse counter-agitation from our side.

It happens that two factors have coincided; the news that the British Government is putting forward demands in connection with the Comintern and the statement made by the Trades Union General Council to the effect that the famous letter ascribed to me is a gross forgery. The British trade unions say that the Comintern has shown them its secret archives; now let the British Government show them its secret archives. The "Times" says that the decision of the General Council is not good enough. But I think that the vast majority of the British working class will think it quite good enough. We ourselves regard the matter as now more or less settled. But I still do not know how I personally am to act. Certain comrades say that I should begin a slander action against the present British Government.

It has now been clearly proved that the British Conservative Party entered the elections on a "forgery"; the demand for re-elections is becoming more and more insistent. This coincidence is not a casual one; it is symbolic and demonstrates how difficult it is for our enemies to create a united front against us even in one country, let alone on a world scale. Nevertheless, we must remember that at the present moment, when we attribute such importance to the strengthening of relations between the working class and the peasantry, the capitalists will attempt to destroy our Union by means of attacks on the Comintern. They will at-

tempt to imbue our peasants with the idea that they will be continually under the menace of new war and new dangers because we want to introduce Socialism in other countries and not give the peasants a chance to rest and to improve their conditions. Their agents will whisper, "See how these international rebels are kindling you into the flames of a new war in the name of a chimera, a phantasy, in the name of an international proletarian revolution." They will conduct agitation along this line and we must prepare the antidote. Our peasants must know that it is not our desire to create war, but to preserve peace.

The capitalists will conduct their agitation, and are conducting it, chiefly through the Social-Democrats. **Social-Democracy is stabilising itself temporarily**—that we must admit. It is strengthening itself, although only for a time.

The reasons for the tenacity of Social-Democracy is an important question and one upon which the Comintern and our Party in particular must reflect. I think the reasons for the tenacity of Social-Democracy are as follows:

1. The chief reason for the tenacity of European Social-Democracy is that of the tenacity of capitalism in general. In the majority of countries Social-Democracy has become so identified with the bourgeois system that it will stand or fall by it.

2. The fatigue felt by the working class as the result of the imperialist war has made it easy to spread "peaceful" reformist delusions among them.

3. A profound change in the social composition of the Social-Democratic Parties themselves has

taken place since the war: the working class aristocracy and the petty bourgeois elements are playing a far greater role.

4. The European Social-Democrats in a number of countries (Germany, Austria, etc.), possess a powerful bureaucratic party machine, which exerts tremendous influence upon the fate of the working class movement.

5. The Social-Democrats almost everywhere based and base themselves upon the reformist trade unions which are a powerful weapon of counter-revolutionary influence by the Social-Democrats over the masses.

6. The difficulties encountered by the Russian revolution from 1921 to 1923 (famine, etc.), were exploited by the Social-Democratic leaders in order to frighten off the working class masses, who were fatigued by the war and thirsted for peace and bread, from the struggle for the dictatorship, the civil war, etc.

Those are the six fundamental reasons for the tenacity of Social-Democracy which influenced the mass of average workers in Europe and not the worst of the workers at that. In certain places the idea grew up among European workers that Communists are all right during the time of revolution, during insurrections and fights at the barricade, but during peace, when it comes to fighting for every penny and shilling, when the trade union struggle is the important thing, the Social-Democratic Party is good enough. That is the psychology of many workers.

Examining and studying the causes of the ten-

acity of Social-Democracy and opposing it with every means in our power, we must recognise that the economic revival of the U.S.S.R. is a powerful weapon in the struggle against European Social-Democracy.

We must not forget that **two stabilisations** are taking place—partial capitalist stabilisation and the economic stabilisation of the U.S.S.R. We must remember that capitalist stabilisation means the partial stabilisation of Social-Democracy and that the capitalists will endeavour to undermine us with the help of the Social-Democrats. The best response to that would be to increase the economic power and the Socialist structure of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

4. Two Internal and Two Foreign Fronts.

It might be conditionally stated that we have two **main** home fronts and two **main** foreign fronts. The two main home fronts, or the two chief internal **places d'armes**, are our industry and our agriculture. The two main foreign fronts are, geographically, the West and the East. What is their significance?

Of the two internal fronts the **directly** decisive front is at present industry, while the decisive front **in the long run** is agriculture.

Of the two foreign fronts the **directly** decisive one is the Western front, while the Eastern front is **decisive in the long run**. It may be said, in other words, that the instigator, the leader, the ruler, i.e., the proletariat, decides directly, while the heavy infantry, i.e., the peasantry, decides in the long run.

How do matters stand at the present moment on these four fronts? On the industrial front our attack all along the line is becoming more and more violent and is moving powerfully forward. On the agricultural front, we are making a partial retreat (to which I shall refer later), although our forces are generally superior. It appears to me that our resolutions regarding the renting of land and the employment of hired labour in agriculture contain certain elements of retreat (I shall explain later in detail in what sense) which are, however, being accompanied by a straightening of the line for the purpose of continuing the economic attack in the countryside.

The present retreat is not the retreat of which comrade Lenin spoke in 1921. At that time we were compelled to retreat along the whole line in order to be able then to halt and to re-organise our forces.

The case is quite different now. On the whole we are attacking and only along a single portion of the front are we obliged to effect a partial retreat in order to straighten the line. Does it not occur in warfare that an army which even enjoys superiority over another is occasionally compelled to retire partially along some section of the front? The partial retreat we are now effecting upon one portion of the front is entirely due to the main retreat of 1921, which was essential, inevitable and beneficial. It is logically connected with NEP as a whole. Among other reasons we want to straighten the front in order to envelop the enemy—the kulak. Enveloping movements are, of course, not without their dangers. How often has it been said that the enveloper himself runs the risk of

being enveloped. We must not forget that. But, comrades, if we are afraid of wolves we shall not go into the woods. NEP has proved that **we are able** to envelop the enemy without ourselves being enveloped. Such an enveloping movement it is now our business to effect.

Thus, the position of our internal and external fronts may be described as follows: At home a general attack on the industrial front (and I have said that the industrial front is directly decisive); on the agricultural front, however, we are gathering forces, our army is growing, agriculture is developing, while at the same time we have a partial retreat which will not merely not stop us but will even help us to go forward together with the vast masses of the peasantry of which comrade Lenin has spoken.

On the other hand, the external situation is as follows. On the Western front the superiority is on the side of the enemy. In a number of countries the Comintern has been obliged to retire its forces, to entrench its parties, to prepare for an obstinate and protracted struggle for position, in certain places to go underground, etc.

One has only to examine the struggle in the Balkans, in Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugo-Slavia, and the whole map of the White Terror. In the West the superiority is indeed on the side of the enemy, who, however, is not and never will be strong enough to attack us directly.

On the **Eastern** front, which is decisive **in the long run**, events are developing much more rapidly and favourably than we expected. For the first time we have entered into direct contact with the

East; we are for the first time in direct contact with China and it is already clear how fruitful and with what tremendous results this contact is fraught for the future.

Such is the picture. It is by no means discouraging.

It was on the basis of this estimate of the situation that our recent Congresses adopted a number of decisions regarding our policy in the near future.

Our decisions **mainly concerned the peasantry.** It was on the question of the peasantry that all our disputes turned and it is on that question that we have now taken a number of decisions which in their turn will determine policy in other spheres. It appears to me that we might express the essence of our policy as laid down in the recent sessions in general, briefly somewhat as follows: At the Ninth Congress of the Soviets in 1921, comrade Lenin said: "Of course, the essence of the New Economic Policy is the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, between the vanguard of the proletariat and the wide peasant masses."

It appears to me that we might now put it briefly saying that the **essence of our present policy is based upon the wide peasant masses.** All our decisions may be fully expressed by this slogan.

The policy of the proletariat is directed to a still closer alliance with the peasantry.

The policy of Socialist industry is based upon the wide peasant masses.

5. NEP and the Peasantry.

Comrades, we know that the word "NEP" signifies the **New Economic Policy**. We all feel that this term is now becoming rather obsolete. And indeed, of the more than seven years we have been in power three have been years of Military Communism and over four years of New Economic Policy. Why then is it still called "New"? I think it may be said that it is no longer a new economic policy—if we like, that it is not NEP. If the old term "NEP" is to be retained, it should be said that the word is derived from "necessary" economic policy.

There was a time when one of the opposition groups in, or rather outside, our Party said that the word "NEP" came from the words "New Exploitation of the Proletariat." Everybody now sees that that is not the case and that the proletariat has benefitted from NEP not only as the class that rules, but also directly as a seller of labour power. It is clear that our economic policy is the only rational, the only true and essential economic policy. You all remember the formula, "seriously, for a long time, **but not for ever**"; it appears to me, that the time will come when we shall again be able to use the word "NEP," this time as meaning a "**needless** economic policy."

The policy, therefore, is not a new one any longer. Not only we alone, but the proletariat of the world, have been able to gain a definite experience from that policy. If we desired to express it more exactly, it could be best done by paraphrasing the words of comrade Lenin: "NEP means the construction of Socialism under the peculiar condi-

tions produced by a predominant petty-peasant population." The important question we must bear in mind in forming our judgment of the decisions we have adopted is whether these decisions really arise from the peculiar circumstances of a predominant petty-peasant population and whether they really carry us forward along the path of Socialist construction, or whether on the contrary they divert us from that path. The question is not as to whether we have already constructed Socialism (it is clear that we have not), but whether we can hold the approaches, **the paths to Socialism**, in the circumstances which we cannot escape of a predominant small and petty peasantry. That is the only way to regard the present decisions.

In order to judge as to their correctness, we must recall, however briefly, the main statistics regarding the conditions of our villages. It appears to me that of the wealth of figures quoted at our Congress and which we must study, it is at present sufficient to remember the following four :

- 1. 72 to 75 per cent. of pre-war production.**
- 2. 70 to 75 per cent. of pre-war agriculture.**
- 3. Over a quarter of a million industrial unemployed.**
- 4. 40 per cent. horseless peasants.**

I repeat that for the purpose of details we require far more statistical material. We have left the period of general judgments behind us. We require exact figures for every province, every county and every rural district. But, in order to judge general policy and the deductions to be made from it, it is enough for us at present to remember the four figures above quoted.

It is said in our villages that a rapid process of differentiation is proceeding. Much is being said about the kulak. It is, of course, a good thing that we, as Marxists, want to hear how the grass grows and to see the process of differentiation when it is only just beginning, only in embryo, so to speak. But when, however, we attempt with the help of more or less exact statistics to establish whither this process of differentiation is leading, and how large the number of kulaks is, we get a picture somewhat as follows:

According to the investigations made last Spring by the Central Statistical Board, embracing 1,300,000 peasant homesteads, kulak households amount at a maximum to 4 per cent.*

Yet we know that there are 40 per cent. horseless peasants.

I must remind you that Lenin called the horseless peasants "proletarians." He literally said in his book, "The Village Poor"—it is true that that was as long ago as 1903, but in my opinion the situation has not altered one iota—that **"the horseless peasant has already become absolutely propertyless. He is a proletarian . . . He is the kin brother of the town worker."** Still earlier, in his book "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," comrade Lenin included no less than half the number of homesteads under the category of "agricultural proletariat"—i.e., "all horseless and the greater

* The Spring investigations of 1,300,000 peasant households revealed that 4.3 per cent. were without sown land, about 70 per cent. had from 1-4 dessiatins of sown land, 23 per cent. from 4-10 dessiatins, while the rest were households possessing more than 10 dessiatins and only 0.9 per cent. over 16 dessiatins.

number of one-horse peasants." Lenin referred to them as "hired labourers with an allotment." It appears to me that this is true to-day. The horseless peasant is, of course, not an industrial proletarian, nor an agricultural proletarian in the classical sense of the term, but he is "the kin brother" of the worker, he is a proletarian **in a certain sense**. There are some who say that our policy "is based on the peasants" (that is also asserted by the Mensheviks and S.R.'s), that the whole trouble lies with the large number of kulaks, and that we must, therefore, now kindle class war in the villages. But how about the trifle of 40 per cent. horseless peasants? No, the trouble with us is not so much the kulak, but that there are still so many "proletarians" in our villages of whom Lenin spoke in his pamphlet, "The Village Poor." The trouble is also that the medium peasant has often too lightly been classed with the kulak. I ask the enthusiasts for kindling class war in our villages, are we to give horses to the horseless peasants? In my opinion we should; it is one of our chief tasks. And what will the result of that be? A diminution of proletarianisation. We cannot at present advocate kindling class war, **but we must clearly recognise that class war is actually going on in the villages**. The class war exists. A 4 per cent. kulak population is far more dangerous in the villages than the Nepman is in the towns, because the kulak is very frequently the master of the minds in the village and his economic power is comparatively more dangerous and his influence larger in the village than Nepman's in the town. We must recognise that class war, but we cannot at present issue the slogan of class war. We should have to apply to the Committees of Poor Peasants, which

are not a bad means for kindling class war. But what then should we do with the 40 per cent. horseless peasants? Transform them into wealthier husbandmen or into proletarians? It depends upon us to some extent, upon the policy of our government. If we are to advocate class war then we must bid farewell to the idea of expediting the development of the productive forces of agriculture in general and of carrying out the programme we have laid down. We are a government based upon the poor, but it is not our desire to perpetuate the poor; we want to improve their lot.

There is a class war in the villages and it will continue. We must realise that. We shall not be "neutral" towards it. We want to march side by side with the poor and medium peasants, i.e., with the vast majority of rural population as against the kulak. We want to isolate the kulak—not merely by administrative pressure, but rather by economic means. It is not our purpose to "kindle class war" at present.

These fundamental facts regarding the state of our villages are lost sight of by the enthusiasts for kindling class war at inappropriate moments. The class struggle in the villages will go on. While to a certain extent untying the hands of the upper sections of the villages, to a partial extent freeing the hands of the kulak economically, it is our duty **at the same time to prepare to envelop and isolate him politically.** It is at present impossible to isolate the kulak economically, let us say to boycott him. The needy peasant will, of course, apply to him for loans, the hired labourer will apply to him for employment. But we can isolate him politically. There are 40 per cent. horseless peasants

whom Lenin called "proletarians," three to four per cent. kulaks, and the remainder medium peasants. That division is, of course, an arbitrary one; it might be arrived at differently when the number of medium peasants would appear to be larger and the poor peasants less. In 1920-21 Lenin spoke of the levelling of the village; he said that it was coming to be entirely made up of medium peasants and was tending to become homogeneous. That is, on the whole, true to-day.

Our duty is to effect not a three-fold division in the villages, i.e., (1) kulaks, (2) medium peasants and (3) poor peasants, but, if possible, a two-fold division. (1) Poor and medium peasants together, and (2) the kulaks. That would be a correct political policy as against the kulak. Yet in order to develop the productive forces of the village we must to a certain extent untie the hands of the kulak.

That does not at all mean that we are "staking on the kulak." Remember how we untied the hands of the nepmen. Was that staking on the nepmen? **It was staking on the development of productive forces, of increasing the class power of the proletariat and in the long run the importance of Socialist industry.**

The same may be said of the kulak. The difference is that the kulak is more dangerous than the nepmen owing to the backwardness of the village and to the fact that the kulak has far deeper roots in the village than the nepmen in the town. Of course, we have to a large extent broken the back of the real kulak. Our comrades in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture tell us that we have taken almost as much land from the real kulaks of

Tsarist days as from the landowners; but, of course, a large section of kulaks still remains.

The kulak is more dangerous in the village than the nepmen in the town, because in the town there is an abundance of proletarian organisation—trade unions, parties, etc. The power of prejudice and religion is stronger in the village, and, therefore, the influence of kulak minority is more powerful. We must bear this difference in mind.

Our policy in the village is in no way based on the peasant, just as the whole nepman policy was in no way based on the nepmen. Why did I then say that our decisions represented a partial retreat, a concession, although a justified concession? I think we none of us are in need of sugar-water or self-encouragement. We are sufficiently strong, and are advancing sufficiently rapidly and surely to have the courage to tell ourselves and others that in such and such circumstances we were obliged to make such and such concessions.

We do not need to fear that. It is far better to say openly in what our concessions consist. It will be asked **what have we conceded and to whom?** It is a **necessary** concession, it is urged and, therefore, no concession at all.

That in my opinion is mere juggling. I also admit that it was a necessary concession. But a necessary concession is a concession. That must be frankly admitted. To **whom** are we conceding, and **what** are we conceding? We are to a certain extent making a concession in regard to the regulations of land employment; we are conceding something to the rich peasant. It did not occur to us in 1921 that we should have to make concessions

in this respect, but in 1925 we are compelled to do so in the interests of the development of productive forces.

It will be said that it is just as necessary for the hired agricultural labourer and the small peasant: the small peasant, it is urged, is also interested in not having to conceal the fact that he has to lease his land, and the hired labourer in not being allowed to mask the fact that he is hiring out his labour.

Quite right. Were we not interested as a proletarian State as a whole in the introduction of NEP? Nevertheless, we say that it is to a certain extent a retreat. It is a forced retreat, from which in the long run we, our class and the rural population of the proletarian State will benefit. Nevertheless it is a retreat from the short line of Socialist construction along which we at first proceeded.

Allow me to remind you how Lenin regarded the question as to whether NEP was "evolution or a tactic." The "Smenovekhovtsi" say that it is evolution. Console yourselves as you like, MM. the Bolsheviki, they say, nevertheless you are evolving, you are slowly becoming transformed and developing into a bourgeois country. Lenin said that it was a good thing to harken to the class truth of our enemy. There is a danger that things may develop along that line, but we hope, and shall do everything in our power to make it be "not evolution, but a tactic," i.e., to surround the enemy and take from him all we require for the development of our productive forces.

At the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, Lenin said:

“Such frank enemies are useful. The things Ustryalov talks about are possible. History knows transformations of all kinds; to rely upon conviction, loyalty and similar spiritual quality is not good enough in politics. Only very few persons possess excellent spiritual qualities. The decisive thing is the historical action of the vast masses, who sometimes treat rather uncavalierly the few people who do not act with them.

“There have been many instances of that and, therefore, we must welcome the frank assertion of the “Smenovkhovtsi.” The enemy is speaking a class truth when he refers to the dangers in our path. It is the enemy’s endeavour to make these dangers inevitable. The Smenovkhovtsi are expressing the word of thousands of the bourgeoisie and Soviet employees who are sharers in our New Economic Policy.

“It is a real danger. We must, therefore, pay the most serious attention to the question.”

Lenin points out that NEP is not evolution nor deterioration, but “a desperate, raging . . . struggle.”

Now we repeat that it will be “a tactic not evolution”; that to untie the hands of the upper sections of the peasants will help the rapid development of the productive forces of the countryside, and will at the same time strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry.

Why, such a situation exists all the time in our Party. We ourselves freed the nepmen and at the same time set up the Commissariat for Internal Trade which determines market prices. We our-

selves permit the bourgeoisie to start small factories employing no more than fifty hired workers, and at the same time organise strikes against them with the help of the trade unions.

That is all due to the fact that we are in power. From the ranks of our Party we have to appoint chairmen of trusts, trade union officials, provincial procurators and chairmen of Provincial Executive Committees, whom, if the necessity arises, our procurators may bring to trial.

In the villages we ourselves untie the hands of the upper sections of the peasantry, because it is necessary for the development of productive forces, for strengthening the general economic front; yet at the same time we ourselves will organise against the upper sections of the peasantry the horseless peasants, whom comrade Lenin called proletarians, and the medium peasants.

That is how the matter stands and it is in that sense that we must speak of the elements of partial retreat in conjunction with our general superiority of forces. **On the whole we are advancing, we are attacking, although we are making small but very important concessions to the kulak sections of the villages. That must be frankly admitted.**

It would be a sad thing if these concessions really meant "staking on the kulak," as some try to make out. But that is not the case. **We are staking on an alliance between our Socialist industry and the wide masses of the peasantry who are beginning to rise against the kulak.** But we must recognise the elements of retreat and must frankly and honestly admit it to all sections of the rural population who are interested in our decisions.

A few words regarding the "definition" of a kulak. There have been many disputes as to whether an exhaustive definition of "kulak" was possible. The best of friends have fallen out over this question, although, of course, not seriously.

It seems to me that we might adopt the formulæ of comrade Lenin. We are seeking something new where everything has already been said.

Lenin spoke of the kulak as follows:

"We cannot judge the strength of the rich peasants by the amount of land they hold. The rich peasants do not grow wealthy on their own land; they buy land; they buy by 'perpetuity' (i.e., acquire as their own property) and 'by the year' (i.e., on lease); they buy of the landowners, of their own fellow peasants and of those who surrender their land from need. It is best, therefore, to class the rich, medium and propertyless peasants according to the number of horses they possess. The peasant who owns many horses is almost invariably a rich peasant; if he has much working cattle, it means that he has much land under cultivation besides his own allotment and has money laid up."*

The medium peasant he defines as follows:

"Throughout Russia, the medium peasant may on the whole be regarded as one who owns a pair of draught beasts. The medium peasant stands midway between the rich peasant and the proletarian—that is why he is called medium." That definition I think is true to-day.

The horseless peasant he defines as a proletarian in a certain sense of the word.

* "The Village Poor."

During the course of our disputes we pointed out that even the medium peasant employs hired labour and, therefore, the employment of hired labour was not a necessary and deciding characteristic of a kulak. But Lenin in 1920 said, "The kulak is one who lives on the labour of others, who exploits the labour of others and uses it for his own ends. The medium peasant is one who does not exploit and is himself not exploited, but who lives by small husbandry and by his own labour. No Socialist in the world would propose to take anything from the small peasant."*

I believe that these definitions are still applicable to-day. The important thing is not that a peasant at a time of need hires a couple of additional hands. But if he "lives on the labour of others," if he "exploits" the labour of others, then he is a kulak. This definition is just as applicable as the definition which makes a pair of draught cattle the characteristic of the medium peasant—of course, with all necessary modifications according to region, province and district. Of course, we must study the history of each individual peasant household, just as comrade Lenin did.

It is to the kulak, as comrade Lenin defined him that we are now making certain concessions, at the same time taking all necessary measures to organise the rest of the village against him.

At one time, it was in 1921, comrade Lenin said that "Co-operation of small commodity producers (we are now speaking of that form of co-operation, and not of workers' co-operation, the former being the predominant and typical form in a country of

* From a speech on "The Situation at Home and Abroad," delivered to the Moscow Soviet in 1919.

small peasants) inevitably gives rise to petty bourgeois capitalist relations, facilitates that development, brings the capitalists to the fore and affords them great advantages. It cannot be otherwise in view of the predominance of small owners and the possibility, and indeed the necessity, of exchange. **Under existing conditions in Russia, freedom and the right of co-operation means the freedom and right of capitalism** (black type ours, G. Zinoviev). To close our eyes to this obvious truth would be foolish or even criminal.*

We now say that it would be greater folly and a greater crime if we closed our eyes to the fact that in two spheres we must permit partial concessions to the rich upper sections of the village population. Not concealing the fact, and foreseeing the dangers which may arise from these concessions, we are taking all necessary measures in order to envelop the kulak and not ourselves to be enveloped by him.

That can be done. The kulak is already beginning to conceal himself. The term "the powerful inhabitant" is even coming into fashion, as a peasant said at our Congress, in place of the simple and easily comprehensible term—kulak. It is not for us to play with words and we must freely and definitely admit that the kulak **exists** and that the village kulak is more dangerous than the nepman in the town. That we know and we are taking the necessary counter-measures. If we put the question rightly, and if we realise what are the elements of partial retreat in spite of our general attack and in spite of the huge superiority of

* Lenin, "The Food Tax," Freedom of Trade and Concessions.

forces of the workers' state and if we tell the whole truth and not half-truths, we shall justify ourselves not only in the eyes of the international and the working class of our country, but also in the eyes of the toilers in the villages.

The village is very shrewd. It is for us proletarian revolutionists to make every effort to understand the real thoughts of the real peasant, to know "what the medium peasant is thinking when he lies awake at night," and how he regards our decisions and policy. We heard the voice of the peasant at our Congress, but we must bear in mind that it is the voice of the Soviet peasant, in the true sense of the word, the peasant who is close to us. We must know what the **medium peasant** is thinking and what is his attitude to our measures. If we allow the slightest internal disharmony, if we do not openly explain in what our concessions to the upper sections of the village consist and why we make them, the peasant will at once sense it, and will believe that we are speculating on the wealthy sections of the village. He will say that they (the Bolsheviks) are seeking the strongest and firmest support in the village, and that that is, of course, the **rich** households in the village, the kulaks. That is how the peasant may regard it. And woe to us if he understands our decisions to mean that we are seeking the firm support of the kulak. There must be no internal falsity in our policy. We must tell the medium peasant openly and directly that there is indeed an element of partial concession to the rich sections of the village in our decisions, **but that it is essential, in order to develop the productive forces of the village and in the interests of the medium peasant himself.** We do not want to fool the poor and

medium peasants; we must speak to them as leaders, as the proletariat should speak to the peasant, as the class-conscious worker to a peasant who does not like falsity. In the town we are obliged to make partial concessions to the capitalists and small capitalists; we must now make concessions to the small capitalists in the villages. Why are we making those concessions? In order the better to facilitate and stimulate the productive forces of the village, which is absolutely essential in the interests of the whole of the village population. If we admit this honestly and plainly, the peasant who shrewdly regards everything we do, will understand us and follow us.

It is sometimes said that the present decisions mean "the beginning of Nep in the villages." No, that is historically incorrect; Nep in the villages began in 1921. You will remember that Lenin in 1921 said: "We must begin with the peasantry," and explained why that was so.

He said:

"We must begin with the peasantry. Whoever does not understand that, whoever is inclined to regard this bringing of the peasants to the fore as a "recantation" or a renunciation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, simply fails to understand facts and surrenders himself to the power of phrases. The dictatorship of the proletariat means the control of politics by the proletariat. The proletariat as the leading and ruling class must know how to direct politics in order to solve the most immediate and urgent problem."

In fact NEP began in the villages. Why had the slogan "Face Towards the Village" been raised in 1924? Why, indeed, did this slogan originate

in 1924? It originated **for economic reasons**. This slogan was first used in an article dealing with the failure of the harvest. It originated because we realised the necessity of beginning with the village, and beginning **economically**. Having reached 72 per cent. of pre-war industry we again find ourselves up against the question of the purchasing power of the village and of the development of its productive forces. That is why the slogan was revived again, as applied to the village in the economic sphere.

Moreover, there was a political factor: the improvement of economic conditions both in the town and in the village could not but result in the growth of the political activity of the village. We know that the less the worker is concerned with gaining his daily bread the more active he becomes. The same applies to the village: the less the moujik is concerned with his burdens and his cares the more active he will become. That is why the slogan "Face towards the Village" originated, I repeat, in connection with economic questions. For the second time, we must begin with the village, in the interests of our industry, so that it may attain 100 per cent. of pre-war level and may find an exhaustive peasant market, which is indeed its only market. In addition there was a political factor which in its time is bound up with the economic factor, the growth of the activity of the village, which obliged us to take it into account.

We must now for the second time win over the village politically (it first unconditionally supported us in 1917-18) just as in 1923-24 for the second time we won over the workers.

Thus, and only thus, must the slogan "Face to-

wards the Village" be understood. We shall then understand why it must be carried out concretely and in a business-like fashion, as we are now in fact doing in the case of the decisions of our recent congresses.

6. NEP and Co-operation.

In order to conclude this group of questions, I would like to say a few words about co-operation. I made the following small experiment: I collected in a small notebook the whole of our Soviet legislation on co-operation—the evolution of our co-operative legislation from 1917 to the present day. And in another notebook I collected everything that comrade Lenin wrote and spoke on co-operation during that period. We all know that co-operation, for reasons not requiring explanation, is and will be for a long time to come a sort of touchstone of the whole of our policy in the villages. We must, therefore, pay careful attention to this question. I cannot dwell on it in detail here. (To compare these two groups and to analyse them would be an excellent task for our red professors; to examine our legislation in conjunction with the declarations of our Party as made through its most authoritative representative and leader, comrade Lenin, would be extremely useful.)

Of course the statements of comrade Lenin and our legislation on co-operation developed side by side. I repeat that I cannot dwell on them in detail. But in order to give some idea as to how Bolshevism regarded the favourable and unfavourable aspects of this subject it is enough to recall two statements made by comrade Lenin. The first made in 1921 I have already quoted, to the effect namely, that it would be a folly and a crime not to

realise that the right and freedom of co-operation meant (under the conditions which then existed) the right and freedom of capitalism. The other statement was made in 1923 when he regarded the building of co-operation as the building of Socialism. You will remember the words "All that is required for the construction of a complete Socialist society." Those words are extremely important and decisive. They must be remembered. Nevertheless, Lenin's views in 1921 and 1923 are bound by a logical unity. The view of 1923 is merely the development of the view of 1921. In 1923 our industry began to ascend, the Socialist elements of industry were obviously beginning to grow. Much more favourable conditions were being created for Socialist co-operation.

As we know, co-operation underwent a series of tests in connection with the general evolution of economic policy. We have only to remember how we at first subordinated it to the Supreme Council of National Economy, then to the People's Commissariat for Food, then to both the Supreme Council for National Economy and to the People's Commissariat for Food, and how we then began to liberate co-operation and adopted the system of political unions. The last word has obviously not been said yet.

It is now clear, in the year 1925, that we are dealing not with one harmonious and homogeneous co-operation which is easily and uninterruptedly developing into Socialism, but with three, if not four kinds of co-operation. Distinctions have to be made not only on the basis of formal organisation, but also on the basis of Socialist content. Consumers' co-operation, especially if we regard workers' co-operation separately, is one thing;

agricultural co-operation is different; and credit co-operation is different still. There can be very little doubt that for some time to come the richer elements in the village will predominate in the credit co-operatives. If things go well, the agricultural co-operatives will unite the large mass of medium peasants. Equally undeniably, consumers' co-operation, and especially workers' co-operation, already represents the true elements of Socialism. All these forms of co-operation taken together are, historically speaking and taken over a period of several years, **a bridge to Socialism.**

Comrade Lenin once said that co-operation chemically produces the Menshevik and the S.R.

“Co-operation, by separating out the richer elements, the higher elements in the economic sense, thereby separated out politically the Mensheviks and the S.R.'s: that is a chemical law and nothing can be done about it . . .”

Those words must not be forgotten; they are true to-day. A year or two will pass and we shall be able to say that co-operation has produced much that is good, much that is Socialistic, but we shall also see that here and there it has given rise to something bourgeois. This bourgeois something we shall have to destroy and we shall always be able to do so because the power of the State is in the hands of the proletariat.

7. In Spite of the Difficulties the Tactics Laid Down Must be Carried out Boldly and Decisively.

We must courageously, firmly and decisively carry out the decisions taken. The policy of the Party in relation to the village has been laid down seriously and for a long time to come! Wavering

or faint-heartedness must not be tolerated in carrying the decisions into effect. That must be understood by every member of our Party. At the same time we must remember the difficulties and dangers.

The tactics we have laid down are not without their dangers. That must not be forgotten. All tactics—parliamentary, trade union, armed uprising or united front—have their dangers. These tactics are inevitable, essential, scientifically justified, the only correct and only proletarian tactics. Nevertheless the tactics have their dangers. What are those dangers? They are that in these enveloping movements we ourselves run the risk of being enveloped. The question who will envelop whom is not yet settled. It can be fully settled only in the course of many years. It is clear to us that those who talked about "the ruin of the country" two years ago fell very wide of the mark. They said that the country would perish from lack of grain and coal and from insufficiency of articles of consumption. They proved to be wrong. It turned out as we expected; we proved to be right, we who were then called excessive "optimists" and who in 1922-23 asked: How is it you do not feel that the country is progressing? You can have no sense of the pulse of Russia if you say that the country is perishing. The revolutionary optimists proved to be in the right. There is every sign of the improvement of the country. It was our Party and its general staff, the Central Committee, who correctly estimated the situation of Russia **then**. We were not deceived then and we shall not be deceived now. In that respect we have every title to be revolutionary optimists. Yet at the same time it must be said that the question as to who will envelop whom has not yet been finally settled,

in spite of the fact that industry has reached 75 per cent of its pre-war level. The danger of degeneration has still not passed. That danger is lurking in the village, where the kulak is fighting for influence over the medium peasants and is striving to win them away from us. The danger lurks even in co-operation, although it is the main bridge to Socialism.

It would appear that the Mensheviks and the S.R.'s have made no progress during the last few years. The old Mensheviks and S.R.'s with their "Sozialistichesky Vestnik," their "Revolutionary Russia" and their Kerensky, can never, of course, revive. In this respect we have nothing to fear. But a new Menshevik and a new S.R. may grow up out of the new conditions, out of the wealthy sections of the village, out of the NEP surroundings and even out of co-operation. He (the S.R. Menshevik) may grow out of the new conditions and become dangerous if we do not take timely measures. Ay, even in co-operation a peculiar kind of Menshevism and S.R.ism is possible; they may be "chemically separated." It is not for nothing that the Mensheviks and S.R.'s are now seriously occupied in adapting their new programmes to our conditions, basing themselves on the private property of the peasant, the medium householder, etc.

Among the various points of their new agrarian "programme" the Mensheviks put forward the demand for "allowing the individual owners the right of freely disposing of the land in their possession," in other words the abolition of nationalisation, "reserving the prior right to the organs of local government to acquire the land dis-

posed of." Here the Mensheviks remind us of the old programme of "municipalisation."

Still more interesting is the way the most flourishing of the Right Narodniki (the "Peasant Russia" group), which is becoming the general staff of the bourgeois "peasant" Parties, deal with the question. They write:

"Our social ideal is the general and complete freedom of the human personality."

"The education of the individual, as the condition and cause of social reform, is the central point in the ideology and programme of the peasant party. This is true of the peasant party more than any other, since the personality of the peasant is more autonomous, free and better provided with the social and economic qualities for varied creative work than the members of other social groups."

This is pure phrase-mongering. Their real programme is this: **"If private property in land is more desirable for the welfare of the national economic life than the socialisation or nationalisation of land, it must be put into effect even though equality of distribution thereby suffer."** Here you have the evolution of Narodnikism! It betrayed its Socialism long ago and now after the eighth year of revolution openly advocates private property in land.

When the Mensheviks and S.R.'s make themselves out to be watchdogs of the October Revolution and our Soviet Constitution, it is, of course, ludicrous and easy to expose. But when the best of their groups openly evolutionises and says, "To the devil with Socialism, we are in favour of private property in land, we believe that it will be better for the 'autonomous personality of the peas-

ant,' " they are staking on the "autonomous personality" of the kulak and the wealthy medium peasants, whom they are trying to win away from us and among whom they may meet with a certain amount of sympathy. **That danger exists.** And to that extent the question as to who is to envelop whom is still not settled. But I repeat, if we fear the wolves we will not go into the wood. We shall overcome the danger if we face the matter properly from the outset. We are a million times stronger than they. Our tactics are right.

As I said, it is interesting to listen to the Soviet peasant attending the Congress of Soviets. We listen to him with all our ears, but at the same time we are aware that the masses are not altogether minded as our advanced moujiks.

The Central Committee of our Party has collected a good deal of material on this question. I should like to quote three examples. They are valuable because they come from various parts, from the Kuban, from Gomel and from Siberia. I will not quote in detail, but only remark that the pamphlet on the re-election of the Soviets in the Kuban Station is a valuable literary production, written by thoughtful comrades, true Leninists, who have described the Kuban Station as it is today. There is next the hundred or more letters from peasants handed in during the elections in the Gomel province and a number of Siberian villages which were investigated. I have taken them from the very valuable material we possess and our Party must see to it that this material is multiplied and that every uyezd and even every rural district should be studied both from the economic and political point of view.

What does this material point to? It reveals that in many places the poor peasants are unorganised and helpless and that our nuclei are politically worthless. The right elements are displaying initiative. When the villages revive economically they inevitably revive politically. And it is not in our interest to hinder that activity.

Of course, Kuban has its peculiarities—certain corrections are necessary, and we make them. The same corrections must be made for the peculiarities of Siberia.

But when all corrections have been made we still have to recognise how much we have fallen away in the villages. In the sphere of economics we need tractors; in the sphere of politics and party work we need tractors of a different kind. There are no Party "tractors" in the villages. Our nuclei are very backward and our Party must face the matter squarely.

There are a number of cases where Communists were not re-elected to the lower Soviets and there occurred on a small scale what our enemies once dreamed of, namely "Soviets without Communists" (or with an insignificant number of Communists). We are faced with the question as to what our attitude to those Soviets should be. I have a number of letters and communications on that subject. Peculiarly characteristic is a letter from a comrade in an Altai village. He writes on the 9th and adds "to-morrow, the 10th, the elections take place; to-morrow I will write more." On the 10th he writes a postscript; he is now a different person. The Communists were not re-elected, and our Communist the day after the elections is like a fish out of water. He has lost his head: he writes: "We are

to blame, we lost our opportunity. What are we to do now?" What those Communists are to do now is a vital question. Some of them have lost their heads, some have simply grown bitter and some stand aside and maliciously watch how the new leaders of the lower Soviets will "get themselves into a mess."

Our correspondent writes: "We have now got them into the taxation offices; let them collect the taxes and make themselves popular."

One or other policy may be adopted in accordance with local conditions, but the **general policy** of our Party should be that a Communist must not stand aside and maliciously watch, but must understand that **by assiduous practical work the influence of our Party must again be won in those Soviets just as it once was in the trade unions.**

It must be understood that we are approaching a period when our leadership of the village and our education of the village must be differently arranged. We must realise that an inexhaustible amount of work of various kinds faces us in this sphere.

There was recently published the first draft of Lenin's pamphlet on the "Food Tax." That draft contains the famous idea of 10 to 20 years' correct relations with the peasantry, but it also contains a number of other striking passages. Let us take the idea of Lenin regarding the "individualism" of peasant agriculture and the importance of electrification.

"Is the 'individualism' of the peasant and his 'freedom of trade' dangerous to Socialism? No.

If we get electrification in 10 to 20 years neither the individualism of the small agriculturist nor his

local free trade are in any way dangerous. If we do not get electrification the return to capitalism is in any case inevitable."

It is sometimes thought that electrification consists merely in construction of power stations. That is not the case. Electrification means the general development of industry, general technical progress, a new level of technique and a new level of development of productive forces.

We must bear this clearly in mind, just as Lenin did in 1921. We all know that in industry, which is a decisive factor, we are making rapid progress. We are now concluding the first programme of electrification, although with some delay, and, most important of all, we have a certain amount of resources in order to carry on the work already begun.

The further development of the revolution depends on fundamental questions of economics. If we get electrification the petty bourgeois individualism of the peasant is not dangerous. If we do not get electrification, i.e., if there will not be a development of our Socialist industry, the return to capitalism will in any case be inevitable. It should be here remembered that the **issue to some extent depends upon the subjective endeavours of the Party and the Soviet Government, which are no small weight in the balance.**

We have begun the campaign for rousing the Soviets in the villages, and we must carry that policy further. No difficulties will discourage us.

The decisive question as to who will envelop whom concerns both economics and politics. Will the kulak win over the medium peasant, as he has to some extent succeeded in doing in the Kuban,

or shall we succeed in making the medium peasant our ally and politically smashing the kulak? Those are the two possible issues. Of course, the only desirable one is the latter and we can achieve it by new methods, by working on new lines.

In Lenin's draft the following thought is expressed. "Either White Guard Terror, or the leadership (an increasingly mild one) and **dictatorship** of the proletariat." That is a very important point. The dictatorship of the proletariat remains. The leadership of the Party remains to its full extent. Whoever damages that leadership, however slightly, is not a Bolshevik. The leadership of the peasantry by the working class will remain, but something else is demanded.

At one of the Congress commissions, a comrade said, "Perhaps it would be better not to speak so definitely of the 'leadership of the proletariat.' The peasant does not like it much." From motives of practical "opportunism" (in the favourable sense of the word) this comrade would like us to express ourselves more cautiously. We rejected the suggestion and I believe we ought to reject it universally. When we carry out a general political policy we cannot but speak frankly, for otherwise both the worker and the peasant would immediately detect a false note. We must say bluntly that the dictatorship of the proletariat remains and explain to the peasant in what it consists. The dictatorship means **leadership by the workers**, who owing to their conditions of life are better organised, that the workers already have thirty years' experience in political struggles and that the leadership of the peasantry by the working class is inevitable. That we cannot renounce.

But Lenin said not only that. He said "**An increasingly mild leadership.**" That is something new and we must remember it. The leadership of the Party will certainly remain; the dictatorship of the proletariat will remain. But we must change their form. When agriculture begins to find its feet, when the peasants begin to elect more freely to the Soviets, we must, of course, change the forms of leadership. The basis remains the old one, but the forms become more "mild." The peasant feels the absolutely certain and firm hand of the proletariat, but yet a capable, supple and "mild" hand. And let it be said, this also is expressed in the slogan of the invigoration of the Soviets.

It is not the first time we have attempted to invigorate the Soviets. It is not the first time we issued the slogan; but nothing came of it. Now something will come of it, because we now have an economic basis for it, because the objective conditions have really changed, because the worker now thinks less about his crust of bread, and the peasant is also beginning to recover economically and in the next few years will live much better, especially if we have the good harvest for which **there** is every reason to hope. Under such circumstances, the economic basis for the slogan of the invigoration of the Soviets exists.

On the other hand, the Party has become stronger and the working class, the leading class, has also become stronger. That is another reason why we think the slogan will succeed.

Thus, the economic struggle will be solved by electrification, i.e., the general development of industry. If we have electrification we shall succeed,

if not, the return to capitalism will in any case be inevitable. Politically this is being solved by the ability of the Party to maintain the firm dictatorship of the working class while applying new methods of work. The moujik must feel the firm hand of the class-rule and at the same time feel that he is dealing with a comrade, who is anxious not to command, not to patronise. The peasant cannot stand being patronised; when you use honeyed words to him he feels the false note. He must feel that the worker is more experienced in Socialist construction; he must regard him as his elder brother, his leader.

We must recognise the dangers and difficulties; at the same time we must proceed boldly, firmly and decisively to introduce a new method of work among the peasantry.

8. The Immediate Tasks.

Let us now proceed to formulate the tasks which arise from the case as we have stated it.

1. First as to **the working class** and our work among the working class. I think the time has come when **we must devote much more attention to the worker than hitherto**. That must be admitted, both in order to strengthen our position among the working class, which is our fundamental basis, and in order in conjunction with the working class to carry on the necessary work in the village, since we can carry on that work only with the help of the mass of the workers.

The workers react much more acutely than ever before to the most trifling infringements of their rights in the factories, neglect of the laws and rude

conduct. We must devote the most serious attention to this, for if anything can undermine our policy, although it be for a brief period, it is the discontent of the working class.

We all know that in a peasant country the mood of the peasants is partially conveyed to and infects the workers. We have sometimes had occasions when the mood of the peasantry was conveyed to the workers. An example is the Kronstadt incident. But the contrary is also true, when the discontent originates among the workers.

In the existing atmosphere, when the village eagerly seizes upon every one of our utterances, the slightest discontent of the workers is conveyed to the peasantry. That is why we must devote great attention to the legal and economic conditions of the workers.

We consider that **the time is ripe for issuing the slogan of the improvement and invigoration of the work in the trade unions.** This should not be regarded as a rebuke to the trade unions. There should be a Party policy for every arm and in particular for the Communist trade union workers.

You cannot convince people now by words alone. The invigoration of work must commence first of all in our factory committees. We need not be afraid if a greater number of non-Party people enter the factory committee than has hitherto been the case. Of course, there will be no factory committees without Communists. We need not fear that.

We take advantage of the presence at this Con-

gress of representatives of all the nationalities of our Union and of large numbers of active workers in our Soviet apparatus and the trade unions, in order categorically to emphasise the necessity for devoting far more attention to the needs and problems of the working class, which is the fundamental basis of our dictatorship.

As regards wages, we saw from the resolution of comrade Dzerjinsky that the prospects have become much more favourable. But that is not enough. We must at once lay down the lines of future work among the working masses and make it our duty to invigorate the trade unions, which at present are the fundamental mass organisations of the workers.

We must bring a far greater number of non-party people into trade union work and increase the active members of the trade unions which are still very small numerically and sometimes exist only on paper.

The Party organisations must assist the trade union organisations in every possible way. The workers must feel that trade union and Soviet work is becoming more active. The task of improving work in the trade unions must be taken very seriously by the Party organisations.

2. The next task is the organisation of Party work in the villages.

The proletariat must turn towards the village, and our provincial committees and uyezd committees turn towards work in the villages. There

must be less lingering in the uyezd towns as, alas, has been the case hitherto. There must be more excursions into the villages. It must not be said that Moscow talks and talks, and then forgets. It must be understood that our policy with regard to the village is a serious one and intended for a long time to come.

It appears to me that Party work in the villages can be reduced to three factors. First, the necessity of re-educating practically the whole, if not the whole, of the Communists in the villages; secondly, the composition of the village nuclei must be partially renewed, and thirdly, we must get into closer contact with the economic life of the village.

We are all more or less responsible for the fact that our village nuclei need to be re-educated. We failed to explain the state of affairs sufficiently clearly to our Communists in the villages; we did not always in good time point out the necessity for a change in attitude; we did not help them in mentally equipping themselves for fulfilling their difficult duties. Hence, we have a sort of "cultural scissors" a difference between the level of development of the village Communist and the town Communist.

As early as 1923 and 1924 I had occasion to point out that a section of non-Party workers has grown up in our factories who in certain respects were better educated than our Party members. Such a situation actually exists. This did not please many of our Communists who said "that cannot be; the non-Party person always knows less and under-

stands less than we Party members." Alas! they were wrong.

That state of affairs was due to the fact that our Party workers were overwhelmed with work and Party duties, whereas the non-Party worker freely attended factory meetings and read books and rapidly developed. As a result, during the course of two to three years, there grew up a section of educated non-Party workers, some of whom proved to be on a much higher level of development than our Party members. That section has now almost entirely passed into the Party.

It is clear from the material of the Central Committee to which I have referred that it now sometimes happens in the villages that the advanced non-Party peasants are more highly developed than the Party members. If such a situation can exist among the workers, all the more is it possible among the peasants. We know that often the non-Party peasant knows our decrees, is almost invariably a better husbandman, better understands agriculture and sometimes is better educated than our village Communists.

We must, therefore, actively engage in re-educating the village members of our Party, so that they may be able to lead the culturally developed section of the village, which is very numerous and which may grow still larger under the impulse of our new policy.

Of course, while strengthening the village nuclei we must not lay all the blame upon the local Communist. He is not always responsible. Often he

could not act differently. Till now Soviet work in the villages has amounted mainly to the collection of taxes, but now it is something different, something wider.

Our task is, while re-educating our village nuclei, also partially to renew their membership. A number of uyezds have already resorted to a partial examination of their membership. The peasant will be sure that the bad "Communist" is not all-powerful when he feels free to lift his voice against him and sees justice meted out to him.

Comrade Mikoyan wrote a letter to the Central Committee in which he referred to one characteristic incident. At one station where comrade Mikoyan addressed a peasant assembly, the peasants were unanimous in asserting that all their Communists were thieves. Comrade Mikoyan proposed that the Communists present (there were twelve of them) should leave the assembly, and then turning to the peasants, he said: "Now tell me exactly as frankly as you like which of them ever stole anything and what." It then turned out that of the twelve Communists only two were actually thieves. The other ten were honest people, but since they tolerated the other two, and no justice was meted out to the thieves, the peasants considered all the Communists in their station as thieves "wholesale."

But how, I ask, without resorting to the method applied by comrade Mikoyan, and which in one form or another must be applied on a national scale, are we to get the peasant to feel that he has a right to speak up against bad Communists? A

Party examination is a matter which must be approached very cautiously. Not a single step must be taken without the consent of the Central Committee; in no case must we proceed to a "wholesale" examination, since in the village we shall get things thirty times more muddled than in the town and shall commit millions of errors. But a serious examination of the membership, prepared and carried out exclusively at the instructions of the Central Committee, is essential, and without it we shall not get the new kind of membership we desire. I do not know to what extent the renewal of the membership is necessary, i.e., what proportion of it must be removed and replaced by fresh blood. But some renewal is essential.

3. The third task is to **get closer to the economic life of the village.** The peasant has faith in the man who stands close to his economic life, and that very often is not the case with the Communist. We must apply ourselves to this urgent task in the very near future, under the guidance of the Central Committee.

I should like to refer to one other essential duty. The work of our two recent Soviet Congresses has made it clear that in the near future we must finish our Union State construction and complete formulation of the U.S.S.R. In this respect we have rather fallen behindhand. Time is passing; the U.S.S.R. will formulate itself along Soviet lines. Is it necessary to make a similar formulation along Party lines? I think not. I think that a separate Party Central Committee for the U.S.S.R. is unnecessary. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist

Party (Bolsheviki) being a Party organisation on a Union scale, can give direct instructions to the U.S.S.R. as it does to the other sections of the Union. Division along Party lines may be dangerous. But along State lines we cannot leave the work begun upon a Union scale unfinished. By that I think we have nothing to gain.

Our national policy is correct and we feel its beneficial results every day. I recently read an article by Chernov. He made a journey through Poland and Lithuania, and among other facts he records that he came across a group of very interesting people. They were "Cadets" of a Soviet orientation. Poland is oppressing the Russians and the Ukrainians and they feel the full weight of national oppression. They, Cadets, believers in the power of the landlords, feel the capitalist oppression in Poland and cannot but recognise the great moral significance of our solution of the national question. Hence their Soviet orientation.

Our solution of the national question is so correct, its importance so great, that it is asserting a certain influence even on a section of the bourgeois, on our open enemies, our counter-revolutionary opponents, the Cadets of "Soviet orientation." We have nothing to fear. We are on the right road, and we will continue along that road.

A few words about a certain mood which exists in and around our Party.

At times, not among the strong members of our Party, but rather among the sections who have ideologically not been sufficiently tempered, there is to be observed a frame of mind which may be ex-

pressed roughly as follows: there may be 10 or 20 years before the final victory of Socialism, and meanwhile we are making fresh concessions to the kulak; we are making partial retreats; everything is now on a petty scale. What have we been waiting for? Is there any purpose in life when things go so slowly, etc., etc.? Such a frame of mind undoubtedly exists. I think we can best reply in the words of comrade Lenin: "Those to whom the work is "dull," "uninteresting," "incomprehensible," who turn up their noses and are liable to panic, or who intoxicate themselves with declamations regarding the absence of the "old spirit," "the former enthusiasm," etc., had better be released of work and retired, so that they may not harm the cause, for they do not want to understand or are incapable of understanding the peculiarities of the present stage of the struggle."*

I do not think that there can be no purpose in living and working just because the complete victory of the world revolution will come only in 10 or 20 years' time. We have taken the maximum period, but shall not be averse to reducing it; in fact, it will be reduced. And that undoubtedly also depends upon the work we do. It would be a good thing for the old generation of revolutionary Bolsheviks to remind the weaker sections of our Party how things were formerly, how they went to prison and penal servitude for 10 years or more sometimes only because they had succeeded in working in freedom for a few weeks, and, perhaps, posting up a couple of leaflets. Now they are not obliged to go in prison or penal servi-

* N. Lenin, "New Times and Old Errors in New Form."

tude. It is now our duty during the course of several years to build up our Socialist industry, to lay the foundation of Socialism, to construct Socialism, to raise peasant agriculture and to put an end to illiteracy. Is that not worth working 10 or 20 years for, even (if matters go slowly) in our own country, and together with our own people—working to raise the Socialist elements of our State, and to help the workers and revolutionaries of other countries? That is a task of which the old generation of revolutionaries hardly dreamed.

We have 40 per cent. horseless peasants; **we must work to give horses to the horseless peasants.**

We have a quarter million unemployed; **we must give work to the unemployed.** Our developing industry must absorb a quarter million unemployed.

We must work on electrification; that is what comrade Lenin called on us and taught us to do.

We are approaching the pre-war level. We must go beyond it. I remember that when at the Thirteenth Party Congress I said that we should soon be leaving that milestone—the pre-war level—behind us, it seemed a piece of extreme optimism. Only a year has passed and we are already approaching that milestone. Neither will it be excessive optimism to hope that by the time of the next Soviet Congress we shall have reached that milestone and passed it. Even after that we shall still go on defining the level of our economic progress by the pre-war standard, but we shall be measuring it by so much per cent. **above** the pre-war level.

We must find suitable secretaries for the rural district nuclei, we must find suitable chairmen for the village Soviets; we must select them, test them a dozen times or more, train them, educate them, make them real leaders in their sphere of work. Is that not a great task? Have we not begun it? Our workers must be literate, they must be clothed, they must have books and papers, they must have schools, they must be Leninists. We must work for many years to achieve that.

These slogans are, of course, not very dramatic, but they are great slogans; **secretaries for the Volost nuclei, chairmen for the Volost Executive Committee, work for the unemployed, a horse for the horseless peasant, the pre-war level of industry, metals, electrification, and beyond the pre-war level, the broad path of Socialist construction.**

Those are slogans which will help us to consolidate our alliance with the peasantry and build up Socialism in our country and enable us to wait until the time comes when the workers of other countries come to our aid for the final victory.


I will summarise what I have said.

If we are to express in a few words the essence of the new tactics of our Party, it may be said that the chief features of the present period are that the proletarian revolution which is inevitable and progressive, is nevertheless for the time being slowing down; the elements of Socialist economy are increasing on the decisive industrial front; and there is an improvement on the Eastern front which

is a decisive front in the long run. At the same time there are many difficulties. We must throw open the door to the productive forces of our villages. We see the dangers resulting from concessions to the upper sections of the villages, and are basing our policy not on the kulak but on the **whole village.**

To express it figuratively, **our policy is one of Socialist industry based upon the wide masses of the peasantry.**

If we tell the peasant that, and he sees that it is true, our Party, which is still weak in the villages, will become stronger. We shall then win over the medium peasants. And having won over the medium peasants, and having the complete unanimity of the working class and the steeled unity of the Russian Communist Party, we shall indeed be invincible.



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