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One Step Higher

Results of the Enlarged Presidium of the E.C.C.I.

THE more rapidly the crisis of capitalist stabilisation develops, the greater becomes the scope of the new upsurge in the world working-class movement, the nearer the prospect approaches of a proletarian revolution in a number of capitalist countries, and of an anti-imperialist bourgeois-democratic revolution in the colonies and semi-colonies, so much the more complicated and responsible are the tasks of leadership of the international revolution by the Comintern and its respective sections.

In his article *Dizzy with Success*, Comrade

Stalin wrote: "The art of leadership is a serious business. We must not lag behind the movement, for to lag behind means to become isolated from the masses. But we must also not run too far ahead, for to run on ahead means losing contact with the masses. Whoever wants to lead the movement and at the same time to maintain contact with the masses must fight on two fronts—both against those who lag behind and against those who run on ahead. Our Party is strong and invincible because in leading the movement it is able to preserve and multiply contacts with

millions of the masses of workers and peasants."

The art of leadership that Comrade Stalin speaks of—not to lag behind the movement and not to run on ahead—is a decisive subjective factor in the struggle to win the majority of the working class as the direct prerequisite to the victorious proletarian revolution.

What should be noted as the first and most important result of the work of the Enlarged Presidium, and as a clear indication of the bolshevik growth of the Comintern and its sections, is the fact that the Enlarged Presidium, in drawing up the immediate tasks, displayed that very art of leadership about which Comrade Stalin wrote. The Enlarged Presidium decisively rejected the viewpoint of those "lagging behind," the viewpoint of the opportunists who assert that there is not and will not be a world economic crisis, that there are no serious changes in the working class, that the tremendous increase in unemployment does not present *new* tactical tasks, that the Communist Parties are not faced with *new* organisational problems.

OPPORTUNIST TENDENCIES CONDEMNED.

In discussing the reports of the various parties the Enlarged Presidium gave a ruthless rebuff to these opportunist theories, which reflect reformist pressure or the passivity of various party elements. In discussing, for example, the report by the representative of the C.C. of the Italian Communist Party, the enlarged Presidium, along with the majority of the Italian comrades, rejected and subjected to sharp criticism the viewpoint of those who do not see the crisis of Italian capitalism, who do not see the new tasks of the party in connection with this crisis, particularly the task of transferring the whole weight of work from activity amongst the refugees abroad to activity in the country itself. Then, in discussing the report from the C.C. of the C.P.G.B., the enlarged Presidium subjected to comradely, but at the same time sharp, criticism the *passivity* of the party in the matter of exposing the social-fascist nature of the MacDonald government as a typical example of "lagging behind."

While dealing the main blow at the "laggers behind," the Enlarged Presidium also rebuffed the "runners ahead"—those who are inclined to consider that we are already faced with the collapse of capitalist stabilisation, and who put forward tactical tasks which will lead to the "loss of contact with the masses." The Enlarged Presidium rejected, for example, the proposal for a general policy of immediately forming *independent* revolutionary trade unions, since, under *present* conditions, this course would lead to the loss of contact with the masses.

The realisation of the tasks placed before the Comintern sections by the Enlarged Presidium (based on an analysis of the current stage of development of the crisis of capitalist stabilisation and of the world economic crisis) represents a step forward which could be taken not only by the masses *already* following the Communist Parties, but also by those who, while leaving the social-democrats, have not yet come over into the communist camp.

AMERICAN CRISIS AND WORLD CAPITALIST ECONOMY.

The crisis of capitalist stabilisation and the development of a new revolutionary advance have made enormous progress since the time of the Tenth Plenum. The American crisis marks an extraordinary sharpening of the crisis in American stabilisation. It is the starting point of a rapidly growing world economic crisis. The economic crisis is maturing in *all* sections of the capitalist system, while in a number of countries (above all, the colonies) the American crisis has already caused profound repercussions. The American crisis, occurring under conditions of economic depression in a number of the foremost capitalist countries, under conditions of a world agrarian crisis and a revolutionary wave in the colonies, brings with it the most profound accentuation of all the contradictions of world capitalism, as a consequence of the rôle played by American capitalism in the world arena. It intensifies the economic depression in the foremost capitalist countries, causing an economic crisis in a number of them. It tremendously accentuates the contradictions be-

tween the colonies and world imperialism; it deepens the world agrarian crisis, and shakes the whole foundations of a number of dependent, and particularly the small capitalist countries.

It is precisely because the development of various countries is not only economically but also politically uneven that we already see the crisis of capitalist stabilisation starting the flames of revolution in some countries (Spain), the flames of insurrection in the colonies (Indo-China, San Domingo, etc.), political crises in the countries of fascism (Poland, Roumania), widespread attempts of the bourgeoisie—faced with a simultaneous rise of activity of the working class—to prepare for the coming decisive fights by means of establishing the fascist dictatorship. Despite the differences in the relation of classes and in the speed of development of the economic and political crisis in various countries, the fact has to be faced of a rapid growth of the *international* revolutionary wave. This is very well understood by international imperialism, particularly by the bourgeoisie of those countries (such as Germany) where the subjective factor of the revolution proceeds side by side with the objective. Hence the policy of consolidating all the forces of capitalism; hence the policy of fascist dictatorship, operated first and foremost by the social-fascists; hence the process of increasing collaboration and alliance between national- and social-fascism (the social-fascist Reich government and the Thüringen national-fascist government in Germany, the proposal to create a fascist militia in Austria out of the Heimwehr and the social-democratic Schützbund, etc.).

AIMS OF THE BOURGEOISIE.

The Enlarged Presidium clearly and accurately disclosed that the international bourgeoisie has now set itself to overcome the crisis at the expense of the toiling masses, at the price of their inhuman exploitation, at the price of still greater pressure on the colonies. It also aims at smashing the Communist Parties (which are the only force mobilising the masses for the struggle), and aims at the direct preparation of war against the U.S.S.R. In striving to carry out these objects, the

bourgeoisie relies on the social-fascists, whom it pushes to the forefront. The Enlarged Presidium recorded that the increasing crisis of capitalist stabilisation on the one hand, and the gigantic successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. on the other hand, have particularly sharpened the contradictions between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R. The estimation of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern and of the Tenth Plenum, E.C.C.I., that the war against the U.S.S.R. is the most real, the main danger, was never more true than now. The comrades reporting were able to assert the **important fact** that the imminent nature of the imperialist war against the U.S.S.R. was already *recognised by considerable sections* of the world proletariat. The Enlarged Presidium linked up the task of further mobilisation of the masses for the defence of the U.S.S.R. with the task of combating the new robber plan of the imperialists—the Young plan—setting against the latter the great Five-Year Plan of socialist construction.

The estimation of the present stage in the development of the crisis of capitalist stabilisation, as a stage of the maturing world economic crisis, which already now is accompanied by tremendous unemployment (in America and Germany alone there are more than ten million unemployed) provides the key to the discovery of the *chief* tactical task of the *current* phase. This main tactical task is the *leadership of the unemployed movement* and the linking of it with the mass economic struggles of the proletariat. The distinguishing feature of the present unemployment is the fact that, in addition to the actual numbers—whole millions out of work—unemployment has assumed the nature of a permanent crisis. Huge sections of the proletariat are now unemployed. Through the millions on half-time (working two or three days per week) this army is connected up with the millions at work in the factories. The unemployed feel most sharply of all the results of capitalist rationalisation. More than anyone else do they realise how the proletariat of the capitalist countries has been led into a blind alley. The unemployed break most rapidly with the social-fascists, and assimilate the slogans of the Communist Party.

OUR TASKS.

The Communist Parties have a multiplicity of tasks in the face of this situation. They have to take the leadership of the unemployed movement, to formulate their demands, using for this purpose both the street and the tribune of parliament or municipality. They have to lead unemployed demonstrations, to organise the workless through unemployed committees and councils set up around the Red trade unions or revolutionary trade union oppositions. They have to form a united front of the unemployed and the employed workers, bringing representatives of the latter on to the unemployed committees, including in strike programmes demands for aid to the unemployed, and arranging joint demonstrations of unemployed and employed workers. This slogan of the joint struggle of the unemployed and the employed workers is the most important lead to the parties, for the main object of the treacherous plans of the social-fascists is the driving of a wedge between the unemployed and the employed workers, the smashing of the united working-class front.

Rejecting the opportunist theory (in a "left" guise) that the *entire employed* section of the working class represent a labour aristocracy, the Enlarged Presidium put forward as the second part of the most important tactical task the job of organising and leading the strike struggle. Apart from the Communist Parties and the revolutionary trade-union movement, there is now no other force capable of *organising* and assuming the *leadership* of the strike struggle. These are the only forces now carrying on a real struggle for the direct demands of the working class. The social-fascist stage in the development of social-democracy is characterised, among other things, by the fact that the reformists not only refuse to organise strikes, not only try to prohibit them, but openly lead the strike-breaking when strikes have broken out in spite of all the obstacles they have made. What is new in principle in every present-day economic strike consists in the fact that it is directed against a three-headed enemy—monopolist capitalism, the bourgeois state, and the social-fascist trade-union bureaucracy. That is to say that

in every strike, even if only a small one, the bourgeoisie operates simultaneously with the force of the employers' organisations, the machinery of the state police, and the strike-breaking activities of its social-fascist agents.

It is evident that, under such conditions, a strike in which 1,000 workers participate, and which is inevitably of a *political* nature, is of greater importance than, say, a strike of 10,000 workers in the Second Period.

TOWARDS THE MASS POLITICAL STRIKE.

Under conditions of a rapidly developing crisis in capitalist stabilisation and of the rising activity of the working masses, to organise and lead the economic strike means to find the most *correct* and the *shortest* way to new forms of mobilisation of the masses—to the *mass political strike*, to be able to lead the masses *up* to the latter.

But the task of leading the unemployed movement and the strike struggle depends upon the task of *organising* the masses for this struggle. There exists a considerable gulf between the political and the organisational influence of the communist parties. This disparity becomes more and more dangerous as the new rise of the workers' movement becomes more profound and widespread, and as the stage of revolutionary combat approaches nearer. The most serious and most important question in the organisation of the masses at the present stage is the question of organising them in the strike struggle. In those countries where Red trade unions exist the task of the communists is naturally to exert every effort for the extension of the mass basis of these trade unions; above all, to extend their factory basis by forming factory groups of the Red trade unions. The matter is more complicated in those countries (such as Germany) where only reformist trade unions exist. Faced with the fact of the fascist evolution of these unions, to retain the old tactics would be tantamount to lagging behind the masses, who demand leadership in the struggle. While rejecting premature proposals to form independent trade unions, and while not getting nervy (to use Comrade Thaelmann's pointed expression), the En-

larged Presidium recommended the C.P. of Germany to take a step forward in the organisation of the masses, such as will be understood and approved by the broad masses—viz., to strengthen and extend the centre of the revolutionary *trade-union opposition*, which is already in existence, to rally around the trade-union opposition all revolutionary organisations and cells, both in the trade-union movement (Red factory committees, etc.) and in the whole workers' movement (revolutionary delegates, unemployed committees, etc.). Relying on this mass basis, relying on the powerful institution of revolutionary delegates in the factories, getting into contact with hundreds of thousands of organised and unorganised workers through the revolutionary trade-union press, the revolutionary trade-union opposition will become a powerful weapon in the working-class struggle in both its economic and political strike movements.

In close connection with the question of strengthening and extending the organised influence of the communist parties, the Extended Presidium emphasised another important task, that of strengthening the factory cells as the lower organs of leadership of the mass movement. The need to extend the network of factory newspapers was also given particular emphasis.

MUNICIPAL WORK OF THE PARTIES.

From this aspect of the spade-work needed for preparing the masses for the coming revolutionary struggles, the question of *municipal work* was also presented and discussed. In the present situation, when the capitalists are violently attacking on all sectors of the class front—including the municipalities—and when the activity of the masses is growing, the sphere of municipal work can and should become one of the most important levers for mobilising the masses, for extending contacts with them. This is also connected with the present rôle of the Communist Parties in the struggle for the immediate interests of the workers. Up till now, however, municipal work has borne the imprint of practical opportunism, and the communist fractions have acted as a refuge for opportunists. Subjecting the errors and weaknesses of municipal work to a ruthless criticism, the Enlarged

Presidium put forward the task of a *decisive change* in this work. Estimating this as one of the most important general-political tasks of the Communist Parties, the slogan put forward for the general line in municipal work is—a *break with bourgeois legality*.

The Enlarged Executive is an important landmark in the inner-party development of the Comintern. Whereas the Tenth Plenum summed up the first results of the fight with the Rights, the Enlarged Presidium was able to record, on the one hand, the fact of a general parting of company with the Rights, the complete bankruptcy of the attempts of the right-wing opportunists to detach any considerable groups from the communist parties; and, on the other hand, the rapid consolidation of the Comintern sections.

RENEGADE COMMUNISTS AND SOCIAL-FASCISTS.

In the camp of the renegades (Rights and Lefts alike) we observe a rapid process of drift to social-fascism. In certain countries (Austria) the renegades have already openly passed over to social-democracy. In others (such as Czecho-Slovakia) they are on the verge of doing so (which Jilek recently himself disclosed in his leaflet). Everywhere they are participating prominently in the campaign of invective against the communists, are collaborating with the social-fascists in strike-breaking, and allying themselves with the latter in various elections. The revolutionary wave is only in its initial stages, yet the treachery of the Rights has already reached maturity. Trotsky has also fully revealed his rôle as a pedlar of social-fascism. While three months ago he refused, like the Brandlerites, to recognise the social-fascist nature of present-day social-democracy, in his recent article, *The Third Period of Comintern Errors*, Trotsky assimilates yet another slogan of the Rights: "Bring pressure to bear on the social-democrat bureaucrats." He openly announces that social-democracy is a weapon of struggle against fascism, openly declares there is a possible perspective of *collaboration with social-democratic leaders*.

This "consolidation" of the renegade groups as lackeys of social-fascism is counterposed by the real consolidation of the Commu-

nist Parties. The deepening crisis of partial capitalist stabilisation, the tremendous success of the general line of the C.P.S.U., the increased influence of the Communist Parties among the masses, based on a correct tactical line, the activation of the Communist Party work—all these things have rallied the party masses around their leaderships, which, in turn, have become strengthened in the fight against Trotskyism and right opportunism. In the first place, it is necessary to note the consolidation of the *Polish* communist party, which for many years had been rent by fractional struggle and whose leadership had been infected with opportunism. In the light of the political crisis growing in Poland, and the rôle to be played by Polish imperialism in the coming war against the U.S.S.R., it is obviously of great international significance that the overwhelming majority of the members of the Polish C.P. have rallied solidly to the new bolshevik leadership. An equally important fact is the internal consolidation of the C.P. of Germany and the increased authority of the Party leadership, both inside the Party and among the broad masses of the workers. We should also note the complete bankruptcy of the German conciliators. The events of the First of May, 1929, and the subsequent months of class struggle, have shown that in the C.P. of Germany (the strongest section of the C.I., after the C.P.S.U.) a leadership has been created which, in the main, has mastered that art of leading the movement, that capacity to lead the masses on to new tasks, about which Comrade Stalin wrote in his article.

WEAKNESSES OF OUR WORK.

What has emerged most clearly in the Polish and German Communist Parties—the most mature C.P.'s in the capitalist countries—can also be observed, though in a lesser degree, in the C.P.'s in a number of other important countries (America, Czecho-Slovakia, etc.). But while registering the fact of this rapid consolidation of the Communist Parties, the Enlarged Presidium also considered, with Bolshevik frankness, the "weak spots" of the Parties—the feebleness and unsuitability of a section of the middle and lower functionaries, and the very poor progress in recruiting new

working-class elements into the parties. Here it was pointed out that the recruiting of new members, above all from the ranks of the working women and working-class youth, is a most important way of renewing the party personnel.

In summing up the results of the struggle against right opportunists, the Enlarged Presidium at the same time pointed out that the fact of a general break with the Rights does not remove the problem of a struggle with the Right opportunism as the chief danger. The strength of reformist influence is still great; the separation from the Rights has not dispersed all the opportunist elements. Every new step forward by the Communist Parties will cause new—though, it is true, ever decreasing—vacillations on the part of certain elements in the parties, above all among those who come from the ranks of the old social-democracy. The main inner-party task confronting the Comintern sections is the struggle against opportunism, especially in its concrete manifestations, and a fight *in practice* against opportunist passivity and conservatism. In many sections (Italy, Great Britain, Switzerland, etc.) the fight with opportunism means combatting an under-estimation of the social-fascist nature of social-democracy.

FIGHT ON TWO FRONTS.

In all sections the trade union and municipal spheres of work should be the main field of struggle against opportunism in practice. While directing the main blow against Right opportunism, the Enlarged Presidium also clearly emphasised the task of fighting on two fronts—against the main right-wing danger and also against "Left" tendencies. The latter tendencies, which include sectarianism and the habit of skipping over necessary stages of the mass struggle, were also condemned during the course of the Presidium's work. The timeliness and utility of such a struggle on these two fronts was illustrated by a comrade from the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia, who stated that the criticism of "Left" tendencies in the C.P. of Germany by the E.C.C.I. had saved that party from further dissensions, had helped the work of consolidating the party,

had helped the "Lefts" to recognise their mistakes.

The self-criticism which marked the work of the enlarged Presidium was expressed in a particularly concrete form in the discussion on the reports of the Central Committees of the various Communist Parties (Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and the U.S.S.R.). The presentation of such reports at the Presidium undoubtedly signifies a new landmark in the internal party life of the Comintern, in the mutual relations between the leading staff and the separate sections. The reports of the Central Committees were not window-dressing affairs. Every C.C. reported on the questions which were characteristic of the class struggle and the fight of the parties in the respective

countries at the present stage. The live and thorough discussion on the C.C. reports showed that this new method of exchanging the experience of the various parties, this new form of leadership of the sections by the leading organ of the Comintern, has fully justified itself. This new form has not arisen by chance. On the one hand it is an expression of the bolshevik growth of the Comintern as a world bolshevik party, on the other hand it corresponds to the new tasks and new tempo of the present stage of rapidly developing crisis in capitalist stabilisation and of the revolutionary advance. It is also a guarantee that when the revolutionary situation arises it will take neither the Comintern sections nor its general staff unawares.

The Problems of the Communist Party of Germany at the Enlarged Presidium of the E.C.C.I.

From Comrade Thälmann's Report at the Presidium

THE Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., in dealing with the question of the developments in Germany in connection with reparation questions, said :

"The reparation burdens lead to a rapid intensification of the class struggle in Germany, expressed on the one hand in a ruthless capitalist offensive, and on the other in great mass proletarian action. The double burden borne by the German proletariat, because of the reparation payments and the pressure of their own bourgeoisie, accelerates the maturing of a revolutionary crisis in Germany." . . . (Resolution of the Tenth Plenum.)

The few months which have passed since the Tenth Plenum have thoroughly confirmed the correctness of this thesis. In Germany particularly the question of reparations is decisive, determining and controlling the entire political development. At the present time, after the conclusion of the Hague Conference, it can be said that the Young Plan not only has a

national importance for Germany, but that it embodies the international world programme of the bourgeoisie against the Soviet Union. The result of the Hague Conference is that, in the first place, the German bourgeoisie has to proceed not only against the German proletariat but also against the Soviet Union.

The antagonisms among the different parties of the Second International in connection with the Young Plan, as contrasted with the resolute, united attitude of the Comintern to this problem, is of the greatest importance. Unfortunately, this unity is not always demonstrated sufficiently by the parties.

The International Bank for Reparations is also of great importance. It is the centre of the economic, and particularly the financial, blockade of the Soviet Union; and, moreover, when imperialist war breaks out against the Soviet Union it will undertake to eliminate any currency difficulties and complications that may arise.

Connected with the acceptance of the Young

Plan are a number of orders, treaties, and secret agreements which bear an aggressive character towards the Soviet Union. I shall only mention the German-Polish liquidation agreement, which aroused a strong sentiment of hostility towards the Young Plan among the German population. This German-Polish agreement conceals American capitalism's objective of utilising Germany as the centre from which to direct operations against the Soviet Union. The most important problem confronting the German bourgeoisie is that of exports. In the first period of payments, which lasts 37 years, Germany has to raise on the average 2.2 milliard marks annually, and in addition the interest on the 14 milliard which Germany received in credits in recent years under the Dawes Plan. If the interest on the debts is calculated at the low figure of 8 per cent., plus 2 per cent. for amortisation, the total amount of interest to be raised in addition to the 2.2 milliard amounts to 1.4 million annually. The difficulties are aggravated by the changes made in reparation payments in the form of deliveries in kind. Under the Dawes Plan the German bourgeoisie could pay in *Reichsmark*; but now, throughout the whole period of the Young Plan, payment must be made in gold currency. This problem is accentuated because of the export crisis in capitalist world economy as a whole. It means that in future the export of German commodities will encounter insuperable difficulties, particularly in connection with American imperialism's new export offensive, which is seeking to penetrate further into Germany and other countries, as well as into the colonies and semi-colonial spheres.

As compared with the third quarter of 1929, German sales in the last quarter decreased by 7 per cent. abroad and by 17 per cent. on the home market. These were the first grave indications of crisis. That this crisis is acutally in being in Germany is proved, for example, by the three and a half million unemployed, a figure which is increasing from day to day, and which does not include the two million working on short time. It is also proved by the slow but steady decline in recent months in the iron and steel industry, and by the par-

ticularly acute agrarian crisis in Germany, which will be still further accentuated by the fall in the prices of wheat and rye. And as a final proof there is the shortage of capital, which may become a critical factor of the gravest character. The world economic crisis, in the course of which the prices of important products are falling considerably, and America's new export offensive, will tremendously aggravate the difficulties of reparation payments, and will force the German bourgeoisie to increase exports by cheapening production to a very great extent.

CAPITALISTS LOAD THEIR BURDEN UPON THE WORKERS.

It is not necessary in this report to enumerate the measures of exploitation which the German bourgeoisie will be compelled to take against the German proletariat and all German workers. The intensification of the capitalist offensive in recent months has already shown that the entire burden will be borne by the proletariat and the working sections of the population alone.

As indications of the growing war danger and the reactionary attitude of the German bourgeoisie to the Soviet Union, we have witnessed in recent months the systematic press campaign against the Soviet Union and against Communism, the speeches in the chervonetz forgery case, that most impudent provocation against the Soviet Union, and the fact that the most important naval centre has been transferred to the Baltic Sea, from Wilhelmshaven to Kiel. At the same time, a decree was issued by the Prussian Minister of the Interior—a social-democrat—which is directed exclusively against Russians and Russian communists in Germany. Further proof is offered by the attack on the München Trade Delegation, the raid on the Berlin Soviet Trade Delegation, and finally by the extraordinary activity of the centre parties. Such people, for example, as Vitus Heller, who a short time ago wrote articles in favour of the Soviet Union, are now strongly supporting the anti-soviet agitaion in the centre newspapers. I think that these few facts alone are enough to show that the war preparations of the German bourgeoisie, managed by America, have

reached a stage quite different from that which obtained at the time of the Sixth World Congress and the Eighth Plenum. Comrade Gussev, dealing with the first point on the agenda, remarked that the Wedding Party Congress had contrasted the danger of a war among the imperialist powers and the danger of war by the imperialist powers on the Soviet Union. In the resolutions of the Wedding Party Congress, at which we had to deal with the attitude of the conciliators who were trying to push the danger of an inter-imperialist war into the foreground and to conceal the fact that the war danger had reached the stage which is now admitted by everybody, there is a paragraph which runs as follows :

“The most immediate war danger, the war to fight which the international proletariat must prepare itself, is a war of intervention against the Soviet Union, the class war of the world bourgeoisie against the world proletariat, which has already reached the stage of preparation for direct military action.”

In another place, when we were dealing with the right wing liquidators and the conciliators, the Congress declared :

“The right wing liquidators and the conciliatory fraction in the Party, who conceal the anti-soviet character of German foreign and defensive policy, and distract the attention of the workers from the danger of intervention to the conflicts inside the imperialist camp, hinder and destroy the Communist Party’s activities in defence of the Soviet Union.”

I think that these two quotations refute Comrade Gussev’s statement.

At the time of the Sixth World Congress another question was also put incorrectly by Comrade Ewert. The majority of the German delegation endeavoured to push into the foreground the fact that, with the great development of the proletarian dictatorship, world imperialism would intensify its activities against the growing strength of socialism. I think that our statement at that time that the chief war danger is the danger of war on the Soviet Union, has been fully borne out, particularly by the events which have recently taken place all over the world. I would also like to oppose Com-

rade Gussev’s idea that Schacht, as America’s representative, was anxious to turn Germany against France and England as well as against the Soviet Union. Everybody, of course, realises that Schacht and Morgan work together in the international sphere as well as in Germany. But to propound the question by saying that American imperialism wants to set Germany against France and England is wholly incorrect. There are the recent negotiations betokening a Franco-German *rapprochement* to disprove this, while there is nothing to prove any contradiction between Germany and England.

CHANGING SOCIAL BASIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY.

At the present time it is true to say that the most important shock troops in the anti-soviet war front are comprised in the social-democratic coalition government. Differences of opinion were in evidence at the Sixth World Congress as to the activities of the social-democratic government, and particularly as to the rôle of social-fascism. I remember, for example, that Comrade Ewert did not in the least grasp the fact that with the entry of the social-democrats into the government the social basis of social democracy must also necessarily change, not only in the sense that it is re-orientated towards the labour aristocracy, but also that, as a whole, it must develop in a bourgeois direction, which, if the Communist Party carries out the correct policy, will inevitably bring the most important proletarian class elements over to the communist camp. As far back as the elections of May, 1928, there were differences of opinion within the Central Committee and throughout the entire party. The comrades around Ewert—not to mention the right-wing liquidators who stand outside the Party—made a thoroughly false valuation of the nine million votes which were recorded for social democracy at that time. Undoubtedly it is true that social democracy was a bulwark for the bourgeoisie, but from the standpoint of the revolutionary class struggle we must not only determine how far social democracy is an obstacle in the way of the revolutionary class struggle, how far it is an active factor directed with the utmost

brutality against the proletarian class struggle, we must also ask ourselves the question whether, with the 3¼ million votes given to the Communist Party, and in view of the governmental activities of the social democrats, we had any great political possibilities of extending and strengthening our own revolutionary class front. In this connection the conciliators were terribly pessimistic, while the Party and the majority of the Party leadership established that optimistic basis from which we proceeded.

To-day we can say that the facts of development since that time have justified the Communist International and the German party. The theses put forward at that time by Comrade Bukharin contained the tendencies which were expressed by the minority of the German delegation at the various sessions. To-day we can draw up, as it were, a balance sheet of the activities of the social-democratic coalition government. In the main, the strategical tasks which the social-democratic coalition government has to carry out on behalf of the German bourgeoisie are the three following: (1) the capitalist offensive along the lines of the Young Plan; (2) preparations for war against the Soviet Union; (3) the suppression by force of the revolutionary movement in Germany. By means of these three chief strategical items in the policy of the social-democratic government we must make it clear throughout the international how social-fascist development in Germany and the nature of social-fascism are expressed in the part played by social democracy. Viewed from this standpoint, we can maintain that Germany will be watched and utilised as the field for social-fascist experiments by many other capitalist countries.

Of course, the bourgeoisie in Germany, as in all other countries, tries to make use of two kinds of methods: the methods of social-fascism and the methods of fascism. Nor can we disguise the fact that, in Germany recently, national fascism has also grown up. The troops of national fascism make murderous attacks on revolutionary workers; and social-fascism, with the social-democratic police chiefs and the social-fascists in the govern-

ment, beats down the unemployed and the workers in the streets. I believe that this shows us fascism and social-fascism becoming one in the general course of development. This is a fact of great importance for Germany and for other countries. Just recently, for example, a national fascist has entered the Thuringian government, which indicates that national fascism is slowly giving up its original unbridled agitation and is now within the framework of the constitution of the German republic, helping to carry out the tasks necessary for the execution of the Young Plan, just as social-fascism is doing.

FUSION OF FASCISM AND SOCIAL-FASCISM.

The latest development in Germany, particularly, shows the growing fusion of national with social-fascism. Of course, national fascism can only advance in Germany because social-fascism clears the road for its progress. Two facts, placed in juxtaposition, bear witness to this: the prohibition of the Red Front Fighters' League and the anti-fascist organisation, and the continued existence of the fascist organisations. These fascist organisations not only continue to exist, but the government is introducing measures which will make them a basis for building up its own regular army. I think we can say that social-fascism (it is tremely difficult to find a suitable word) is the weapon-bearer of the fascist dictatorship. It is very difficult to maintain the line of separation between the development of a social-fascist dictatorship, when it has reached the stage, as in Germany, of a social-democratic government using the most reactionary weapons of violence, and the methods of the fascist dictatorship. And the further conclusion which must be drawn is that the social-fascist dictatorship has not by any means employed its weapons against the revolutionary front as fully and as extensively as it will do in the near future. I think that our Austrian brother-Party has given too little consideration to this fact in the development of fascism. The fusion of social-fascism and national fascism, which assumes different forms in Austria from what it does in Germany, will assume still other forms in other countries.

The stronger that revolutionary mass action grows, intensifying the political crisis, the stronger and more aggressive will be the fascist methods used to suppress the proletariat.

Whenever a revolutionary crisis comes to a head the social-democrats enter the government. In 1919 they entered the government to defeat the revolution; in 1923 they entered the government in order to defeat, with their emergency laws, the revolutionary workers of Saxony, Hamburg, etc. Now, when the Young Plan and its fulfilment are the order of the day, social democracy is the bourgeoisie's most active factor in the struggle against the revolutionary proletariat and in the preparations for war against the Soviet Union. A few days ago *Vorwärts* wrote that diplomatic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union must be broken. Comrade Münzenberg has told us that the judicial committee of the German Reichstag received a letter from Severing, the social-democratic Minister of the Interior, in which he referred to the growth of communist disorders, mentioned the damage to the *Vorwärts* windows, and asked for the immediate acceptance of the law for the protection of the republic. I think these two examples show that social-democracy both supports to its utmost the preparations for war on the Soviet Union and uses the most brutal means to suppress the revolutionary class front.

The answer to the question: how far, or rather how long, the social-democratic government coalition will remain the distinctive form of government, depends upon various factors. We are of the opinion that the present social-democratic government will remain at the helm for a long time, although we should not—and, indeed, cannot—exclude the possibility of changes in the government taking place through parliamentary divisions or extra-parliamentary conflicts. But the general trend of affairs, the plans drawn up by this government for carrying out the Young Plan, and the new financial and fiscal programme, make it highly probable that it will remain at the helm for a fairly long time.

DIFFERENTIATION IN RANKS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY.

In dealing with social-fascism we cannot be satisfied with asking and answering the question: Is social-fascism inside or outside the government? The policy of social-fascism, whether it is inside or outside the government, will always be directed against the revolutionary class front, and will always assist in carrying out the tasks of the bourgeoisie. If we draw up our balance sheet of government activities in this way we become aware of the growing contradiction between that government and—(1) the millions of electors who voted for the social-democrats; (2) certain sections of social-democratic members of the party, the trade unions, and other mass organisations. On the other hand, there is a group being formed, which is growing in strength, consisting of the labour aristocracy employed by the state, and of those elements in the factories, the municipalities, the trade unions, etc., which carry out the policy of social-fascism towards the revolutionary class front. This process is most clearly in evidence in the National Socialist Party of Germany. A short time ago this party carried on its agitation by making great promises to the middle classes and the proletariat without being pulled up by the bourgeoisie. To-day the "National Socialist Labour Party" can no longer make any promises at all to the proletariat and the middle classes, because, in the present acute situation, the German bourgeoisie had to forbid the party to make any special promises.

This explains the changed attitude of the national fascists in such matters, for instance, as entering the Thuringian government and assisting the social-fascists and the bourgeoisie, within the constitution, within the framework of the republic, to carry out the Young Plan. This also explains why we no longer hear a word from the national fascists about national suppression in the south Tyrol, about a war of revenge against France, which was so loudly boosted by them a few years ago. That has all been forgotten. That is why they have lined up absolutely with the social-fascists and the bourgeoisie in the anti-

soviet war front, and why in home policy they work within the constitution and the laws of the republic. In the present situation the fascists themselves cannot surpass the reactionary onslaughts of the social-fascists. I think, therefore, that this brief outline of development will enable us to draw up the balance sheet of the present government; and we can, I think, add that a similar development will take place in those other countries where there is a strong Communist Party carrying out a correct policy. This is the only way in which to approach the question of the further existence of the present government. A few weeks ago the *Kölnische Zeitung* wrote as follows:

"We should not hide from ourselves the fact that the government is confronted with difficult tasks; and we should therefore do everything possible to promote the stability of the government and the coalition, the more so as it is difficult to say what would replace the present government."

Further on it continues:

". . . The more the impression is strengthened that the government will enter upon the new year as irresolutely and indecisively as it took leave of the old, the greater will be the incentive to all those rebels who are only waiting for the parliament of the *Reich* to fail utterly and the system to be cast overboard."

We can see from this how a leading organ of the German Populist Party sums up the situation. These few lines excellently characterise the real situation in Germany. In such a situation, when millions are slowly turning away from social-democracy or social-fascism, a serious factor comes into being within social democracy—left social-facism, whose task it is to divert the thousands of social-democratic members from entering the Communist Party. In its last decisions the Comintern repeatedly declared that within social democracy to-day left social-fascism plays the most dangerous rôle. I think that at the present time this applies not only to Germany but to various other European countries, and perhaps also to other continents. It is a fact that the left social-democrats have been forced to give up their left-wing demagogy and phraseology;

that in the division on the vote of no confidence in the Saxon government the left social-fascist Böschel stood together with Bünger, representative of the German Populist Party, in declaring that they two were quite prepared to establish a coalition in the Saxon *Landtag*. This shows that left social-fascism, which a short while ago was conducting a sham opposition to coalition policy, is now, together with the German Populist Party, taking up the cudgels for the government policy, nationally and in Saxony. This is a manœuvre made in order to present the government to the workers in a different light from that of the bourgeois government bloc which formerly existed in Germany and was still in existence some weeks ago in Saxony.

INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF ROLE OF LEFT S.D.'S.

I consider this left social-democratic policy to be of importance at the present time, because it prevents social-democratic workers from joining up in the Communist Party. The whole position in Germany goes to show that left social-fascism is not merely a national German affair, but a tremendously serious matter for the whole Comintern. In Saxony the left social-fascists are trying to restrain the masses by demagogy, are winning several positions in the Reich, which will again temporarily mislead the masses into believing that the left social-democrats will carry out a different policy from social-democracy. This situation gives us great possibilities of accelerating the process of decay within social-democracy. As, however, the situation is becoming more acute, and our demands now are different from what they were, for instance, at the beginning of the second period, questions connected with the work of detaching groups of workers from social democracy are also of a different character.

Nowadays we no longer try to carry on fraction work within social-democracy; we try, in the critical stages of any revolutionary action, to bring groups of social-democratic workers over to the Communist Party. In Germany conditions are ripe for this work. This is shown by the recent entry into the

Communist Party of the former Menshevik Schwalbe, the parliamentary deputy Rexe, and practically the entire local social-democratic group in Danzig; and still more by the unrest and discontent in the S.D. Party, which, if our Party intensifies its policy as the contradictions develop, will give us still greater possibilities than we have at present. From this point of view we must emphatically declare that in this respect there are great ideological weaknesses in our Party, reflected, for example, in the inability of some of our comrades to cross political swords with fanatical social-democratic officials. We believe, however, that with intensive work in this direction we can strengthen our successes.

From the Tenth Plenum until to-day we can report a good deal of progress, although we do not wish to hide the fact that several instances of resistance, many defects, and even mistakes, were apparent in carrying out the Party policy.

The basic problem, put forward by Comrade Manuilsky, the struggle for the majority of the proletariat, has arrived at an important and decisive stage in Germany. We can by no means rest satisfied with the modest beginnings made on the various class-struggle fronts. In recent times we have employed very many methods and forms of struggle to win over the masses of the proletariat to a revolutionary policy. At the August plenum of our Central Committee our most important task, laid down in the report of the Tenth Plenum, was that of making a decisive change towards revolutionary mass work, particular attention being paid to the growing unemployment in Germany and to the lessons of August 1st, so that in any similar action in the future the mistakes made at that time should not be repeated. The two following plenary sessions of the Central Committee, which took place in October and November, 1929, were much more important. At the October plenum we discussed the slowing down in the fight against the Young Plan in connection with the agitational and systematic popularisation of the development of the Five Year Plan and the proletarian dictatorship. This meeting of the Central Committee introduced something new in the Party. For the first time we clearly grasped the great

importance of the national fascist movement side by side with social-fascism, for unfortunately the national fascists had won an advance in the struggle against the Young Plan. We can now state, however, that we have not only made up for that slackness, but that our Party has made such progress that we can say we have taken over the leadership of the fight against the Young Plan in Germany.

THE NOVEMBER PLENUM OF THE C.C.

The two chief points on the agenda of the November plenum of the C.C. were: (1) summing up the results of the November 17th municipal elections, and (2) preparations for the national congress of the revolutionary trade-union opposition.

On the first point the C.C. dealt with the great inequality in development shown by the great differences in the voting for communists in different districts. On the second point the key question was that of creating around the Party an organisational basis from which to widen our ranks, intensify our revolutionary mass work, and give our Party the possibility of passing to higher tasks in the form of revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie and against social-fascism. At the last meeting of the Politbureau we discussed the most important and extremely complicated question: How it is possible that, with an objectively favourable situation and with a correct policy, the Communist Party did not succeed in mobilising the masses in 1929 by revolutionary action and by economic strikes such as took place in 1928? The Politbureau declared that the decisions of the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. and the last three meetings of the Central Committee were successfully carried out, although this does not mean that we did not make mistakes in carrying out our policy. The following advances and successes were to be noted: (1) the political mass work of the Party has been considerably strengthened; (2) the slowing down in the fight against the Young Plan has been stopped and progress made; (3) the first steps have been taken to give a firm organisation to the revolutionary trade-union opposition; and (4) activity among the unemployed has increased, and contact established between them and employed workers. If we analyse the development of the revolutionary

class struggle in Germany, then the question of the fight against the Young Plan becomes not only a question calling for a revolutionary answer—setting the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in contrast to the liberation of the German working masses from the chains of national and international capitalism—not only a question of the overthrow of capitalist domination: we put the question forward in the daily struggle of the German working class for each piece of bread. In this connection the fight against the Young Plan is not only the most burning question in the Party's attack on social-fascism: it also plays the greatest part in our day-to-day struggles, in extending our fighting activities. A few comrades have already referred to one section of the theses containing the following table, and Comrade Manuilsky has already answered this point:

| Year | Strikes | Lockouts | No. of workers affected by | | No. of working days lost | |
|--------------|---------|----------|----------------------------|----------|--------------------------|----------|
| | | | strikes | lockouts | strikes | lockouts |
| 1927 | 759 | 112 | 233,000 | 270,000 | 2.9 mil. | 3.1 mil. |
| 19 8 | 691 | 72 | 328,000 | 452,000 | 8.5 " | 11.8 " |
| 1929(9 mths) | 296 | 16 | 119,000 | 116,000 | 2.3 " | 3.6 " |

I do not think that this definition will suffice. Since there are certain disputed questions to be discussed, in which discussions all the Parties of the Comintern must try mutually to help each other, I think that in the present instance we should examine the questions more closely. We are of the opinion that various factors in development must be taken into consideration on this subject. If, for example, in 1929 far less days were lost by strikes and lock-outs than in 1928, the fall can perhaps be explained by the great increase in unemployment. In other countries, however, other facts have to be considered. In America, despite the increase in unemployment, the number of working days lost through strikes also increased. In England, too, the number of days lost through strikes has increased sixfold, although unemployment has also increased. It is also important to consider the case of Poland, where, with very great unemployment, strikes have assumed a quite different character from 1928. I think that we must here make a distinction which was analysed during the period leading up to the first Russian revolution of 1905, and was taken as marking a certain stage of advance in the development of a revolutionary situation.

The period from 1923 to 1928 was a period of depression in the working class from which they have been emerging in the last few years in order to undertake the mobilisation of their forces against the attacks of capitalism. The year 1928 marked a certain stage in what Comrade Manuilsky has rightly called the maturing of the revolutionary wave into a revolutionary situation. This is principally a question of the Communist Party subjectively influencing the masses.

CHANGED METHODS OF CAPITALIST ATTACKS.

Were the strikes which occurred in 1928 conducted by the old methods of 1925-27? Of course! The first dispute to be conducted by the class-conscious section of the German bourgeoisie with a sharp change in the tactics and forms of struggle was the Ruhr lock-out of December, 1928. Another question, not of such great importance, is that the bourgeoisie during the times of prosperity could still make certain concessions; whereas to-day, as the whole situation has become extremely acute, there is a change in the entire form of the capitalist offensive, which is assisted by the forces of the state and social-fascism. The methods adopted by the employers have been utterly transformed since the lock-out in the Ruhr metal industry in 1928. I think that the changed character of the capitalist offensive, with the help of the machinery of the state and the social-fascist trade unions, shows that this lock-out was the first indication of the new forms and methods of the employers' offensive.

It was Severing who, as representative of the government, put through the starvation award against the metal workers in 1928. This award, which greatly worsened the position of important sections of metal workers in the largest Ruhr metal works, and of metal workers generally, was the first new attack made by the employers in Germany in answer to the counter-offensive which was then beginning to be made by the German proletariat.

The change which we are carrying out in our Party was a very difficult one to make. At the large conferences in January, 1929, which dealt with the tactics to be employed in factory committee elections, we had to put forward our best comrades to convince our delegates and

officials of the correctness of the Comintern line. That was not an easy thing to do. Although the conference accepted the resolutions with only a few voting against, at the actual moment of voting our delegates were not really convinced. In carrying out our revolutionary work in the trade unions we also encountered a certain resistance in our own Party. This resistance was strengthened because our Party then was not as internally consolidated as it is, for example, at the present time. Several important Party members, right-wingers and liquidators, had been expelled from the Party, but their mantle had fallen on the conciliators, who tried to put obstacles in the way of our carrying out the new line, and so strengthened the resistance offered by our own Party members.

The change in the Party, the turn to the masses, took several months. The German bourgeoisie changed its methods. Nowadays, with the crisis that prevails in Germany, not the least concession is made; there are, on the contrary, wage reductions and lengthened hours. The machinery of arbitration also helped to prevent the outbreak of large wage struggles. But the Labour Court is now making other decisions. We shall see in the factory committee elections that we shall have to deal with other and far more rigorous measures on the part of the German bourgeoisie to prevent the election of revolutionary factory committees. We must also take into account the fact that in 1929 there were many small struggles not included in the official statistics of disputes, which only refer to disputes concerned with agreements and arbitration. The small struggles which took place in Berlin, Saxony, Hamburg, and the Ruhr district were the first fights to assume the new and more aggressive character, the first to bring up the question of the independent leadership of the struggle against the combined forces of the employer, the state, and social-fascism. I think that in 1929 the proletariat began to choose new methods of struggle in answer to the new methods adopted by the employers, the social-fascists, and the state power; but it had not yet succeeded in reaching the stage of developing economic strikes to the utmost possible extent. The strategy of the employer

is pitted against our own revolutionary strategy. When important questions are dealt with only after some time has been allowed to elapse, the Party cannot use its own strategy quickly enough against the strategy of the bourgeoisie.

GREAT PART OF THE UNEMPLOYED.

On the other hand, we cannot conceal the fact that the millions of unemployed have played a very important part. It would be stupid to conceal that concrete fact, and it would refute what Marx said earlier: that the bourgeoisie creates a reserve army which it tries to play off against the employed workers. But the rôle of the unemployed today is far greater than even our own Party comrades imagine. We have realised, by our own experiences on various sectors of the class front in Germany, what a powerful factor the unemployed army is when we succeed in bringing it, together with employed workers, under our control and influence, into the revolutionary stream. To-day, with this huge army of unemployed, the prospects for 1930 in Germany are different from those of 1929. What has changed in comparison with 1929? No unimportant trifle! (1) The Young Plan has already worsened the position of the masses. In the second half of 1929 the real income of the workers fell sharply by 13.7 per cent., and the fall is still continuing. (2) Social-fascism and the government have lost their prestige among the masses, so that the Communist Party has better opportunities of advancing. (3) We have new and different methods of struggle, of strategy, of revolutionary mass work, and revolutionary action. (4) One of the chief causes for the paucity of great economic strikes in the past was, in my opinion, the lack of a strong organisational force to develop and lead such struggles; that is perhaps the most important of all. And the slowing down, particularly in this fourth point, was perhaps the most important brake hindering the development of economic struggles; for social-fascism, together with the bourgeois state forces and the employers, ruthlessly suppressed every struggle and strike in 1929.

Comrade Thälmann's Speech at the German Commission of the Extended Plenum

WORLD imperialism, from the period of the Dawes to the Young Plan, shows various forms of development. At the time of the Dawes Plan it was seeking, under the leadership of American imperialism, to gain influence over German policy by means of credits. At the present time, with the ratification of the Young Plan, the international bourgeoisie is trying to penetrate German national economy by other methods.

American capitalism is penetrating the factories, in order to extend its export possibilities. These measures on the part of American capitalism were in evidence at the Hague Conference where, for example, such eminent industrialists as Kassel and Vögler negotiated with world imperialism on behalf of the government and where Schacht and company dealt with the bankers. They are part of the general economic policy of an export offensive, most clearly marked in America. Thus the Opel strike is for the first time a strike directed, not only against the German bourgeoisie, but against the united front of German and American capital, which is interested in the Opel concern to the extent of 120 millions. This fact, that foreign capital is advancing to new methods of suppression in Germany, will be of the utmost importance for other countries. The rapprochement between France and Germany is proceeding much more rapidly than we thought possible. French industry and the French bourgeoisie are prepared to export capital to Germany in the near future, and this will bring about a further change.

Now as to the question of 17th November and the social democracy: The Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P. of Germany, which took place at the end of November, dealt with this question most satisfactorily. It was by no means accidental that we suffered great defeats throughout Saxony, in Leipzig, Dresden and Chemnitz, although our Party was internally consolidated in Saxony, and the position in this respect in Dresden is comparatively good. The policy adopted towards the left social

democrats was incorrect. Before the elections the Party was confronted with two main tasks. Firstly, the employment programme: although our Party in the *Landtag* had for several months past put forward fighting demands on the subject of giving employment to the unemployed, the question was not dealt with by our Party in the election contest. The left social democrats, however, did put forward an employment programme. The second question was that of the abolition of 9th November as a holiday in Saxony and Thuringia, where the bourgeoisie made a most energetic attack, while we did not even suggest that the workers should down tools on that day, a proposal which the social democrats would certainly have rejected. Even if we did not make that day a holiday, we should have put forward our revolutionary slogans of May Day and 7th November. As it was we just dragged in the wake of the left social democrats, and the masses were of the opinion that these left social democrats were defending 9th November. In questions of tactics we must develop a certain elasticity. Thirdly, Brandler had won fairly considerable influence in Saxony, while the national fascists, because of rationalisation, had gained ground among the bourgeois and temporarily among some working class sections of the population. The principal reasons for our defeat, therefore, are to be found in this cross fire of fascists, left social democrats and Brandlerites, which gave rise to some irresolution in our ranks, but which also compelled us to reorganise the Party in Saxony, in order to give it a unified direction.

IMPOSSIBLE TO GENERALISE ABOUT SKILLED WORKERS.

Now as to the social democracy: At the Plenum I said that our Party displays many ideological weaknesses in the question of furthering the disintegration of social democracy. I think, that in the too abstract form in which comrade Gussev has put the question, we cannot make inroads on social democracy.

If we say that the skilled workers were the

decisive factor in the Russian revolution, leading to the victory of the proletariat, our statement is quite correct. But there are also skilled workers in Germany, for instance the building workers, who now occupy, as a revolutionary vanguard, one of the most important posts in the army of the unemployed. On 1st February, the day of the hunger march, 80 per cent. of the building works in Hamburg had a one day strike. It is quite impossible to generalise about skilled workers as a whole. The compositors and lithographers form a strongly bourgeois element, while, on the other hand, such sections of skilled workers as the pipe layers have been driven into the revolutionary camp and, together with the unorganised, have played an important part.

The most important question we have to ask ourselves is: has the Party made the correct approach to the women workers, the young, unskilled, untrained sections of the working class, which have grown so tremendously in the last few years?

It is not an exaggeration to say that one part of the social democracy will be driven forward into the revolutionary class front. The question of the disintegration of social democracy is closely connected with our revolutionary work in the trade unions; it is the question of the work we do in the General Federation of Trade Unions, which has about 5 million members.

We have to consider the question of methods, flexible methods, for bringing millions of persons into the revolutionary camp. At the district congresses, there were 6,200 elected delegates; 25 per cent. were unemployed, elected at the labour exchanges, and about 12 per cent. were delegates representing young workers. But the most important fact in the election was the poor attendance at the election meetings, for on the average, only 10 to 12 per cent. of the workers in any particular factory, etc., took part in the election of the delegate. We do not know anything about the attitude of the other 88 per cent.; this is a serious point. Of course some of them are on our side, but what do they think, and why didn't they attend? Not only for fear of victimisation, but also to some extent for fear of communism.

In Germany we began with the national

conference of the revolutionary trade union opposition; then we had district conferences and now we are organising area conferences. The question of the national conference was raised because development was proceeding so rapidly in Germany that we had no time to postpone the date two or three weeks, although such a postponement of the conference would have been a great advantage. A national conference had to be convened quickly. The delegates were elected by the rank and file, as were the delegates to the district conferences and the area conferences now being organised in Berlin, Saxony, Lower Rhine, the Ruhr, Pomerania, etc. The national committee has now decided upon the establishment of local as well as district committees, to be elected by the workers in the most important industries.

QUESTIONS ARISING FROM NEW METHODS.

Now for the trade unions. Why are we discussing the question whether revolutionary factory committees should be affiliated to the revolutionary trade union opposition? Or the question whether the workers of a particular factory who have elected a "red" factory committee should be affiliated as a body to the revolutionary trade union opposition? Because no decision has as yet been arrived at on these points. The time has now come to answer all the questions raised by the new methods of work in the revolutionary trade union opposition. The most important question is, shall we accept unorganised workers into the trade union opposition, of course with membership cards? If we do that we shall make the complicated process of strengthening our revolutionary mass work and detaching the workers from the G.F.T.U. and the social fascists whom at present they support, much more difficult. The questions arising in connection with this subject are extremely complicated, and they must be settled on their own merits. If we were to lay down a rigid plan, as comrade Lozovsky has done, we should lose the flexibility essential in our work and play right into the hands of the social fascists, we should not be opening up a road along which the revolutionary trade union opposition could march and grow. It does of course grow more because of the unorganised and non-party workers; out of the reserve millions of workers

we shall win great masses into the organisation of political activity. But to let slip the 5 millions in the G.F.T.U. and the 1½ million or so in the Christian and Hirsch-Duncker unions (which are also affected by this question of disintegration) would be sheer treachery to the proletarian revolution. Consequently we formulate our answer in this way : that we shall not shrink from forming new unions, according to the situation prevailing and the events which have lead up to it, and if we are in a position to carry the masses along with us ; at the same time however we shall not cease our work in the revolutionary trade union opposition. On the contrary, we shall carry it still further, for there are millions of organised workers. But as against the 5 million organised in the G.F.T.U. the question of new trade unions will give rise to extremely complicated questions as it develops. Perhaps the most important question of the future is effective fraction work in the trade unions. Can the revolutionary opposition be strengthened without such fraction work? The factory cell is the centre of political activity on the basis of which all our other activities and organisations, shop stewards, committees of action, electoral committees for factory elections, etc., etc., must be conducted. In the same manner the fraction is the body which strengthens and extends the revolutionary opposition in the trade unions and gives it higher tasks to accomplish. I think that in relation particularly to red factory committee elections, the connections of the factory committee election campaign with other organisational tasks, such as the rapid development of effective bodies of revolutionary shop stewards, is of the utmost importance. The shop stewards should organise all the workers in the factory to the counter-offensive against, and the direct attack on, the bourgeois state power, the employers and social fascism.

BRANDLERITES A SECT.

On the subject of the struggle against the right wingers, the conciliators and opportunists in our own ranks, we display those ideological weaknesses which were enumerated in the last politbureau resolution. The March 6th campaign was neglected because of the emphasis laid on the factory committee election campaign, which occupied chief attention.

I will not deny that comrade Gussev's criticism that we neglected our ideological struggle against the right wing is fully justified. The fight against conciliation and the fight against opportunism in our ranks are not one and the same thing. A few months ago we discussed whether the Brandler group should be fought theoretically and practically in our press. Perhaps that task was neglected, nevertheless I think that, viewed objectively, we were quite right in saying that the theory of Brandlerism must be fought as sharply as possible by ideological means. If however we had gone on from that to fighting him openly in the general Party press (as distinct from our theoretical journals) we would have given this insignificant sect of officers without a crew an importance which they in no wise merited. The Brandlerites are a sect, and if we refrain from any incorrect tactical manœuvres in our Party work, they will find it impossible to win over any workers to their side, for their programme is contradictory and they have lost all understanding of the political situation in Germany. The struggle against the conciliators is a different matter, for they have not yet been entirely eliminated from our ranks. But the measures we have taken are forcing them to give way under the pressure of the Party, for in the few months which have elapsed since the Wedding Party-Congress the authority of the Party leadership has increased not only in the Party, but among the masses generally. Is there, apart from the leadership of the Communist Party, which has collective forms, any other leadership wielding the same authority among the masses at the present stage of development? No! Let us put another question : are there any leaders in the social democratic party who are really authoritative persons? The activities of social fascism have given rise to more mistrust than trust among the many millions who adhere to or who voted for that party; and as those activities of the social-fascists in the government increase they discredit those of its leaders who still wielded authority, such as Severing, and who are consequently regarded by the masses as traitors to the proletariat. This development has, I think, forced the conciliators, or rather their leadership, to submit. At the Sixth World Congress we had to fight the false theory and

the incorrect ideas of Comrade Ewert. And if, with the present intensification of the situation, Ewert, as was said, still ranks as a great man in England, it only proves that the most important political question has not been dealt with in England. For ourselves, Ewert's declaration is no proof that he agrees with us, even if he does state that he is with us in the

fight against Brandlerism and the liquidators. Ewert must prove, in active, disciplined work, that he is willing to carry out the tasks of the Party shoulder to shoulder with the Party—I will not say with the leadership—and to carry them out in a way that no longer expresses his old political conceptions.

On Two Fronts*

By V. Molotov

NOW that Comrade Rykov has read out the "document of the three,"† a document prepared in advance and written in ample time (after the example of certain plenums of the past period well known to all here)—after this one cannot help speaking first and foremost on the basic question, the question of the Party *line*.

The document of Comrades Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky begins by repeating what Comrade Rykov stated in his last speech, when he also spoke on behalf of the three, at the April Plenum of the C.C. He starts with an ambiguous reference to the supposed "position of unequal rights" of the three in the Party and on the C.C.

I will cite the beginning of the document :

"The last Plenum of the C.C. (April, 1929) passed a decision concerning us (Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky), accusing us of right-wing deviation and placing us in a *position of unequal rights* within the Party and its leading organs." (My italics.—V. M.)

Now, what is this "position of unequal rights" that these comrades are talking about? What have Comrades Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky found to be a "position of unequal rights" after the decision of the April Plenum of the C.C. which condemned their right-wing position?

If these comrades had any respect for prin-

ciple in taking up this position they should at least explicitly state what is their "inequality of rights" in the Party and C.C. But neither at the April Plenum nor in the document read out yesterday did they explain this ambiguity. Yet it is clear that this statement about the unequal rights of the group of C.C. members can only be understood in the sense that this group considers itself a "side" within the C.C., counterposing itself to the rest of the Central Committee: "ourselves" and the C.C. In reality the three have gone as far as to deny the homogeneity of the C.C. In defending *their own* line, *their own* policy, *their own* group, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky oppose themselves to the Central Committee. Only on the basis of that juxtaposition could they bring themselves to talk of their inequality of rights in the party and on the C.C. They are trying as a group, you see, to obtain for themselves full rights, "equality"; they are putting forward the demand for parity. There is no need to prove that such a demand has nothing in common with bolshevism. Equivocal declarations about a "position of unequal rights" are a characteristic reflection of the entire lack of principle, lack of ideological steadfastness, of the authors of the document read out by Comrade Rykov—a document that is hypocritical and equivocal through and through.

WHEREIN DO "UNEQUAL RIGHTS" CONSIST?

But the Plenum must nevertheless get a clear answer as to what "unequal rights," what "inequality," the three members of the Political Bureau are alluding to here. What

* This article represents the speech made by Comrade Molotov on November 13th, 1929, at the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. (slightly abridged).

† The "document of the three" is the written statement of the three comrades, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, read out by Comrade Rykov, on November 12th, at the Plenum of the C.C.—V.M.

are they claiming, what do they want, from the Central Committee and from the Party?

If this "inequality of rights" consists in their views having been condemned by the Party and defined by the April Plenum as a right-wing deviation (which was done with full right, and recognised by the whole Party and Communist International), we might remind the three comrades that, on the same grounds, Trotsky was at one time able to talk about his "inequality of rights" in the Party and on the C.C., when his views were *recognised to be anti-Leninist, hostile to bolshevism*.

In face of this, no matter how solemnly the Bukharin group declares in its "manifesto" that "differences are removed," no bolshevik can believe it. No; we see from their attacks against the C.C., with allegations of "inequality," that the Bukharin group regards itself as an *opposition* inside the Party. One of the most typical features of every opposition is the position, "ourselves" and the Party. As their own document shows, these three members look upon themselves as an opposition to the Party, as leaders of this opposition in the C.C. They have thus *started fractionalism*. That is the fact we must now recognise.

In the document of Comrade Rykov and the others it states that while there does exist a single Party line, these three comrades have favoured, and still advocate, a *method* of putting this line into operation differing from the Party. They put the matter thus: the line of the Party and of the Bukharin group seems to be the same, but there is a *difference* in the "concrete methods of carrying out the general line."

Furthermore, the three admit that "even on the basis of the concrete methods of operating the general line adopted by the Party," "big positive results have, in general, been achieved." Therefore the three, registering the "undoubted successes of the Party," state: "We consider that the differences between us and the majority of the C.C. are removed." Thus, while continuing obstinately to assert that "with the methods proposed by us (*viz.*, the three.—V. M.) at the April Plenum for carrying out the Party general line, we could have attained the desired results

in a less painful way. . . ." Comrades Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky are compelled to admit the successes of the Party, and even try, while not renouncing their fundamentally opportunist errors, to shelter for the time being behind the formula, "Differences are removed."

Later on I will also deal with the real meaning of the Bukharin group's special "concrete method" of carrying out the Party policy. But it is already evident from what we have said that the declamation about the "removal of differences" is in itself absolute sham.

PARTY'S SUCCESSES UNDENIABLE.

The three leaders of the right are now no longer able in any way to deny the Party's successes. Indeed, how could they be denied when every citizen of the Soviet Republic knows that the first year of the Five-Year Plan has been completed with great success; when we have already completed in the main the grain-collecting campaign, and have a ninety-million inviolable grain fund; when the working class and broad masses of the countryside are becoming more and more infected with the enthusiasm of socialist construction? It would be curious to observe anybody among us who would attempt to deny these achievements of the working class. Naturally, Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky recognise these elementary facts! But if, after that, they declare that they advocate a "method" different from that of the Party for the operation of the general line, if now also they declare that their "method" would give the desired results "in a less painful way," can we not see that in these declamations the right-wing leaders are continuing to oppose not merely one concrete method to another concrete method, but really to counterpose one policy to another policy, one line to another line. The false and thoroughly ambiguous phrases about two concrete methods do not hide the fact: the position of the *Party* is counterposed by the position of the *right wing deviation*. One cannot separate the operation of the policy (the "concrete method") from the policy itself (the "general line"). We know very well that without those practical measures we carried out this year—and, above all, without the whole system of measures assailing the capi-

talistic elements—the policy of the C.P.S.U. does not exist. No verbal gymnastics whatsoever can conceal this.

We now have to be doubly cautious in regard to statements about agreement with the general Party line. Such declarations are not even to be demanded from a communist. What sort of a Party member is it who does not agree with its general line? Upon any such declaration as to disagreement being made, any organisation would show such a “communist” the door. Nowadays the times are such that even people having nothing in common with the Party, and openly unfriendly elements, at times declare their “agreement” with the general line of the bolsheviks.

A BOURGEOIS LIBERAL ON THE PARTY LINE.

We will illustrate this by a document.

At yesterday's Plenum Comrade Krzhizhanovsky handed me a document expounding the views of the well-known V. A. Bazarov on the Party's policy. The latter has been working for some considerable time on the State Planning Commission, and a few days ago, at the request of Comrade Chernykh, member of the Presidium of the Commission, he expounded his present political attitude. Comrade Chernykh wrote down V. Bazarov's statements. These notes contain a good deal that is curious, and not only for the position of Bazarov, a former bolshevik, afterwards a semi-menshevik, and of recent years a typical bourgeois liberal.

What is his attitude to the Party line?

The following is what Comrade Chernykh made a note of on November 6th, from the conversation with Bazarov:

“He (Bazarov) can firmly declare that he *at any rate* is on our side of the barricade. *He has no differences of principle with the Party on the question of the line of development.*”*

Even this bourgeois liberal, who remains such even now, declares that “he has no differences of principle with the Party on the question of the line of development.” Does not this declaration impel us to use caution? Of course it does.

* These and subsequent italics in the quotations from Bazarov are mine.—V.M.

We may recall that at the commencement of “N.E.P.” Ustryalov also declared that in the main he was “in agreement” with the policy of Lenin. Only, Ustryalov thought that N.E.P. would ultimately lead Russia on to the bourgeois course, and on the basis of that conception he “approved” of the policy of the Leninist Party. Lenin then gave wide publicity to Ustryalov's statement, and warned the Party and all workers against this unsolicited “ally.”

That warning of Lenin's enabled the Party to adopt a class-conscious attitude towards the “change-of-landmarks” tendency, and to intensify the struggle against the counter-revolutionaries among the “change-of-landmarks” elements. And that struggle, indeed, improved the bolshevik quality of the Party.

Now we are in a different period. We have successfully begun to fulfil the tasks of reconstruction, and, in spite of all and sundry bourgeois liberals and reactionaries, we are going ahead. All but those who live in the atmosphere of the bourgeois menagerie of hate for the soviet system are bound to recognise at least certain indisputable successes of the proletariat. When we begin to extend the work of socialist construction with tremendous successes, and commence the victorious uprooting of capitalism from its last stronghold—from agriculture—then even certain bourgeois liberals have to retrace their steps. In V. A. Bazarov's statement as to the absence of differences in principle with the Party policy, we are bound to perceive a retreat of that nature on the part of a prominent representative of bourgeois liberalism.

And this is what Bazarov says about our industry:

“Bazarov will not be surprised if the coming year (1930-31) gives still higher indices for industry. . . .”

“Bazarov admits that *actual experience is refuting his theory of a declining curve.*”

And yet only two years ago Bazarov published an erudite book with a great number of tables and diagrams proving just the opposite. Now he has to disassociate himself from his own “learned works.” It would seem that here also the “differences are removed”!

I will now read what Bazarov says as to the fundamental difficulties of our development. You will see that he proceeds, as it were, on the track of Party decisions, on the track of previous Plenums of the C.C. And the doubts he expresses follow on precisely the same line as with Bukharin. Here is the opinion of Bazarov :

“Bazarov sees the main difficulties of our development in agriculture. Generally speaking, he considers the policy of collectivisation and the advance into the countryside as correct, but thinks the Party has taken the offensive at too rapid a speed.”

You see that he disagrees exactly on the same point upon which there is disagreement between the Party and the Rights. This is what Bazarov goes on to say :

“In the opinion of Bazarov we are depriving the peasantry of the stimulus to the development of productive forces, and are creating excessive difficulties on questions of supply. . . .”

BAZAROV AND BUKHARIN.

In what way does this statement of Bazarov's—particularly the statement about the “excessive difficulties” that we are “creating”—differ from what is said in the document of Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky about the possibility of getting desirable results “by a less painful method”? As a matter of fact, there is no difference between Bazarov's position and that of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. Both the non-Party Bazarov and the three Central Committee members agree that the “general line” has assured definite successes. But they all declare in unison that the tempo of the working-class offensive creates “excessive difficulties,” is a “painful method,” and therefore evidently needs modifying. The statements of Bazarov and of the three right-wing leaders, though expressed in slightly different terms, are exactly the same in essence. We must admit this is highly instructive.

We will cite a few more quotations expounding Bazarov's views. The following, for example :

“We must recognise the situation as being very difficult, and the chances of the failure of our policy (observe: “our policy”!—

V.M.) are bigger than the chances of success. However, the conclusion should not be drawn from such an appreciation that he, Bazarov, is in favour of a retreat.”

As you see, Bazarov speaks of the policy of the C.P.S.U. as “our policy.”

Like a true liberal, like a real bourgeois, he does not believe in the success of the revolution. In his opinion “the chances of failure of our policy are bigger than the chances of success.” But even this soured liberal does not advocate retreat. Filling his lungs with air, and stepping back still further behind the workers, he “courageously” declares :

“Under the present conditions we should decide neither on “unrestricted markets” (which Bukharin did not understand in April.—V.M.) nor on the increase of agricultural prices (which Bukharin also did not understand.—V.M.). *No matter how small be the chances of success, we can now only go forward.*”

Bazarov, you see, has practically admitted that there is no escaping from the rapid advance of the bolsheviks, and he “bravely” announces that “now we can only go forward.”

Finally, Bazarov states that, “not being a Party member, one cannot insist that he has 100 per cent. assurance.” This time I think he is right. Who, indeed, would think of demanding that Bazarov be 100 per cent. certain of the victory of the revolution! The bolsheviks also have to test their policy by facts, and derive new material from experiences, so as to improve their work, not to mention that various mistakes occur even in the best practical work. In Bazarov's proviso, however, to the effect that one cannot demand 100 per cent. faith from him as a non-member of the Party, there clearly protrudes the tail of a bourgeois liberal not believing in the proletarian revolution. Therefore his statement about agreeing with the Party line is not worth a sou.

On the other hand, we see that, basically, Bazarov's statement in no way differs in its political position from what is stated in the document of Tomsky, Rykov, and Bukharin. But, comrades of the right wing, if you obtain a new ally like Bazarov, or at any rate

come politically close to this bourgeois liberal, one can hardly congratulate you. It is not a great honour for a bolshevik! Yet you want your viewpoint to be placed on an "equal footing" with the viewpoint of the Party! You had better give it up, for nothing will come of it.

I have quoted from Bazarov's statement on the successes of our policy. Whether we like it or not, he is none the less a former bolshevik, an ex-Märxist, and at present a soviet collaborator. But nowadays it is not merely ex-revolutionaries and employees of the soviet apparatus who recognise the successes of the soviet. Everybody knows that even Herr Scheffer writes about these successes in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, and Mr. Farbman writes of the same thing in the *Daily Herald*. And a good many other bourgeois newspaper correspondents are compelled in their writings to recognise the big soviet successes in the advance of industry, improvement of agriculture, collectivisation, etc. Yet everyone knows that these Scheffers, these Farbmans, are our enemies—our bitter and irreconcilable enemies.

RIGHTS MUST DO MORE THAN RECOGNISE SUCCESSSES.

Therefore, to record their recognition of certain successes of the Party and the soviet system is quite inadequate for people who are known as leaders of the right wing and who have not yet renounced their errors. What are such admissions about successes and statements about the removal of differences worth if they are made without the open condemnation of their own right-wing vacillations? Such an attitude to questions of principle can only testify to an absence of all principle and absolute bankruptcy in ideas. The Party cannot restrict itself to registering successes. It has to know—and does know—by what policy, by what work, under what conditions, and at the same time against whom, against what resistance, against whose cloaked sabotage of Party work, have these successes been achieved.

Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsy frequently state in their document: "We are not Rights." On the first page of this document it speaks of the "incorrectness and political

harmfulness of all attempts to turn the Party 'back to the 14th Congress.'" In these words the authors of the statement have apparently found it convenient to dissociate themselves from Frumkin. A year and a half after Comrade Frumkin's action they dissociate themselves (and even then in a veiled form) from him. But why dissociate yourselves from Frumkin, comrades? You have yourselves gone ten times further than he did!

As if Comrade Frumkin ever said anything like you did about Party policy in the countryside, about the fight against bureaucracy, about the position in the Comintern, about the military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry! You have gone ten times further to the right than Frumkin, and after that have thought fit to "disassociate" yourselves from him. Is that worthy of political leaders? Why, you have generalised and carried to their conclusion the errors of Frumkin. You have become the actual mouthpiece of the very tendencies which Comrade Frumkin, in a comparatively weak form, expressed last year. And now you are going for this same Frumkin. And do you think that by such an attitude to your own supporters or semi-supporters you will win anybody's confidence? No, there is no principle or sound ideology in that. Moreover, I do not know the present position of Comrade Frumkin, but it is quite possible that he is now closer to the Party line than you three comrades are, for I don't think anybody could go farther to the right than you have done.

The three C.C. members further declare in their document: "We are not conciliators." What are you, then? "Left-wingers," perhaps! But you don't look like it. No one will believe that you are lefts. Shatzkin, for example, might be called a "left." Lominadze was recently a "left," and now admits his "left" errors. But you do not resemble them. Who are you, then, if you are nevertheless not in agreement with the C.C. and with the Party?

When one recalls or re-reads what you have said in recent times or what you are saying now, what is one to call it? At any rate, what you preach is sheer *opportunism*; it is a *Right*

deviation. It may be that these views sometimes resemble a *cowardly* opportunism; but it is none the less opportunism of an open and right-wing kind. This is now the second year the Party has been waging a persistent fight against the Right deviation. And now it is no longer even possible to hide behind the mask of conciliationism. Conciliators with the Right deviation are now open opportunists, actual Rights. No other kind of conciliators now exist.

THE RIGHT MANŒUVRES.

I now come to the main question—how the three define their disagreement with the Party C.C.

Here is what the authors of the document say about this :

“Fearing that *the application of extraordinary measures, as a protracted system*, will inevitably also affect considerable strata of the middle peasantry, we opposed at the last Plenum (April, 1929) the application of such measures. *Our differences with the C.C. and P.B. consisted precisely in that.*” (All italics mine.—V.M.)

But everyone knows that is absolutely false. It is a transparent attempt to slur over the question of principle involved. But they will not be able to confuse the issue here, for the simple reason that there remain the documents, the speeches, the articles, and the declarations of the right wing leaders. Can you get away from your own speeches and your own declarations? What, for instance, are you going to do with the accusation against the Party—*i.e.*, the “military feudal exploitation of the peasantry”—a charge lifted straight from a Miliukov newspaper? Surely you do not think that without unconditionally admitting the incorrectness and anti-Party nature of these and similar statements, you can seriously talk of “removing differences”?

About a year ago Bukharin, supported by Rykov and Tomsky, made the following statement :

“What actually determined subsequent policy? That which is stated in the document—*viz.*, Comrade Stalin’s speech on *tribute*. At the 14th Party Congress Comrade Stalin went all out after Preobrazhensky over the latter’s theory of ‘colonisation’ and the ex-

ploitation of the peasantry. But at the July Plenum he proclaimed ‘*the slogan of tributes—i.e., the military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry.*’” (Italics at the end mine.—V.M.)

In these statements, as everybody can see, in the guise of attacks on Comrade Stalin you have attacked not only the C.C. but the whole Party. You are not talking about some mere trifle, but of a *policy which has been operated in fact—i.e.*, about something the whole Party has done. You have hurled these charges at the Party, you have not withdrawn them—and now you think that someone might believe you that “differences are removed”?!?

I will cite another passage from the document of Comrade Bukharin, quoted above, to which Comrades Rykov and Tomsky assented. Here is what was written in Comrade Bukharin’s document of January 30th, and what the group of three has not yet renounced :

“The whole country (‘The whole country’!—I suppose we are to include the kulaks and nepmen!—V.M.) is tormented over the questions of grain and supplies, and the conference of the proletarian ruling Party keeps silent. The whole country sees and feels that all is not well with the peasantry. And the conference of the proletarian Party, *our* Party, keeps silent. The whole country sees and feels the changes in the international situation. And the conference of the proletarian Party remains silent. Yet there is a shower of resolutions about deviations.”

And now do you think you can keep silent without having said a word in renunciation of these whines, worthy of hysterical petty-bourgeois?! Are you not keeping the anti-Party attacks written in your documents in reserve for some future occasion? Indeed, have we not still serious difficulties ahead?

And how are you going to get away from your attacks against the Communist International? How can it be that the “differences are removed,” when you have not uttered a word as to whether your typically liberal attacks, which spoke of “secessions and splits” and “disintegration” in the Comintern, are still upheld? And do you not think it necessary to say anything about these recent anti-Comintern attacks of yours, not even after such scoundrels as Lovestone in America, such typical social-

reformists as in Jilek in Czecho-Slovakia, such renegades as Serra in Italy and Kilbom in Sweden have been expelled from the Comintern—in spite of your moaning? If we were to take seriously the Bukharin hysterics about the lack of consolidation in the Comintern, then we should still have tolerated these petty-bourgeois passengers and careerists in the ranks of the Third International. And this is at a time when the revolutionary wave in the capitalist countries is rising, when this revolutionary upsurge is acquiring a more and more international character. In fact, you have not deemed it necessary to say a word about that either. It is evident that opportunist spectacles prevent you from perceiving the maturing of a new powerful wave of the international proletarian revolution.

SILENCE IMPOSSIBLE.

Surely, after all you have said and written, you do not think you can just run off into your burrows and keep silent? No, comrades, that won't do.

The three right-wing leaders have come here and announced that their main difference is on the application of the extraordinary measures as a system. It would seem that all the rest is not of much significance. Let us examine this a little more closely.

The differences with the Rights concerned a number of most important questions.

First and foremost, the dispute concerned the speed of development of industry. The possibility of ensuring a rapid rate of industrialisation was bound to be the most important point of all the concrete differences with the Rights. They also debated such a question as the development of soviet and collective farms, which is closely bound up with the whole question of intensifying the attack on the kulaks. As we know, the right-wingers took up an attitude of absolute distrust of this, and by their fusillade against the Party policy attempted to divert it from the course taken. The questions of the fight against bureaucracy, the operation of inner-party democracy, the policy of the Comintern, were also in dispute.

The *basis* of the discussion, however, lies in the different estimation of *class* forces, a different attitude to the *class* struggle, a different interpretation of *class* tasks. That is the root

of the matter. The most important question of all is: how to mobilise the working masses for the extension of the attack on capitalist elements in the U.S.S.R. and for the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of capitalism throughout the whole world. It is evident that the right-wing leaders even now do not want to take up this question. They blur the fundamental question by means of double dealing, and try to conceal the main differences by hypocritical arguments about disagreeing as to the application of "extraordinary measures as a system."

Actually, when they put forward their objections to "extraordinary measures," they are not merely opposing "extraordinary measures, as a system," but are *against the policy* of an extended offensive on the capitalist elements, against the policy of an intensified attack on the kulaks. The so-called "extraordinary measures" in the situation prevailing last year were simply a component part of the policy of extending the proletarian offensive against the kulak and nepman on all fronts. Everyone knows what a variety of measures we have undertaken in order, in an organised manner, to carry out an intensified offensive against capitalistic elements. In now concealing the differences by alleging that they merely concern the question of extraordinary measures, the right-wing leaders are trying by a roundabout method to attack our policy of advancing against the capitalistic elements. The question was: either to advance on the capitalist elements or to retire before them and bury our heads in the sand. If we combine all the concrete points of dispute with the Rights into one question it amounts to this: either to attack the capitalist elements on all fronts—not pausing at the application of extraordinary measures when necessary—for the sake of assuring bread for the workers and Red Army, for the sake of carrying out the Five-Year Plan, and for the sake of strengthening the cause of the proletarian revolution: or else, not to make this attack, and opportunistically to withdraw our line before the exasperated counter-attacks of the class enemy. Whoever shrinks from this advance acts in exactly the same manner as Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others in the October days, when they shrank

from recognition of the necessity for an armed rising.

POLICY OF RETREAT.

Thus have the leaders of the Right revealed themselves by their document: they have indeed quailed on the fundamental question—the question of advancing against the capitalist elements. For the policy of advance they have endeavoured to substitute the policy of retreat. That is the real gist of our disagreement.

Even Bazarov understood that there was now no going back, that now the only road for the working class of the U.S.S.R. lay forwards. And he was compelled to say that, although he does not believe in the success of the revolution. It was at any rate honest on his part to say openly that he has no faith in the revolution.

It is also important to refer to the attitude of the right-wing leaders towards the question of the so-called “normal” market relations in the present period. The theorist of the right-wingers, Comrade Bukharin, at the April Plenum of the C.C., opposed the Party policy with a policy of “unrestricted commodity exchange,” the policy of establishing “normal” market relations. That was the essence of Bukharin’s speech. “Normalisation” on bourgeois lines, and along with that an “unrestricted commodity exchange,” was what Comrade Bukharin called for at the April Plenum. Whoever did not agree with that was without more ado dubbed a Trotskyite by Comrade Bukharin.

What is evident in the new document of the opposition leaders? It is not difficult to see that on this question they are retreating, discarding the Bukharinian ideological baggage by the roadside. It is true, they even do this in a cowardly and not an honest way.

In the document of the three it states that the mass collective farm movement and the wide development of tillage contracts, “with the withdrawal of the system of extraordinary measures, presents the problem of market relations *in a new way*.” The words “in a new way” are underlined by the authors of the document. This means they are compelled to retreat from Bukharin’s frankly right-opportunist line. But they are not retreating as

people should do who respect honesty of principle in politics.

Here also they again repeat the invention about the Party’s applying extraordinary measures, as a “system.” Here also they cast an aspersion on the Party by the allegation that it is carrying out the construction of socialism by a policy of extraordinary measures—i.e., a policy of administrative repressions. On the other hand, compelled to admit the necessity of a retreat in their advocacy of “unrestricted” market relations, they endeavour to cover up the collapse of the Bukharin policy by the reservation that the question of market relations arises in a new way, “*with the withdrawal of the system of extraordinary measures.*” (My italics.—V.M.) It would thus appear that the Party must first of all “withdraw” a non-existent “system” of extraordinary measures, and after that the right-wing leaders will agree to bring up the question of market relations “in a new way.” Is not such an attitude to questions of principle, to questions of ideological struggle, shameful for bolsheviks? We have to say once again that Comrades Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky are only verbally in favour of our policy of offensive on the kulaks. In practice, by making all kinds of reservations, they are pulling the other way.

Our policy is to *advance against the kulaks until we smash them as a class force*. And this offensive on the capitalist elements is being safeguarded by everything we are doing for the development of industry, for the support of soviet farms, for strengthening the collective farm movement, for organising the poor peasants, for increased tax pressure on the capitalist elements, and in the way of fighting the various influences of the kulaks, nepmen, and the saboteurs in our state industry, etc., etc. The authors of the document are trying to trot out a new policy in a masked form. Instead of a policy of attack they are urging a policy of *capitulation* before the capitalist elements. After that, no matter what they say about “removing differences,” we must intensify the exposure of the right-wing policy of capitulation before the kulak and nepman.

THE OFFENSIVE ON CAPITALIST ELEMENTS.

And so we see the right-wingers have fought against the Party while the latter has been extending the offensive on capitalist elements. In your document you also favour—in words—the policy of the offensive. But with your political sentiments is it possible to take part in the offensive? With such an attitude towards Party policy can you be good allies of the advancing army? One could not even say that you would advance with the baggage train. A baggage train is also needed, but disorganisers are not wanted in an army, particularly in the general staff.

It is clear from what has been said that the differences with the Rights are very serious. The differences here are fundamental. One must not seek for—and, indeed, will not find—a middle course between the policy of the Party and the policy of the Rights. The Party line and the right-wing line are irreconcilable.

Therefore, the authors of the document should ponder their position to its logical conclusion: either they must admit their errors and make a practical break with right-wing ideology, or else they will drift into the camp of the enemies of the Party. The Right deviation leads to the camp of bourgeois liberalism. That is where its roots are. It is obvious that the Party will wage an intransigent struggle against this deviation.

Compare the present plenum with that of last April.

It is clear to all that the right-wing leaders have made a rather clumsy somersault. What did they not talk about at the April Plenum! How many liberal phrases did we not hear from them! How much indulgence for the kulak did they not show in their speeches! Think of all their impermissible attacks on the Party, and how impotent they are now! Here are a couple of illustrations:

I will cite a typical passage from Bukharin's speech at the April Plenum of the C.C. He then tried very zealously to sling mud at practically every one of us sinners, and then to "reduce us to a common denominator." And this is how he summed us up:

"Thus, what was preached by Comrade Pyatakov and the whole Trotskyist opposition, what Comrade Mikoyan criticised as backing

Thermidor, what he called a plan for capitalist development, is now preached in a still sharper form by Comrade Stalin, and elaborated with particular genius by Comrade Kuibyshev and a number of other comrades. And what is all this from the standpoint of our fight against Trotskyism? *It is a complete ideological capitulation before Trotskyism.*" (The italics all by Comrade Bukharin.—V.M.)

After that "remarkable" appreciation, the most "talented"—and at any rate the most stubborn—of the Bukharinites, Comrade Rozit, exclaimed "Hear, hear!"

Thus, the theoretician of the Rights, Comrade Bukharin, could find nothing better to do at the April Plenum than to accuse the C.C. of "*complete ideological capitulation before the Trotskyites.*" Yet it would seem that after the C.C.'s having completely "capitulated" before the Trotskyites, the right-wing leaders now inform us that "differences are removed." This means, I suppose, that Bukharin and his friends now also intend embracing Trotskyism?!

HONEST ADMISSION OF ERRORS NECESSARY.

If the authors of yesterday's document are the least bit serious in declaring that "differences are removed," will they not endeavour to draw from these declarations even the most elementary conclusions? If so, they will have to delete their speeches at the April Plenum, and not only those speeches. They will have to delete all their liberal declarations and abortive documents. By such an honest admission of their errors they will be able to work in the Party no worse than many of us. But they will have to approach the main problems of Party policy in a principled manner, like proper bolsheviks, and renounce all their semi-liberal, semi-Trotskyist right-wing talk, borrowed from somebody else's ideological wardrobe. Then the differences will really be removed, and we shall all be working on the same basis.

At that same April Plenum Comrade Uglanov made a speech which he had much better have left unsaid. He went as far as saying that "we use pressure and not policy in legislation and leadership." And what now? Are "differences removed" also?

Until he clearly admits his errors, particu-

larly at the April Plenum of the C.C., we shall not be clear on the main question—whether he remains in his former erroneous position or whether he has left it. The greater the clarity on such questions the better, for it is not a personal question but one of principle, not a minor but a fundamental question. We must obtain absolute clarity on such questions.

We must tell the Right leaders of their most serious transgression. It is a sin common to all oppositions which are up against the bolshevik Party. It consists in *lack of faith in the strength of the proletariat*. This is registered in their last document, when they say :

“ We made a somewhat erroneous estimation of the powerful levers of influence over the countryside, which were rather obscured by the negative sides of the extraordinary measures.”

You were compelled to admit that you “ under-estimated ” the forces of the working class. This is called, in no matter what language, lack of faith in the forces of the proletariat, lack of faith in the forces of the revolution.

In opposing the leaders of the Right deviation at the April Plenum, we tried in every way to convince them that the working class has tremendous possibilities for a decisive advance on the capitalistic elements, and should pull together in developing it. The main arguments against the Rights were about the class changes taking place in the country, the changing relation of class forces, and, in connection therewith, the necessity to exert more pressure on the kulaks, to intensify the organisation of the poor peasants, to rally the poor and middle-peasant masses around the Party and soviets on the basis of a strengthened productive alliance with the working class. Our special advantage now is that the line of the Bukharin opposition is refuted by the actual facts, has been shattered by practical experience.

MISREPRESENTATION CHARGED.

An attempt was made in the document to accuse our press of having incorrectly interpreted the views of the right-wingers. Mistakes, of course, do happen. They cannot be avoided in practical work. Comrade Rykov

even thought fit to read out the following passage in his declaration :

“ We are bound to state that the system of views put forward in the newspapers and journals (they talk of *the* newspapers and journals, as though it were almost on a world scale!—V.M.), supposedly as being ours, has *nothing in common* with our real views.” (Italics by the authors.—V.M.)

If one were to believe this ill-fated document, it would appear that *all* the newspapers and journals that criticised the right-wingers were incorrect. But, you see, Comrades Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsy are so self-assured of their innocence. That, however, is ridiculous.

For what of the decision of the April Plenum of the C.C.? Does this decision exist, or is that also merely one of the articles in the “ newspapers and journals ” alluded to?

And what about the decision of the Plenum of the E.C.C.I. *re* Comrade Bukharin? One cannot relegate that decision also to the category of articles in “ newspapers and journals ”?

It remains for me to recall that the Plenum of the E.C.C.I. unanimously passed the resolution concerning Comrade Bukharin, and that the Central Committees of all Communist Parties unanimously supported this decision. It would thus seem that the right-wing leaders are people of genius who have not been properly understood. They may console themselves like that, but no one will believe them! No grounds at all are adduced whereby we should doubt that the newspapers and journals have, on the whole, fulfilled their duty of explaining the ideology of the right wing as being foreign to bolshevism.

Now we must recall what the Plenum of the E.C.C.I. stated in the main resolution on the question of the Rights and conciliators. I wonder if comrades remember the following passage from the resolution of the Tenth Plenum, E.C.C.I. I will read it out :

“ The Plenum of the E.C.C.I. considers it incompatible with membership of the Communist Party that any of its individual members defend the views of the Right deviation, which is condemned by the Comintern as being an anti-communist tendency and profoundly

hostile to the interests of the proletarian revolutionary movement.

"At the same time, the Plenum declares that the tendency of conciliation, which has come out as a timorous opportunism and conceals an openly liquidatory tendency, has recently, on all the main questions of the communist movement, drifted into a right-wing position, and assumed the rôle of the right-wingers inside the Comintern. After the exclusion of right-wing liquidators, it has become the centre of attraction of all right-wing elements in the ranks of the Communist Parties, the mouthpiece of all defeatist sentiments and opportunist views. In view of this, the Plenum of the E.C.C.I. demands: (a) that the conciliators openly and decisively disassociate themselves from the right-wing deviators; (b) that they conduct an active fight, not merely by words but by deeds, against the right deviation; (c) that they unequivocally adhere to all decisions of the Comintern and its sections, and actively put them into operation. The non-fulfilment of any of these conditions places the infringer outside the ranks of the Comintern."

The right-wing leaders should pay greater attention to what the Plenum of the E.C.C.I. said concerning the Rights and conciliators.

The present Plenum is meeting more than six months after the decision of the April Plenum condemning the views of Comrades Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky. It also takes place after the decision of the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., which removed Comrade Bukharin from the Presidium of the E.C.C.I., and also condemned his Right views. In spite of this, the right-wing leaders have up to now (to put it mildly) badly understood and obviously underestimated these decisions. Such an attitude towards the higher organs of the communist movement is quite impermissible.

It must be said that even in the practical work of the C.C. the question of the right-wingers has acquired an acute significance. For example, in a number of practical tasks the C.C. has not been able recently to utilise those comrades who have followed the path of the Right deviation.

RIGHT DEVIATORS CANNOT BE ENTRUSTED WITH RESPONSIBLE WORK.

Ask yourselves this question: Could we, during recent months, the most difficult months in the grain collecting campaign, have sent any of the right-wing deviators into the localities as C.C. representatives for the grain collection? We could not. And the Polit. Bureau did not do so. The C.C. was unable to bestow the honour of such a commission upon the Right deviators. The C.C. could not trust the Right deviators with the execution of the most responsible commission in connection with the grain collection, as it considered that they were neither desirous nor capable of carrying out what the Party wanted, and exactly what was required in the interests of the cause. In fact, they themselves did not ask to be sent on such commissions. I remember, however, that at the beginning of last year (1928—Trans.) Comrade Uglanov did some good work in connection with the grain collection in the Volga region. He had not then slid over to the Bukharin position. This year, in so far as he has not dissociated himself from this position, the question of commissioning Comrade Uglanov for the grain campaign has not arisen. I do not think that anyone among, say, the Ukranian, Ural, or Siberian comrades would consider the despatch of a Right deviator as C.C. representative for the grain collection as being of real assistance.

A further example:

In Comintern questions the right-wing leaders have more than once played into the hands of the opportunists and renegades in the foreign Communist Parties. The Bukharin group has afforded certain casual passengers in the communist movement abroad sufficient cause to expect help from the group in this respect. The impudence of the anti-Comintern attacks on the part of right-wing renegades in Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, Sweden, and in other Parties has in no small degree been encouraged by the struggle of the Bukharin group against our party. Ideologically, these elements have been nurtured from the muddy spring of the theory of "organised capitalism," a theory one of the varieties of which is Bukharin's views on the "organised economic disorder" in capitalist countries.

Such are the facts. Sufficient for the time being about the Rights.

Let us now turn to the Lefts.

MACHINATIONS OF THE LEFTS.

There are some new documents of the Trotskyites which were only received by the C.C. at the end of October. From these documents Comrades Shatzkin, Kostrov, Averbach and others were able to see, among other things, that Trotsky attached special importance to the question of influence over the youth and the Y.C.L. organisation. Among Trotsky's instructions there is this special direction :

"It is exceptionally important to be kept informed as to what is going on in the Young Communist League, particularly at its headquarters, in the editorial of the 'Y.C.L. Pravda,' etc. A good group should be appointed for this work. . . ." etc.

From this it is clear how carefully we must examine the apparatus of such organs as the "Y.C.L. Pravda." It is true the "Y.C.L. Pravda," in spite of a number of failures and gross errors, in certain cases has been of excellent assistance in extending self-criticism. But we must nevertheless seriously take into account the existence of Trotsky's instruction for the sending of a "group" for work in the Y.C.L. organisations. We must cleanse all our organisations, particularly the Y.C.L., from any remnants of these counter-revolutionary "groups."

But of particular importance is the document featuring Kamenev. I am alluding to the document containing a written note of a conversation between Kamenev and two Trotskyites (known under the initials "K" and "P").* The conversation took place on September 22nd, 1928—i.e., after Kamenev was accepted into the Party again, and had had an opportunity to "open out his heart" to Bukharin.

The interview of the Trotskyites K. and P. with Comrade Kamenev is reported in the "notes" as follows :

"In a one-and-a-half hour speech, L.B.

* It is now ascertained that "K" and "P" are none other than the Trotskyist Kaplinsky, who was recently re-admitted to the Party, and Pereverzev, who still remains in the camp of the Trotskyites.—V.M.

(Kamenev), by means of answers to leading questions and explanations on the questions, gave the following estimation of the position in the country : The country, while economically growing, will enter, after four harvests, a more *acute economic crisis*. The condition of the grain collections is an indication that *the crisis situation will not be overcome by the measures undertaken.*"†

Such was the general estimation of the economic position, according to Kamenev, in September of last year.

Further on Kamenev's view is given concerning the extraordinary measures. Do you think he is in favour of these measures? No; he is opposed. Kamenev states :

"The extraordinary measures of last year were carried out foolishly, and affected a considerable section of the middle peasant elements and even poor peasants. . . ."

"If the Government and Party were to bring up the question of once more applying the extraordinary measures, one can say with certainty that *these measures would not be supported by the poor peasant section of the countryside.*"

Kamenev is evidently awfully well acquainted with the poor peasants!

THE REAL SUBSTANCE OF KAMENEV'S ATTITUDE.

After that Kamenev comes to what we might call the main substance of the matter. He proclaims :

"The leadership has brought the country to such a state that *there are no longer any measures of an economic nature capable of bringing the country out of the crisis* by its own resources. The renewed application of the extraordinary measures at the present time would be a most tremendous mistake, would create a situation in which the peasant population might adopt undesirable methods of fighting for grain."

We are now also well acquainted with these "undesirable methods of fighting for grain." It would seem that now nobody is able to deny the fact of mass collectivisation.

But I will read to the end the extract typifying the substance of Kamenev's political "plan" :

† Italics in this and subsequent quotations from the "Notes" are mine.—V.M.

"The only possible measures at the present moment are measures of a political nature—i.e., a change of leadership, adjustment of the line in the direction of greater class distinction, and the working out of a number of measures to be operated over a long period, for the political mobilisation of the masses and their activation."

Of course, all the verbiage at the end of the end of the quotation I have cited—about "mobilisation of the masses," "their activation," etc.—all that is for the sake of fine words. Actually, the substance of Comrade Kamenev's views in September of last year, as seen in this extract, looks extremely dim—as dim as those of a real bourgeois liberal. In his declamation about the need for new measures of a "political nature" one cannot help but discern a call for the scrapping of the Party policy and a masked tendency towards bourgeois democracy.

After that it is easy to understand what is stated in the "notes" about Kamenev's attitude to Trotsky. This is what the document literally says about this:

"Further, L.B. (Kamenev) stated that the estimation of the July Plenum of the C.C. given by L.D. (Trotsky) was absolutely true."

This means that in returning into the Bolshevik Party Comrade Kamenev argues like a Trotskyite, not like a bolshevik. (Someone just exclaimed: "as a young Party member"! Yes, like a young Party member, if you reckon "according to the new style.")

I must read one or two more things from this curious document. How can one pass over, for example, what Comrade Kamenev, according to K. and P., considered to be the way out of the situation that prevailed. This is what the "notes" say on that matter:

"L.B. (Kamenev) considers the way out of this situation is to join the Party and gradually occupy responsible soviet and trade union posts."

What is written is, in my opinion, quite clear, and needs no comments.

Judging by what is written in those "notes," even after re-entering the Party Kamenev remains ever ready to hit back. The following are the exact words in the notes:

"The crisis is maturing, and when it

reaches a definite limit we will speak about it, we will inform the Party and the working class. At the present time, however, we must take steps in order to work together."

From a subsequent note of the conversation it is evident that Kamenev had no intention of breaking with the Trotskyites.

Comrade Zharov, who was present at the conversation (and who is also a former Trotskyite from Leningrad) could find nothing better to do than embolden the Trotskyites:

"Zharov, who was present, remarked that there were already cases of some of their supporters having even been put on to the bureaux of Party nuclei, which proves the vitality of our views in the Party."

I think it does prove something, but by no means what Zharov was thinking. It proves that some of our Party organisations have too much confidence in former Trotskyites.

KAMENEV ON TROTSKY.

On September 22nd Kamenev said things about Trotsky that were not at all clever. The "notes" record:

"Kamenev also said that L.D. (Trotsky) should now issue a document in which he should say: 'Call us back and we will work together.'

"But L.D. (Trotsky) is a stubborn man; he will not do that, but will sit in Alma-Ata until such time as they send a special train for him. By the time they send this train the position in the country will be such that Kerensky will already be standing on the threshold!"

I will read further Kamenev's opinion on the Trotsky opposition. Kamenev told the Trotskyites who visited him:

"One has to regret that a rupture took place. Experience has confirmed the whole position of the opposition. The diagnosis presented by the opposition is absolutely correct."

Consequently, Kamenev remained a Trotskyite even after returning to the Bolshevik Party. At any rate this is shown by the whole of his interview with the Trotskyites in September of last year.

I have not read the whole document, but what you have heard is quite enough. Com-

rade Bukharin, as is known, ran to Comrade Kamenev, but nothing came of his *bloc* with the latter. Kamenev remained Kamenev, and after returning to the Party drew towards Trotsky. That is a lesson for us. I think that the leading organs and the whole Party cannot overlook that document.

There may certainly be various differences in the Party which must be overcome, but the document cited does not concern various differences but the open support of the Trotskyite struggle against the Party. These conversations of Kamenev with the Trotskyites cannot be considered anything other than support of the Party's enemies. They are Trotskyite machinations behind the back of the Party.

But, apart from that, we must pay closer attention to the essence of Kamenev's political views, as expounded in these "notes." Characteristic is Comrade Kamenev's statement that, in view of the crisis, economic measures are inadequate, and that the way out lies in "measures of a political nature." Thus there protrude from these words the ears of "neo-nep," the ears of an advocate of "political nep," the ears of the prophet of bourgeois democracy, the ears of a bourgeois liberal! The meaning of Kamenev's arguments is clear: to scotch the policy of extending the advance on capitalist elements. Such is their real meaning: and that is just what the liberal bourgeois of all kinds are dreaming about.

RIGHT AND LEFT ALIKE HAMPER
REVOLUTIONARY ADVANCE.

We must now draw one general conclusion. This conclusion concerns both Rights and Lefts together. Indeed, both the one and the other lead towards the same result. Under conditions of sharpened class struggle, when the working class has commenced a radical transformation of the country's economics, uprooting capitalism from its deepest stronghold, the countryside—under these conditions both Right and Left opportunist deviations in the execution of the general bolshevik line lead to the same thing. They lead to a breakdown of the offensive, and in practice amount to capitulation before the increased counter-attacks of the class enemy. We must treat

statements about agreement with the general Party line with equal mistrust, whether they come from Bukharin and his supporters or from Kamenev and his political friends—unless they are reinforced by unconditional support of the Party policy in actual practice.

We are now passing through one of the most important and most responsible periods of the revolution. A *turning point* has arrived in a decisive matter, in the socialist reconstruction of agriculture. A considerable section of the poor peasantry has been drawn into the collective farm movement. Every day we witness more and more new successes in this direction. But it is particularly important now to note the fact that Comrade Stalin so plainly emphasised in "Pravda," in the article for the twelfth anniversary of the October Revolution. That fact is that the *middle peasants* are beginning to move into the collective farms. That is one of the most important results of the recent period.

Since the middle peasantry began entering the channel of the collective farm movement there has commenced a new period in our revolution, a period of tremendous international significance. This change in the feelings of the middle peasantry means a great deal. This turning point means that we will now receive from the wide masses of the peasantry trust not merely in the elemental foundations of soviet policy in general, as a policy defending the interests of the toiling masses, but confidence in soviet policy as a *policy of socialism*. The change in the mood of the middle peasantry marks a turning point in their attitude towards socialism, towards the reconstruction of the countryside on a socialist basis. Henceforth the ideas of socialism will begin to reach the genuine poor and middle peasant masses of the villages. Class-consciousness in the struggle for socialism has already penetrated profoundly among the working masses during the first years of the soviet régime. Now this consciousness is really beginning to take hold of the peasant masses. However many difficulties we still have to overcome on this path, however lengthy our work in elucidating the tasks of constructing socialism in the countryside (and

even in the towns), we have now emerged on to the broad road of the socialist transformation of the *entire* economic system, the broad road of socialist production, not only in the towns but in the countryside also.

A TURNING POINT.

Even formerly we were aware that, in spite of all waverings, the broad masses of peasants had tremendous faith in the basis of soviet policy; but until recently these foundations of soviet policy had not been properly revealed to the millions of toilers in the countryside. Now a turning point has come in this respect, and it is a great victory for the working class and the Party. This move among the peasant masses is of tremendous importance in strengthening the foundations of socialism in our country. It will add great force to the growth of the international significance of the U.S.S.R. and its rôle in the revolutionary overthrow of world capitalism.

Under these conditions opportunist vacillations must be dealt a concerted rebuff. The Party has always administered such a rebuff, and must now give both Right and Left opportunists a real knock-out blow.

The leaders of the Right presented us with a

document about which enough has been said here. It is a document of falsity, hypocrisy, and double-dealing. It cannot satisfy anyone in the Party. It is not a document announcing the calling-off of the anti-Party struggle, but a document for continuing this struggle. The Plenum has to draw its conclusions therefrom.

The April Plenum not only condemned the views of the right-wing leaders, it gave them a warning. After that the E.C.C.I. had its say. Now we must carry out the necessary measures of an organisational nature in order to relieve the Party general staff of incorrigible Right deviators. It is necessary in the interests of the revolutionary cause, in the interests of the Party. To all those who have admitted their errors of principle the Party has always afforded an opportunity to take active part in the common work; but those who yet flounder on the main questions of policy and who continue to entangle the legs of the working class while the latter is leading the advance on its class enemies—these must be shown their place by the Central Committee.

The Party forms its troops not of the rotten opportunist elements but of the close ranks of fighters for the proletarian revolution.

The Brandlerites and the U.S.S.R.

By G. Valetsky

THE German and some of the other right-wing renegades, when raising their banner of revolt against the Comintern and the "aggression of Moscow," have put forward the slogan of "independence" for "Western" communism from the "internal" questions of the C.P.S.U., "neutrality" towards the ideological struggle that has taken place within its ranks. They have protested against the "mechanical transference of internal Russian disputes" into other sections of the Comintern, asserting that the "tendencies" arising in these sections have nothing in common with the questions troubling the C.P.S.U. At the same time, they have sworn their unshakable devotion to the "Russian Revolution," and solemnly declared their permanent readiness

in every way to defend the U.S.S.R. from its enemies.

The hypocrisy of this position was clear from the very start. "Neutrality" towards "disputable Russian" questions—*i.e.*, towards questions the deciding of which is closely bound up with the fate of the revolution and of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, such a neutrality can mean nothing else but—at the best—unfriendliness and flat indifference to the destinies of the revolution. The hypocrisy of these statements is already exposed by the fact that the supposed "neutrality" has not prevented these opportunists from demonstrating their sympathy for all and sundry opposition groupings in the U.S.S.R.—not only for their own kin, the right-wingers

and conciliators, but even for the "left" counter-revolutionary Trotskyite plotters. Moreover, the theory of hypocritical "neutrality" in regard to the C.P.S.U. has been accompanied by accusations against the Comintern of having split, "by order of Moscow," the Communist and in general the working-class (trade union) movement in the capitalist countries. By such accusations they hinder the real defence of the U.S.S.R. and the revolution. In fact, this "neutrality" amounts to a repetition of what the leaders—particularly the "Left" wingers—of the Second International have been shouting for more than a decade.

The practice of the right-wing renegades has wholly confirmed the fact that in leaving the Comintern, despite their assertions and vows, they have in reality gone over to the camp of the enemies of the Soviet Union. Already on the eve of August 1st, 1929, at the very moment when the counter-revolutionary Nanking Government, at the instigation of the imperialist powers, opened war against the U.S.S.R. by seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Right renegades of all countries, led by the Germans, openly sabotaged the anti-war demonstrations, protesting, in concert with the whole Second International, against the ridiculous exaggeration of the supposed war danger" on the part of the Comintern.

RIGHTS AND THE ANTI-SOVIET "CRUSADE."

But the real anti-Soviet nature of the right renegacy has shown itself clearest of all recently, when the hurricane of anti-soviet slander has raged in all capitalist countries.

Of course, as the Right renegades still appear before the workers with the title of "communists," they do not *openly* participate in this slander. But they contrive, in their daily press in Leipzig (*Arbeiterpolitik*) and Stockholm (*Politiken*), destined for mass circulation, to keep silent, not to pass an opinion, to observe "neutrality," and confine themselves to printing slanderous official telegrams, supplied with more or less ironical headings.

In the weekly organ of the Brandlerites, *Gegen den Strom* ("Against the Cur-

rent") for the whole of the current year, since January 1st, there has only been one little article devoted to the U.S.S.R. This editorial, on the fourth page of the issue for February 22nd, 1930, under the calm objective heading, *The Economic Situation in the U.S.S.R.*, so well characterises the false "neutrality" of these people and the real hostility that clumsily emerges, that it is worth while to deal with it in detail.

The article starts by recording the "lagging behind of important branches of industry" in the first quarter of 1929-30. To this is added: "It would be erroneous to draw from this fact the conclusion that the Five-Year Plan has already (!) collapsed." The Brandlerite who wrote this did not mention a word that this "lagging behind" took place not as regards the Five-Year Plan, but in respect of the control figures for 1929-30, which considerably surpass the figures originally fixed for the second year of the Five-Year Plan. Maliciously observing that in the Soviet Union the plans "rarely are carried out as planned," he of course does not point out that the achievements of the first year of the Five-Year Plan considerably outstepped the plan fixed. In the light of these not accidental omissions on the part of an evidently well-informed author, one can evaluate his pretendedly "optimistic" observation that it would be "premature" to deduce the "collapse of the Five-Year Plan."

Going on to give an "objective" exposition of the progress of the collectivisation of agriculture, the author ends: "The fight for collectivisation is proceeding. Its outcome is not yet decided. But there cannot be any doubt that this economic battle of the revolution for the destiny of a hundred million peasants has world-historical significance."

That is all. That is literally all that these people, impudently calling themselves "communists," have to say to the workers at a time when all the dark forces of the capitalist world are preparing a crusade against the Soviet Union, which is absorbed in the gigantic labour of socialist construction.

"The Five-Year Plan has not *yet* collapsed." "The outcome of the fight for collectivisation is not *yet* decided." "But

there cannot be any doubt . . . it has world-historical significance." The same thing is written word for word, letter for letter, by the "Left" social-democrats like Otto Bauer, the Vienna "Arbeiterzeitung," and "Leipziger Volkszeitung," who, in face of the wild hue and cry against the Soviet Union and the feverish preparations for intervention, act as "benevolent observers."

DENYING THE WAR DANGER.

That is all that the Right renegades of the Brandler species have said *directly* about socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. But one must give them their due: *indirectly*, they have said a good deal more!

They have chosen the present moment in order once more to decry the Comintern for "howling about an allegedly existing war danger." For this they have used the pen of the "world political expert" attached to their court—the super-renegade Roy.

In an article, *The World Situation (Gegen den Strom*, January 25th, 1930), he praises the "radical change in the foreign policy of the British bourgeoisie." Its decision to "liquidate the war feeling in Europe." At the same time, this "radical change" is defined by Roy as, incidentally, "the failure of the attempts of the imperialist powers to overcome their mutual rivalry in order to form a united front against the U.S.S.R." Roy goes on to assert that "the internal and external contradictions of world capitalism compel

America to maintain a policy of peace towards the U.S.S.R.," and concludes: "The policy of the present leaders of the Comintern to represent that there is an acute war danger among the imperialist powers, and particularly against the U.S.S.R., proves they are incapable of understanding the main factors of the world situation. . . ."

This pacifist twaddle—again lifted word for word from the "Left" social-democrats—is an attempt to lull the watchfulness of the working masses in regard to the most real danger of military intervention against the U.S.S.R., which is growing more acute every day. This talk, accompanied as it is by open appeals to the workers "not to come out on to the streets on every little (!) pretext," exposes the real rôle of the entire Right renegacy in the capitalist countries. From behind the phrases about "neutrality" in "Russian disputes," from behind the "objective" wait-and-see presentation of the tremendous fight for socialist construction in the U.S.S.R., from behind the pacifist make-up, there protrudes the dirty face of the worst agent of the class enemy. In the measure that the external imperialist contradictions become more acute, and the internal class struggle in the capitalist countries more intense; in the measure that the capitalist world, shaken by a world economic crisis, grows more actively hostile to the stronghold of socialism being created in the Soviet Union—so the honest workers who may still follow the Right renegade leaders will break away from them in disgust.

From Gussev's Speech in the German Commission of the Enlarged Presidium, E.C.C.I.

COMRADES, I think the experience of hearing reports at the Presidium of the Comintern has fully justified itself. We have heard the reports of the British and Italian Communist Parties and then that of the German Party. From the first two it is evident that with the aid of such reports it is

possible for us to submit to careful and thorough discussion certain fundamental questions concerning the respective Parties. Hitherto we have not had such discussions in the Comintern.

This experience demonstrates in practice the change in the work of the Comintern and its

sections which Comrade Molotov alluded to in a private conversation.

This change consists in our having passed on from the period of agitation and propaganda, from the period when the Party was working out its main strategic plans, was establishing a correct political line in the struggle against Right and Left deviations and collecting its forces. From such a period we have passed on to one where the Party is called upon to lead mass actions, a period when these mass actions in the form of economic strikes, political demonstrations, etc., represent a school in which wide sections of the proletariat are trained and prepared for the coming combats.

Of course, such a division into periods always suffers from a certain amount of artificiality. Formerly also the Party led proletarian actions. That is not the question. The question is what main form of work is most characteristic for the Party in the previous and in the present period. In the main we have completed the period of gathering forces, though this still goes on and will continue to do so. The leadership of mass actions, the training of the advanced sections in such mass actions, has now become the prevailing form of work in all sections of the Comintern.

In that sense, I consider that the report of the German Communist Party is the most important and decisive of the three reports we have heard at the Presidium. The British Communist Party was not able to show us what are the forms and methods of leading mass actions, as the Party is not leading any such actions. The Italian Party, which is illegal, has also not been able to bring any experience of the mass movement. The only experience in that respect at the session of the Presidium was presented by the German section of the Comintern. But that is not the only reason why the report of the German C.C. is the most important. It is also important because the German Communist Party, along with the C.P.S.U., comprises the chief force of the Comintern, or, if one can put it that way, is the backbone of the Comintern. The successes of the German C.P. have above all been expressed in the fact that the Party has made a big step forward in the struggle to win the majority of the working class, a

big step forward in extending its political influence. These successes are particularly valuable in that they provide fine examples of the change from the agitational propaganda period to the period when the leadership of mass actions becomes the main task of the Party.

C.P.G. MARCHING AHEAD.

The Communist Party of Germany began to effect this change earlier than other sections of the Comintern and is marching ahead of other sections. In the struggle against social-fascism, the Communist Party of Germany has organised a number of mass actions, political demonstrations, economic strikes and a wide campaign in defence of the unemployed. Such are the most important forms of mass action of which the German C.P. has assumed leadership. The big successes of the C.P.G. in organising the revolutionary trade union opposition, based on a mass campaign, shows a considerable step forward in the organisational strengthening of its political influence among the masses. Furthermore, these successes demonstrate—along with the committees of struggle (to recall the brilliant experience of the Ruhr) and the corps of revolutionary delegates—new specimens of organs for the leadership of mass actions. I therefore think we should study the German experience in a most attentive manner, so as to extend it to other sections of the Comintern. So far we have only been concerned with leadership of economic strikes and political demonstrations, which up to now, only represent the commencement of wide political mass actions. Matters are approaching the mass political strike. I think the most significant indication of this is the strike at the Opel works, which was an example of the mass political strike, and, at the same time revealed the greatly increased influence of the Communist Party among the working masses.

But although this revolutionary workers' movement in Germany is, as yet, only just beginning to approach the new and higher form of struggle—the mass political strike, nevertheless, the whole situation in Germany goes to show that a rapid maturing of the elements of a revolutionary wave is taking place there. There are many symptoms illustrating this.

Not only revolutionary mobilisation among the working masses, not only the mass actions of the workers in strikes and political demonstrations, not only the unemployed movement—but also the very significant changes, realignments, regroupings and redistribution of forces that are taking place in the bourgeois camp.

Many facts point to regroupings inside the bourgeois camp, above all, the so-called crisis of the bourgeois parties and the formation of new parties. The old embedded strata of the German bourgeoisie are beginning to loosen, a new stratification of the bourgeoisie is taking place and new parties are being formed. These are not very big; but their significance lies not so much in whether they play an important role, but in the fact that they are symptomatic of the disintegration of the old parties and of regroupings in the bourgeois camp. Two of such parties have recently been formed, of these, the biggest is the National-Conservative Party, under the direction of Treviranus. At the same time we see the almost complete falling to pieces of the Democratic Party, a stable position in the People's Party and the centre (the parties of big capital) and a rapid increase in the strength of the National Fascists.

If we also take into consideration the rapid growth of the Communist Party, and of its influence, it becomes evident that the poles are rapidly widening in Germany—which is also a sign of sharpened contradictions, of increasing elements of revolutionary advance.

We also observe, moreover, a move to the right within the People's Party, as also in the Centre Party, and a sharp swing round in the latter party on the question of war against the U.S.S.R. On that subject there are quite frank statements in the paper *Germania*, which talks almost openly of war against the U.S.S.R.

Included among the changes taking place inside the bourgeois camp is also the rapid fascist evolution of the right and left wing social democracy, as agents of the bourgeoisie within the workers' movements.

TOWARDS FASCIST DICTATORSHIP.

The basic significance of all these regroupings, all these changes, all this new align-

ment of forces, is the consolidation of the bourgeoisie for the establishment of a fascist dictatorship in Germany and for the war against the U.S.S.R.

Besides the reshufflings and regroupings taking place in the bourgeois parties, every day brings us some new facts showing that a consolidation is proceeding in the bourgeois camp which is aimed at a fascist dictatorship in Germany and war against the U.S.S.R.

One might refer, for example, to the Polish German Treaty and the entry of the fascists into the Thüringen Government, which is a step towards fascist collaboration, not merely with other bourgeois parties, but also with the social-fascists. This regrouping inside the bourgeois camp is somewhat complicated in connection with the struggle taking place between Anglo-French and American imperialism. This struggle also finds reflection inside the bourgeois camp in Germany itself. I did not quite understand Comrade Thaelmann's remark in connection with what I said on item 1 on the agenda, concerning Schecht acting as an agent of Morgan, and concerning the attempt of American imperialism to turn Germany into a European stronghold of the United States. I was not clear as to whether Comrade Thaelmann's remark was an objection to what I said or whether it was supplementary. Comrade Thaelmann spoke of the existence in Germany of a tendency towards rapprochement with France. On that question I did not say anything at all. In general, I did not speak of the tendencies existing among the various sections of the German bourgeoisie, in regard to their orientation towards either American or Anglo-French capital. I spoke about a different thing. I spoke of the foreign policy of American imperialism, directed towards transforming Germany into a European outpost of the U.S.A.

But the one thing does not in the slightest degree contradict the other. Both tendencies can exist without hindering one another. A struggle is proceeding between Anglo-French and American imperialism to win Germany, to transform the country into their own stronghold. Connected with this, a struggle is proceeding within Germany also. The distribution of forces is somewhat like this: the representatives of the so-called new heavy industry

i.e., the electrical, chemical and automobile industries, are closely connected with American capital. You know what big captures American capital has made in Germany in these spheres. You know that it has bought up a huge section of these three branches of industry, and thus created a base for itself in Germany. I said that a struggle is proceeding between the representatives of this so-called new heavy industry and the representatives of the old heavy industry, i.e., the mining and mineral ore industries, and metallurgy which tend towards French imperialism. How this struggle will end, who will be the victor in this struggle, whether the U.S.A. will be able to turn Germany into its stronghold or whether the Anglo-French will be able to turn Germany into their stronghold—these are questions which only the future can answer. We will not engage in prophesying, but will merely record the facts of the struggle. Therefore, I consider that Comrade Thaelmann's remark cannot represent an objection to what I said, but can only be supplementary; and, incidentally, is a supplement which in turn needs supplementing.

This process of struggle within the German bourgeoisie, as I have already said, somewhat changes the main regrouping which is taking place in connection with the growth of the revolutionary movement in Germany, and in connection with the successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R.

MOVEMENTS OF PROLETARIAN FORCES.

In the proletarian camp a movement of forces is also taking place. Put briefly, this consists in a considerable section of the workers abandoning social-democracy, while at the same time the influence of the Communist Party is growing rapidly among the working masses. We are thus witnessing a process of shifting camps. Class is lining up against class, and at the same time there is commencing a struggle to gain the intermediary sections. This struggle is extremely important; for it is in this manner that we are confronted with the problem of the hegemony of the proletariat which is the pre-requisite to its dictatorship. The masses are also becoming freed from the pacifist, democratic and parliamentary illusions which had been nourished by the ad-

vent to power of the Müller Government. These illusions are being rapidly evaporated. This, in fact, means freeing the masses from the influence of social-democracy. This process of liberating the masses from social-democratic influence is a destructive process. The process of destroying pacifist, democratic and parliamentary illusions takes less time than it takes for the Communist Party to capture these masses that are leaving social-democracy.

What are the causes of this phenomenon? In the first place it must be emphasized that by no means all the workers who quit social-democracy are capable of coming over to the Communist Party.

A considerable section of the social-democratic workers, while leaving the social-democrats, do not join the Communist Party, and I do not think we want them.

The majority of these will undoubtedly dodge the revolution, just as the menshevik workers dodged it in Russia; or, at the best, together with the petty-bourgeoisie they will waver, first coming on the side of the German Communist Party, then going back to the side of the social-democrats.

In the end they will be on the side of whoever wins. That is the first, and a very important reason why the Communist Party does not embrace all the workers leaving social-democracy. The second reason is a section of the workers are not in the Communist Party as a result of the practical opportunism existing in a certain section of the lower party organs. This section consists of those workers who have already left the social-democrats, already joined our Party, but were not retained inside it, or even as Party supporters. I will recall an experience of the Ruhr. During the Ruhr lockout, if my memory does not deceive me, about 1,000 new members joined the Party in the Ruhr district alone. And where are those members now? According to the organising department of the E.C.C.I. they were not retained in the Party. I think that these workers did not find a response to the demands, or at any rate to all the demands, which they presented to the Party. They did not find everything they were looking for.

I can quite imagine the feeling of non-party, unorganised workers, or even of workers who have recently been in the S.D. Party but are

not yet contaminated by the social-democratic poison, and who have decided to abandon their old party and go over to the Communist, who, in their opinion, have a better policy. But on arriving in our Party, they find that there is little difference between us and the social-democrats, both in the sphere of practical policy and in the work of the lower C.P. organs. There is the same practical opportunism. That is why the workers who are not satisfied with the position in the lower organs begin to leave the Party. That is a very urgent and very important problem. A recruitment of new members is now taking place in the German Party. It is meeting with much success, although according to information received from the Party itself, the majority of recruits are unemployed. This element is very valuable, but nevertheless is not the main basis of our Party.

DRAW NEW MEMBERS INTO PARTY LIFE.

The question of retaining the new Party members is now a task of extreme importance. These new members must be drawn into our lower organs, into the factory cells, the street nuclei, etc.

The recruiting has in the main taken place at open meetings. That is a method of recruiting that can be resorted to, but at the same time it should not be forgotten that the lower Party organisations, particularly the Party cells, should be drawn into this recruiting work, especially into the work of retaining the new members in the Party ranks. Without that, there is no guarantee that after a time a considerable number of these new members will not leave our Party.

The most glaring examples of practical opportunism in the factories are to be observed in the work of the red factory-committees. In practice it has transpired that the factory committees have had no revolutionary programme. That has now been rectified. In the elections to the factory committees that have now commenced, unlike last year's campaign, a programme has already been put forward which sharply distinguishes the red factory committees from the reformist committees. Apart from the main slogan aimed at uniting the employed and the unemployed workers—viz. the 7-hour day—the most important part of the

Programme of Action of the Factory Committees comprises the slogans: Against "economic democracy" and the coalition; Against the Young Plan; Against fascism and social-fascism; Against the preparations for war on the U.S.S.R.; For a united front of the employed and unemployed workers, etc.

The successes that the Party has already registered recently in the elections to the factory committees, show that this year the election campaign may end with incomparably greater success for the Party than was the case last year. At the same time this makes it incumbent upon the Party to give much more attention to the work of the red factory committees, and much bigger forces, than hitherto.

MASSES HOLD PARTY RESPONSIBLE.

The masses now electing the red factory committees will hold the Party responsible for the work of these committees. If elements of practical opportunism are discernable in the work of the factory committees,—and there was no small amount of this in the first committees elected—the Party influence will undoubtedly be somewhat undermined and the confidence of the masses in the Party weakened.

The second sphere of practical opportunism in the factories consists in the cases which have recently taken place in the Berlin organisation at the Siemens, Uhlstein and Loewe factories. In all these cases the cells, or their leading organs, have opposed the Party instructions in connection with the elections to the factory committees, and refused to carry these instructions out.

These cases show that in certain cells the functionaries, in particular, are incapable of making any change in Party work which means a sharp intensification of the fight against the social-democrats in the factories. In the municipal elections these comrades voted for the Communist Party. But it is one thing to participate in municipal elections, and quite another to fight day-by-day for the interests of the workers, to participate in the work of the red factory committees, in the everyday work of the cells, and particularly in such an important stage as the factory committee elections, to fight against the social-democrats in the factories. Here many of the active com-

rades, the functionaries, throw in their hand and even go so far as to sabotage Party decisions. At last years factory committee elections a considerable section of these Party workers opposed the operation of the new tactics. After the May event, the C.C. of the German Communist Party had to record that the lack of success of the mass political strike was to a considerable extent due to the fact that a certain section of the functionaries refused to carry out this slogan in the factories. That is an extremely urgent problem. I will return later on to the question of Party personnel. Now I merely want to point out that the Party, in my opinion, has not made sufficient use of the incidents in the Siemens, Uhlstein and Loewe factories, in order to overcome tendencies of this kind among the functionaries and lower organs of the Party. I think the self-criticism developed by the Party in this affair was inadequate. You will only find a small announcement about this matter in the *Rote Fahne*. In order to illustrate the scope of this self-criticism I will refer to Russian experience, and take merely two cases of self-criticism in the C.P.S.U. The first case is of no little importance and concerns the cell in the State Bank, in which a strong right deviation in practical work was discovered. How did the Moscow organisation act in regard to this deviation? The State Bank cell is one of very considerable dimensions in the general Moscow organisation. It could have been struck off the books with one movement of the hand—in other words, disbanded. We acted in a different way, however. We mobilised the whole Moscow organisation to consider this discovery of a right deviation in the State Bank cell. In all cells of the Moscow organisations reports were made on what had happened in the State Bank cell, and only afterwards, when this question had been discussed in all cells, when it had been politically elucidated for the whole Moscow organisation, only then were appropriate organisational measures taken which helped us to overcome the right deviation in the State Bank cell.

THE CASE OF THE ASTRAKHAN ORGANISATION.

Foreign comrades may be still more astonished at the case of the Astrakhan organisa-

tion. Most comrades know what that case was about. They should also know that we mobilised literally the whole Party, all local organisations, in order to overcome the bad features that had been discovered in the Astrakhan organisation. We were not restrained by any considerations that this self-criticism, this exposure of the offences by a number of Party members who were in Astrakhan, might help the enemy in their fight against us.

I quite realise that for the German Communist Party such wide self-criticism would be difficult, in view of the fact that there is a strong social-democratic Party there, that the enemy is actually inside the workers' camp. It is possible that the German Communist Party could not conduct its self criticism on such a wide basis; but, nevertheless, the extent of criticism undertaken by the Berlin organisation was, in my opinion, totally inadequate. I think that the German C.P. is at any rate sufficiently strong now to criticise itself in front of the enemy. Insufficient self-criticism will lead to our being unable to win quickly enough the workers who are approaching us. The workers will only have complete confidence in the party when they see that the Party ruthlessly criticises its own errors. And for that reason self-criticism is an extremely important element—I would say one of the most important elements—in our winning of those working masses who are beginning to leave the Social Democratic Party.

The third reason whereby the Communist Party does not gain to a sufficient extent the workers leaving social-democracy is the organisational weakness of the Party in face of growing and changing problems.

Take the work of the cell, the factory, or street cell in the German Party. The cell is now confronted with new tasks that did not exist formerly. It is transformed, or at any rate should be transformed, into the lower Party organ in the leadership of mass work. What does that mean? It means that it becomes the organ which organises the mass actions, and leads them.

I spoke at the very commencement about the change in the work of the Comintern and its sections, about the passing from one period to another. Now we see that this change is bound

to find reflection also in the work of the cell. The cell is confronted with new practical tasks in connection with the growth and strengthening of the trade union opposition, in connection with the increased number of red factory committees, in connection with the organisation of the corps of revolutionary delegates. The tasks of the cells are changing, and it is necessary for this to be understood by all active Party workers and all rank-and-file Party members. The cell can no longer continue to work as it has done hitherto.

REVOLUTIONARY DELEGATES.

In connection with this there also arises the question of the corps of revolutionary delegates. We have not had much experience in the organisation of these corps as yet. There are reports about 300 factories, a figure not big enough for Germany. This experience has not yet been studied sufficiently to enable us to come to any definite conclusions. It must be more carefully studied, and all material collected. This institution only exists in the German Party, and, I think, also something of the sort in the Austrian Party, only on a much smaller scale. If we were to succeed in building up the corps of revolutionary delegates in accordance with the wide plans of the Party—viz., actually to elect revolutionary delegates in the shops, at general shop meetings—one delegate from 20 or 30 workers, this institution could play a very big rôle, both as a "driving belt" from the cell and factory committee to the masses, and also as the main skeleton for the trade union opposition and as a reserve for recruiting new members into the Party. Of particular urgency at the present juncture is the question of utilising the corps of revolutionary delegates in order to set up organs of the revolutionary trade union opposition in the factories. The organisational formation of the revolutionary trade union opposition in Germany commenced in a somewhat peculiar manner. They started building it from the top. First a national conference was convened, then they began to convene regional conferences. They started building the structure from the roof, and there is still no proper foundation in the factories. Yet the question of this foundation will become supremely important in the

coming period. When the conferences are finished, what is the next thing to be done with the revolutionary trade union opposition? How are its forces to be further directed? How is it to be organised in the factories?

QUALITY OF PARTY PERSONNEL.

Finally, the fourth reason why the Communist Party is unable to win rapidly enough the workers who are beginning to approach the Party and leave social democracy, lies in the actual composition of the Party—of the Party personnel. Once, in a conversation with German comrades, I had occasion to compare the Party with our soviet militia divisions. As you know, these divisions are constructed in such a way that there is a regular staff, diluted by a so-called changing staff called up for definite periods of training. In time of war these militia divisions will be completed by the changing staffs, and thus transformed into fighting divisions. All comparisons, of course, have their defects, and cannot be fully extended to all aspects of the comparable objects. But at any rate we may consider that in Germany, with the increasing elements of a revolutionary wave, we are right in speaking of the Party as the regular staff of that revolutionary army which will be engaged in the revolutionary fights of the near future.

From this point of view it is thus very important to examine the composition of this regular staff, to review the composition of the Party membership, to see whether it is possible to dilute this regular staff with the hundreds of thousands of workers who, while not joining the Party as members, should nevertheless in practice act as the rank-and-file soldiers of these revolutionary divisions.

I think that in this respect the composition of the German Party is still far from satisfactory. You know, comrades, that there are still in the Party a fairly large number of passive elements, still to a certain extent infected with social-democratic traditions. There is still a fairly large number of elements who will drop out during the coming revolutionary fights. There can be no question here, of course, as to a Party cleansing. The revolutionary fights, better than any cleansing, will purge the Party of these elements. But for the time being,

while the revolutionary struggles are still in process of development, there still exist in the Party a certain section of these insufficiently revolutionary, passive elements, still infected with the remnants of social-democratic traditions. Moreover, they come mainly (it would be incorrect to say exclusively) from among the skilled workers. In that respect there is a substantial difference between the history of the C.P.S.U. and the history of the German C.P. In the C.P.S.U. the skilled workers played a leading rôle. They were the flower of the working class, they were the advanced "intelligentsia" of the working class. We had no labour aristocracy in Russia. The standard of living of the working class was in general so low that only the skilled worker had certain chances of even becoming literate, and under the conditions of Russian Tsarism to become literate already meant a big step forward on the path of revolutionary development.

SKILLED WORKERS IN THE OLD CAPITALIST COUNTRIES.

One need only read the recently published recollections of Lenin by Comrade Ktupskaya to recognise this process of revolutionising the workers by means of evening classes and Sunday schools. That was the first step the skilled worker took in order to become a revolutionary. The position in Germany, and in general in the old capitalist countries, is different. There, skilled workers become the aristocracy, and therefore they were to a certain extent divorced from the unskilled workers and opposed to them. We feel the influence of this factor in the German C.P. in that one still comes across old Party members who have retained the social-democratic prejudices, and these are particularly to be found among skilled workers. The composition of the Party will change, and the Party should adopt a conscious policy of effecting a certain change in the composition, should freshen the membership by drawing in the most revolutionary elements of the German proletariat, above all, the younger generation of workers, the unorganised, the unskilled, the women and the youth. In this connection the task of organising the unorganised becomes of increasing importance. In practice this is done through the trade union opposition, and partly

through the committees of struggle.

This form of organising the unorganised played a tremendous role during the Ruhr conflict.

Lozovsky: "And where did the unorganised get to afterwards?"

Manuilsky: "They became organised."

I do not want to discuss this question with you now, Comrade Lozovsky. We have already discussed it. I merely want to say that this form has receded somewhat into the background, has not developed. After the Ruhr lockout sufficiently energetic attempts were not made anywhere—not even in Germany, to utilise this form. It is natural that now, when the German C.P. is having such tremendous successes in the field of organising the trade union opposition, the committees of struggle have receded somewhat into the background. But I think it would be a mistake if we were to consider that the matter of organising the unorganised could be completed by building up the trade union opposition. The trade union opposition is a permanent organisation, while the committees of struggle are temporary, and capable of reaching incomparably larger masses.

OPPORTUNIST ELEMENTS HINDER RECRUITING.

I will now turn to the question of cadres—i.e., I will continue my comparison with the militia divisions as applied to the question of the lower and middle commanding staff of the Party. I have already said that things are not satisfactory here. The Party itself has frequently emphasised the importance of this question, the Party itself has frequently pointed out that the personnel is clogged with opportunist elements. There are consciously concealed Brandlerites, as has been discovered in Berlin, and also the unconscious Brandlerites, infected with social-democratic habits and traditions. I would not be against a cleansing-out of these elements, but such a cleansing should be linked up with the mass campaigns conducted by the Party. We are now commencing the elections to the factory committees. It seems to me the Party has acted correctly in pointing out that the question of cleansing the ranks of the most opportunistic elements will be decided in the

light of how the various functionaries behave at these elections. The basic test in effecting the cleansing is to examine how the campaign has been carried out—particularly in the fight against the social democrats. The existence of ballast among the Party functionaries is, of course, a considerable obstacle to the recruiting into the Party of workers leaving the social-democrats.

In the sphere of mass agitation, the main task of the German C.P. is now to popularise the political programme of the Party among the masses. The Party has already taken the first steps in this direction, but these steps are still quite inadequate.

Two articles have appeared in *Rote Fahne*. (I do not know whether any other articles have appeared lately, during the session of the Presidium, as I have not been able to keep up with the last few numbers of *Rote Fahne*. Anyway, up to the time of the Presidium meeting two articles appeared.) One article states that the Party wants to take power and can take power—*i.e.*, put the question that in 1917 was put by all bourgeois and socialist parties in Russia.

Lozovsky: "We also put it."

Yes, we also put the question, and it was answered by Lenin in his famous work, *Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?*

There recently appeared in *Vorwärts* a big article precisely on this question, in which it was proved that not only ideologically, but also politically and morally, the Communist Party was incapable of taking power and of maintaining it, and that even physically it was not capable of retaining power in its hands. To this *Rote Fahne* correctly replied that the Party desires to take power, can take power, and is capable of retaining power.

The second *Rote Fahne* article states what the Party will do if power comes into its hands. I would refer comrades to this article and to the programme put forward by Lenin in his work, *The Coming Crisis and How to Deal with it*.

It is totally inadequate, however, to limit the matter to these two articles—or even to two dozen articles. It is not a question of publishing a few articles, but of persistently ramming home to the masses day after day the idea that

the time has now really arrived when we must start thinking of how to emerge from the crisis that Germany is now experiencing, what is the way to lead the German proletariat out of this crisis, what are the forces which can help the workers to deal with this crisis, to rescue them from their unbearable situation.

That is why we must now provide the answer to the question that is on the lips of 3½ million unemployed and their families, is on the lips of those who have had 13½ per cent. wage reductions, and also on the lips of wide sections of the petty-bourgeoisie. All these elements do not see any way out of this position, and a section of the petty-bourgeoisie, and even a section of workers, are already falling into the arms of the national-fascists, who promise them an easy way out of the situation. In the struggle against social-fascism and national-fascism, in preparing the masses for the coming fights, in winning the majority of the working class over to the side of the C.P. (which is the main condition for the widespread development of the struggle)—in all these things the fundamental question of our agitation is the extensive popularisation of our revolutionary programme. We have to tell the masses how the German bolsheviks will cope with the difficulties and what they will do if power is in their hands.

STRATEGY OF TRANSITION TO REVOLUTIONARY COMBATS.

The German Party is now passing through a period when the masses are being rapidly trained and prepared for the coming revolutionary combats in a number of partial economic and political actions. Our enemies are trying to provoke the Communist Party into a premature change over to higher forms of struggle. In this respect there is a very typical article in the paper *Germania*, which knows the whole terminology of the Communist International ("maturing of the revolutionary wave," "direct revolutionary situation"). Our enemies are trying to provoke the Party into premature action at a time when the broad masses are not yet ready for new forms of struggle. In a way, there is also a danger in this respect from the side of the unemployed, as the latter are highly inflammable material,

and with them the adoption of higher forms of struggle is accomplished easily.

Lozovsky : "Not very easily, up to now."

Well, we will see how things go with March 6th. The unemployed are deprived of the economic strike, of the mass political strike, and of the general political strike. They have a very poor choice in the form of struggle. What means have they? The political demonstration and the armed rising. They have no other way. For that reason they will more

easily adopt higher forms of struggle.

The Party did right in stating in *Rote Fahne* that the Party will itself choose the moment for action, and will not be guided by what the enemy wants. It will not react to their provocation. The main thing now is not to start premature combats, but to avoid them, to play for time, while simultaneously assuring the training and preparation of the prolétariat for the coming fights, in the present forms of mass action.