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Discussion on the Report of the Executive

Ernst Meyer:

(Germany)

Comrades, the German delegation is in accord with the policy of the Executive since the III World Congress and with the remarks of Comrade Zinoviev, in the most essential points.

Comrades, the situation described by Comrade Zinoviev has not changed in the main since the time of the III World Congress. We must admit that this situation has not been properly appreciated in all the countries. In some countries it has been analysed in an exaggerated manner and exaggerated deductions were drawn from it, while various other groups (partly also in Germany) refused to recognize the correctness of this analysis altogether. Apart from the mistakes of an opportunist nature, which were frequently made, some comrades' conclusions induced them to advocate a policy of isolation which was tantamount to turning the Communist International into a sect. I believe that the German Party has shown by its attitude and actions since the last World Congress that it is endeavouring to carry out the decisions arrived at in International comradesly deliberations.

The question of the united front, which is occupying our attention at present, and which, according to Comrade Zinoviev's statement, is not to be considered as a mere episode, but as a period of Communist tactics, has been very much discussed in Germany. The only fault I have to find with Comrade Zinoviev's statement is his omission to acknowledge that the discussions and the application of these tactics were greatly furthered by the Berlin Conference. This conference has not only clarified the situation within our Party, but it also helped the Party and the Communist International in persuading the non-Communist workers that the communists were really striving to fight in common with them, and that they were misrepresented by their opponents.

It is self-evident that in the application of these tactics, misunderstandings appeared even among our friends. Comrade Zinoviev has already drawn our attention to several of them. Some comrades outside Germany look upon the United Front tactics in the light of an election agreement with the social-democratic and even bourgeois parties. They consider these tactics as a preliminary to an organic amalgamation, and it is no use denying that such misunderstandings have appeared here and there not only among the non-party workers, but even within our own Party.

Moreover, the fear has been expressed that the negotiations with the reformist leaders, instead of bringing about cooperation among the workers, have only done harm to our cause. On the strength of our experiences during the Rathenau campaign, we can definitely state that in many districts and localities it was only owing to the negotiations and consultations with these leaders that harmonious cooperation and a common struggle were brought about. Some comrades assert that the united front must only rest on an economic basis, and should not be extended to the political field. This is also a wrong conception. Our own ex-

perience has taught us, that in the present situation such a division is entirely out of the question. Comrade Zinoviev was quite right in opposing those (also in the German Party) who are making such a distinction in the struggles which the communists have to carry on.

Apart from the misunderstanding which is likely to crop up, real mistakes have also been made by our Party. These mistakes were quite frankly acknowledged at our Party meetings and in Party resolutions. It is not necessary to discuss these matters again, as this has been done very exhaustively at meetings in the Central Committee and in the Press. I should like only to draw attention to one thing: much as it is to be desired that mistakes should be discussed, in order to avoid them in the future, it must be borne in mind that criticism must not make us forget essentials. For instance, the statement of the Czech comrade concerning the mistakes made during the application of the United Front tactics, is tantamount to rejection of these tactics. If the comrades from the Czech opposition have nothing else to say, not only on the question of breaches of discipline, but also on tactical and practical questions, I am convinced that the comrades on whose behalf the statement was made by the last speaker, will have sat down for the last time at the same table with communists.

There must be elasticity in the application of the United Front tactics. It must be adapted to various phases, and it would be quite wrong to consider it always as negotiations between leaders or between various parties. These united front tactics must take various forms according to the situation and if some comrades consider the attitude of the German party during the Rathenau campaign and during the railway strike as opposed to the factory committee movement, they are labouring under a misunderstanding. The establishment and consolidation of the factory committee movement have resulted from the attitude taken up by the German party since the III World Congress. We should not have a factory committee movement such as the present if we had not consistently applied the united front tactics, thus getting into closer touch with the masses and penetrating into the trade unions and industrial concerns, in a world, wherever the workers congregate.

The amalgamation of the U.S.P. and the SPD. is also a result of the improved tactics of the Party by getting rid of misunderstandings, which were the result of a previous and quite different situation and by making it more difficult for the hostile organizations of the S.P.D. and the U.S.P. This is a great step forward for us, in as much as it does away with the illusion that there is room for another intermediate organization between the reformist and communist parties within one country.

The most difficult question which we had to solve in connection with the United Front tactics—(and which we have probably not yet solved)—is the question of the Workers Government. We must differentiate between social democratic governments and Workers Governments. We have social democratic governments in Germany—in Saxony, Thuringia and formerly

also in Gotha—governments which we had to support but which have nothing in common with what we understand by Workers Government. If we desire that the International should support the idea of the Workers Government and if we wish that this watchword should be adopted by the brother parties which are working approximately under similar conditions to ours, this does not mean that we expect them to aim at the establishment of social democratic governments and to participate in them, but merely that they should struggle for Workers Governments, thus making our struggle easier. The chief difference between a Workers and a social democratic government is—that the former without bearing the label of a socialist policy is really putting socialist-communist policy into practice. Thus, the workers' government will not be based on parliamentary action alone; it will have to be based on the support of the wide masses, and its policy will be fundamentally different from that of the social democratic governments such as those existing in some of the states of Germany.

This gives rise to the following question which was already outlined by Comrade Zinoviev; is the workers' government a necessary phase of the labor movement in the various countries? Our answer to this is: no, it is not an inevitable, but a historically probable phase of the labor movement. It is quite possible that such workers' governments will be established and will be able to hold out for a certain period. This is also an answer to the second question: can a workers' government be of long duration, or will it be only very transitory? In order to answer this question satisfactorily one must have a clear idea of what constitutes a workers' government, and whether there is any difference between a workers' government and the dictatorship of the proletariat. To-day Comrade Zinoviev made this distinction between a workers' government and proletarian dictatorship. This was never made quite clear before when this question was discussed. We find the following statement by Comrade Zinoviev on page 123 of the report on the session of the Enlarged Executive:

"The workers' government is the same as the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is a pseudonym for Soviet Government. It is more suitable for the ordinary working man, and we will therefore use it."

According to our conception this is wrong. The workers' government is not the dictatorship of the proletariat; it is only a watchword which we bring forward, in order to win over the workers and to convince them that the proletarian class must form a United Front in its struggle against the bourgeoisie. Should this watchword be followed or adopted by the majority of the working class, and should the latter take up the struggle for this aim in good earnest, it will soon become evident that the attempt to bring about this workers government (at least in most countries with a big proletarian population) will lead either directly to the dictatorship of the proletariat or to a prolonged phase of very acute class struggles, namely, to civil war in all its forms.

In that respect we consider the slogan of the workers government as necessary and useful to winning over the masses. It will lead to a sharper class conflict from which the Proletarian Dictatorship will finally arise.

In conclusion, I wish to say that the German Party however fruitful it may have been, has been hampered by the lack of understanding of our problems shown by our brother parties. In our discussion of the workers government and the United Front we have found our work of agitation hampered by the remarks of the Party Press and of the French Party. We may say here that there are no questions today which may be solved on a national basis. All problems are directly dependent for their solution upon the action and the propaganda of our brother parties. The consciousness of the International effect of any party's actions must be insisted upon. True International discipline does not consist only in the union of all members through a central bureau, or in the execution of the resolutions adopted at our International Congresses; international discipline and international solidarity demand that every party understand its brother parties and realize the effects of its own activity upon the other parties. Some time ago we attempted to reach an agreement with our French comrades especially on the question of the Versailles Treaty. The Conference of Cologne was called primarily for that purpose. Our French comrades have helped us in the solution of this question, but we must say that the crisis of the French Party has greatly hindered the execution of our agreements at Cologne. We urgently insist here of the solution of the French question not only in the interest of our French comrades, but in our own as well. It seems to us that the Third Congress did not take up this question seriously enough, and that the International had too long delayed its solution. But it would be a mistake if after recognizing our errors, we did not limit our disciplinary measures, after a final solution of the principles, to a minimum.

Murphy:

(England)

Comrades! With the main line of the Executive Committee's Report, our Party is in entire agreement. So also do we agree that the diagnosis of the condition of Capitalism throughout the world is correct. We appreciate the fact that the offensive of Capitalism today against the working class is not the offensive of a class which is confident of its power, but an offensive started as the only means of defence. Probably there is no country in the world where this offensive has been more cleverly conducted than in Great Britain. But in spite of the attempts, in spite of the cleverness of the capitalists there, they have still proved totally incapable of tackling their own fundamental problems. At this moment we have just witnessed the fall of Lloyd George. The fall of Lloyd George marks a new stage in the disintegrating process of capitalism in Great Britain, even though the election which is proceeding is being used as a vehicle for the consolidation of the imperialist parties. Again they have acted very cleverly and although the Labor Parties of Great Britain have had high hopes of that General Election, I feel that their hopes are not going to be realized to the extent to which they have figured. This is a most important development in itself because it foreshadows a new period of more violent activity in Britain than what we have experienced hitherto.

Comrade Zinoviev stated in his speech that the Fascist movement is confined to Italy. As a matter of fact when the Fascist of Italy began their attack on the Communists, the trade unionists, co-operatives, etc., the capitalist papers in London were announcing the regularizing of the special police and announcing that these were the future Fascisti for England.

Now, with such conditions obtaining in general, practically everywhere, it is of the utmost importance that we should take the measure of these events and outline for ourselves the policy of the immediate future. We have heard a great deal about the United Front, and there is no doubt that the opposition to the United Front, is steadily disappearing in the ranks of the Communist International.

Its introduction in Britain however, had some rather remarkable effects. It came to the Party in Britain practically as a galvanic shock. The party was young, and had no great experience, and at first the demand for the United Front resulted in some districts in considerable loss of membership of the Party. This particular demand for the United Front had come successively after a struggle within the Party which was practically in the process of formation.

At the Second Congress there was no Communist Party. There were only a number of parties, small parties, with all shades of socialist colour from pale pink to brilliant scarlet. These were ordered by the Second Congress to come together, unite, and to immediately proceed with the application for affiliation to the Labor Party. It is one thing to make a demand. It is one thing to unite Socialist parties and call them a Communist Party. But it is another thing to make out of those forces a real Communist Party: and the following months have been months of insistent struggle within the Party itself striving to get clear of the various difficulties within its ranks. The Labor Party issue had divided the parties even before they had come together, and now that they had come together, at the first Conference that particular issue was only carried by a small majority. It took another year before this particular issue was enabled to pass into the party experience for practical work. In this the Labor Party had unwittingly assisted us, because at the Brighton Conference they had deferred consideration of the issue, and twelve months had elapsed before it became a fighting issue for the party in relation to the Labor Party. Previously it was more a matter of theoretical discussion inside the party, than a matter of practical fighting with the Labor Party. This fight was brought to a head by the Labor Party Conference in Edinburgh this year.

In order to appreciate the difficulties we have had to face in tackling this question, I want to remind this Congress that we have not only had difficulties to tackle in relation to this question of affiliation to the Labor Party but it was not until October of this year that the party elected its Central Committee at its National Conference—an indication of the syndicalist character of many elements in the party.

With the struggle in the party, and being compelled to face this larger issue of unity in action, you can readily appreciate that this was no light matter for us to undertake. But once the Party got into its stride, valuable lessons were learned both by the Party and the Labor movement as a whole. The Labor Party which in the general election—or in the period leading up to the general election—has been out-manceuvred by the capita-

list parties in its attempt to play up to the middle class has been losing support from the working class. One of its tactics in order to capture all the middle class votes has been the tactics of expulsion of the Communists from its ranks. The Edinburgh resolution focused the struggle between the Communists and the Labor Party. There the two resolutions, stated that no party which had parliamentary candidates in the field running in opposition to the Labor Party, should be permitted, to become affiliated.

Consequently we were faced with this situation: that the conditions of the party at the moment forbade our entrance into the Labor Party. Furthermore, the Labor Party challenged the situation by compelling the Labor organizations affiliated to it to exclude such members as belonged to a party which conducted a parliamentary campaign against it by running candidates. Consequently we delivered a counterstroke. Immediately the party withdrew its parliamentary candidates who were running in opposition to the Labor Party, accepted the constitution of the Labor Party. By this means the Communists have won a considerable victory inside the ranks of the Labor movement. In spite of the fact that we lost membership at first, the influence of the Communist party increased in different sections of the working class.

In Glasgow, Sheffield, Manchester, Birmingham, the Labor Party has been totally unable to put into operation its own resolutions. Furthermore in Barrow, Battersea and other local Labor Parties, the Communists have practically got control of the Labor Party organizations.

Further we were faced with this fact, that this attempt to exclude the Communists from the Labor Party only produced further problems for that party which it could not overcome. For example, the fact that the Labor Party is made up of affiliated trade union organizations compelled them to face the issue of expulsion of Communists from Labor Party Conferences. Here they must face the big labor organizations and not all these will follow their lead. Already at least one Labor organization, and an important one has refused to put into operation the Labor Party resolution: and immediately the Labor Party was face to face with a breakaway of a Labor union, a mass organization. In that they dare not go any further.

Hence we can see that policy of the United Front, instead of being a policy which weakens the Communist Party, is a policy which is accumulative in strengthening the Communist Party.

Equally important has been the progress in the industrial movement. At the Trade Union Congress, for example, by pursuing the policy of putting forward a program for the consolidation of the union movement, we have been able to parade all the union leaders before the masses and show them their defects.

With regard to the actual struggles in the factories or in the union movement we have one considerable influence. In the Engineer's lockout it was the Communist and the supporters of the R.I.L.U. who controlled that struggle and made whatever fight was made.

Here I must take exception to one point in Comrade Zinoviev's report and it is his statement on the factory committees movement. He said that "No Communist Party can be considered a bona fide, formally established mass party that has no stable influence in the factories and workshops, mines, railways, etc. In the present circumstances no movement can be considered a well organized proletarian mass movement of the working class if its organization does not succeed in establishing factory and workshop committees."

To this we take exception. We think it has been spoken with eyes too closely fixed on Germany. In England we have a powerful Shop Stewards' movement. But it can and only does exist in given objective conditions. These necessary conditions do not exist at the moment in England. How can you build factory organizations when you have 1,750,000 workers walking the streets? You cannot build factory organizations in empty and depleted workshops—while you have a great reservoir of unemployed workers.

The movement under these conditions takes other forms. It takes the form of a minority movement in the unions and throws up a great unemployed workers' committee movement. In the engineers' lockout it was these organizations which conducted the fight and rarely those who were actually locked out from the factories.

Hence the Communist Party must adapt itself to the various forms of the struggle thrown up by the given historical conditions. In one country the conditions make possible a drive into the factories and the creation of factory committees. In another minority movements in the unions and unemployed workers' committees are the order of the day. That Communist Party which is deeply rooted in the struggles of the masses and adaptable to the varying forms of mass organizations which the conditions make possible is a bona fide Communist Party

whether the form of mass organization is that of factory committees or some other form.

Let us face also the International implications of this policy as expressed by the demand for the United Front. Since the Conference of the 2nd and 2½ Internationals what have we seen? We have seen a number of struggles taking place in this country and in that country. At the time of the engineers' lockout there were some countries in which occurred disputes of the metal workers, and the Communist Parties of these countries did not know what the other was doing and had no vital contact with each other. They did not put forward the same slogans and no measures were taken to make even a United Front of the Communist Parties. In this direction the Communist International has much to do to improve the situation.

But further we have heard much talk of the awakening peoples of the East and the colonial populations. We hear of a rising movement in India, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and we have a revolutionary movement developing in Ireland, yet little has been done to bring together the parties of those countries which control and subjugate these peoples, into live contact with the problems of the struggling masses. Remedy the defects in these directions and we shall make possible a wider application of the United

Bukharin:

I would like to analyze the general tactics of the Executive and its bearing upon the various groups and tendencies.

We have to say, whether the Executive of the Communist International has acted properly or not. This may be divided into two main questions: 1. Whether the International has rightly judged the various tendencies within the Communists International, whether the internal political tactics were properly carried out. 2. Whether it has rightly or wrongly defined the general line of tactics. These are the two main questions to which we should receive the answer. Within the International I can distinguish various tactical currents and tendencies. I would like first of all to enumerate them: firstly, the Centrist tendencies, secondly, the semi-reformist tendencies parading under the mask and phraseology of the Left Wing; thirdly, various transitory forms partly reformist, or perhaps embodying the two currents at one and the same time; and fourthly, the Left Wing proper. By the Left I understand such groupings that commit the so-called "Left" errors. After these we have the proper kernel of the International, which as we hope, is pursuing the right policy.

The Centrist tendencies have been expressed in their crudest form in the general activity of the International and at the Congress through the delegations from two parties, firstly by a section of the French Party and secondly by a section of the minority of the Norwegian Party, the representatives of which have spoken here. The French Centrist tendencies are a survival of the former social democratic ideology, and they also pass under the mask of pretending to accept everything that is proposed to them. They are offered the 21 conditions, and they will accept them. Some good resolutions on Party activity may be suggested to them, and they will accept these unanimously without even discussion, and with acclamation. They are ready to assent to anything that the so-called "Moscow Dictatorship" may desire. Later of course, they will abuse the "Moscow Dictatorship" with characteristic communist vigour, but they subscribe to everything that is asked of them. Outwardly this looks perfectly loyal, but the great danger consists in the fact that all this exists only on paper. As a rule after the acceptance of such good resolutions, nothing is done. Those tactical deviations which are real and which really take place have never yet been formulated. The attempt has never been made to elucidate the standpoint underlying these deviations.

One of our French Comrades was quite right—this was perhaps one of the few points in his speech, where he was right—when he said: "We of the Left have always our discussions, but the Centrists always make reservations and it is therefore difficult to know what these people are really driving at". Yes, this is the most dangerous thing, and when speaking of the French Centrists, we have to define their tactics in the struggle for the conquest of power, within the limits of their own party of course. With regard to that half of the Party which is turned towards the masses, we must say that there is nothing here of real support to the labor movement in France. Of the struggles of the Trade Unions, which is the real substance of working class social life in France, one finds no trace in the Party. This the Party entirely ignores. This can be seen in the work of all the French Party and in its central organs. The central organ is still far from being a Communist organ; we must say this frankly to our French comrades. "L'Humanité" is still a long way off from being a Communist paper, although it has very great possibilities for influencing the workers in a Communist sense. If the French comrades would take a deeper interest in the

working class, they could exercise a much greater influence among the French workers than they have done hitherto. Within this tendency we also have a strong pacifist current of pronounced humanitarian hue, which has the only virtue of prolonging the existence of French bourgeois traditions.

There is yet another point. This tendency contains also a certain anti-communist leaning which is directed against the international discipline of the Communist International, and this danger from the Right we must combat.

With regard to the Norwegian Party, we have heard even a comrade of the Right Wing speaking here. What did he tell us? He told us that the name of the Norwegian paper "Social-Democrat" was nothing else than a jumble of letters. But why do we call ourselves Communists? Possibly our Norwegian comrade thinks that it is due to our liking for particular letters. Nevertheless, we take it that the name is a symbol which defines our methods at the very start. We have tolerated the social democratic newspapers for two years, and do you think that this has no influence on the contents of the papers? We can and will prove that by their contents also these papers are partly semi-socialdemocratic, and in these papers one at times comes across articles which are written in a spirit of hostility towards the Communist International. This is the absolute truth and when our comrades here tell us that this is only a minor matter, that things will be put right in January,—after two and a half years—I say that this has been promised many times, but never done. Then again, what about international discipline? The comrade is entirely oblivious of that. We have repeatedly and unequivocally stated the decision of the International and of the Executive that our Congresses will not tolerate such a situation, and yet they come along here and tell us that this is a matter of little importance. Some of the Centrist and semi-Centrist elements form a special category whose peculiarity is that they always appear under a Left mask. We have heard two criticisms of our program, notably on the agrarian question and on the question we were criticized very sharply from the Left by our friend Serrati. He said it was a strange sort of Marxism to divide part of the land among the peasants, i. e. the petty bourgeoisie, and he thinks that as truly revolutionary and orthodox Marxians we should fight against the petty bourgeois canaille. This sounds very well. But experience has shown that it is only a cloak. And I hope that Comrade Serrati himself will not deny it. Something is wrong at the root.

The same thing as to the question of nationalities. In the question of nationalities we also had an opponent in the person of Herr Levi. He said that we were making terrible concessions in raising the question of nationalities. He wanted to know what had become of our orthodoxy. Later on we saw the wonderful development of our quondam Comrade Levi. Here we had an ocular demonstration of what was heretofore hidden in the shell. Yes, it was only a mask that was assumed by the opportunist tendency to conceal its opportunist character. Our Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries are shouting from the housetops that they represent the real interests of the workers. This is a strategical trick which we have to expose.

Let us take our French comrades. Their main tactical course is one of pure passivity. They do not support strikes, and so forth. But they also wear a cloak: "the dangers of the United Front". They say: what can we do with such miserable fellows who are really not Socialists at all? We had an illustration of this in the speech of our extremely Left Comrade Duret. Some time ago Comrade Duret spoke against the expulsion of Verfeuil and Co. He was and continues to be in favor of trade union autonomy, and at the same time he comes here to accuse us of opportunism. A few days ago he was against the expulsion of Verfeuil. Verfeuil is an out-and-out bourgeois wretch. And now Comrade Duret tells us: What an opportunist International we have, that it demands from us the United Front, the welcoming of Serrati, etc. What does it mean? It means, Comrade Duret that also in your person the International has a survivor of reformism, and that your phrases are meant to deceive. Nevertheless, we are extremely glad that you are on the road to convalescence, but in politics the symptoms of convalescence are not everything, and the situation has to be watched to see how you will get on in future. We must have practical proof of your recovery before we can fully trust you. We know how some people are apt to be swayed, and when a comrade talks here so sharply, almost with derision at the International, then we have to repeat what Comrade Radek once said to such a comrade: You should be a little more modest, and you should first of all give us proof of your own really revolutionary activity.

Let us examine the substance of Comrade Duret's arguments in so far as I have been able to crystallize his more important points. His first point was that our Party was unable to manoeuvre. This was the first argument against the United Front, and it has already been brought up by our friend

Bordiga. But I say that it is wrong to believe that a party must first be built up to the last man before manoeuvring, before they are perfected, because it is in the process of manoeuvring that real parties are built. If we were to wait until we get perfect parties, we would be falling into the tactics of passivity which has been consistently criticized by the French Party. The Left point a finger of scorn at the Centrist comrades and accuse them of being passive people who will not do a stroke of work, yet they themselves repeat the same mistakes when they wish to wait until they get a perfect party. No, the Party is produced in the course of the struggle, and the same thing will have to happen in France.

Comrade Duret raised another argument, that socialist opportunists are unwilling to march together with us. This is indeed a smashing argument. Just fancy, you must at once give up your communist virtues for the reason that the socialist-opportunists refuse to march with you. What a strange argument! If you cannot come to an agreement, it is your duty to expose them, to write against them, to agitate against them, and so forth. This is the only sensible way of making use of the sins of the social patriots. But here again you are handicapped by their confounded passivity. You are too lazy, that is what I would like to say to you.

The third, and extremely comical argument was, that for Germany of course the tactics of the United Front was an excellent thing. This is what the Reformists usually say. Even during the war it used to be said in Germany: Why, of course, we support the revolution in Russia, but in Germany it is quite a different matter. You are arguing in a similar way. In Germany, you say, the masses are organized, in our country they are not. Therefore, in Germany the masses can be won by the tactics of the United Front, and in France they cannot. But, in the name of common sense, where is the proof or shade of proof of such an argument. In France, just as in Germany the movement cannot depend upon the organized workers alone. The unorganized too should turn to you for guidance. The growth of the numbers of your organized comrades would bring you a corresponding increased following among the unorganized. Your argument is really an extraordinary one. Not being a parliamentarian, I would simply call it piffle.

Now, comrades, let me turn to another category who are so to speak half way between the Left and the Reformists, and whose typical representative is comrade Weithauer. He declares himself an adherent of the left, it is the Left Wing Opposition in Czecho-Slovakia; comrade Weithauer appears to me to be one who appears to be at his wits end endeavouring to invent an ideology for the Left Wing Opposition. I maintain that all criticism should not come from the Right but from the Left. What comrade Weithauer proposes has really nothing to do with Communism, but has much in common with petty bourgeois Proudhonism from beginning to end. The Labor Movement in Germany knows of a certain Dr. Bernstein who, for the purpose of fighting against capitalism, advocated a strike against child-bearing, because it would mean that no new children would be born, and without children militarism cannot exist. Weithauer comes along with a proposal to deal capitalism a mortal blow by advocating a boycott of goods of capitalists who are callous towards the working class. Here we have a bright idea. I cannot conceive of any other weapon that comrade Weithauer might wage against capitalism that would hit the working class harder than the one he now proposes. This is the language of philanthropy, which would fit comrade Weithauer much better if he were a member of the gentle sex and at the same time of aristocratic descent. But, comrades, it is really a serious matter. This is not Marxism; it is theoretically wrong from A to Z. This fallacy that the worker is more exploited by merchant capital than by industrial capital betrays such profound ignorance that I would advise comrade Weithauer to join an elementary, Marxian preparatory school. This theory is not only ridiculous, but it is also absolutely opportunist.

Comrades, I would like to enlarge upon the fallacy of comrade Weithauer. I hear that he is a philosopher. But his philosophy is not the embodiment of Pure Reason, but rather the dialectical negation of pure reason. The question is: did the Executive treat this question properly? The Executive saw at once that here we had to deal with some honest working class elements. In the French question, the Executive took a firm stand and demanded the expulsion of the Right Wing Opportunists, yet with regard to the Centre, the Executive proposed the policy of patience,—up to certain limits, of course. Was it right or wrong? It was right of course. In the case of Czecho-Slovakia we knew that here were some honest workers behind the fallacies of comrade Weithauer. What did we do? We practiced patience, urging the Czecho-Slovakian Party to retain in the Party those workers who were influenced by these fallacies. It is for you here to decide whether the Executive was right.

I would like now to say a few words on the so-called mistakes of Leftism, and in the first place with regard to the speech by Comrade Ruth Fischer. Her principal mistake was in exaggerating dangers. In some cases the criticism was proper, and Comrade Radek who can by no means be described as a Leftist, has declared this criticism to be justified. But the mistake begins when Comrade Ruth Fischer says: "Here we have Reformism and Revisionism in full bloom". This is an exaggeration, an entirely undialectical treatment of quite complete situations and action. This is her mistake, which should be frankly pointed out.

Another mistake I noticed in the speech was, when she said the following phrase which I put down in writing: "The idea of strong organization is a survival of the social democratic spirit". No, it is not in any way a survival of the social democratic spirit. We should not frame our policies on the assumption that the strength of organization means nothing to us, while the whole bourgeoisie devises even new forms of organization. Fascism is not merely a form of organization that the bourgeoisie had possessed previously, it is a newly invented form, adapted to the new movement, calculated to drag in the masses. In other words, the bourgeoisie sees the necessity of having a mass party, which unfortunately even Comrade Bordiga fails to understand. It is a question of the form of organization, and of course, we cannot take upon ourselves to dictate the form of organization which should be adopted. On the contrary, it is the masses that have to decide, but we have the nucleus of the form of organization, and this is a problem not only for a social democratic party, but for every militant party.

Now we come to the third point. Comrade Fischer said that the Putschist tactics have been the subject of much strife within the German Party, and has brought about a certain state of depression in the Party. That may be so. But it is a known fact that in the battle of life not every point can be defined and described beforehand. It would have been much worse for the Party if there had been no vigorous campaign against Putschism.

I have yet a few other remarks to make. Look at the situation in Italy to-day. Everything cries aloud for the unity of the proletarian forces. The most important problem in Italy is the problem of organizational unity with the Socialist Party. Yet comrade Bordiga has not a word to say about this important problem. His entire speech was an essay of the most abstract Bergsonesque philosophy of action, which is no action at all. But not a single word on concrete problems. This is another outpouring of his meagre spirit, which in reality is not a sound instrument of the proletarian struggle. It is the survival of purely dogmatic sectarianism. The Italian Party, having done some very good work, has also committed mistakes in the agrarian question, in the question of the "Arditi Del Popolo", etc. All the mistakes of the Italian Party are the logical outcome of the fallacious ideas that have found expression in the speech of comrade Bordiga.

Comrades, in dealing with these questions, and in correcting the errors of Leftism, the Executive did not act upon the standpoint of either "right", or "left", but on the standpoint of the proper proletarian tactics. The proper proletarian tactics need not be either Right or Left; all it has to do is to adapt itself to the concrete conditions of the proletariat of the respective countries. I therefore invite you to consider the tactics of the Executive as your very own, to test it and to continue to support it until we shall become the real power with the entire proletariat on our side.

Carr:

(America)

Let me say, in the name of the Communist Party of America, that we are in full agreement with the tactics of the Executive during the past year. This applies, not only to the general trend, but also to the concrete decisions made by the Executive in America.

I now turn to general considerations. The Third Congress issued the watchword, Back to the Masses! It is true that in America there was lacking for a long time a clear view as to the tasks of a Communist Party. So thoroughly, however, has propaganda been carried on under this watchword that there are now very few comrades in America who, as Comrade Radek would phrase it, pride themselves on their desire to wander in solitude beneath the stars while awaiting the fine morning when the red sun of the revolution is to shine into their faces. Almost every member of the Party now understands that it is the Party's task to work among the masses. They realize that we must not restrict all our activities to our own party members, but must extend them among the various organizations of the working

class. In the American Party, you will no longer find anyone to oppose this watchword.

The second watchword, that of the United Front, has also been a good one for America. In the States, however, the situation is somewhat different from that in European countries. Naturally it was different, for in America there is no Labor Party, no Socialist Party, which is backed by the masses. The Socialist Labor Party still goes its way through the country like an old witch, but no one pays any attention to it, and the masses do not join it. When the watchword of the united front first came to America, it was only to be expected that there would at first be certain misunderstandings in the Party as to the matter. Some of the comrades interpreted it as a command that we should make a nice little agreement with the politicians and leaders of the Socialist Party and other organizations. It was even proposed that when we had put forward a candidate for the elections, we should withdraw him in favor of the yellow Meyer London, and that we were to support the latter at the election. Such views no longer prevail in the Party. Every member understands that this is not the meaning of the united front, but that what we have to do is to engage in activities in which we can make common cause with all the workers and with all working class organizations against the bourgeoisie.

I come, now, to concrete questions. As you know, in America we have an illegal Communist Party, whose branches are secretly organized. At one time there were two parties but they were amalgamated in May, 1921. After the union, the question came to the front how the Party was henceforward to work among the masses. How were we to realize the slogan of the International, the slogan which the process of events was spontaneously commending to us all?

Many of the members were convinced that it was essential to organize a legal Party, for the better permeation of the masses. The party split over the question whether a legal party should be organized, and if so, how. The problem was discussed here in Moscow. These were formulated on the subject, and in these theses it was recommended that a legal party should be organized. Watchwords were formulated, and partial demands were specified. It was, moreover, definitely declared that we must guard against the danger of the party being completely broken up. The underground party was to be continued and strengthened, but in addition a legal Party was to be constructed, as an instrument of the Communist Party, that we might be able to work more effectively among the masses. These theses were sent to America, and were hailed with delight by the great majority of the members. Voices were, however, raised against them, from the extremists of either wing. The Left opposition, which was outside the party, was averse to the proposal, for it was a defeat to their propaganda. But the theses were not wholly accepted even within the party. Some of the comrades regard them as wrong in principle. They said that the theses were based upon false information, that the Executive was not rightly informed regarding the situation in America, and that that was why such theses had been sent. Nevertheless, the theses were officially accepted, and the debate concerning the problems propounded in them lasted for months. Upon this matter, too, a great dispute occurred. That perhaps serves as foundation for Comrade Zinoviev's remark that in America there are serious faction struggles. But now these disputes are at an end. The questions that were agitating the Party last summer were settled at the Party Congress, with the valuable aid of the representative of the Communist International, who attended the sessions. Perhaps we shall hear something more of the matter in this place. One seems to be listening to far-off thunder, to the mutterings of a storm which has passed into the distance. The real storm over the question is finished. The theses of the International concerning the immediate tasks of the Communist Party in America, have now been accepted as sound by the overwhelming majority of our members. I believe myself to be justified in saying that nine tenths of our members consider them to be in conformity with contemporary U.S. conditions, and are satisfied that they lay down the right lines for the work of the Party in America.

The Executive of the Communist International sent orders last winter to the Party that a reunion was to take place. The comrades of the Left opposition who came here to appeal for recognition as the Communist Party of America were instructed to re-enter the Party, and the Party received orders to accept them back. The Executive commanded that the unity of the Party in America should be re-established. In this matter, too, the Executive acted rightly. Such is to-day the opinion of the immense majority of the Party, but voices have been raised in opposition from both extremes. The members of the Left wing had split the Party and did not wish to re-enter the fold, and many of the "Right" leaders did not wish to re-admit them.

These latter said officially, "yes, we will take them back!" But in reality those who came back were not welcomed with as much enthusiasm as one could have wished. Here, again, there was a great dispute between those who really desired the unity of the Communist movement in America, those who wished that all entitled to term themselves communists should be enrolled in a single Party—and those who believed that it would be better for the Party if all these left elements were to remain outside the organization. After months of dispute, the orders of the Executive were at length carried out. Last month the two fractions were re-united unconditionally, with the collaboration of the representative of the Communist International, who was then in the States. In this matter, likewise, the American Party holds today that the Executive of the Communist International took the right course.

There are one or two other points in Comrade Zinoviev's report to which I find it necessary to refer. Zinoviev says that our Party is small. That is true. He also says that there is a great left-wing movement among the workers, and it would seem that he is doubtful whether we are following the right course in America. The left-wing working class movement to-day is to a preponderant extent the outcome of our Party's activities. Our members have been active in nuclei in the trade unions. Some of the noted trade union leaders who visited Moscow were sent here thanks to the work of the communist nuclei in the trade unions. Consequently it does not give quite a true picture to divide these two elements so sharply, saying: "Here is the Party, quite small; there is a great left-wing trade union movement". The description does not accord with the facts. The party work in the trade unions is not yet so ably conducted as we might wish, but from day to day we are learning better how to influence the unions, how to organize the whole left-wing working class movement against the right wing consisting of the Gompers' faction, and by degrees how to revolutionize the labor movement as a whole.

Comrades, in America to-day, thanks largely to the right lines established during the past year on the recommendation of the Executive of the Communist International, we have for the first time a genuinely united Party—a Party, the great majority of whose members are in accord concerning the problems with which the Party is confronted. We declare that this Party approves the work of the Executive of the Communist International, that the Party hopes and believes that this work will be continued on similar lines during the ensuing year.

Domski:

(Poland)

The United Front has been much tried out in our country in the course of the last six months. We have already accumulated a good deal of experience, and I believe that this experience is not encouraging to the adherents of the tactics of the United Front as it has been applied of late. Of course, every time one says something against the United Front one gets the reply: But you do not understand that we must have the majority behind us! And in Moscow one hears at times even a sharper answer: It is only an ass who fails to understand, etc. Of course this is, rather a sharp argument. Such an argument would kill an elephant. But it is altogether irrelevant to the question. Of course, we ought to win a majority of the proletariat, but it has to be a majority for a Communist Party, not for a hotch-potch of hazy and nebulous ideas.

This experience of the United Front we have been collecting everywhere, chiefly in Germany, but also in Poland: Comrade Ruth Fischer has said here a few things about the United Front in Germany, pointing out the mistakes that have been committed in the application of it, characterizing them quite properly. To this I have something to add: When the comrades of the German Executive are defending this tactic, they say: Behold the great victories we have won thereby; the chief among these victories being the strengthening of our Party in Germany. Comrades, when one has such a situation as the taxation compromise, depreciated currency, soaring prices etc, one has to be very careful in claiming that all successes of the Party were due exclusively to Party tactics. No, there were other circumstances behind this gratifying growth of the German Communist Party. And when all claims are now made for the tactics of the United Front we should examine whether the successes in Germany were promoted or hindered by these tactics.

Comrade Meyer has claimed yet another victory; the Independents have joined the majority Social-Democrats in Germany. Yes, a great victory for the Social-Democrats and we ought not to dispute it. They have scored yet another victory. The workers in the U. S. P. did not protest against this union. The major part of the Independent workers have quite calmly transferred their membership to the Social-Democratic Party,

and this because our tactics of the United Front has well paved the way for it, so that the Independent workers could glide over quite imperceptibly and Ledebour was left in isolation. If this be your victory, then I wish you less of such victories—of victories that might lead to your undoing.

I am glad to observe that the Communist Party with the aid of the Executive has taken cognizance of this mistake. The tactics of the United Front is applied quite differently now. Every Communist will subscribe to the way in which the tactics are now applied (I refer to the Factory Councils' movement in Germany). These are the proper tactics.

We, in Poland, have also had some experience with the tactics of the United Front. Comrade Mikhalovsky has already spoken about it. We have addressed ourselves to the various factions, inviting them to a joint demonstration. In Warsaw we have given up our own demonstrations, in Cracow fifteen of our comrades were brutally maltreated by the P. P. S. It was indeed gratifying tactics. It has its saving grace in the fact that the Party Executive was absent from the demonstrations. This tactic has also had its theoretical effects. During the cabinet crisis in Poland, when Pilsudsky was forming a government headed by Slivinsky the communists in Warsaw sensed the danger of war, but our party press evolved quite a different theory. I must quote the text verbatim so that no one could say that I was reading between the lines. Here is what the editor of our Central theoretical organ had to say:

"One would think that the first duty of the Social-Democratic Party was to demand the immediate political amnesty and the liberation of the revolutionary members of the working class. It is upon this point that the Communist agitation towards the Slivinsky Government should be centred."

Thus, with the arrival of a new Pilsudsky Government we begin with the demand for a political amnesty. (Radek: it was not a war government.) Oh yes, it was not a war government before the elections. Here I will quote again:

"A democratic government, very well. But in the Diet and in the methods hitherto applied by the Government, there has been, and there could be, no basis for democracy. This basis could be furnished only by the struggle of the wide masses for democracy, and if Slivinsky had the courage to rely upon the masses, if he had for this purpose started his administration with the amnesty and the proclamation of political liberty for the working class, the Communist Party would gain a good deal thereby. But it is no less certain that the democratic government would gain just as much by winning the support of the masses for a certain length of time, this having a broad and solid basis of popular support."

This reads strikingly like an offer of support to the government by our Party. These were the experiences that we had in Poland. Fortunately they are comparatively few. This was because in Poland we had no basis for these tactics of the United Front. In Germany we had that basis; in France the demand for the tactics of the United Front has only aggravated the crisis in the Party without bringing any advantage, at least so far. As regards the workers' government, I was in the same boat as my friend Duret, I could not understand the meaning of workers' government in our tactic. At last I have heard a clear definition of this government. Comrade Radek has solaced me in private conversation that such a government is not contemplated for Poland (Radek: I never said it). Oh, then Poland will also have to bear the punishment of this sort of government. It is thus an international problem. Comrade Radek says that the workers' government is not a necessity but a possibility, and it were folly to reject such possibilities. The question is whether we inscribe all the possibilities on our banner and try to accelerate the realization of these possibilities, once we have inscribed them on our banner. I believe that it is quite possible that at the eleventh hour a so-called workers government should come which would not be a proletarian dictatorship. But I believe when such a government comes, it will be the resultant of various forces such as: Our struggle for the proletarian dictatorship, the struggle of the social-democrats against it and so forth. Is it proper to build our plans on such an assumption? I think not, because I believe that we should insist on our struggle for the proletarian dictatorship. If the workers' government is to come, it will come even if we agitate and fight for our full program. It may happen that the working masses would turn their backs on the National Labor Party and join the social-democrats, as has been the case in Upper Silesia. It would be a step forward, at all events. But it is not our duty to agitate for such a step. We must agitate for our own Communist Party.

But some comrades give a different interpretation to the slogan of a Workers Government. We are really out for the Proletarian Dictatorship but we dare not say it. The working masses are afraid of the Communist Dictatorship, and even

when we declare that the Proletarian Dictatorship, is not the Communist Dictatorship, they do not believe us.

I therefore think, that when we meet with opposition to the Communist Dictatorship on the part of opponents whom this "Commissar" dictatorship paints in the blackest colours, it should be our policy to counter-act such a position, not by launching slogans that are pseudonyms, as comrade Zinoviev aptly remarked. Pseudonyms will not win the fight for us. We must state our revolutionary slogans quite clearly. This does not mean to say that we ought to make any partial demands. We should draw up partial demands and we have done so in every struggle, in as much as these were necessary for the struggle of the working masses for the improvement of their lot. These slogans we ought to formulate and to support. But we should not advance any slogans in which we do not believe ourselves, we should have no slogans intended to expose anybody or as a means for manoeuvring. We must have slogans either partial or ultimate in which we are ready to fight.

In conclusion, I would like to say this: The working class is not so foolish and not so cowardly as some are inclined to think. The working class wants to fight for the revolution. He who speaks to the workers in their own language for any length of time is bound to be understood. It is sheer ignorance of the situation of the working struggle to suppose that the workers can be ordered about like an army, now to the right, then to the left, without their own intelligent comprehension. This war can end in victory only when our slogans and our ideology are perfectly clear and well understood by every soldier. Only in this manner can the working class carry on the struggle consistently towards the ultimate goal.

Kolarov:

(Balkan Federation)

I am going to address you on behalf of the Balkan Communist Federation.

Comrade Zinoviev said that our Federation has hardly functioned during the past year. Unfortunately this is true. Our efforts to make the Federation a political centre for the Balkan Parties have been only partially successful. The work is only just beginning, and it will require the continued united efforts of the Balkan Parties and the effective assistance of the Executive of the International to bring the work to a satisfactory conclusion. Now that the Rumanian Party has been put on its feet, and the Yugoslav Party is in the course of reorganizing itself by adapting itself to the conditions of illegality in which it finds itself, there is every reason to believe that the Communist Balkan Federation will soon become an important factor in the Balkan revolutionary movement.

I want to emphasize the fact that the Balkan Parties are in full agreement with the general lines of policy of the Executive Committee since the Third Congress. They are of the opinion that the resolutions of the International Congresses were rightly interpreted by the Executive which acted according to the spirit of these resolutions. As to the tactics of the United Front, the Balkan Parties accepted them from the very first. The Bulgarian Communist Party studied and laid down the manner of the application of these tactics in Bulgaria in a detailed resolution which was put before its last Congress. The same thing happened at the recent Conferences of the Yugoslavian and Rumanian Parties. The Constantinople Turkish Communist Party has also accepted these tactics. In addition to the theoretical adhesion to the tactics of the United Front, the Balkan Party had endeavoured to put them into practice. The Bulgarian Communist Party had occasion to use them repeatedly, and with very good results. It is owing to these tactics that the Party was able to make an impression on the government clerks and officials, the most inert proletarian section of the country, and to draw it into the struggle under the effective leadership of the Communist Party. In Yugoslavia and Rumania the bourgeois and the petty bourgeois parties, which were hitherto the leaders and protectors of these proletarian elements, see their influence dwindling. The social-democrats have categorically refused to form a united front with the communist parties in these countries, which does not prevent the latter from enjoining the masses to be united in their struggle. The experience of the Balkan countries proves that the United Front tactics, if wisely interpreted and applied, is an effective means of revolutionizing and uniting the masses even in the industrially backward countries.

The problem of the workers' government does not arise in the agricultural Balkan countries, and therefore I shall not dwell on it.

It is self-evident that a rigorous discipline is a vital necessity for the International as well as for its sections. All The Communist Parties recognize this fact and are loud

in proclaiming it. However, the only real guarantee for the observation of international discipline is the united opinion of all our sections on all the great sections of the program, the organization and the communist tactics. Differences of conception cannot help resulting in lack of discipline. A proof of this is the example of the French, the Italian and other parties. One of the essential tasks of the Communist International is to create and to foster unanimity.

Seidler:

(Czecho-Slovakia)

Comrades, on behalf of the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation with the exception of Comrade Vaitauer, I declare our complete accord with the activity of the Executive since the Third Congress.

On various occasions, when the situation was serious, the Executive intervened very successfully in the development of the Communist movement in Czecho-Slovakia. The formation of a united international and, organizationally centralized party may be considered to be the greatest success of our last year's activities. We had several comrades who feared that it would be impossible to overcome all the difficulties in view of the fact that we had to work among a working class of various nationalities with different traditions, national prejudices and illusions, which were rendered more complex by the language difficulty. We are able to state to-day that these problems have been solved. That this is so, is greatly due to the decisions and advice which we receive from the Executive concerning the organizational shortcomings of the Party, the United Front and the question of trade union tactics, have been especially useful.

The Congress Commission will deal with a concrete case of breach of discipline, which occurred in our Party. We shall have full opportunity in the commission to state in detail the reasons by which the Managing Committee of the Party justified its viewpoint, which we share. However, we hold that discipline within the Communist International is so important, that we immediately put the decision of the Executive into practice, although we were not in agreement with it, and lodged a protest against it. We trust that the commission will fully examine this matter. It goes without saying that communist discipline is binding for us. We therefore declare that we shall recognize the decision of the Congress. I merely wish to draw the attention of the Congress to the fact that the decision of the Executive undermined the authority of the Committee of the Czech Communist Party, and that it would lead to disastrous consequences if, in the present complicated situation of the labor movement in Czecho-Slovakia, the Central Committee of the Party had not sufficient authority and opportunity to enforce party discipline.

As to the future work of the Executive, we are of the opinion that the information and the connections of the Executive should be improved.

Katayama:

(Japan)

The Japanese Communist Party has approved the report of comrade Zinoviev. I will not speak here only on the United Front as applying to Japan. The Japanese Communist Party is underground and is still young but we have been working openly through the Trade Unions and by other means. Our unions are fighting unions, having no traditional difficulties. We have no Henderson, and we have no Gompers. Comrades, in the past we have practised the United Front in many instances. When we started the propaganda movement against the Washington Conference all the trade unions cooperated to fight and make propaganda against this bourgeois, capitalistic, imperialistic conference at Washington. Then when the Government introduced a bill against all radical movements in Japan the trade unions of all shades, Anarchist, Syndicalist, Communist and Moderate came together to make effective propaganda so that the Government finally backed down.

We have started a movement under the name of "Hands off Russia", which was similar to that organized in England and now all trade unions and all radical associations are cooperating to fight against intervention and for the recognition of Soviet Russia. We could not do anything for the Russian famine, but with the change of government we started the Russian relief work and now not only trade unions, radical associations, but also even the petty-bourgeoisie cooperated to aid the Russian famine. This aid is all carried on under the control of the Communist Party, although it is deep underground.

Now I want to tell you my feelings during the last few days; we have difficulties with the United Front in the Communist Party. The United Front is not yet established in all countries, it is not established even in all the parties yet. But,

comrades, we have a big enemy. We must fight this enemy at all costs. You forget, comrades of France, Italy and other countries; you forget that you must fight the enemy. On the contrary you are fighting each other. You ought to fight for the United Front against imperialism and capitalism. And again I tell you, we have not heard anything about a United Front internationally. What are you doing for other countries to unite them and make a united front against imperialism and capitalism? Nothing so far. I have not heard of anything so far of the international character of the United Front. We want a United Front with the strong Communist Parties of the world. Colonial countries need the United Front to fight capitalism. The Fourth Congress must impress all comrades going back from here with the necessity for a United Front, not only in their own countries but also in other countries so that we can reach our aim. Someone said that the United Front is a compromise. Yes, it is a compromise, but a compromise to gain our aims. It will not weaken our movement, but strengthen the movement. It is not a compromise with the petty-bourgeoisie. No, it is a compromise with labor leaders in order to reach the workers who are under the influence of these leaders. It will strengthen the Communist movement and enable us to gain our ends.

Rakosi:

(Hungary)

Comrades, I must confess to you that I do not very willingly limit myself in the discussion to the Hungarian question. The Hungarian question, like the Hungarian Party, is at this moment a very knotty problem; and every step which is not sufficiently considered, and every word which is not weighed may cost the lives of good fighters. I cannot allow myself the luxury, as comrade Landler has done, to speak of the illegal situation which has in the past and will probably in the future cost the lives of some of our best comrades. I would rather light on the situation of the Hungarian emigrant movement and the Hungarian Party.

Comrades, what is the Hungarian emigration? It is that portion of Hungarian Communist Party and the Hungarian working class movement, which has had to seek refuge abroad. What has been the nature of the Hungarian Communist Party? It had an energetic and swift period of fruition, which lasted only four months. In four months it seized power, which it retained four and a half months. These eight and a half months could, of course, not suffice to thrash out the various differences of opinion, on matters of tactics, involved in the upbuilding and consolidating of a Communist Party. The Hungarian Communist Party went into emigration, where the many practical and theoretical differences of opinion could not be passed through the test of actual practice in the daily struggle, neither could they be settled by activity, mass action or daily contact with the workers.

The Executive has occupied itself for ten months with this question and has taken great trouble in solving the fundamental doctrinal differences as soon as possible. Because these theoretical differences were of too petty a nature, no adequate steps could be taken. This fact remains, however, that the political emigrants engaged in a quarrel during ten months: pamphlets were published which were a rare tit-bit for the social-democrats, who published long leaders in the "Vorwaerter" in which they threw mud upon revolution, our Soviet Dictatorship, The Communist Party and the Communist International. The Executive had to take measures with regard to this matter, which occupied the first enlarged session of the Executive. In such a situation it was not only the right but the duty of the Executive to remove this cancer with a keen knife. For a hard knot, a sharp plane is needed. After such a scandal, the Executive could do nothing else than extirpate this malignant growth, with all possible energy. These are the main outlines of this factional struggle.

I would like to say something further with regard to the Hungarian Communist Party. The Hungarian Communist Party is not the product of any one faction; it is the product of the Hungarian proletariat, that proletariat which during four and a half months had the power of the State in its hands, and which now realizes more painfully every day, what it had lost in the short lived Soviet Dictatorship.

The Hungarian Communist Party, as well as those comrades who are now in prison, have not been a party to this factional strife. To set the activity of the best Communists of Budapest on the credit side of any one faction, is something against which I must energetically protest.

And another point; it would be most disadvantageous for the Hungarian proletariat and the future of the Hungarian Party if the World Congress received the impression that the

Hungarian Party is being shattered by factional strife. The Power of the Hungarian Communist Party is not to be measured by factional struggles. It suffices to glance at the activity of the Hungarian bourgeoisie which is still greatly in terror of the Communist Party and of its return to power.

The Hungarian counter-revolution, which is trying to nip in the bud every Communist growth by means of fire and sword, is compelled to look to the future and to organize itself in illegal groups to carry on a secret struggle with the Communist movement, which is sprouting abundantly in Hungary. And I hope that the Communist Party of Hungary and the Hungarian proletariat, which in 1919 demonstrated its ability to struggle for emancipation, and which is now carrying on the struggle under unexampled difficulties, will continue in the future to proceed along the path laid out for it by history, by its revolutionary past, despite emigrant factional strife and white terror.

Comrades, I would like to reiterate that it was certainly quite unpleasant for the Executive to clean out this Augean stable and restore order. It wrung the heart of every Hungarian comrade when the matter of our party came before the Executive; and it cut us to the quick when we saw that our labor and struggles had borne such fruit. I am in complete accord with the last part of Comrade Landler's speech in which he proposes that the World Congress express its sympathy with martyrs protesting against their persecution. I also wish to say that the Communist International lost no opportunity of aiding the Hungarian proletariat whenever possible. You, comrades, know well that we have succeeded in releasing 400 Hungarian comrades from Horthy's dungeons; and I can also state that the Executive immediately took steps to free the present group of arrested comrades from the vengeance of white "justice". We have nothing against an investigation of the Hungarian question; I would, however, energetically protest against handling this question as one of factional struggle, even in a disguised form. The matter must go either to the Executive or to the Congress. The Hungarian Party, and the Hungarian emigrants have contributed sufficient material for the Second and Two and a half Internationals; and that which comrade Landler has put before us to day is nothing more than digging up offal which had already been buried. I am absolutely opposed to having this matter considered from the point of view of factionalism.

Vuyovich:

(Young Communist International)

Comrades, the Young Communist International has always approved and still approves the policy of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. It is of the opinion that during these fifteen months the Executive Committee has carried out the decisions of the Third Congress in spirit and in letter.

We may say that the application of the United Front in the Young Communist League was crowned with complete success in all the countries where it was carried out. In Germany, France, Czecho-Slovakia, and in other countries, the Young Communist Leagues basing themselves on the general instructions issued by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, have applied the United Front tactics, and we are justified in saying that it was proved in practice that we were right in adopting this line.

The Young Communist International is also in complete accord with the attitude of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the particular question of France, Italy, Norway, Czecho-Slovakia and of the other countries where the Executive Committee had to intervene in the course of the last fifteen months.

The Young Communist International is of the opinion that the desire of the Executive Committee to put into practice in these countries the decisions of the majority of the Third Congress, that is to say the desire to win over the majority of the working class, has not only been thoroughly understood by the Executive Committee but has been put into practice in all countries, specially in Czecho-Slovakia and Italy.

The Young Communist International on whose behalf I am addressing you, wishes to emphasize one particular point of Comrade Zinoviev's speech. I refer to the formation of communist nuclei in all the workshops and factories. It is of the opinion that the time has come to put into practice the thesis adopted on this particular point by the Third Congress.

The Young Communist International has already done its utmost to put these theses into practice. I could give you concrete examples of this, notably that of the Lyons region in France. The workshop organizations which we established there have been completely successful, and thus, by our action, communist nuclei came into being in the workshops and factories. The

Young Communist International is of the opinion that the Communist Parties must make a real effort in that direction in the near future.

Another point seems to us equally important, and that is the centralization of the Communist International, and discipline within the Communist International. The Young Communist International has already shown by the activity of its organizations in the various countries that it believes in discipline and communist centralization. In France, and in other countries where the Executive Committee met with a certain amount of resistance on the part of the Communist Party, the Young Communist Leagues were always the first to give the necessary support to the attitude of the Executive Committee within the Communist Parties, which had been their companions in the communist struggle.

The Young Communists severely condemn the various breaches of discipline which took place during the period covered by the report of the Executive Committee. We trust that such things will not happen in the future, and that the theses and the resolutions, which formed the basis of the Communist International which was accepted everywhere in various resolutions in the course of several congresses, will be respected not only in words, but that every section will show in all future revolutionary struggles that communist discipline exists and is really applied. We also trust that owing to this, the Executive Committee of the Communist International will feel more sure than heretofore that all its decisions will be carried out. We trust that henceforth the watchwords of the Communist International, such as the United Front, will be adopted and applied in their entirety. The Young Communist International is of the opinion that the Executive of the Communist International has gone through the preliminary period during which its work consisted in laying down the general political line for all the Communist Parties. We believe that the time has come for the Executive Committee to pay attention to organization and to endeavour to influence more than heretofore the transformation of the Communist Party into a real mass party. We trust that the sections of the Communist International will no longer impede the political work of the Executive Committee by their avowed or tacit resistance, and will allow it to devote more time in all the countries to the work connected with the reorganization of the Communist Parties on the basis of workshop and factory committees and in close contact with the working masses.

In this way, the Communist International and its Executive Committee will be able to conduct the revolutionary struggles which the situation demands with much more energy than heretofore.

Malaka:

(Dutch Indies)

On behalf of the Communist Party of Java, I wish to speak on the importance of the question of the United Front for the oppressed masses of the East. I should like to put several questions to Comrade Zinoviev and Radek. Perhaps Comrade Zinoviev did not mean that Java must have a different United Front. Perhaps our United Front is different from the others. However, the decision of the Second Congress of the Third International means that we must form a United Front with the revolutionary nationalists. Thus, our United Front is not a United Front with the social democrats but with the revolutionary nationalists. We must recognize in our country that we also need a United Front. However, with us the tactics of the nationalists frequently assume various forms. Two of the most popular forms of nationalist tactics against imperialism are the boycott and the liberation struggle of the Moslems—of Pan-Islamism. It is on these two forms that I should like to put the following question: firstly, should we or should we not support the national boycott movement, secondly; should we support Pan-Islamism? If so, how far shall we go?

I am ready to admit that a boycott is not a communist method, but it is a method which under the political and military enslavement of the East is one of the most effective weapons, and we have seen that the 1919 boycott in Egypt against British imperialism, and the great Chinese boycott in 1919—1920 were crowned with success. The last boycott movement took place in British India. We may assume that this year or next year another form of boycott will be applied in the East. We know, of course, that the boycott is not our method but rather the method of the petty bourgeoisie and of the nationalist bourgeoisie. Moreover, we can say that the boycott is tantamount to supporting the native capitalists, but we also see that owing to the boycott movement in British India 18,000 leaders are kept in prison. The boycott in India has produced a very revolutionary atmosphere, and has

compelled the British Government to ask Japan for military support in the event of the boycott movement being transformed into an open armed rising. We also know that the Mohamedan leaders in India, Dr. Kirchlef, Hasrat Mahoni and the brothers Ali are nationalists and that there was no rising when Ghandi was arrested. Everyone knows that local risings must end in defeat, because we have no arms and other war material at our disposal. Therefore, the boycott movement is important for us Communists, now and in the future. We know in India and Java that many of our communists are inclined to proclaim the boycott movement in Java, perhaps because the communist mood created by the Russian Revolution has passed over, and perhaps also because in British India the atmosphere was not ripe for communist actions capable of competing with the other movement. In any case, we are confronted with the question: should we or should we not support these tactics? And how far shall we go? Pan-Islamism is a long story. First of all I will deal with our experiences in India where we collaborate with the Islamists. We have in Java a very large union comprising many very poor peasants, viz. *Sarakat Islam*. Between 1912 and 1916 this union had more than one million members. Until 1920 we collaborated with this union. Our Party, consisting of 13,000 members, went to the National Assembly and carried on propaganda. In 1921 we succeeded in making *Sarakat Islam* adopt our program, and it went into the villages agitating for the control of production and for the watchword: "All power to the poor peasants and to the proletariat." Thus, we carried on the same propaganda as our Communist Party. Only sometimes under another name. However, a split occurred in 1921, owing to the tactless criticism of the leaders of the *Sarakat Islam*. The government, through its agents, made use of this split, and also of the decision of the Second Congress of the Communist International to fight against Pan-Islamism. The government agents said to the simple peasants that the Communists did not only want to create a split among them, but also that they wanted to destroy their religion. This was too much for a simple Moslem peasant. The peasant thought to himself that he had already lost everything in this world, and that he was not willing to lose heaven as well. Such was the mood of these simple minded people, and the government propagandists and agents made good use of it. Thus we have a split.

The *Sarakat Islamists* believe in our propaganda. They are with us "with their stomachs", but with their hearts they remain with the *Sarakat Islam*,—with their heaven, which we cannot give them. Therefore, they boycotted our meetings, and we could not carry on propaganda any longer. In the beginning of last year we made efforts again to get into contact with *Sarakat Islam*. We said at our Congress in December 1921 that the Moslems in the Caucasus and other countries which worked with the Soviets and struggled against international capitalism know their religion much better, and we also said that they are at liberty to carry on propaganda for their religion, but that this must not be done at meetings but in the Mosques.

We have been asked at public meetings if we were Moslems or not, and if we believe in God. My answer to this has been that when I stand before God, I am a Moslem, but when I stand before men I am not a Moslem, because God said that there are many devils among men. Thus we inflicted a defeat on their leaders with the Koran in our hands, and at our last year's Congress we compelled the leaders of the *Sarakat Islam*, through their own members, to collaborate. When a general strike broke out last year, they needed us, as the railwaymen were under our leadership. As the *Sarakat-Islam* leaders had expressed their willingness to work with us, they were obliged to help us. We went to them and said: Your God is all-powerful, but he has also said that on this earth the railwaymen are more powerful. The railwaymen are God's Executive Committee in this world. However, this does not solve the question, and if we have another split, we may be sure that the government agents will be there again with their Pan-Islamism. Therefore, this question of Pan-Islamism is very important.

It is also very important to understand the meaning of Pan-Islamism. Once it had an historic meaning and meant that Islam must conquer the whole world with the sword, and that this must be achieved by a Holy War under the leadership of the Caliph who must be of Arabian descent. About forty years after the death of Mahomat the Mohamedans were split into three great States, and thus the Holy War lost its significance for the entire Mohamedan World, for it was no longer necessary to fight in the name of God for the Caliphate and the conquest of the world, because the Western secular Caliph of Spain said: I am the true Caliph, I must carry the banner. The Caliphs of Egypt and Bagdad said the same. Thus, Pan-Islamism has lost its original meaning, and means now something quite different. At present Pan-Islamism is a nationalist liberation struggle, because Islam for the Moslems is everything: not only religion, but also the State,

the economic system, the food, in fact everything. Thus Pan-Islamism now means the fraternity of all Mohamedan peoples and the liberation not only of the Arabian, but also the Indian, Javanese and all other oppressed Mohamedan peoples. This fraternity is called the liberation struggle against the British, French, and Italian capitalists, consequently against world capitalism. Such is the meaning of Pan-Islamism in India

among the oppressed colonial peoples for which secret propaganda is being carried on. This is our new task, and just as we are willing to support the national war, we shall also support the liberation struggle of the very active and energetic 250 million Mohamedans who are subject to the imperialist Powers. Therefore, I ask once more if we should support Pan-Islamism in this sense, and in how far we are to support it.

Zinoviev's Reply

"Comrades, you will allow me to discuss in some detail the question of Workers' Government. It is not yet quite clear to me whether there are serious differences of opinion with regard to this question, whether this question has been completely ventilated, or whether a good deal of our differences were caused by variations in terminology. In the course of the Congress, and during the working out of the resolution on tactical questions, with which we shall deal after the question of the Russian Revolution, this will become clear. I think, comrades, that the question will be made clear if I express myself as follows: it is clear to us that every bourgeois government is a capitalist government. It is hard to imagine a bourgeois government—the mule of the bourgeois class—which is not at the same time a capitalist government. But I fear that one cannot reverse that saying. Every working class government is not a proletarian government; not every workers' government is a socialist government.

This contrast is radical. It reveals the fact that the bourgeoisie have their outposts within our class, but that workers have not their outposts within the capitalist class. It is impossible for us to have our outposts in the camp of the bourgeoisie.

Every bourgeois Government is a capitalist Government, and even many Workers' governments can be bourgeois Governments according to their social composition. I think that the main point is: there are Workers' Governments and Workers' Governments. I believe that one can imagine four kinds of Workers' Governments, and even then we will not have exhausted the possibilities. You can have a Workers' Government which, according to its composition, would be a Liberal Workers' Government, for example, the Australian Labour Government; and several of our Australian comrades say that the term Workers' Government is incorrect because in Australia we have had such Workers' Governments of a bourgeois nature. These were really Workers' Governments, but their composition was of a purely Liberal character. They were bourgeois Workers' Governments, if one may so term them.

Let us take this example. The general elections are taking place in England. It is not probable, but one may well accept in theory, as a possibility, that a Workers' Government will be elected, which will be similar to the Australian Labour Government, and will be of Liberal composition. This Liberal Workers' Government in England can, under certain circumstances, constitute the starting point of revolutionizing the situation. That could well happen. But by itself, it is nothing more than a Liberal Workers' Government. We, the Communists, now vote in England for the Labor Party. That is the same as voting for a Liberal Workers' Government. These are absolutely the right tactics. Why? Because this objective would be a step forward; because a Liberal government in England would disturb the equilibrium, and would extend the bankruptcy of capitalism. We have seen in Russia during the Kerensky regime how the position of capitalism was smashed, despite the fact that the Liberals were the agents of capitalism. Plekhanov, in the period from February to October 1917, called the Mensheviks, semi-Bolsheviks. We said that this was an exaggeration; they are not semi-Bolsheviks, but just quarter-Bolsheviks. We said this because we were at war with them, and because we saw their treachery to the proletariat. Objectively, Plekhanov was right. Objectively, the menshevik government was best adapted to make a hash of capitalism, by making its position impossible. Our Party, which was then fighting the mensheviks, would not and could not see this. The parties stood arrayed for conflict. Under such conditions, we can only see that they are traitors to the working class. They are not opponents of the bourgeoisie, but when, for a period, they hold the weapons of the bourgeoisie in their hands, they make certain steps which are objectively against the bourgeois state. Therefore, in England, we support the Liberal Workers' Government and the Labor Party. The English bourgeoisie are right when they say that the workers' government will start with Clynes and finish in the hands of the Left Wing.

That is the first type of a possible Workers' Government. The second type is that of a Socialist Government. One can imagine that the United Social Democratic Party, in Ger-

many, forms a purely socialist government. That would also be a Workers' Government, a Socialist Government—with the word—Socialist—of course in inverted commas. One can easily imagine a situation where we would give such a government certain conditional credit, a certain conditional support. One can imagine a Socialist government as being a first step in the revolutionizing of the situation.

A third type is the so-called Coalition government; that is, a government in which Social-Democrats, Trade Union leaders, and even perhaps Communists, take part. One can imagine such a possibility. Such a government is not yet the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it is perhaps a starting point for the dictatorship. When all goes right, we can kick one social-democrat after another out of the government until the power is in the hands of the Communists. This is a historical possibility.

Fourthly we have a Workers' Government which is really a workers' government—that is a Communist Workers' Government, which is the true Workers' Government. I believe that this fourth possibility is a pseudonym for dictatorship of the proletariat, that it is truly a Workers' Government in the true sense of the word. But this by no means exhausts the question. There can be a fifth or sixth type, and they can all be excellent starting points for a broader revolutionizing of the situation.

I fear that in seeking for a strictly scientific definition, we overlook the political significance of the term. I do not care for hair splitting about a scientific definition, but I am concerned about not confusing the revolutionary definition. The bourgeoisie will not give up its power voluntarily; it will resist with all its might. The question is to consider all eventualities within the perspective of the world revolution and civil war. One should never forget that, outside the Labor parties, there stands a bourgeoisie which for hundreds of years has been in power, and which will exert every effort to retain this power.

Therefore, in order to construct a Workers' Government in the revolutionary sense, one must overthrow the bourgeoisie; and that is the most important. We must not forget that we have here to distinguish between two things: (1) Our methods of agitation; how we can best speak to the simple workers, how we can enable them best to understand the position. For that purpose, I believe the slogan of a "Workers' Government" is best adapted. (2) How will events develop historically, in what concrete forms will the revolution manifest itself? And all rambling discussions over slogans are worth nothing. We will now slightly raise the curtain of history.

How will the revolution proceed? We will attempt all ways: through the workers' government, through a coalition government, and through a civil war. But all prophecies are out of place here. The revolution will probably come quite differently from the way we imagine it. We have already seen this in the Russian Revolution. Five years ago it was believed that the blockade, the famine etc., would force us to surrender. We foresaw all sorts of eventualities, except the eventuality of the new economic policy, except the victory of the revolution. The situation varies in each country. The revolution will probably come quite differently in Germany and in England. This does not mean that, as conscious revolutionists, we should not try to peep behind the curtain. We are thinking beings, the leaders of the working class. We must look at the question from all sides. It is nevertheless difficult to make any prediction. If we now look at the slogan of the workers' government from this new standpoint, as a concrete road to the realization of the proletarian revolution, we may doubt whether the world revolution must necessarily pass through the stage of the workers' government. Our friend Radek said yesterday that the workers' government is a possible intermediary step to the dictatorship of the proletariat. I agree, it is a possibility, or more exactly an exceptional possibility. This does not mean that the slogan of the workers' government is not good. It is a good instrument of agitation where the relation of forces makes it possible. But if we put this question: is the workers' government a necessary step towards the revolution? I must answer that this is not a question that we can solve here. It is a way, but the least probable of all. In countries with a

highly developed bourgeois class, the proletariat can conquer power by force alone, through civil war. In such a case an intermediary step is not to be thought of. It might take place, but it is useless to argue here about it. All that is necessary is that we see clearly all the possible ways towards the revolution. The workers' government may be nothing more than a liberal labor government, as it might be in England and in Australia. Such a workers' government can also be useful to the working class. The agitation for a workers' government is wise, we may gain many advantages therefrom. But in no case must we forget our revolutionary prospects. I have here a beautiful article by the Czecho-Slovak minister Benisch. I will read you a passage.

The "Tschas", organ of minister Benisch, writes, on September 18: "The Communist Party is building the United Front of the workers on a slogan of a fight against unemployment.

"We cannot deny that the communists are clever. They know how to present to the workers the same thing under different forms. For instance, some time ago, the communists began a campaign for the formation of Soviets. When they saw that this campaign was unsuccessful, they stopped their agitation, but resumed it a year and a half later under the mask of United Front committees. The United Front of the proletariat might become a tremendous force."

This bourgeois is right, I believe. We communists who deal with the masses intellectually enslaved by the bourgeoisie, must make all efforts to enlighten our class. I have said that a workers' government might be in reality a bourgeois government; but there might appear a workers' government with real revolutionary tendencies. It is our duty to enlighten in all ways the more receptive sections of the working class. But the contents of our declaration must always remain the same.

Another thing, comrades, Soviet Government does not always mean dictatorship of the proletariat. Far from it. A soviet government existed for eight months in Russia parallel with the Kerensky government, but this was not a dictatorship of the proletariat. Nevertheless, we defended the slogan of the Soviet Government; and we only gave it up for a very short time.

This is why I believe that we can adopt the policy of the workers' government with a peaceful heart, under the only condition that we do not forget what it really amounts to. Woe to us if we ever allow the suggestion to creep up in our propaganda that the workers' government is a necessary step, to be achieved peacefully as a period of semi-organic construction which may take the place of the civil war, etc. If such views exist among us, we must combat them ruthlessly; we must educate the working class by way of telling them: Yes, dear friends, to establish a workers' government the bourgeoisie must be first overthrown and defeated.

This is the most important part of the slogan. We will say to the workers: Do you want a workers' government, if so, well and good, we are ready to come to an agreement even with the social-democrats, though we warn you that they are going to betray you; we favor a workers' government, but under the one condition that you be ready to fight with us against the bourgeoisie. If this is your wish, then we will take up the fight against the bourgeoisie; and if the workers government results from the struggle, it will stand on sound principles, and will be a real beginning to the dictatorship of the proletariat. There is no question here of the word pseudonym, I leave this word to Comrade Meyer; but we must draw a sharp line in this question. It is no way a strategic move likely to replace civil war. The International must adopt the right tactics, but there are no tactics by means of which we could outwit the bourgeoisie and glide smoothly into the realm of a workers' government. The important thing is that we overthrow the bourgeoisie, after which various forms of the workers' government may be established.

In England in the given situation, a government may have revolutionary effects, and therefore we will support it even if it be of a limited, menshevik-liberal nature. But in doing so we by no means avoid civil war. As a matter of fact it would be civil war only in another form which may become even more cruel than any other. The existence of such a workers' government does not mean the avoidance of civil war. We know that just such a menshevik-liberal government may oppose us more cruelly than a bourgeois government; Noske and our own mensheviks have given sufficient proof of this. This is why I say that this slogan may be a good means of agitation when we understand well its revolutionary possibilities: for instance, take the slogan advanced by Blum and Frossard in France. The Executive is responsible for this. We had proposed this slogan in the course of our discussions. But it was premature in France. Why?

Because, on account of the traditions of the Party, the slogan was understood as a pure parliamentary combination. Some have said: Yes, Blum-Frossard's slogan was a good thing. Others have said: yes, but it is not easily achieved. The Executive was theoretically right when it said that the slogan of the workers' government must not be rejected. It was a possibility, it contained revolutionary prospects, but in France, under the circumstances, it was premature. If we had based our united action on the eight-hour day, we might have had better results. As it was, some comrades at once grew suspicious, and rumors were soon set afloat of the unification of the parties, etc. We must take the facts as they are. Some of our friends of the Left have perhaps been guilty of exaggeration. If I am not mistaken, it was Comrade Souvarine who said that there was a time in Russia when a Lenin-Martov Government was contemplated. This is not true. Such possibility never came up in Russia. We must not forget that with the fall of Czarism, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie was also half accomplished. The February Revolution, indeed, was a bourgeois revolution; but it was not wholly bourgeois, it was already then a great popular revolution which contained the seed of the October Revolution. Soldiers' Soviets had been organized from the very first day; soviets which were not to be disbanded after a few months as Noske had done in Germany, but such as began the fight against Kerensky from the very beginning.

At such a time when the mensheviks formed a kind of secondary government, the slogan of a workers' government was in place. As we know this led to no positive results. The civil war was not avoided. We did not form an alliance with Martov, but with the Left wing Social-Revolutionaries who represented the revolutionary peasantry. In this sense, the slogan was justified. But to attempt the same thing in France, and to say that this was the same as a Martov-Lenin government, was a wrong appreciation of the situation.

Even our best comrades have made mistakes in the application of this policy. I do not believe that this Congress, after the work of the commissions has been accomplished will reject the slogan of the workers' government. This slogan is indisputably correct as a means to approach the masses. It is only a question of knowing how to apply it. It contains the same dangers as the United Front. When one speaks of government, one naturally thinks of Parliamentary combinations, with a distribution of cabinet seats, etc. We shall meet even greater difficulties here than in the application of the United Front. But this is no reason why we should reject it, as our French comrades have proposed. They say: "Our Party is too weak, we can do nothing with it". If your Party is too weak, you must strengthen it. If you cannot swim, jump into the water, and you will learn quickly enough. We point out the dangers of the policy so that we may be able to meet them. In this period of apathy through which we are passing the danger of opportunist infection is great. Comrade Radek was right when he said that the danger now threatens from the Right; the six sessions which we have already held must have convinced you of this.

We must adopt a rigid line of conduct in this question. We must say to our comrades: "Yes, Workers' Governments are all well and good, but first of all we must overthrow the bourgeoisie"; for that purpose, we need weapons, we must be organized, we must have the majority of the working class. We must see clearly that we have a hard fight before us, that victory cannot be achieved without such a fight. With this I believe I may bring this part of my closing speech to an end.

I shall now dwell upon the most important parties, following the same order as in my first speech.

Accordingly, I shall begin with Germany. Comrade Fischer, who after all appeared much less terrible than some would have imagined reproached us by saying that the Third Congress had not had a wholly good influence upon the German Party. This accusation she should have advanced against the Third, but not the Fourth Congress. However, we are the successors of the Third Congress, and we stand ready to render account, I do not believe that the reproach was justified. We do not need to exaggerate and say that we have saved the German Party. It is not we who have saved it, but the German proletariat itself. Some say that the Levi question was not correctly handled. Permit me to say that this is not so. Do not forget that during the Third Congress even the best militants were doubtful on this question.

This same doubt prevailed among our Russian delegates. Some, of them thought that after all Levi is a clever fellow. Perhaps he can settle the question better than we can. It appeared however that this task and the duty of the Third Congress was to see that Levi be the only one to pass over to Noske, or at least

that he go in very small company. Geyer and company are not of much importance. We let him have them willingly, and a few more with them. But the danger existed that he could take away with him part of our Party. In this matter the Third Congress has given a certain amount of assistance to our Parties and has enabled them to take up the right attitude and to save the best elements for the revolution. Thus, in this respect comrade Ruth Fischer was somewhat in the wrong.

As to the Rathenau affair, Comrade Radek already emphasized that we regard this part of her criticism as justified. At the time of the Rathenau assassination, we sent a confidential communication to the German Party when the action had already begun, expressing to our Central Organization in Germany our opinion on this matter.

With your permission, I will put before you a few quotations from this letter. The letter is dated June 18th, and was therefore written when the fight was at its height:

"As to the attitude of the Party, we have followed as much as possible all that is going on in Germany. We have read your report very carefully and are grateful to you for the details which it contains. The tactics of the first days, as described in the 'Rote Fahne' are, in our opinion weak. One should not adopt as a slogan: the republic! the republic! in a situation such as this. One should on the contrary put evident proof before the masses from the very first that the present Germany is a republic without republicans. One should show to the wide working masses, which are less concerned about the republic than about their economic interests that the bourgeois republic, far from being a guarantee for the class interest of the proletariat, is on the contrary the best weapon for the oppression of the working masses in the present situation. We must not blow the horn together with the Social Democrats and the U. S. P. The independence of our agitation work should never, never, be sacrificed to the United Front policy. This is for you a condition sine qua non. We are willing to negotiate with the S. P. D. and the U. S. P., but not as poor relations, but as an independent power, retaining its own character and putting before the masses the full program of the Party". I believe that this question is a sufficient proof that we warned our German Party in good time against this weak point of the Rathenau campaign. We went even further than that, for we asked if the German Party could not take up a more energetic attitude. Of course, it did not behave us to tell the German Party that it should at once begin an action, declare a strike etc. This kind of thing must be decided upon by the Party itself. We did however, raise the question of the possibility of an immediate, independent and energetic action by our Party. I am convinced, as far as I can judge the situation, that there was no possibility for such action; it would have resulted in nothing but bloodshed. The Central Committee did not commit such a mistake, and in spite of many shortcomings, it made the best of the situation.

A few more words about the Berlin organization. I forgot to mention in my first report that we had during this period a little disagreement with the Berlin organization, which to a certain extent found some expression in the press. Comrades, I am sure that I am expressing the mind of the entire Executive by saying that this conflict was a very painful incident, and that we are anxious to avoid even the shadow of a conflict. The Executive is well aware of the weak points of some of our local organizations. The Berlin, the Paris, and even the Petrograd, Moscow and many other organizations have their weak points. It cannot be said that the Circus Busch campaign was a brilliant feature of the activity of our Berlin organization. However, we know that it is a proletarian organization, and we did not want to have it interpreted as if there was cause for continuous friction. As far as we are able to judge this matter, no serious difference of opinion exists, and if there is any difference, it is very slight and likely to occur in any organization. At the time we invited the Berlin comrades to come here, in order to settle this little matter as quickly as possible. We did not succeed in this. I cannot help emphasizing this at the Congress, in order to get rid of this incident once and for all. We are convinced that the Berlin organization will be generally of the greatest use to the Party.

I should like to say just a few more words in connection with Comrade Fischer's speech. Comrade Fischer, your speech (if you will allow me to say so) was conspicuous for having combined many correct statements with a number of incorrect ones. This is, of course, not very serious, and it can, so to speak, happen in the best families. You said for instance that the S. P. D. captured the U. S. P. through the United Front illusion. This is not so; you flatter the U. S. P. The latter was not captured, it rather wished to be captured. And this is precisely what we must tell the German workers. The fact that

the U. S. P. wanted to be captured, is a matter of political importance. It looked for the right moment to be captured, in fact it threw itself into the embrace of the S. P. D. This fact is very important, and will assist us in bringing back the workers of the U. S. P. into the right fold. You were also guilty of exaggerations when you said that weeks were wasted in negotiations with the other leading organizations. It is true the negotiations were rather protracted, but they certainly did not last as long as that. If I am not mistaken, they only took up one week of our time. However, it is easy to make mistakes in such small matters, and not much harm was done.

The German comrades, particularly in private conversation, told me that I had painted the situation of the German Party in too roseate colours, whereas not everything there was really so bright. Now, Comrades, since many other delegates have reproached me in the opposite sense, it is reasonable to assume that it was not so bad if I depicted the situation of a Party in too favourable terms. It is nevertheless a fact that it takes other Parties many months' discussion to solve such problems as have already been solved by the German Party. After the affair of the March days, after the Rathenau campaign, after the discussion which we have had in the German Party, it may be stated without exaggeration that the Party in Germany has triumphed over the greatest difficulties and is on the way to becoming a real and earnest Communist Party fully capable of manoeuvring, which will soon bring about decisive events in Germany, perhaps much sooner than many of us and of our German comrades themselves imagine. This I say not by way of compliment, but because I am fully convinced of it.

Now I turn to our French comrades. I regret to observe that not all shades of opinion in the Communist International have found full expression in the debate. Many remained silent, and this was not praiseworthy. Comrade Duret was perfectly right when he said that whenever the boys of the Left Wing have something on their minds, they promptly say it openly, and at times with excessive candour. This is a good trait of the Left; but the other comrades who sit a little further to the Right are persistently silent, and this is bad. On considering what has been said in this hall one cannot help seeing that a Centrist semi-democratic mood is present in the ranks of the Communist International, or at least in its close vicinity.

Comrade Duret said that the masses in Germany are organized and in France they are not, that the United Front is applicable to Germany, but not to France. Comrade Duret should be told that he entirely ignores the real significance of the idea of winning over the majority of the workers. It is certainly a loose mass, like the sand on the sea-shore. This is our handicap. We must combine this loose mass and mould it, and this is much easier to do in France, just because the movement there has no traditions. In Germany, the worker, in order to change his membership card, has to undergo quite a big internal struggle. That is not the case in France. At the very beginning of the Communist International we said that the Social Democracy is the greatest obstacle to the revolution. It can be argued that the stronger the Social Democracy, the more difficult it is to organize the United Front. You in France are lucky that social-democracy has not been so strong. It is for this very reason that you will succeed more readily, if you will but prosecute a truly revolutionary policy, if you will build up a truly Communist Party. It was further said, that in France the United Front was immediately interpreted as an electoral combination for political purposes. Perhaps, that is so. But why did you not start in the sphere of trade unionism, why not in the economic field? In both of these fields there is no possibility of opposition in principle. The only opposition in principle comes from comrade Bordiga, but he is wrong. Why did you not take up the question of the eight-hour day? Now you come and tell us that your Party is too weak, etc. You are too weak because you have misconstrued this question.

In this connection I would like to say a word or two in regard to Comrade Rosmer, in order to conclude with the French question. This morning he quoted my words to the effect that a party that was not active in the trade unions was not to be taken seriously and that a party which did not understand the trade union movement as a revolutionary movement is also not to be taken seriously. Rosmer said he agreed with the first proposition but he did not agree with the second one. He thought we should take into consideration the objective difficulties which were quite insurmountable. Nevertheless I must insist that it is a very important question; the trade union movement is the present time movement. No doubt, there are objective difficulties which should by no means be under-estimated. For instance, the Shop Stewards Movement in England has in many

places gone to sleep, which goes to show that a revolutionary mass movement had not arisen in that country. But we must see quite clearly that when there is a real revolutionary party it is bound to bring about such a movement in a short time. I am firmly convinced that when our Party in Germany will become sound it will within six months achieve the beginning of a serious trade union movement. Strikes take place; we have the strikes at Le Havre, which have lasted for three or four months. At Le Havre the masses were almost unorganized. The Party did nothing in the beginning. In the face of such strikes as these it is quite possible for a Party like ours, having a central organ with 200,000 subscribers, to initiate a trade union movement in a short space of time. I therefore think we should fight shy of such weak-kneed elements who always say: Alas, it is difficult, there are obstacles. Of course there are obstacles, but a great deal depends on ourselves. Therefore I think that I ought to insist on my second proposition.

There is yet another thing I would like to emphasize in the speech of Comrade Duret. He said that after the split of the Centre there was a danger of some of them coming over to us and swamping us. In this he was right. It is because of this that we rejected them when they wanted to join us. But they joined among themselves and declared: We are forming our own International. That was the 2½ International. First there was a split, now there is a junction of the majority of these elements with the 2nd International, but a part of these gentlemen will knock at our door, and we will then have to be careful to keep the door shut tight and flourish the 21 conditions once more before their noses. We may even have to say then: These 21 conditions do not suffice for these fellows! We may have to present to them 42 conditions. Otherwise all these fellows will sneak in, and tomorrow we shall have the same crisis over again.

I now come to the situation in Italy.

This in particular has been the painful side of the whole of our discussion. One feels convinced that the Party led by Bordiga is at bottom a sound workers' Party, a revolutionary workers' Party which has accomplished a great deal of good, and yet one is often constrained to combat them theoretically and politically. This is the painful side. But Party duty compels us to tackle this painful matter. Comrade Bordiga started by arguing against our thesis of winning the majority of the working class. He said that it was a vague formula, that one could not understand what is really meant by it, and he demanded that we strike out of the resolution all reference to winning a majority of the working class.

This was the subject of the first fight between Comrade Lenin and Comrade Terracini. I must confess to having felt a sort of pity for Terracini at the time, it seemed to me that Comrade Lenin had handled him somewhat too roughly. It seemed impossible that these people could really be in opposition to the majority. Meanwhile the Fascisti have been victorious; the Italian Socialist Party is broken up, and a multitude of other events of world importance have taken place. Yet even now Comrade Bordiga gets up on the platform and says: the majority is a vague formula. I must now confess that Lenin was right. These people were apparently afraid of the majority. Bordiga quite seriously put the question: how shall the majority be counted? In our resolution it was stated that we should bring the majority of the working class under the influence of the communists. How shall we know that we have won the majority? We will not call in a chartered accountant for the purpose. We will not even ask Comrade Bordiga to find for us a suitable Italian notary or a witness furnished by Mussolini to certify that Communism has the majority in Italy. I believe that the trade unions should be the first standard to go by; also other standards would be found to indicate to us when we have won the majority. This does not mean to say that we should postpone our fighting until we have organized the majority of the workers. This is considered by Bordiga as a sort of bargain-hunting. He labors under the impression, that today the Executive faces towards the Right, and tomorrow towards the Left. This I must say is an error which should be eradicated. If this is not done, the Party is simply lost. How can the Party start work without possessing the requisite energy, without being conscious of its principal aims? This is surely not a vague formula. Bordiga takes exception to my statement that some Parties have increased their influence, although remaining weak numerically. Nevertheless it is a fact. The whole thing lies in the question of influence. To organize the majority of the workers immediately is a matter of impossibility; it will be possible only after the conquest of power by the proletariat. Even in Russia, only now, in the fifth year of the revolution do we claim to have organized the majority. In other countries it cannot yet be thought of. But the Communist Party can secure influence over the majority now. Yes, there are parties which are backward numerically, although

they have strengthened their influence. I will quote to you an instance of a distant country, New South Wales. There we had a Party which numbered 500 members. After we had accepted it into the Communist International, it increased its membership to somewhere between 900 and 1000. But this small Party has brought the trade unions of that country—a quarter of a million workers—completely into the Profintern, with great discipline and with great enthusiasm. This is a good example. We will not say: please organize the majority. We know too well how to value the initiative of the minority. It is certainly a splendid group of 500 workers that has managed to influence 250,000 workers.

It all amounts to a real determination by Communists to gain influence over the majority. Bordiga wanted to know, for what purpose we were to win the majority for the Communist program.

We are also in favor of winning them over for the revolution. However, if Comrade Domsy thinks that all the 230,000 workers in South Wales have read Bukharin's program, and will read all the projects of Comrades Thalheimer and Kabakchiev he is very much mistaken. The workers know very well what they want. They want to overcome the bourgeoisie, and that is enough for them for the present.

Just a few words more about the Italian trade unions. I read lately an article which was probably written by Comrade Terracini. He deals with the Fascist trade union movement. The Fascisti are establishing all over Italy their own trade unions,—a new and very important phenomenon. They want to become a mass organization. As to the attitude of the workers, in can be illustrated by the following example. In one large factory the owner dismissed all the workers and declared that henceforth he will take none but Fascist workers. After a little consideration the workers obtained Fascisti cards and were taken on again. Soon after, an election of the factory committee took place in this factory, with the result that the Fascisti obtained one per cent of the votes, while an overwhelming majority of those elected were Communists. This was a very clever move on the part of the working masses, who had a very good idea of what really was at stake. They said to themselves, we will procure the cards in order to avoid brutal treatment, but we will nevertheless remain revolutionary. But we must consider what we must do while the Fascisti are capturing or organizing trade unions. It goes without saying that we must penetrate into Fascisti trade unions in order to win them over to our side. And yet what do we see? Our comrade publishes an article in which he explains the nature of Fascism, syndicalism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The article is full of very clever arguments, only one thing is missing: the soul, the live masses, the only things which we should say and bring into the trade unions in order to overcome the bourgeoisie. The only necessary idea was missing in this article, and therefore the watchword was stillborn. This is just an illustration of what is really wrong with our otherwise splendid and brave Italian Communist Party.

I am coming now to the Poles and to the speech of our Comrade Domsy. I cannot quite forgive Comrade Domsy that he committed a grave political error already before the Third Congress. It was Domsy who during the Russo-Polish war wrote an article which contained the following passage: "To bring the Red Army and the bayonets of the Soviet Government to Poland is not a communist policy." He adopted, at first in a letter and subsequently in the "Rote Fahne", an attitude which we termed at the time as the most genuine of nationalism. Every proletarian with any common sense will admit that in the event of the bourgeoisie of one country holding down the proletariat with bayonets, the latter will be only too glad if a red army, be it a Hungarian, Italian or even French red army came to its assistance. This would be the opinion of every worker. Of course Comrade Domsy is not a nationalist. This was only a small remnant of the past which many a comrade of ours imbibed with his mother's milk, it is a remnant of the P.P.S. ideology. The Polish intellectuals as a whole are afflicted with nationalism, even some of our best comrades are tinged with it. Comrade Domsy committed this error fifteen months ago. I am not saying this in order, so to speak, to demand his head. If he has something to teach us to-day, we are quite willing to learn, but nevertheless we will bear in mind that he has been guilty of the political error.

Now I am coming to the lesson which he taught us to-day. I have already discussed what Comrade Domsy said about the majority. We are perfectly aware that we have not yet the majority in Poland. We cannot take the elections, recently conducted by Pilsudsky as a criterion. We know that Pilsudsky is an opponent and that the bourgeoisie has falsified the election. We are perfectly aware of all this, but we also know that we are not very

far from a majority. We have not got it yet, but we shall probably have it in the very near future.

He also said that the United Front was alright in all the other countries, but not in Poland. This is the same kind of ideology of which we had an example to-day.

In all the other countries the Executive may assume the role of a dictator and may apply the United Front tactics, but in my country it is a different matter, the conditions are different, and so is the working class and the Party. To this I say that the United Front tactics are most suitable in a country like Poland, I notice in the Central Organ of the P.P.S. in Warsaw a daily column with the heading: "Long live the Workers and Peasants' Government". What does this mean? It means that the watchword of the workers' government finds an echo in all the sections of the masses. You said that we carry on this demagogue because this watchword promises to be successful with working masses. Comrade Donsky says we must be against the workers if these watchwords are already so popular with the masses that even the social traitors are having them continually on their lips,—it is all the more reason for us to insist on the watchword of the United Front. We must keep the watchword continuously before the masses. We know that the Polish workers and peasants are not in favor of a bourgeois government, but that they are in favor of a workers' government. Therefore, although you are their representatives, we propose to work for a workers' government and a United Front. This shall be the slogan in the agitational campaign. The situation in Poland has certain features of its own, but it is precisely for this reason that we want to apply the United Front tactics there more than anywhere else.

Now a few words about Norway.

I said that there were twelve papers in Norway that call themselves Social Democratic, and Comrade Haakon-Meyer told me quite maliciously that there were forty such papers. Probably they all bear the title "Socialdemokrat". Our Party in Norway is strong, and therefore much is expected of it. When we heard the short statement by the young academician, we said at once to ourselves that the Comrades were mistaken. One section of the Mot-Dae group is good, but the other is not under the control of the Party. It comprises young academicians of whom it may be said that up to 25 years, they are rabid revolutionaries, at 26 they begin to change, and at 30 they are well established barristers and opponents of the working class. We are afraid of these academicians. Those who have really learned something, should accept the Party discipline and should go to the workers in order to help them in their struggle for emancipation. It cannot be tolerated that after having been eighteen months in the movement, they declare the Communist International not to be sufficiently independent. We must insist on coming to a very definite conclusion on the Norwegian question, and I trust that we shall succeed in this.

Now a few more words about Comrade Varga's speech. He showed very conclusively that it is better to eat one's fill than to be hungry, that bread is better than hunger and that the legend about the hunger must be done away with.

But this is not the question, for firstly it was not a legend. It was a severe famine, so we had to tell the working class. Things are now somewhat improved; and naturally we shall tell the working masses that the Russian toilers are no longer starving—I am in agreement with Comrade Varga on this matter. We shall tell them that the position of the Russian worker is improving daily. We shall not rejoice overmuch, until it has become a definite fact. We shall go to the workers with facts and figures. Step by step, we shall ameliorate the condition of our workers; and then tell the workers of other lands of this. But this is not the matter in dispute, but something quite different. There is no longer famine in Russia. But we must admit that, in other countries, the dictatorship of the proletariat may cause a famine. Shall we refuse to tell the workers this bitter truth? We cannot avoid it. We must tell the workers just how the matter stands. In Russia we had five terrible years; in other countries the period might be shorter. The dictatorship does not necessarily imply famine; this depends upon various factors. But in many lands it would be probably accompanied by a famine. It would be opportunism and cowardice not to say this to the workers. We can't say to the workers, "To-morrow everything will be fine; you will have meat and a good home". This would be laying ourselves open to attack by the reactionists. The question is not whether I should tell the workers of other countries that there is no more famine in Russia; it is whether they will be visited by famine. They must be told this fearlessly. And the worker knows what life is, he knows the advance guard of the working class must tell him this quite frankly.

With this, comrades, I am practically at the end of my reply. I would just like to put one more question. Yesterday,

Comrade Radek said that danger threatened us from the Right and not from the Left. I would like to emphasize these words, and express myself in full agreement with them. It is not a matter of the goodwill to the various comrades and groups, but it concerns the objective situation. We must see this clearly. Still worse times could come and so we shall strengthen the Communist International and maintain it as the advance guard of the proletariat, only in so far as we have a genuine international organization which will fight every trace of opportunism, not merely with words but with deeds. Today, I said in a commission:—sometimes we hear from our friends that in principle, they are in agreement with all that the Executive does.—That is how it always begins, so I quoted a few words from Bismark, who once said: "Whenever we old diplomats say we are for a thing in principle, we are against it in reality." We do not need this sort of thing in the Communist International. Whoever is against the tactics of the Communist International should now say so clearly. Whoever is for them, should be so with all his heart and soul. Then we shall build up a real International, that will light up the obscurity of the world, such an International as will at the first opportunity lead the working class to battle and to victory.

The Resolution of the IV. World Congress on the Report of the Executive

"The Fourth World Congress of the Communist International wholly approves the political work of the Executive Committee of the Communist International which during the fifteen months of activity has carried out the resolutions of the Third World Congress, and have applied them correctly in accordance with the special political conditions in each country.

The Fourth Congress approves especially the policy of the United Front as it has been formulated by the Executive Committee in its thesis of December, 1921 and in other documents of the Executive Committee relating to this question.

The Fourth Congress of the Communist International approves the attitude of the Executive Committee on the crisis in the French Communist Party, on the working class movement of Italy, on the Communist Party of Norway, on the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. Questions of practical details will be dealt with by special commissions whose resolutions will later be put before the Congress. With regard to what has happened in certain parties, the Fourth Congress, reminds the National Sections that the Executive Committee of the Comintern is the court of appeal for the whole Communist movement during the time between world congresses and that its decisions are binding upon all affiliated parties. It follows therefrom that any infringement of these resolutions on the ground of a later appeal to the next congress is an open breach of discipline. If the Comintern should allow such practice, all regular and unified activity of the Comintern will become impossible.

In answer to the doubts of the Communist Party of France as to the application of par. 9 of the statutes of the Comintern, the Fourth Congress answers that this par. 9 gives the Executive Committee of the Comintern the unquestionable right to expel from the Comintern, and therefore from the affiliated national section, any person or group which according to the view of the Executive Committee, are inimical to Communism.

The Executive Committee of the Comintern is forced to make use of par. 9 every time a national party does not show the necessary energy and consideration for the protection of the Party to expel non-Communist elements from its ranks.

The Fourth Congress of the Comintern reaffirms the 21 Conditions laid down by the Second Congress of the Comintern and demands of the future Executive Committee that it enforce these most strictly. The Executive Committee of the Comintern must become more than ever an international organization of the proletariat; it must ruthlessly combat all opportunism; it must become an organization based on the principle of the strictest democratic centralism."

The resolution is adopted by a great majority.

The Soviet of Workers, Peasants and Red Soldiers of Vladivostok to the Workers of the World.

Comrades! From the shores of the Pacific Ocean, where the Red Soviet Flag flies, we send you our proletarian greetings. Today, after four unhappy years of Japanese intervention and the excesses of the White Guards, the Soviet of Workers, Peasants and Red Soldiers, delivered from its enemies, has reassembled in the city of Vladivostok. The innumerable sacrifices of the Russian workers have not been in vain. After a bloody struggle, the Red Army has won the last piece of Russian territory which has hitherto been in the power of the emissaries of the Japanese militarists; the people of Vladivostok greet their liberators with enthusiasm; with curses it has sped the reactionaries on their way in their cowardly flight. For the first time, a powerful Workers and Peasants' Army has paraded the streets of the Free City with their victorious banner. This triumphant procession has shown the power of the working class of Soviet Russia and of the whole world: a class united and invincible. The appearance of this orderly army in the city abandoned only a few hours previously by the interventionists, has given the workers the assurance that the time of trial is over. After the departure of the interventionists and the capture of Vladivostok by the Red Army, there is no need longer of the provisional government of the Republic of the Far East, which was created in 1920 in order to prevent a collision between Soviet Russia which was still comparatively weak, and the belligerent Japanese imperialists. Comrades! you know how, during these last two years, Soviet Russia has become strong; you know what successes it has gained in the international field. You have seen how the delegates of Soviet Russia have defended the interests of their Government at Genoa and at the Hague. You know the blows which the Japanese schemes of annexation received at the conference of Dairen and Tchang-Tchun. Soviet Russia has built up its strength thanks to the unexampled enthusiasm, and by the exertion of the entire strength of the workers, her innumerable enemies have been defeated and her economic disorganization repaired. The imperialist policy of Japan has been broken by the resistance of the Russian people, by the Japanese people themselves, and by the pressure of those great Powers which are interested in hindering the growth of Japanese influence. The liberation of the Primur provinces signifies the definite reunion of all the scattered regions of Russia. The Japanese proletariat has proved itself conscious of its task, and has shown its resolute will to reunite the whole of the Primur region, devastated by intervention and by the White bandits, with the home land of the revolutionary workers of Vladivostok. On the 5th November, in all the unions of Vladivostok, the election took place of workers' delegates to the Soviet. The peasants and the Red Army also sent their delegates. The great day arrived on which we realized the dreams of all the exploited, of the disinherited and oppressed. This is not merely a victory for the workers and peasants of the Pacific coast and the workers of Russia. It is a victory for the world proletariat. It is your victory, comrades, because from now on the Primur region will be an integral part of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the heart of the world revolution. From now on the principles of the world revolution, the principles of the October Revolution, will shed their light upon the towns and villages of the Primur region which, during long years, were steeped in the gloom of reaction. Accept our greetings comrades, in this moment of painful struggle which you are carrying on against the master classes of your respective countries. All the sympathies of the Vladivostok proletariat are with you. Ourselves but recently freed, we desire with all our heart your emancipation from capitalist exploitation. Deliverance is near, comrades: you have as proof, the World Congress of the Communist International, now being held in Moscow, the Premier City of the Social Revolution; Comrades, the working class of the Pacific Coast has conquered, but it is not assured of peace, and of the possibility of organizing its social life and the economic development of the country, so long as foreign war vessels still lie off the shores of Vladivostok. The continuation of intervention in Russian waters gives to the White Guards the hope of striking another blow at the young proletarian Soviets of the Primur region. We await your word. We are certain that it will sound from your hearts in the form of protests addressed to your respective governments. To them you should say: "Hands off Soviet Russia."

The Chief Secretary of the Regional Bureau, *Pchenitsine*.

Witnessed: Chief of Administration.

Asamov 55, November 9, 1922.

The IV. World Congress to the Workers of Russia!

The 4. World Congress of the Communist International, holding its first session in Petrograd—the city in which the proletarian revolution originated, and where the Soviet Power was born—sends its greetings to the Workers, Red Soldiers, and Peasants of Soviet Russia, now celebrating the 5th anniversary of the October Revolution.

Comrades! Five years ago your heroic charge against the fortifications of the old world overthrew the government of landowners and bourgeoisie in your country, and wrested one sixth of the globe from capital. During the most frightful war with world capital you have succeeded in defending your Soviet Russia—this conquest of the world proletariat—and are now able to progress further every day on the path of peaceful socialist construction. *The victory has not been easy for you.* Hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants have fallen in the cause of Communism. For years the working class has had to suffer the greatest poverty and torment. But the workers, listening to the cries of their hungry children, have not let fall the Red Flag, but have passed the hardest stretch on their road of suffering with firm and unflinching steps, led by their faithful vanguard, the communist Party.

The Fourth World Congress, which is attended by the majority of the delegates who also took part in the former congresses, is at one with you in paying reverence before the countless graves of proletarians and Red soldiers who have fallen for our cause on the vast plains of Soviet Russia; but the Congress records with joy that though it is but the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution, and the second year of the peaceful development of Soviet Russia, the wounds of the struggle are rapidly healing. The industry and agriculture of Soviet Russia are in the process of reconstruction, the material situation of the workers is improving; a new generation of working youth is growing up, and arming themselves with scientific and technical knowledge; the forces of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army increase in strength, and at the same time the working class of Russia retains the state power as securely as before.

The IV. World Congress meets on Soviet soil at a time when the black clouds of capitalist reaction are gathering more and more densely over the working class of the whole world. With wide-spread front capital has taken up the offensive against the economic gains of the working class; everywhere wages are being reduced, the eight hour day done away with, the rights of the trade unions restricted. Reaction is also pushing forward on the political field. In Italy the Fascists, who form the last reserve of the bourgeoisie in its struggle for existence, have seized state power. The monarchist elements in Germany are organizing themselves, and preparing to take up the offensive. In England even Lloyd George's government has proved too liberal, and is being followed by a Conservative government. Class antagonisms become acuter, and there is every sign that Europe is to be involved in a series of violent conflicts between proletariat and bourgeoisie.

But the darker the night in Europe, the more brilliantly the star of your and our proletarian dictatorship shines from the Soviet North where hammer and sickle rule the land under the protection of the five rayed star of the Red Army. The more the workers of other countries have to suffer under the yoke of ever-increasing capitalist oppression, the greater will be the hope with which the working class of the whole world gazes towards that part of the globe where the workers' government has already controlled the helm of state for five years.

Comrades: You need our help and support in your difficult struggle. But perhaps we shall claim the aid of the first proletarian state of the world when the decisive moment of battle with capital comes. So you must guard our common conquests, your and our Soviet Power. Defend bravely every section of the proletarian front, where you made the breach in the capitalist trenches five years ago, and conquered the ground upon which is founded our proletarian home. Our common victories will extend this home of the proletariat over the whole world.

Long live the great October Revolution and its heroes!

Long live the Russian working class!

Long live proletarian Petrograd, the home of Soviet power!

Down with world capitalism and its main support—the treacherous Social Democrats and reformists!

Long live the Proletarian World Revolution!

Long live the Federated World Republic of Soviets!

To the Italian Proletariat

Dear Brothers, Comrades Workers and Peasants of Italy! On the day of the solemn opening of the Fourth Congress of the Third International concurrent with the celebration of the Fifth anniversary of the victory of the proletarian revolution, the Communist International makes its appeal to you, realizing that the recent events in your country place at the fore of the revolution arena your struggle against the unbridled sway of reaction which is overrunning your country.

Two years ago the Comintern insistently advised the leaders of the then United Italian Socialist Party to take up the offensive. The Comintern strongly urged you to purge the party of the opportunists and to take advantage of the dismay of the bourgeoisie and the rise of the revolutionary sentiment among the toiling masses after the trials and tribulations of war and the disappointment of peace,—to deliver a death blow to the antiquated social order.

But the advice of people inclined to half measures and caution, gained the upper hand. They were frightened by the dictatorship of the proletariat. They appealed to the deeply rooted popular tradition of bourgeois democracy and bourgeois law and order.

Later, what the Comintern predicted, came to pass; while the Centrists were busy negotiating with the Right Wing, the bourgeoisie regained its strength, the reaction took the offensive, and power was seized by the bandits who personified the most violent class hatred towards you and your ideals.

The Fascisti became the masters of the situation.

They have actually established a Dictatorship. They trampled under foot all semblances of democracy and of law and order—those false gods which the weak leaders of Italian Socialism worshipped. By iron and blood they are demolishing the remnants of the workers' organizations which even before they ferociously attacked with the aid of the government now entirely in their hands. Do not despair, brothers of our class! Not only has not all been lost, but employing well considered and determined tactics, victory is sure of attainment. The forces of the proletariat in the largest industrial cities—Turin, Milan, Venice and Trieste remain unimpaired and can easily be prepared to repel the enemy.

The Communist Party of Italy was alert enough to break in time with the vacillating elements which under the guise of maximalism carried out the tactics of indecision and compromise, going so far as to conclude (a year ago) a peace agreement with the Fascist bandits. Today the Communist Party firmly

holds aloft the Red Banner in its hands. The Communist Party issues a call to all Socialists who are in favor of revolutionary action, to the entire working mass and the class conscious peasantry who are stirred with horror at the sight of the black reaction spreading like a cyclone, to rally their forces round the banner of revolution!

It must be acknowledged that if the forces of revolution in Italy are not so weak as represented by the panic-mongers, on the other hand the forces of the Fascisti are much weaker than their friends and followers claim, because in the camp of our class enemies there is a lack of unity.

The Fascisti are first of all a tool in the hands of the agrarians. The industrial commercial bourgeoisie observe with fear the experiment in unbridled reaction which they designate "black Bolshevism."

On the other hand, in addition to the politically immature elements which are actually in the struggle such as the reactionary hooligans, the Fascisti count in their ranks certain elements of the rural proletariat and a section of the peasantry. These elements will soon realize by what deceptive promises they were carried into the counter-revolutionary adventure which is converting them into an army of the landlords to fight against their own brothers.

Finally, Fascism designates the policy of International adventures. Grandiloquent, but without a definite program and definite ideals, without a firm and united class basis, Fascism is bound very soon to arouse against itself a broad movement even among the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie.

The entire Comintern is behind you, dear Comrades. It is very closely watching the unfolding of your strenuous and responsible struggle. It points out to the proletarians of all countries the lesson of the Italian events as an illustration of the consequences of the terrible tactical mistakes of opportunism. It will be only too glad to point to the further history of your movement as an illustration of how such mistakes can be rectified. The Communist International stands ready to lend its utmost support in your bitter struggle.

Long live the unity of the workers of Italy in their struggle against reaction!

Long live the persecuted but courageous Communist Party of Italy!

Long live the unity of the world proletariat in the struggle against capitalism.