

# POLITICAL AFFAIRS

*A Marxist magazine*

*devoted to the advancement of democratic thought and action*

EARL BROWDER, *Editor*: EUGENE DENNIS, *Associate Editor*: V. J. JEROME, *Managing Editor*

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We are pleased to announce that readers have responded enthusiastically to *Political Affairs* in its new format, and many letters have come to us praising the contents of the first issue, particularly the leading article by Earl Browder on the study of Lenin's teachings in relation to contemporary problems.

The March issue of *Political Affairs* will be highlighted by articles on the coming Three-Power Conference, the World Trade Union Conference to be held at London, German cartels, the St. Lawrence Seaway Project, the wages question, and the national budget and tax program.



## A POLITICAL PROGRAM OF NATIVE AMERICAN FASCISM

By EARL BROWDER

IF AMERICANS WISH to understand the fundamental forces which work within our country to take it upon much the same path that Hitlerism took Germany—if we wish, in short, to know our own native fascism—we must look upon the noisy imitators of the Nazis as merely the surface froth on a movement much deeper and more menacing. The source of power and programmatic direction of this native fascism operate from more "respectable" bases. This article is an examination of native fascist trends as expressed in the public utterances of Dr. Virgil Jordan, President of the National Industrial Conference Board, as well as their influence on Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, late Republican candidate for the Presidency of the United States. Dr. Jordan is chosen for examination as the most consistent ideologist of this trend, who functions as head of the "Brain Trust" for the most reactionary and militant monopolist capitalists in America, our native counterpart for the German Thyssens who financed Hitler's rise to power; Gov. Dewey is also selected for special consideration because he became the instrument upon which that reaction-

ary camp depended for execution of its effort to assume power over the nation in the 1944 elections.

### FOUR YEARS EVOLUTION OF DR. JORDAN

On December 10, 1940, Dr. Jordan made a speech to the Investment Bankers Association; on December 1, 1944, he addressed a meeting of the Associated Industries of Massachusetts. Very interesting, indeed, is a comparison of these two speeches, which reveal how the changes in the world are reflected in the political thinking of the reactionary circles of big business.

In 1940, Dr. Jordan assumed that he was speaking for a united and self-confident capitalist class, which had America and the world "by the tail on a downhill pull," to use an old Western American colloquialism. He bubbled over with enthusiasm and an overwhelming sense of power. He was riding "the wave of the future." He foresaw no serious difficulties in doing business with Hitler, then engaged in seizing most of Europe; he assumed that Hitler was going to solve "the Russian question" for him and his fellows; and he en-

visioned only the minor problems of salvaging the British Empire for a junior partnership in the rising American Empire for which he spoke. He rose to lyrical heights in his peroration, picturing the world as a ripe plum about to fall into the hands of American monopoly capital without a struggle. He said:

Whatever the outcome of the war, America has embarked upon a career of imperialism, both in world affairs and in every other aspect of her life. . . . Even though, by our aid, England should emerge from this struggle without defeat, she will be so impoverished economically and crippled in prestige that it is improbable that she will be able to resume or maintain the dominant position in world affairs which she has occupied so long. At best, England will become a junior partner in a new Anglo-Saxon imperialism, in which the economic resources and the military and naval strength of the United States will be the center of gravity. Southward in our hemisphere and westward in the Pacific the path of empire takes its way, and in modern terms of economic power as well as political prestige, the sceptre passes to the United States. All this is what lies beneath the phrase "national defense"—some of it deeply hidden, some of it very near the surface and soon to emerge to challenge us.

By the end of 1944, however, Dr. Jordan himself reveals that four years before he profoundly misjudged both what was near the surface and what was deeply hidden. Strangely enough, this profound mistake has

not shaken his confidence in the correctness of his basic views; he displays a fanaticism worthy of a Hitler in fighting to the end for his chosen goals. But it is a fanaticism shot through with profound pessimism, and the pessimism arises from the growing unity among the American people and among the United Nations. Those things which give hope to the democratic world, bring despair to Dr. Jordan.

Let us see in more detail how Dr. Jordan views his country and the world at the end of 1944.

First, as to America's relation to the world. The 1940 dithyramb on "America uber Alles" has been replaced by its opposite. Dr. Jordan now sees only a "spiritual reconquest of America by the Old World." He elaborates this theme:

Business, labor and government, no less than educators, scientists, economists, and artists, in one degree or another have felt the drag of this spiritual undertow pulling them back toward the Old World way of life. . . . America . . . has become once more a kind of spiritual dependency or colony of Europe. . . . Anyone who understands the direction of the ideas embodied in the post-war plans being debated today in Britain, and in the reconstruction schemes proposed for France and other countries on the Continent, and who realizes the influence these have on our ideas about the future in America, must feel the terrific force of this undertow.

What is the archetype of this "Old World" from which America must

emancipate herself? Of course, it is the Soviet Union. The name of Stalin is the only one mentioned by Dr. Jordan as an "enemy" of the United States. He cryptically enunciates his program toward the Soviet Union in the formula of Herbert Hoover: "The world cannot live for long half under Socialist serfdom and half under economic freedom."

But Dr. Jordan, without naming their leaders, recognizes a world of enemies. He says:

... In most of the rest of Europe, in Italy, France and even in England, no Red armies were necessary to destroy economic freedom and civil liberty. It has been done long before by the business men, the labor unions and the governments of these countries. Our armies abroad are fighting for ideas—for a philosophy of life and a conception of government—which were dead nearly everywhere in the Old World long before the war began.

Furthermore, these enemies of Dr. Jordan's conception of the good life not only control all of Europe. They also control the United States itself. His description of the state of affairs in America is fully as black as that of Europe. Not only American labor and government have succumbed to the black plague of socialism, but also the ranks of business, and even Dr. Jordan's special field, big business itself!!!

"The mind of American industry," Dr. Jordan finds, is a "wilderness of confusion, conflict, folly and wear."

"We have abandoned or surrendered," Dr. Jordan finds, the basic principles of American life, "like most other people . . . and what is worse, there are now many among us, in business and elsewhere, who are willing to deny or repudiate or compromise them as no longer applicable. . . ."

Dr. Jordan sets himself the task of leading a struggle to reverse the whole world trend of development, of our own country as well as of all others. And he has lost all his illusions that this will be easy to do. He sees it as necessary to win the capitalists back to their lost faith, to "reconvert" the capitalists themselves, before he can win his battle.

The greatest difficulty that faces us in reconversion is that business itself no longer has any coherent conception, conviction or philosophy of its function. During the past decade it has suffered a deep wound to its integrity of spirit, a profound sense of inferiority or guilt, from which it has not been able to recover despite its spectacular accomplishment in this war. It drifts today toward the difficult problems of the post-war future without any clear and consistent philosophy—or even any principle other than that of momentary expediency.

Dr. Jordan finds the key to the whole evil new way of life, into which America has drifted with the rest of the world, in the concept of planning for full employment. He therefore rejects bodily the concept of full employment, which he calls "the ideal . . . of the 'silver pig-sty,' out of which no strong, prosperous

or secure people ever came." The evil that must be driven out of American life, and out of the whole world, is the "monotonous reiteration of imaginary and arbitrary measures of national income, full employment, consumer purchasing power and social security as goals for the future."

Dr. Jordan's remedy for all the ills of the world is "freedom"—planless freedom, except for the plans that will be made by the "private enterprisers" who make up the National Industrial Conference Board. And he holds out the promise that this planless freedom, once it has been extended to the world markets, will also bring prosperity to America, since England, our principal competitor, "knows that her post-war planned economy, however complete, cannot compete in any free markets of the world with the productive power of a free America."

Here we have come to the "constant" factor in the "variable" sum of Dr. Jordan's view of world affairs. Here is the point of basic unity of the Jordan of 1940 with the Jordan of 1944. For the "freedom" to which Dr. Jordan sings such ecstatic songs of praise, is nothing more nor less than the freedom of American monopoly capital to conquer the whole world and make it its own empire. The program for which he fights is no more nor less than a program of world conquest, by economic power and free competition so far as possible, by military and naval power so

far as necessary. It is a program for a new world war.

Despite all his extreme pessimism, Dr. Jordan has not surrendered the fight. He admits his program received a severe defeat in the recent elections, when his candidate Dewey was defeated. (He speaks derisively of "the last election or auction.") But he insists that "no ultimate issues were settled." He acknowledges that in the world as it now exists, his "idea of economic freedom" is nothing less than a "subversive revolutionary force internationally as well as internally, just as Bolshevism was after the last war." He boldly faces the issue that "this fact will furnish the key to most of the post-war problems of international relations as well as those of domestic policy for another decade or two," and assumes for himself unhesitatingly the role of "revolutionist." He sings the glories of heroism, risk, and sacrifice, not for the extermination of the Axis, but for the extermination of the existing regimes of all the United Nations.

In the utterances of Dr. Virgil Jordan we have the authentic faith of our native American fascism, with its program which, like all fascism, is a program of imperialist conquest of the world. It comes from the common source of inspiration for fascism in all countries, from the rotting reactionary circles of monopoly capitalism, drunk with power and contemptuous of the great stream of human progress, culture, and democ-

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racy, which in the midst of the bloody business of crushing the Axis is working out a successful program of harmonious co-existence and co-operation between the socialist and capitalist worlds.

#### DEWEY AS THE CANDIDATE OF THE JORDANS

It is of more than academic interest to review the performance of Thomas E. Dewey, in the 1944 election campaign, as the chosen candidate of Dr. Jordan and likeminded circles. The record reveals much as to the relation of forces of the two main political camps in the United States.

To what extent did Dewey put before the country the Jordan program?

The keynote of the Dewey campaign, its *leitmotif*, was one hundred per cent on the Jordan line. It was the "Red scare." Dewey stated it in his Oklahoma City speech on September 26, as follows:

Let's get this straight. The man who wants to be President for sixteen years is, indeed, indispensable. . . . He's indispensable to Sidney Hillman and the Political Action Committee, he's indispensable to Earl Browder, the ex-convict and pardoned Communist leader.

This keynote was worked up to the crescendo of Dewey's Boston speech, which reached the level of hysteria. American home-owners would have their homes taken away from them if Roosevelt was re-

ected. Roosevelt was identified with Browder, and then Browder was characterized in the following terms:

Browder stands for everything that would destroy America. Everyone knows that communism is for State ownership of all property, including your house, your farm and the factory and the shop and the office in which you work. It stands for absolute dictatorship, the abolition of civil rights and total political and economic bigotry.

And because a majority of Americans know nothing whatever about communism, they could not know that Dewey was a liar about communism, they could only judge that he was lying about Roosevelt. Dewey did his best, however, to put across the Jordan line that Roosevelt's practical policies are destroying everything for which Americans have an affectionate attachment, that "the American way of life" is being liquidated by the Roosevelt Administration. This "destruction of America" was identified with the appearance of labor as a political force in alliance with the progressive capitalists behind Roosevelt; in the Dewey-Jordan concept of the "American way," labor enters public life only through the servants' entrance.

After this fundamental assault upon national unity at home, the second most important point of the Dewey campaign in agreement with Jordan's line was the attack against United Nations' solidarity. Here al-

ready we see Dewey, the politician seeking votes, unable to express himself with the same blunt forthrightness as does Jordan the ideologist, although the fundamental unity is equally complete. Dewey was careful not to put himself in open opposition to our Alliance and to the Dumbarton Oaks plan. But on particular issues which he believed were obscure to the general public, he boldly espoused a stand which would wreck the Alliance and reduce Dumbarton Oaks to an illusion. He denounced the Teheran and other conferences as "secret diplomacy," with a dozen variations, and thus served notice that if elected he would not deal directly with our Allies as Roosevelt has done. He openly identified himself as an unconditional supporter of the anti-Soviet Polish government-in-exile in London as against the Soviet Union. He denounced the armistice which took Roumania out of the war, because it was signed for the Allies by Marshal Malinovsky, which was practically a denunciation of the Alliance itself. (And to this cake he added the fancy frosting of a sneering mispronunciation of the Marshal's name, as of some obscure personage whose correct designation it would be undignified to know.)

Thus on Allied unity, while Dewey's score of agreement with Dr. Jordan could not be placed at one hundred per cent, nonetheless it is a fact that Dewey and his advisors borrowed a great deal from Jordan's

arsenal. The degree to which disagreement existed was not in spirit, but was protective coloration.

The point at which Dewey failed the Jordans seriously, was in his handling of domestic economic policy. This was doubtless equally as painful to Dewey as to Jordan, for their hearts were in the same place; but it was on these questions that there emerged the sharpest contradiction between that which was necessary to win votes, and that which was necessary to forward Dr. Jordan's program.

Dr. Jordan declared (after the election):

Let us tell them that neither business, nor labor, nor government, can guarantee them economic security and leave them their civil liberty and personal freedom. . . . Anyone who tells them otherwise is a fool or a fraud.

Well, that is exactly what Dewey did, he told the voters otherwise, and according to Dr. Jordan's yardstick it is Dewey who is a fool or a fraud.

It is very interesting to review Dewey's utterances on this field. Here are a few gems:

Never again must free Americans face the spectre of long-continued mass unemployment. We Republicans are agreed that full employment shall be a first objective of national policy. (Acceptance speech, June 29.)

We must have full employment. It must be at a high wage level. We must have protection of the individual from loss of his earning power through no

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fault of his own. We must have protection of the individual against the hazards of old age. We must have these things within the framework of free—and I mean free—collective bargaining. To reach these goals we must increase, not decrease, our standard of living. We must increase, not decrease, our production. (Speech at Seattle, September 18.)

Here we must pause a moment, and note that Dewey promised unemployment and old age insurance "within the framework of free collective bargaining," which might mean that he wished to leave these questions to be settled by each trade union with each individual employer. However, we must be charitable, and assume this was merely a slip of one unfamiliar with the problems he was speaking on, that he really intended to promise federal insurance supported by statute.

There is a third thing that is essential to achieving our agreed objective of world peace and prosperity. This absolute essential is a strong and vigorous America with jobs for all. (Speech at Portland, September 19.)

Whether we like it or not and regardless of the party in power, government is committed to some degree of economic direction. Certain government measures to influence broad economic conditions are both desirable and inevitable. . . . If at any time there are not sufficient jobs in private employment to go around, then government can and most create additional job opportunities. There must be jobs for all.

. . . We have unemployment insurance, old age pensions and minimum wage laws. They are going to stay and we are going to broaden them. . . . In agriculture, in labor and in money, we are committed to some degree of government intervention in the free workings of our economic system. In many directions the free market which old-time economists talked about is gone.

. . . We have seen in the war what can be done when American technical and management skill is given a chance to do a job. All that was necessary was to give American enterprises the green light in order to bring forth miracles of production. In the same spirit, American business and American industry can be given the green light for peacetime production. Then we shall see peacetime miracles as we have seen war-time miracles. (Speech at San Francisco, September 21.)

We stand committed to the proposition that America can and must have both economic security and personal freedom. (Speech at Pittsburgh, October 20.)

Direct all government policies toward the goal of full employment through full production at a high level of wages. . . . (Speech at Buffalo, October 31.)

We must have here in America a land of opportunity, a land of full employment at high wages, with a rising standard of living. (Speech at New York City, November 4.)

Thus we see that from beginning to end of the campaign, Dewey formally committed the Republican Party to the goal of full production

and full employment, to be achieved in so far as necessary by governmental intervention to *create* the number of jobs required to achieve the goal. So far as formal commitment to a goal is concerned, and the general means of governmental intervention to reach it, Governor Dewey went as far as any political leader ever went; and he went squarely against the policy laid down by Dr. Jordan.

Still Dr. Jordan supported Gov. Dewey, whom he classifies as a "fool or a fraud," and considered it a calamity that he lost the election.

Evidently the Jordan school of thought is ready to bow to the realities of modern American political life. And one of those realities is this, that any candidate who failed to promise full production and full employment, with the government as guarantor for its achievement, would not even be a serious contender in the election.

Of Dewey's 22 million votes on November 7, a big majority would have been lost to him if he had taken any other stand than he did on production and jobs. If he had openly expressed Dr. Jordan's policy on this point, Dewey would probably have gotten less than six million votes.

What this means, practically, is that the Jordans do not expect to win elections by an open fight for their policy. They expect to win by indirection in the electoral field, with their candidates bowing hypocritically before the overwhelming opinion of the mass of the voters, and by

extra-electoral methods, through their control of industrial and financial power and all that goes with it that is outside the control of government—and, as Jordan frankly says, by "subversive revolutionary" methods.

Dewey represents the political and economic interests and methods of thinking of the Jordan school, plus the tactical approach of the politician hunting for votes at all costs. Therefore, Dewey cannot be judged merely by his direct utterances on such questions.

Where Dewey stands in reality on the issue of production, jobs, and social security, is therefore better judged by what he did not say than by his commitments. What he formally committed himself to was a program already inaugurated by President Roosevelt; what he did not say, was any single word new on the subject, any single proposal that went an inch beyond what was already established beyond hope of overthrow by appeal to the voters. That is the best proof that Dr. Jordan judged correctly when he picked Dewey as the candidate to best help in the project to reverse the political and economic current of the democratic world.

#### SOME CONCLUSIONS

A few obvious conclusions may well be formulated as a result of this examination of the speeches of Dr. Jordan and Governor Dewey.

1. They confirm the fact, which we noted in January 1944, that the

decisive sections of the American capitalist class have abandoned the old policy of hard-boiled reaction and imperialism, and are seriously trying to adjust themselves to the democratic currents and needs of the nation at war. There is no longer any decisive unity of the bourgeoisie around a reactionary program; the fascists, like Jordan, no longer lead the class, but only a minority of it.

2. The democratic national unity in America, extending over all class lines, is more and more crystallizing upon a program which faces the realities of today, and seeks a solution of the national problems in a new way

that abandons the old capitalistic dogmas, with such force that even the enemies of this national unity program must pay lip service to it.

3. And finally, that from now on we must be on the alert for the flank attacks of masked enemies of national unity and of the United Nations; these will be more dangerous than the open assaults from now on; but with the nation on the alert, so that it cannot be tricked and thrown into confusion, there are bright prospects ahead for great advances and victories for democracy. The national and world currents are now fully moving toward that end.



Franklin D. Roosevelt

## THE PRESIDENT ALERTS THE NATION

By ADAM LAPIN

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE to Congress came at a time when difficult and complex problems had accumulated on the Western war fronts in the course of the general advance of the Coalition armies, and when a concerted drive was being launched by Hitlerite agents, their helpers, and their dupes to weaken the relationships between the major allies, on the political scene. The message provided both a sober and penetrating analysis of the entire world situation, and an immediate program for action.

The illusion of an already achieved and painless military victory had been shattered by the Nazi counter-offensive on the Western Front. The unity of the United Nations was disturbed by British intervention in Greece, Italy and Belgium, and by efforts on the part of pro-fascist, anti-Soviet elements to use the Polish question to develop discord with the Soviet Union.

Gone also was the illusion that the political victory in the November 7 elections had automatically solved all problems. Coinciding with the Nazi military counter-attacks was an organized and by no means unsuccessful

effort in this country to challenge the President's foreign policy of international cooperation, to split the United States from its allies and to force a negotiated peace. It had become clear that hard fighting would be necessary, not only on the war fronts, but also on the political front. This lesson was driven home both by the House vote to establish a permanent Dies Committee and by the propaganda attack against our allies.

What was needed was leadership which would focus the attention of the people on the real problems of winning the war and the peace, which would counteract a carefully fostered cynicism on international collaboration, which would help further develop national unity. This leadership was provided by the President in his State of the Union message.

\* \* \*

The President discussed four major problems in his message: foreign policy, the military situation, home front mobilization and post-war planning for jobs and full production. Newspaper stories and editorials

stressed his proposal for national service legislation. But this proposal cannot be understood when torn out of context of the entire message. The President himself put the major emphasis in his message on foreign policy, on the need for United Nations unity.

Indeed, one of the President's great contributions in his message was to illumine the central importance of continuing and strengthening the grand alliance between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain to the winning of the war, to the achievement of a just and lasting peace and post-war prosperity and security. All the other problems discussed in the message were related to this central task.

In his review of the war during the past year, the President stressed the significance of coalition warfare in the victorious advance of the Allies. He said that the experience of the war confirmed the correctness of the Administration's decision to "reject the arguments of those who would have had us throw Britain and Russia to the Nazi wolves and concentrate against the Japanese." He pointed out that the logic of such a position was a "purely defensive war against Japan while allowing the domination of all the rest of the world by Nazism and Fascism." He said that one of the reasons that made concentration on the European theater of war inevitable was the presence of "two active and indomitable allies—Britain and the Soviet

Union" as well as of the "heroic resistance movements."

The President stated as one of his principal reasons for adoption of national service legislation that it "would be the final unequivocal answer to the hope of the Nazis and the Japanese that we may become half-hearted about this war and that they can get from us a negotiated peace."

Why did the President find it necessary to devote so much attention to foreign policy at this time? He made this clear at the very start of his message. Certainly, he did not minimize the hard fighting ahead before Germany and Japan are defeated. And yet he stated unequivocally:

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western Europe was less dangerous in actual terms of winning the war than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our allies.

Never before had the President so sharply condemned defeatist propaganda, stated so clearly that the rumors against our allies, the British and the Russians, bear the trademark: "Made in Germany."

As if to emphasize and make more specific the President's warning, Secretary of State Stettinius chose the same day to issue a statement branding Senator Burton K. Wheeler as spokesman for the "discredited few" which seek a negotiated peace.

The President and Secretary Stet-

tinus did not speak so bluntly without cause. Men like Senators Wheeler and Brooks, Representatives Okonski and Clare Hoffman were no longer indulging in double-talk or snide hints. They were saying openly over the radio and in speeches on the House floor that the war was "futile and senseless," that it would only end in the sweep of Communism over Europe, that we should pull out and offer Hitler a soft peace.

There were two major reasons why the America Firsters, the rabid imperialists, the pro-fascists, in Congress and in the press, had chosen this particular time to speak up, and why their campaign against American cooperation with our allies had become especially dangerous.

First, there was the fact that the America Firsters were fanning and aggravating differences which had developed between the major allies and which had become Hitler's principal hope of staving off total defeat.

Secondly, the Munichite imperialists were able to take advantage of widespread confusion on foreign policy among liberals inside and outside Congress. Instead of helping to stem the revolt against the President's foreign policy which had been approved by the people in the elections, some liberal supporters of this policy were actually confusing and aggravating the situation.

For example, men like Senator Pepper of Florida joined in attacking the French-Soviet treaty and similar treaties as contrary to the spirit of

Dumbarton Oaks and in charging that the Administration was scrapping the Atlantic Charter. This, in face of the fact that the Atlantic Charter was being used by reactionaries as an anti-Soviet weapon to prevent the people of Poland from choosing their own, truly democratic government which, in the interests of Poland and all the United Nations, would be friendly to the Soviet Union.

The liberal critics from the "Left" were in effect part of the "perfectionist" attack on the President's foreign policy which he handled so effectively in his message. "Perfectionism," of course, became an umbrella which covered America Firsters, reactionaries and members of the B2H2 group in the Senate. The logic of perfectionism reached its ultimate absurdity when Senator Ball agreed with Senator Wheeler that the alleged unseemly conduct of our allies jeopardized American approval of Dumbarton Oaks.

The top-lofty moralism of "perfectionism" on the part of the liberals stemmed primarily from a lack of understanding of the coalition which had won the elections. Newspapers like *PM* and the *Philadelphia Record*, and Senators Guffey, Murray and Pepper appeared to think that the President should appoint only liberals to high office. This led them into the fight against the President's State Department appointments, which provided Wheeler and Brooks *et al.* with an ideal platform for a

general attack against the President's foreign policy. It was also inevitable that this first false step, and the doubtful alliances which it engendered, should lead to muddle-headed confusion on the fundamentals of foreign policy.

It was one of the major points in the President's message that he hit out, not only at the outright isolationists and imperialists, but also at the perfectionists. "Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism or power politics, may obstruct the paths to international peace," he said.

This point was central to his entire discussion. It was necessary once and for all to make a clear-cut departure from the constant carping criticism directed at our allies, from the widespread notion that every difference of opinion necessarily doomed the grand alliance. The President made the obvious and yet penetrating observation that the closer we come to victory, "the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors." He explained that it was impossible to expect that everything would be smooth and easy in the liberated countries, and he drew a parallel with the period of unrest in this country following the Revolutionary War. But he insisted that problems and differences should not be permitted to "divide us and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in winning the war and building the peace."

The President emphasized that what is necessary is a determination

on the part of the peace-loving peoples "to respect and tolerate and try to understand one another's opinions and feelings." For liberated Europe he proposed that our policy be one of encouraging democratic governments, of using the influence of the allies to the end that "no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the people's right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men, they are to live." The President cut through much of the nonsense about the Atlantic Charter, emphasizing that it is a guide, a statement of high principles, but that it does not furnish "rules of easy application" to each and every complex situation.

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It has been said in criticism of the President's message that he was not "specific." But the President offered something more important than details. He proposed an approach, an attitude, which will make it possible to overcome differences and work out details. He offered as the basic foreign policy of the United States a determination "to stand together with the United Nations not for the war alone but for the victory for which the war is fought." As the principal means of assuring that victory is secured, he emphasized the absolute necessity for "developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system" projected at Dumbarton Oaks.

The President proposed so simple and basic a program that some liberals seemed more dazzled with the hocus pocus of various obstructionist alternatives with lots of details. Senator Vandenberg, for example, was widely hailed for his booby-trap proposal for a treaty to keep Germany and Japan disarmed—while hedging in his stand on Dumbarton Oaks, and making snide criticisms of the Soviet Union. He urged that the *quid pro quo* for signing such a treaty should be unilateral veto power by this country over all political decisions affecting Europe. He is thus insisting in effect that the United States throw its political strength behind anti-democratic, reactionary and ultimately anti-Soviet forces in Europe.

Before a foreign policy can be elaborated, its essentials must be firmly understood and accepted. This requirement is woefully unfulfilled in the critics of the general character of the President's message. For all who wanted to hear, the President's message, as well as the budget message which followed, was quite specific.

For example, the President urged in his budget message that the international bank and the stabilization fund planned last year at Dumbarton Oaks "be established at once." He also urged the elimination of the Johnson Act and other restrictions on foreign loans and trade.

The President warned against the "malignant effects of economic isolationism." His post-war program of

60,000,000 jobs and full employment is based on the assumption that a peaceful and stable world will be achieved by the cooperation of the United Nations. It rests in part on the need for extensive foreign trade. It also rests on the equally valid assumption that the stability and prosperity of the rest of the world will be jeopardized without high post-war employment in the United States.

For those who have been too eager to accuse the President of abandoning his social objectives, the discussion of post-war perspectives in the message was a fitting and effective answer. The President again reiterated his Economic Bill of Rights. He emphasized that our post-war full-employment economy would be based on private enterprise; but at the same time he insisted on the principle that the government must see to it that every worker willing and able to work has a job. He envisioned social security and health programs to safeguard the living standards of the people. He projected huge public work programs like M.V.A. and the St. Lawrence Seaway to stimulate production. And he declared that the government must be prepared to share "part of any special or abnormal risk" incurred by private capital in expanding production after the war.

The President did not separate post-war from war problems in vacuum-sealed containers. He believes that post-war planning must begin while the war is still going on.



But certainly the message dispelled any illusions that the war is already as good as won and that it is now possible to concentrate primarily on post-war plans.

The utter defeat of negotiated peace and anti-United Nations propaganda was a major objective posed by the President for the home front. Alongside this, the President placed the need for increasing the production of vital armaments programs. It is generally agreed that the problem here is getting enough manpower to the right jobs while increasing the strength of the armed forces. The President pointed out that a national service program was the only means of solving this problem.

The President also offered two other arguments for national service legislation: that it would let the Nazis and the Japanese know once and for all that a negotiated peace is not in the cards and that it would be "supreme proof" to our fighting men that the home front is at last fully mobilized to back them up.

Now, it is all very well to argue, as a number of labor leaders have done, that many mistakes have been made in handling production and manpower problems. But this is all water over the dam. The President did make a convincing case for national service legislation on the basis of actual war needs. He specifically insisted that wage and seniority conditions of labor be protected. And there were no anti-labor provisions

in legislative proposals supported by the Administration.

A. F. of L. President William Green did not sound quite the same hysterical note in opposing national service in principle that he had the year before. The seriousness of the war situation provides ample explanation for a partial change in attitude. The C.I.O. did not oppose national service in principle at all, and a statement approved by its executive officers proposed a labor-agriculture-industry-government conference to thrash out the problem, with a pledge that the C.I.O. would approve any constructive solution adopted by this conference, including legislation. But it is a fact that the labor movement as a whole, including the C.I.O., has not shown sufficient initiative in endorsing the principle of national service legislation and then assuming leadership in trying to develop a sound and workable measure.

This is only one example of a broader problem. If the President's program on foreign policy, home front mobilization and post-war prosperity is to be achieved, it will need the most extensive kind of support. It will require the greatest strengthening of national unity. A key prerequisite for this is an alert, aggressive, and united labor movement, working in unison with other patriotic forces, including conservative win-the-war elements. C.I.O. President Philip Murray has fully seen the need for this. A. F. of L. President William Green and the

die-hards in the Executive Council have not, and they rejected Murray's bid for cooperation.

The absence of C.I.O.-A. F. of L. teamwork is the biggest barrier to a full mobilization of all the forces that support the President's program. It is the explanation for the lack of initiative shown by labor on many important issues. For example, there was a disappointing lack of response in the labor movement, in Congress and among organizations of all kinds to the President's message. This does not take away from the importance of the message. On the contrary, it re-emphasizes the need for supporting his program.

The President's message as a whole

was inspired by and designed to strengthen national unity, including a firmer cooperation between the President and Congress. It was an appeal to all sections of the population to join behind the nation's program of winning the war, for strengthening the Anti-Hitler Coalition, for building the international security organization now, and for full employment after the war. It served to focus attention on the real problems ahead. It was one of the great Presidential messages in American history, and it should result in strengthening and extending the coalition which elected the President in order to make sure that the nation's victory program is carried out.



## BROWDER ON NATIONAL SERVICE

LABOR CAN WELL GIVE its unconditional support to President Roosevelt's proposal for the mobilization of all citizens for national war service.

When the President made the same proposal last year, Congress refused to take up the question, and the labor movement was divided, with many of the outstanding leaders opposing such a law as unnecessary. It would be unfortunate if again this question should be met with the old positions frozen. The time has come to settle it, and it is obvious that the only sense in which it can be settled is positively. Labor should take the lead in proposing what immediate steps can be taken under existing legislation and executive orders to solve the manpower problems and in formulating the concrete measures of additional legislation which may be needed and in supporting its enactment.

It is argued, in some labor circles, that such a law is unnecessary because there is plenty of manpower if it were not misused by individual employers. Such persons point out that official demands for a certain number of workers of particular skills have been made for certain plants, and that inquiry has shown that the same plants had just discharged a larger number of the same category of workers; obviously, much of the outcry of manpower shortage is falsely raised by individual employers as a cover-up for their own mishandling of the question, and that the War and Navy Departments, having no means of checking up on the question, automatically echo these false claims.

But no matter how widespread such conditions may be, they constitute an argument for the national service law, and not an argument against it. Such a law is the precondition the government requires for regulating the employers' use of manpower, much more than it is needed for directing labor where it might not otherwise wish to go. For labor is ready to work anywhere it is really needed, and only demands that it be used rationally and efficiently under nationally established trade union and governmental standards. It is an obvious fact that we will not have rational utilization of manpower so long as decisions are left to private employers, with all their special interests.

There is further a gigantic psychological problem involved. The great mass of men in our armed forces will never understand any

stubborn opposition from labor ranks to a national service law, and if such an opposition should develop it will enormously strengthen the influence of anti-labor and reactionary agitation among them. On the other hand, nothing would so thoroughly cement the unity of the front-line fighters with the workers back home as precisely the *complete* mobilization of the nation's manpower for active and planned participation in the national war effort. This equalization of service of home and battle fronts exists in fact, and it will tremendously strengthen national unity psychologically, if that fact is registered in law.

There is the further and decisive fact, that the prompt adoption of a national service law, formulated with the whole-hearted participation of labor, and not as has been the practice, in disregard of labor's views, will be a tremendous blow against our enemies; it will be a notification to them that their last hope of a weakening on our home front is gone. It will be a tremendous stimulant to our Allies, the chief of whom have long had similar legislation and some of whom have been critical of our laxness in this matter. It will help cement the Coalition in which we must wage and win the war, and will help disintegrate the enemy.

In the face of these indisputable facts, all other arguments fall to the ground as irrelevant and immaterial.

Full support to the Commander-in-Chief without hesitation, in the careful but quick formulation and adoption of a national service act! This is the supreme issue of the day for the labor movement, if it would fully rise to its position as backbone and main reliance of the nation in its supreme crisis.

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# A NEW POLAND IS BORN

By MARCIA T. SCOTT

THE MAGNIFICENT REALITY of Polish freedom springs to life under the mighty tread of the Red Armies and the patriot Polish troops fighting by their side. All progressive humanity joins in hailing the triumphant events which are bringing about not only the complete liberation of all Poland, but have given a mighty impetus to the final victory of the whole United Nations cause. The Allies from both east and west, as agreed at Teheran, are closing the mighty vise forged in the fire of the democratic peoples' will to freedom. This triumphant moment in the war has been made possible by the united military action of the Coalition. Now we have a deeper responsibility than ever to match this military unity with an even greater unity than has yet been achieved in solving the political problems that accompany liberation.

Profoundly significant to the democratic, freedom-loving peoples of the world is the fact that the Polish army now joined with the Red Army in the liberation of Poland is the army of the new Poland symbolized by the people's Provisional Government. This resurgent, independent Poland has arisen out of the ruins left by

more than five years of Nazi occupation and the long years before that of oppression by its reactionary landlords and Colonels' clique. In years to come the date of December 31 when the Polish Committee of National Liberation was transformed into the Polish Provisional Government will be marked by Poland as one of the great landmarks in its history.

The historic importance of this move has been further heightened by the recognition swiftly granted the new Provisional Government by its great neighbor, the Soviet Union.

Here, before our eyes, we see the essential aims of this People's War of National Liberation being realized in the course of the war itself. No great step forward has ever been taken in humanity's ceaseless and glorious struggle to free itself from oppression that has not been accompanied by the die-hard efforts of those who have lost out in the struggle and forfeited the support of their own people, to find support in the outside world by slandering those who have defeated them, with the hope that foreign support and if need be foreign arms will aid their return to the land that has rejected them. That this same pattern is being followed by the bankrupt Polish Government-in-Exile and by like-minded people everywhere who make common cause with them in an effort to prevent the democratic aims of the war from being realized

anywhere, cannot obscure the real meaning of the great people's victory that has been won in Poland.

#### THE POLISH LIBERATION MOVEMENT

When the Nazis struck, the people of Poland were abandoned by their former dictatorial leaders whose former ties with Germany and whose refusal to join in a common front with the Soviet Union and the other democracies and to accept the aid of the Red Army had left their borders open to the German aggressors. Deserted by their own officers, the Polish soldiers and the Polish people put up a heroic resistance as the German panzer divisions churned over Poland up to the point where they were stopped by the Red Army's timely reoccupation of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. Then, underground, they fought on as partisans under the horrors of German occupation with its policy of complete extermination of all the Jews, and the attempt, of which the Maidenek murder camp gave such ghastly evidence, to apply the same policy as well to all the Poles who would not collaborate.

As long as Premier Sikorski was alive, carrying out a policy of friendly relations with the Soviet Union and encouraging the organization of a Polish army in the Soviet Union which would help in the liberation of Poland, the people of Poland could still look to their exiled gov-

ernment in London for some leadership. But when they saw their Polish brothers in the Soviet Union withdrawn to the Middle East instead of joining with the Red Army on whom alone they could count for liberation, when they received orders from London to hold back their guerrilla operations and not to collaborate with the Red Army, when they saw the vicious anti-Soviet attacks of London's Polish underground press and its agents' activities against loyal Poles, they knew that the exiles in London were not concerned with the true interests of Poland. They knew that their lives and their freedom could only be won by cooperating with the Red Army and with the Soviet Government, and that only the people carrying on the liberation struggle within Poland, and those patriotic Poles outside who supported them, were capable of accomplishing their country's independence and security.

On New Year's Eve, 1943, representatives of all the anti-fascist groups risked their lives to attend a secret meeting in Warsaw to plan for the re-birth of Poland. The delegates, representing more than a score of Polish underground organizations of varying political beliefs, formed the Polish National Council (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) as the central directing organ of the liberation movement. Their first step was to base themselves on the Polish Constitution of 1921, the original demo-

cratic constitution on the basis of which Poland was reborn after the First World War, according to which governmental power could reside only in the people through their elected representatives. This Constitution was torn up by Pilsudski's *coup d'etat* of 1926 through which he seized dictatorial powers and was replaced by the reactionary instrument Pilsudski railroaded illegally through the Sejm in 1935. This illegal constitution which in effect abolished free elections and gave the President unlimited powers, even to the extent of naming his own successor, is the basis for the London Government-in-Exile's spurious claim to legitimacy.

On July 23, the day after the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish frontier, the Polish National Council issued a decree from Warsaw announcing the formation of the "Polish Committee of National Liberation" as the temporary executive organizing local administration in the liberated areas.

The Polish Committee of National Liberation met at once in Chelm, first Polish city to be liberated (it later transferred to Lublin) and issued an eight-point manifesto in which it stated that it was based on the Constitution of 1921 which would continue in force until the calling of a constituent assembly elected by direct, equal, secret and proportional voting, which would be free to adopt a new Constitution.

The Manifesto called on the Polish people to fight for a free, independent, strong and democratic Poland and to collaborate with the Red Army in Poland's liberation. It called for close alliance and collaboration with Poland's immediate neighbors, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and for the strengthening of friendly relations with Great Britain, the United States, France and the other United Nations. It proposed that boundary claims be settled on the principle that land inhabited chiefly by Poles belongs to Poland, and that inhabited chiefly by Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians to the Soviet Union. It demanded territory in the West including East Prussia, ancient Polish Pomerania and Polish Silesia, a frontier on the Oder River and an outlet to the sea.

In internal affairs the Committee announced restoration of all democratic liberties, suppression of fascist organizations, security for Jews, higher wages and social insurance for workers, sweeping agrarian reforms and cooperative trade, the reopening of schools and universities, and the reestablishment of normal life. It announced that private property would be retained in farms and medium-sized enterprises, and that national property and large business, transport, and forests would be temporarily administered by the State, properties to be restored to their owners as conditions became normal.

Two days later the Soviet Govern-

ment issued a statement declaring that Soviet troops entered Polish territory with the sole purpose of routing the German armies and helping in the restoration of an independent, strong and democratic Poland, that the Soviet Government had no intention of acquiring any part of Polish territory or effecting a change in the social structure of Poland. This statement was followed by an agreement providing for the turning over to the PCNL of all administrative affairs as soon as any part of the liberated territory ceased to be a zone of active military operations.

By this action the Soviet Government reaffirmed its consistent policy of national self-determination and non-interference in internal affairs scrupulously adhered to in all its dealing with other States, as well as its specific commitments under the Atlantic Charter, just as it had previously done on entering the territory of Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

#### THE POLISH PEOPLE RESTORE ORDER

As the Red Army with the help of the Polish troops liberated ever larger sections of Polish territory, the Polish Committee of National Liberation went to work to carry out the program enunciated in its Manifesto. By the time the PCNL became the Provisional Government, it was administering a territory inhabited by some 7,000,000 Poles, or approximately one-third of Poland.

The story of what the PCNL has accomplished in the five months of its existence in restoring order and rebuilding the ruins left behind by the Germans and laying the foundations for a new free Poland is told in numerous dispatches from a group of American correspondents who have recently been touring the areas under its administration.

The first accomplishment that must be noted is the arming of the Polish people themselves to help in driving out the invaders. The new Polish army organized by General Rola-Zymierski out of the units trained and equipped in the Soviet Union and the underground forces fighting in Poland, invited all members of the National Army formerly directed from London to join up with the same ranks previously held. More than half of the officers and nine-tenths of the men formerly bearing allegiance to London have done so, despite the allegations from London that members of its underground army were being arrested and disarmed. That has only happened to those Polish soldiers who refused to join in the liberation of their country. In a dispatch published in the *New York Times* of January 11, W. H. Lawrence reported seeing innumerable underground newspapers and war posters issued in the name of local representatives of the London government and its National Army Command "forbidding the local populace to comply with military mobil-



ization recruitment and prescribing the death penalty for those who registered or joined the Lublin army." He said that Lublin regarded the organizers of such campaigns as traitors and enemy agents and treated them as such. The new Polish army has recently been estimated to number 300,000, with prospects of swelling to a million before long.

The second great accomplishment and the outstanding social reform is the distribution of the land to the peasants and agricultural laborers of this formerly landlord-ridden country, the symbol of whose poverty was the peasants' custom of splitting a match four ways before using it.

According to the latest reports, by January 11, some 110,000 peasant families had received an average, to that date, of seven and a half acres of large estates formerly held by 698 wealthy Polish families. The peasants receive formal deeds to their land, on which they may build a house under credit arrangements provided by the government and operate an individual farm. This property may be inherited, but it cannot be sold. Subject to distribution are only the estates of 125 acres or over, all others being left to their former owners to operate. Church lands are untouched, in line with the government's policy of giving every possible aid to religious freedom and the functioning of the church. To avoid civil disturbances, the local former landlords of the large estates are asked to live

in some other part of Poland, where they may apply for a twelve-and-a-half-acre plot of land (the maximum the present land fund permits) on the same basis as anyone else, or receive a pension. However, there has been little trouble from the landlords, since few remained in the liberated areas. Many of them were absentee landlords to begin with. Those who collaborated with the Germans fled with them. Those who opposed them are dead or in concentration camps. Some who had not actively collaborated joined the Germans in the end rather than see their estates taken over by fellow-Poles. Some who remained sabotaged production by refusing to plant, while a few others actually assisted in carrying out the reform.

The third great accomplishment must be considered the revival of industry. The Krosno oil fields have reached 75 per cent of pre-war production; machinery and agricultural implement works and sugar refineries are in operation; railways have been prepared and provided with coal. W. H. Lawrence reported in the *New York Times* of January 8, on a visit to the opening of the first steel mill in liberated Poland, where he was informed of the prospect of having the mill running at full capacity of 150,000 tons of steel annually within three more months. Lawrence was amazed at the excellent housing conditions that had already been provided at low cost for the workers. A

livable minimum wage is provided, but conditions are still necessarily very difficult with severe shortages of food and clothing. Industrial reconstruction, of course, is only in its infancy. But the new government has announced as one of its main concerns the industrialization of Poland. The agrarian reforms provide the necessary basis for this, since lack of land was the historical cause of Polish poverty.

The fourth great accomplishment is the tremendous trade union revival that has taken place. Many former trade unions went underground, preserving their organization as best they could, taking part in sabotage and partisan operations, functioning as best they could under conditions of the murder or deportation of many thousands of their members. As the Germans retreated, they were usually the first members of the population to organize. Temporary factory committees were set up which helped to restore order. The first delegated trade union conference to meet in Lublin represented 120,000 workers organized in thirty central trade unions, whose number and membership is growing rapidly.

Fifth should be noted the tremendous development of the cooperatives, the main line of the development of trade in the new Poland. The cooperatives, with already over a million members, have done much to keep down inflationary prices, to assist in rationing and to secure an

equitable distribution of the limited food and consumers' supplies.

Finally, the restoration of the social, educational and cultural life of the people must be mentioned. Amazing progress has been made in the opening of schools, libraries, cinemas and theaters. It is of course impossible to enumerate all the achievements in this and other fields; but in the light of the chaotic conditions left by the Germans, the restoration of order in itself seems nothing short of a miracle. There is no intention of idealizing the picture of liberated Poland. Life is harsh and difficult. The destruction of the war is all around the Polish people—and on their land its greatest and bloodiest battles are being fought. Only against that background can the achievements of the past five months be truly measured. But who can doubt that this is the real and living Poland, and who can wonder that these people look to the new government which has set them again on the road to life and freedom as their own and not to those in London, who betrayed them once and are ready to betray them again in order to get back what they have lost and what the Polish people have gained?

#### THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT IS FORMED

It was the Polish people themselves who demanded that the Polish Committee of National Liberation become

their Provisional Government. A thousand delegates from the cooperatives, representing a membership of one million, met and raised the demand. During the fall the Polish Workers' Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the Polish Peasant Party all held conventions in which they all expressed their confidence in the Polish Committee of National Liberation and asked that it formally become the government.

Numerous trade union meetings voiced the same desire. All these and other groups sent delegates to the Provisional Parliament, representing all legal political parties and all classes, which elected Boleslaw Berut as President, and accepted his proposal that the PCNL become the Provisional Government. The election of the new Provisional Government was carried out in the most legal way possible under existing conditions. The cabinet is composed of five representatives from the Polish Socialist Party, five from the Polish Peasant Party, four from the Polish Workers' Party (formerly the Communist Party), one from the Democratic Party, and two members not affiliated to any political party.

The President, Boleslaw Berut, is the man chiefly responsible for achieving the unity of all the resistance forces within Poland and welding them into a coalition government. Active in working class activities since the age of thirteen, he has a long record of struggle for

the independence of Poland. Formerly a member of the Workers' Party, he was largely identified with the development of the cooperative movement. He has disassociated himself from any party now because he considers his primary task to be "the unification of the efforts of all groups and parties represented in the National Council."

Edward Osobka-Morawski, Premier and Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government, was a lawyer and economist in pre-war Poland and for many years district organizer of the Polish Socialist Party. He helped to organize the workers of Warsaw in their heroic original defense, and after that went underground, becoming vice-chairman of the Polish National Council, and then chairman of the PCNL.

These "unknowns" and their fellow cabinet members so indefatigably working for the restoration of Poland, are accused by the Polish Government-in-Exile of usurping power, of being "puppets of Moscow" and unfit to govern the Polish people. This accusation is echoed by reactionary forces in our country who call the Soviet recognition of the Polish Provisional Government "a blow at Allied unity," and who are bringing pressure to bear on our own government by every means at their disposal to prevent America from also taking this necessary step.

Let us for a moment follow to their logical conclusion the results

if our government were to take their advice.

#### RECOGNITION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT MEANS UNITY AND PEACE

To continue to recognize the Polish Government-in-Exile as the legitimate government of Poland could only mean of course that the Polish Government-in-Exile should return to Poland to take over the reins of government.

Let us see what that would mean to Poland in terms of our commitments under the Atlantic Charter "to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live"; in terms of the Moscow Four-Power Declaration that "their united action . . . will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security," and in terms of the three-Power agreement of Teheran which looks toward peace for many generations.

The imposing of the Government-in-Exile on the Polish people would mean a direct repudiation of the action they have already taken in supporting the Polish Provisional Government. It would further mean saddling on them again the illegal and oppressive Polish Constitution of 1935. This is clear because in the long and patient negotiations the Soviet Government and the PCNL carried on with the London Poles

in the hope of reaching some agreement which would enable the moderate elements represented by Mikolajczyk to join in a coalition government, this was the main point on which the PCNL insisted and which the London government flatly rejected. They rejected it because this Constitution was their only claim to legality, since none of its members was ever elected by the Polish people. Rackiewicz, the President, was personally appointed by the previous President, Ignacy Moscicki, who, in turn, had been designated by Pilsudski.

Thus, the return of the Government-in-Exile could hardly meet the test of the right of the Polish people to choose their own government.

Nor could it meet the test of maintaining united action or achieving a durable peace. It would be in direct opposition to the recognition accorded the Provisional Government by the U.S.S.R. after months of patient but futile negotiations which it hoped would achieve united action. Furthermore, it would bring into Poland a government committed to *hostility to our Soviet ally*. The Soviet Government was forced to break relations with the London government because of its actual collusion with Germany in the Katyn forest affair. Since then the London government has become even more reactionary, until with the failure of Mikolajczyk to win it to any sort of reasonable position,

and his enforced resignation, it stands forth more nakedly anti-Semitic, anti-Soviet and anti-United Nations than ever. In a recent article in the *New Masses*, Dr. Abraham Penzik, an outstanding Polish Socialist in this country, describes the composition of the London Government as follows:

This government is made up of the three former Socialists, Arciszewski, Kwapinski and Pragier, whose hostility to the Soviet Union is well known; two extreme nationalists, Berezowski and Folkierski, whose fascist allegiance and affiliations are also well known; two Christian Democrats, Sopicki and Kusnierz, the latter, now Minister of Justice, was called in Poland a "clubber" because he instigated beating of Jewish students at the University of Cracow; one Pilsudski follower, Count Tarnowski; and finally General Kukiel, whose action in the spring of 1943 was the direct cause of the severance of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Polish émigré government.

Former Premier Mikolajczyk himself, while attacking the Provisional Government, bears witness to the lengths to which the government of Arciszewski, his successor, would go. In a recent issue, *Jutro Polski*, organ of the Polish Peasant Party in London, charged that elements of the Arciszewski government have been gambling on Soviet defeat, and that they were continuing to act on the Pilsudski-Beck doctrine that war

against Russia was for Poland the way to salvation.

With such a program, the return of the present London government could only mean preparation for a new world war, in which the Poles would obviously have to seek allies. Who would these allies be? Would they seek to organize the Western allies for a drive against the Soviet Union? Or would they find it more convenient to seek the aid of the Germany they do not wish to see decisively defeated?

The Polish Government-in-Exile has made no secret of its plans for dismemberment of the Soviet Union. Under the sponsorship of General Sosnkowski, replaced as President-designate, but still Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armies of the Exiled Government, an exhibit held in Rome a few months ago showed Polish imperialist claims stretching beyond Smolensk, Kiev and Odessa, and Polish plans for the domination of Europe through the formation of a Central European Federation with the Baltic Soviet Republics, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece all joined with Poland as a great buffer against the Soviet Union.

Refusing as it does to accept the Curzon Line as a border, the Polish Government-in-Exile would be faced with the necessity of seizing Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia from the Soviet Union. Already, by agreements between the

Lithuanian, Byelo - Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics and the PCNL, a mutual voluntary exchange of populations is taking place. Some members of the small Polish minority that formerly inhabited these Soviet territories are now moving into Poland proper, so the land taken over would be inhabited almost entirely by Byelo - Russians and Ukrainians. These regions could only be obtained by their forcible seizure, and their Soviet inhabitants would certainly put up a mighty resistance, since they remember the oppression to which Poland's national minorities were subjected in the past by the clique the London Poles represent. The Soviet Government would be bound to come to their aid, since these territories are legally incorporated into the U.S.S.R.

Aside from the external embroilments in which the Polish exiles would thus most certainly involve their country, they would immediately be faced with the bitter civil strife which the PCNL has proved able to avoid. Arciszewski has stated flatly that he would welcome Mikolajczyk and the Peasant Party back into the government only on condition that there could be no question of any coalition with the government in Lublin. That means they would endeavor to throw out the entire present Provisional Government, in which case they would have the overwhelming majority of the Polish people to reckon with.

And how about the land reforms that have already been accomplished? They, of course would be undone, since it is mainly the interests of the old landlord clique that the Polish Government - in - Exile represents. And now they do not even include representatives of the Polish Peasant Party. Mikolajczyk, it is true, did decree land reform—but only to be effected after the war was over. But there is little likelihood of Mikolajczyk's return, unless he accepts completely the reactionary policies he has thus far, albeit so weakly, opposed. And it is quite clear what the reaction would be of the hundreds of thousands of peasants now owning and cultivating their own land for the first time, were they to be forced by a new government to give it up.

The anti-Semitism of the London regime has of course been revealed to the whole world through the persecution of the Jewish soldiers in General Anders' army in the Middle East, as well as among the Polish troops in England, where large numbers of Jews sought to enlist in the British army to escape the insults of their Polish officers, who were never punished by their government. Recently the conservative, pro-Zionist *Jewish Morning Journal* carried a dispatch from its correspondent in Lublin, Moses Poliakov, to the effect that the Polish Jewish Socialists in liberated Poland support the Provisional Government because they are

convinced that it will institute democratic government and wipe out anti-Semitism.

It is clear, then, that the return of the Polish Government - in - Exile could only result in widespread civil strife within Poland, which could only be curbed by the imposition of the dictatorial type of regime for which they in fact stand, based on policies which would inevitably lead to a new world war. It follows that continued recognition of the Polish Government-in-Exile runs counter to the interests of our own country and all the United Nations.

The Polish Government-in-Exile is supported by the most reactionary elements in our country, by the isolationists and imperialists, by the soft-peace advocates, by all who would stir up dissension among the United Nations, by all those who would prefer a German victory to a victory and peace won in unity with the U.S.S.R. It was supported by Dewey in his disruptive campaign for the Presidency. It is supported by such bitter internal foes of our nation as Senator Wheeler, who interlarded his long tirade on the floor of the Senate against Allied unity by bitter attacks on our Soviet ally which he accused, in the good old Hitler manner, of trying to Sovietize, not only Poland, but all of Europe. It is supported by Senator Vandenberg, whose pro-fascist inclinations have long been known and whose much publicized military alliance

plan is merely a more subtle means of achieving the same end Senator Wheeler seeks; for, despite his fine words about the disarming of our enemies, his demand that America shall exercise a veto power over all the democratic solutions being reached in the course of the war, is merely a clever maneuver to prevent a world security organization. It is supported by such people as Congressman Okonski, who couples his demand that we withdraw our troops from Europe with attacks on the Soviet Union. It is supported by the reactionaries in the Catholic hierarchy.

It is supported by the Social-Democrats around the *New Leader*, who, day in and day out, demagogically invoke the Atlantic Charter against the Soviet Union while denying its very basis in supporting the London Poles. These Social-Democrats have one motivation only—their hatred of the Soviet Union and their desire for its overthrow. They are supported by the reactionary Polish émigrés in this country, the National Committee of Americans of Polish Descent, (K.N.A.P.P.) followers of Matushevski, who maintains the closest links with fascist groups and who has carried on ceaseless intrigues to win American support for them. They are supported by the pitiful remnants of the "Socialists" whose false prophet, Norman Thomas, warns that Stalin is a greater dan-

ger than Hitler, and who recently insolently rejected a warm message from the Polish Socialists, with the claim that the London "Socialists," repudiated by the people of Poland, are the only legitimate standard bearers of Polish socialism. It is supported by the defeatist Hearst, Patterson and Scripps-Howard press—and by all the Trotskyite and profascist elements in our country.

The Government-in-Exile is, on the other hand, opposed, not only by all progressive Americans, but by the great mass of Polish people in America, who refused to be swerved from support of the Administration by attempts to inject the Polish issue into the Presidential election campaign. It is opposed by a large group of outstanding Polish-Americans, among them Professor Oscar Lange of the University of Chicago (formerly of the University of Cracow), who, on his visit to Moscow, was convinced of the representative nature of the P.C.N.L. and of the sincere intention of Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Government to aid in the rise of a strong and independent Poland.

It is opposed by such important groups as the American Polish Labor Council, headed by Leo Krzycki. This organization, which includes members of unions numbering over 600,000 affiliated with the C.I.O. and the A. F. of L., sent a message on January 18 to President Roosevelt expressing the hope that "our gov-

ernment will find a way toward cordial cooperation with the newly established Provisional Government of Poland."

In view of its pronouncements and actions, of the character of its support, the Polish Government-in-Exile thus stands accused of treason to the basic aims of the United Nations. It is these governors without a people who are the puppets, representing only a disreputable profascist clique which wants to return to power. It is support for them which constitutes a violation of the Atlantic Charter, since it utterly fails to meet the democratic aspirations of the people of Poland as expressed in the Provisional Government they themselves have chosen.

Clearly, the only course for our country, Great Britain and the other United Nations is to withdraw our recognition from them, and to extend it to the Provisional Government of Poland. To continue to support these exiles against the liberation movement within Poland, can only lead to a replica of the British Government's support of the Greek reactionaries against the liberation movement within Greece—to a replica of civil war.

In our dealings with France and with Yugoslavia, both Great Britain and the United States have recognized the role of the liberation movements and the fact that the new democratic governments in Europe must be based on them, which



means of course including the Communists, who have everywhere played such a mighty role in the freeing of their countries, and who have demonstrated their desire and ability to refrain from raising the establishment of Socialism as an issue and to work with all anti-fascist groups in forming united and stable people's governments. It is with these governments that the Polish Provisional Government must be equated and it should be recognized for the same reason that they have been.

But it is not possible to continue to apply one yardstick to the French, the Yugoslavs, the Czechs, and another and quite a different one to the Greeks, the Belgians, and the Poles. As Earl Browder said recently, the four features obviously necessary in dealing with the rehabilitation of liberated countries are: (1) Restoration of independence with demo-

cratic self-determination; (2) mobilization to participate in the fight for liberation; (3) establishment of provisional governments based first on the most active fighters for liberation; (4) purge from power and influence of all quislings.

The Polish Provisional Government meets all these requirements, while the Polish Government-in-Exile does not. In the interests of the United Nations, therefore, the recognition of this condition needs to be accepted and the corresponding policies commonly applied in the case of Poland. Only so, can the basic aims of the United Nations be achieved. Only so, can our government be assured of the future peace and security our people so ardently desire, of which United Nations unity, and above all American-Soviet friendship must be the corner-stone.



# WHAT OF THE WAR CRIMINALS?

By V. J. JEROME

HITLER HAS CROWNED his "Aryan Man" with the title "Prometheus of Mankind." But this is not Prometheus the light-bringer; this is a destroyer by fire.

The atrocities of the Nazi war criminals are no stray, sporadic offenses of individual soldiers or groups of soldiers; they are the expression of a centrally planned and coordinated undertaking on the part of the Hitler Government and the German High Command for wanton massacre, plunder, and destruction by the German fascist army on a mass scale. "The Hitlerite army," said the Molotov note of January 6, 1942, on Nazi atrocities, "wages not an ordinary war, but a bandit war to exterminate the peace-loving peoples standing in the way of the German fascist criminals' aspiration for domination over other peoples and over the whole world."\*

It is against this background of deeds by the sub-bestial supermen of the *Herrenvolk* that the issue of Axis war crimes and their punishment must be considered.

\* *The Molotov Paper on Nazi Atrocities*, New York, 1942, p. 30.

\* \* \*

We judge people, said Marx, not by what they think and say of themselves, but by what they really are and do, not by their conceptions of themselves, but by their reality.

What the reality of Hitlerite Germany today is, its deeds have burned with eternal brands into the consciousness of humankind. It is a reality of rapine, devastation, and mass slaughter that no hordes of Attila or Ghengis Khan were ever known to perpetrate. It is a reality of demonic tortures of body and spirit, of voluptuous butchery rarefied with the ultimate artifices of Kultur, which put to shame the Caligulas and Torquemadas of all past ages. It is a reality of hostage-shootings and robot-bombings. A reality of Lidices, Distomos, and Kievs. A reality of labor-saving mass self-burials. A reality of mass murder-volleys in Tremblinka forests muffled by loudspeakers blaring Strauss waltzes. A reality of Maidaneks and Birkenaus and Auschwitzes—the acme of Nazi ingeniousness and scientific installation: the reality of lethal convoy trucks, "hygiene institutes," "cyclone" gas crystals, Evi-pan vials, and phenol injections; of asphyxiation chambers hermetically sealed, needing only three minutes to gas two thousand human beings of all ages and nationalities; of crematorium centers, three of which alone can in two years burn to ashes over four and three-quarter million Jew-

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ish men, women and children. A reality of the warehouse at Maidanek, of men's shoes, women's shoes, babies' shoes, thousands upon thousands, stored and sorted and graded for size—all with such real *gründlichkeit*—for shipment to the people on the *Vaterland* home front.\* . . . It is a reality that brought ex-Secretary of State Hull, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, and Secretary of War Stimson, as members of the War Refugee Board, to state on November 26, 1944, upon making public the Board's report:

It is a fact beyond denial that the Germans have deliberately and systematically murdered millions of innocent civilians—Jews and Christians alike—all over Europe.

This campaign of terror and brutality, which is unprecedented in all history and which even now continues unabated, is part of the German plan to subjugate the free people of the world.

It is a reality of the preparation by the German High Command for a Third World War. We should not be seeing the full horror of Nazi brutality, bestial as its matrix is, if we saw it simply as brutality for its own sake. Directly viewed, these unspeakable crimes are the logical out-

come of an irrational "master race" ideology, the consequence of succumbing to the dehumanization of Nazism. When viewed, however, in a fuller context, when seen as a part of the Nazi Party's plans to wage world war for a third time, these mass atrocities begin to assume their own macabre rationale.

The Nazi Party has set about with fiendish method to ravage, depopulate, and debilitate the countries of Europe through systematic material destruction, mass extermination, and starvation. It is a diabolic scheme, assiduously planned to keep Germany superior in manpower and in potential war-fitness even after complete military collapse. The "Furor Teutonicus" with which Nazism set about decimating European manhood is not simply the madness brought on by the frustration of its aggressive plans, but is a new plan for future aggression.

In a lecture to the members of the Nazi Office of Economic Welfare, Marshal von Rundstedt stated:

The total destruction of our neighbor nations, as well as the destruction of their wealth is necessary for our victory. One of the great mistakes we made in 1918 was to spare too many civilian lives in enemy countries, for we Germans must always have a population at least twice as large as the combined populations of the countries bordering on Greater Germany. Therefore, we are forced to destroy at least a third of the inhabitants of all our neighbor countries; the only method to

\*The Canadian newspaper reporter and radio broadcaster, Raymond A. Davies, in an eyewitness account of the Maidanek death-camp, reported: "In the office of this building I saw some letters in German. Typical was a letter from a German boy—a member of the *Jugend*—writing, I think, from somewhere near Munich. He said his group needed so many shirts, so many trousers, so many pairs of shoes. He added: 'Please don't send us anything bloodstained.'" (*PM*, November 12, 1944.)

do so is by organized starvation, which in this case is far superior to the use of machine-guns, for there are limits to, and disadvantages in, executions which do not exist when famine is used, particularly with regard to the younger generations.\*

It makes sense, a cold, hard, ruthless sense. It makes sense if we understand that the Nazis began to lay this plan for a third World War as early as December, 1941, when they saw defeat looming on the Soviet Front. A secret report drawn up in February, 1942, by General von Stuelpnagel, outlining the German High Command's strategy for the next war, proceeds from the assumption that "the conquest of the world will necessitate many stages" and that the impending defeat of Germany can be made "a temporary defeat," which "is no great tragedy if we succeed in gaining a greater margin of economic and demographic superiority than we had in 1939, by piling up ruin and destroying men and material in enemy and neighboring territory."

The report discloses a ghastly program for the destruction of property and manpower of the other European nations, calculated to leave Germany with "economic and mechanical potentialities that are greater than the enemy's." In this way, the report continues, "we shall be in a

better position to win the war twenty-five years from now, than we were in the summer of 1939."\*

Foreseeing Allied military occupation of Germany, the program outlines a policy for evading and resisting the peace conditions. It stresses as most important the creation of "an underground propaganda of initiatives," whose main objective will be to keep intact the underground Nazi forces and the General Staff, in whichever "neutral" countries its personnel may be harbored, in preparation for still another war of aggression.

Significant in this connection is an Associated Press dispatch date-lined American Command Post in Germany, September 30, 1944, which said:

First Army correspondents saw for the first time today the full text of one of the most unusual orders of the entire war.

This is the order directing all German Army officers—save expendable junior officers—to save their own lives in battle so that the Reich will have an officer corps to prepare for a third world war.

The junior commanders have been nominated to "die a hero's death" to spur the flagging troop morale while their superiors save their own skins in emergencies.

The captured document, addressed to all German officers, was issued by the army command in August during

\* *Combat* (Algiers), November 28, 1943, quoted in *Free France*, March 15, 1944.

\* *Ibid.*

the most critical hours of the battle for France.\*

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A cardinal aim of the war to exterminate fascism is the punishment of the fascist war criminals. This aim has been officially rendered an integral part of the victory program of the United Nations.

The tripartite Moscow Conference Declaration of November 1, 1943, included the well-known "Statement on Atrocities," signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, in which the three Allied Powers, in behalf of all the United Nations, "solemnly declare and give full warning" as follows:

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any Government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done, in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the Free Governments which will be erected therein. . . . Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without

\* *New York Times*, October 1, 1944.

prejudice to the case of German criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the governments of the Allies.

This firm resolve of the United Nations, it is already evident, must cope with a mass of misconceptions, prejudices, and deterring attitudes solemnly claiming authority in the laws and customs of nations. The sword of law and justice drawn against the Axis war criminals will first have to hack through a barrier of pseudo-judicial enmeshments and baseless technicalities contrived by some of our own over-zealous worriers over the rights of our enemies.

This is manifested most alarmingly by the work, to date, of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (representing fifteen nations, without the participation of the Soviet Union) and by the basis upon which its work has been conducted.

The Commission came into being in London in October, 1943, a full year after the intention to create it had been announced by Lord Chancellor Simon and President Roosevelt. Nonetheless, its establishment showed the determination not to repeat the error of a post-Armistice "Commission on Responsibilities," such as was set up by the Preliminary Peace Conference of World War I, in late January, 1919. In his speech in the House of Lords on October 7, 1942, Lord Simon stated

that "the Versailles Treaty failed to secure effective punishment of the principal criminals, partly owing to the fact that provision for this purpose only was contained in the final peace treaty negotiated and signed months after the armistice in June, 1919." He added: "We do not intend to make the same mistake as was made by postponing this demand until the final peace treaty has been signed. The named criminals wanted for war crimes should be caught and handed over at the time of, and as a condition, of the armistice, with the right to require delivery of the others as soon as supplementary investigations are complete." The Lord Chancellor stated further that the examination of facts "should cover war crimes of offenders irrespective of rank."

However, the restraints upon the present Commission's work, including the restriction of its investigations to war crimes against nationals of the United Nations, as preconceived in Lord Simon's speech, have weakened its effectiveness as a major instrumentality for the punishment of fascist war crimes. The Commission's work has been further cramped by the Procrustean legalism of its first Chairman, Sir Cecil Hurst.

The grave implications of the shortcomings in the Commission's work were brought out in its Chairman's declaration at a press conference, on August 30, 1944. Sir Cecil's

summation of the first ten months' activities of the Commission, coupled with his stated conception of its scope and functions, must be set down as a record of strictures, slow motions, and stunted performance.

Sir Cecil's declaration was a litany of complaints over the difficulties of governmental war-time investigations, the insufficiency of legal basis, the "unprecedented set of circumstances," the "extreme difficulty of the factual situation," etc. On account of which imponderables, he bade us prepare our minds that at "the hour of 'cease fire,' when the enemy lays down his arms," the list of war criminals "would be meagre."

Thus, while the Moscow Conference Declaration, in the name of the United Nations, has explicitly stipulated that "at the time of granting armistice . . . those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party" guilty of war crimes "shall be sent back to the countries where the abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished," the United Nations War Crimes Commission prepares us for a list that "would be meagre."

The Commission's function, the Chairman stated further, "does not cover collaborators with the Axis, treasonable behavior, so-called 'quislings,' or atrocities by Axis Powers against their own nationals "on account of race, religion or political opinions."

This narrow and impeding con-

ception of Axis war crimes would, insofar as the Commission is concerned, leave unpunished the Hitlerite puppet tyrants, war-collaborators, and war criminals in France, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and other subjugated countries by virtue of the fact that those fascist gauleiters and mass murderers were native traitors to their own peoples.

More shocking still, it became apparent from Sir Cecil's declaration that the Commission's list did not include the names of Hitler or any other fascist arch-criminal.

To a question, "Is the case against Hitler complete?" Sir Cecil replied:

Yes, it is complete—in the mind of man. As to what this Commission would do if it were asked to state the case, I do not know because at the moment it has not tackled the job.

He was more explicit, however, about the eventuality of escape by arch-criminals to a "neutral" land. He hoped for the best that by exercising "very considerable pressure" the United Nations would persuade the harboring countries to surrender them:

But a neutral state is a neutral state, and there are limits beyond which even the whole body of the United Nations cannot go in dealing with a neutral.

This, in the face of the solemn warning in the Moscow Declaration that "most assuredly the three Allied

Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth."

Sir Cecil's statement is indefensible even on the technical grounds of prescribed limitation of the Commission's scope. For, if we should assume that the arch-criminals are outside of the Commission's competence, then, certainly, this would be true of procedure toward their possible lands of refuge. Sir Cecil's conclusion in regard to the latter point must therefore be viewed as reflecting the Commission's decisive approach towards its task as a whole. That approach, so obviously out of keeping with the determination of the United Nations to bring about the unimpeded and effective punishment of the war criminals, has well been characterized by the Soviet Academician A. N. Trainin as "the strategy of mercy." It is a Justice with scales, but no sword.

In fairness to the Commission it should be stated that its record of non-performance is chargeable mainly to the non-cooperative and curbing attitude of Britain's Foreign Office and Lord Chancellor. This fact was amply brought out by the circumstance of Sir Cecil Hurst's resignation as Chairman and British delegate on January 5, 1945. The resignation was a public action, known to have had the support of the American delegate, Herbert Pell, to draw attention to the Commission's impasse after its proposals to Foreign Secretary Eden and to Lord

Simon on major matters had been either totally ignored or belatedly, and then negatively, answered.

In May, 1944, the Commission unanimously recommended to the Foreign Office the extension of punishment to atrocities committed by Germany and Hungary against their own nationals on racial or religious grounds. The action was taken upon a motion by Mr. Pell, who based himself on President Roosevelt's assurance that the perpetrators of such crimes would be punished. In September the Commission, again unanimously,\* proposed the establishment of a United Nations tribunal for the trial and punishment of top war criminals, to which end Sir Cecil, early in October, requested Mr. Eden to call an inter-Allied conference. The communication remained unanswered, either by Mr. Eden or Viscount Simon, until two days after Sir Cecil's resignation; the May communication was answered in October. Both replies were rejections of the Commission's proposals.

Under these strictures, the Commission has not succeeded in carrying through its tasks in accordance with the political, anti-fascist purpose of the United Nations War and in the light of the definitive tri-power Moscow Declaration.

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It would be erroneous, of course,

\* The Chairman argued against the motion, but cast his vote in the affirmative out of consideration for the Commission's unity.

to view these sorry results in isolation. Everywhere strategists of mercy overwhelm us with show of "law" and "precedent." Faint-hearts in opening the path to justice, they are stout-hearts in encumbering it with snags and sawyers. And when jurisprudence and history fail them in hindering, they are quick to bolster the impediments with contentions from psychology, ethics, religion, and metaphysics.

A favorite line of reasoning advanced by such people is the theory of "territoriality of jurisdiction," which is by them construed to mean that only courts of the Axis States may try Axis nationals for war crimes committed on Axis territory, home or occupied. One such "territorialist," Viscount Maugham, stated in the House of Lords on October 7, 1942:

... At present, we have no power to try Germans for the murders of any British people, or other people not being Germans, in Germany or in German-occupied territory. I want to make this perfectly clear. A German who has committed the crime of murdering one or more Englishmen in a German prison camp, or otherwise in Germany, may come here, after the war, and live in luxury in a Mayfair hotel, disporting himself in this city without anybody having the right to touch him.

Such is the *reductio ad absurdum* of metaphysical legalism!

Invitation to Mayfair! Can reciprocity be more chivalrous for invi-

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As to empirical support for this "territorialist" contention, one can best measure it by the outcome of the Leipzig trials following the War of 1914-18.

The world has a grim foreshadowing of what would result, should the Allied nations once again yield to German courts the right to try German war criminals. What cynical memories are summoned up by those "trials" in the German Supreme Court at Leipzig—begun two and a half years after the Armistice! Out of almost 900 names originally submitted to the German Government by the Allied Powers,\* twelve persons were finally brought to trial, of whom six were convicted. The punishment imposed was imprisonment, in most of the cases for terms of a few months. Of the convicted, four were obscure underlings; the two officers, who drew the only "heavy" sentences of four years, shortly thereafter "escaped."

So fared once the dogma of basing the trial of war criminals upon territoriality of jurisdiction.

The applicability of the territorial theory of jurisdiction to war crimes has been questioned by eminent authorities on criminal and international law. Most recently, Sheldon

Glueck, Professor of Criminal Law at Harvard University, in his comprehensive and generally excellent volume, *War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment*, injects the sane reminder into the discussion that "the rule of practical reason should take precedence over the rule of abstruse conceptualism." He states:

... While the territorial principle is fundamental to jurisdiction in ordinary situations, there already exist exceptions in the law of many nations based largely on necessity and realism. Thus crimes threatening the security of a State, or interfering with the functioning of its public agencies and instrumentalities, or committed against its nationals, are frequently and ought reasonably to be punishable by the injured State no matter where or by whom they are committed.\*

Those who would subject war crimes to territorial jurisdiction, Professor Glueck points out, fallaciously proceed from "the traditional notions of jurisdiction prevailing in peacetime between friendly nations." Further, with trenchant logic, he argues: By what law would Germany punish? By the Nazi law? We should then be honoring the monstrous legal perversions of an outlaw gang. By a revised legal code? Its value would at best be doubtful and the redrafting would be necessarily slow. By the pre-Hitler law? The

\* Among the high-ranking war criminals included in the lists were the Crown Prince, Marshal von Hindenburg, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, General Stenger, and von der Lancken.

\* Sheldon Glueck, *War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment*, New York, 1944, p. 81.

defense would assuredly be offered in behalf of the numerous new-generation offenders that they were not punishable by an anterior law they could not reasonably be charged with knowing.

Of course, our "territorialists" leave totally out of the reckoning the fact that under Allied Military occupation, Germany will for a long time be without self-government—a condition that will render academic the entire question of "territorial jurisdiction." Professor Glueck well concludes "that at least for several years after the defeat of Germany and Japan, United Nations' tribunals, and not those of the Axis governments or even of their immediate successors, should manage the processes of justice in the case of war criminals."\*

\* \* \*

From the sphere of jurisdiction the metaphysical legalists extend their arguments to the sphere of responsibility: Against whom can guilt for war crimes be lodged?

A favorite deterrent to the punishment of war criminals is offered in the form of the "act of State" technicality. According to this contention, a foreign subject cannot be made individually responsible by an injured State for war crimes if his acts were authorized or affirmed by his own State, with which alone responsibility rests. The motivating

\* *Ibid.*, p. 84.

theory underlying this argument is the principle of sovereign immunity, which requires the consent of a given State to any jurisdiction over its acts by another State.

The "act of State" doctrine in relation to war-crime punishment is as fallacious as it is pretentious. Viewed in connection with this problem, it proceeds from a distorted notion of sovereignty as a prerogative that in effect may be exercised in wilful independence and criminal defiance of the principles that must guide nation-to-nation relationship and responsibility. Whatever may be its validity in peacetime relations, the "act of State" theory is inapplicable to the problem of war crimes for the very reason that it would render international law governing warfare unenforceable. Aptly, this dogma has been characterized by Professor Glueck as "legalistic nihilism."

The chief objections to the "act of State" theory are effectively summed up in a statement issued on January 14, 1945, by the National Lawyers Guild on the punishment of war criminals:

... We have found no valid precedent for applying it to the trial of war criminals. To do so would largely nullify the laws of warfare since virtually all violations can be defended as having in effect been ordered or ratified by the State. It would run counter to the solemn declarations of the United Nations to punish the criminals who at the time

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of such declarations were known to have acted at the orders of their governments. It would be contrary to the precedents of military tribunals which have punished individual war offenders time and time again although they have acted under the direction of their governments. To apply this doctrine would mean that all violations of the rules of warfare could be legalized by a State under the control of the law breakers. There is no precedent or legal principle which compels us to reach so absurd a result.

The rejection of the "act of State" defense as regards war crimes in no sense implies immunity of the State from legal liability. International relations and the system of customs and laws governing them must take as their postulate the responsibility of the State to the *law of nations*, as well as the right and duty of the Family of Nations to enforce its law.

Responsibility, however, must be capable of being actualized. It must be determined within its specific province and through its concrete form. The State, by its very nature, cannot realistically be tried for war crimes that carry with them the punishment of execution or imprisonment. The responsibility of the State must of necessity be of a *political* or *material* nature. For its violations of every law of human decency, the Nazi State has brought upon itself the sentence of destruction. "But," as Academician Trainin states in a recent work on the sub-

ject,\* "the shattering of the 'Third Reich' must come about, not as a result of a lawsuit, not on the basis of a court sentence. The Hitlerite State will be shattered by the military might of the peace-loving peoples, united in the struggle for peace, freedom, and democracy."

\* \* \*

Closely related to the "act of State" theory is the defense of "superior orders." This theory, controverted by many jurists and statesmen, asserts that individual soldiers or sailors are not liable for violations of the laws of warfare committed by them in obedience to orders of their governmental or military superiors.

As in the case of the other technical obstacles discussed, the "superior orders" doctrine would grant immunity to practically the entire gang of Axis war criminals. Not only would it rule out of the punishable category all subordinate offenders, but it would, by definition, exclude also the commanders, even the arch-criminals, since they would be furnished with the defense of "government orders."

Indeed, one renowned legal authority, accepting the theory of "compulsion by law," has declared: "If members of the armed forces commit violations *by order* of their Gov-

\* Professor A. N. Trainin, *The Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., under the editorship of Academician A. Y. Vishinsky, Moscow, 1944, p. 74. Regrettably, this splendid pamphlet is still unavailable in English translation.

ernment, they are not war criminals, and may not be punished by the enemy."\* It will be seen from this statement that no distinction is made between members of the armed forces thus exempted, but that *all* members—from common soldier to the High Command—are held to be immune from punishment.

The initial error of such "authorities" on international law is their failure to see the law as *international* law. The law of nations is not designed to provide "escape clauses" to a recalcitrant State or its nationals for evading responsibility for crimes against world society. International law would be reduced to a contradiction in terms if a State that flouts the laws of humanity should be empowered to superimpose the authority of its "law" upon the law of nations. The practical outcome of such a perversion of international law with regard to war crimes would mean only one thing: the *complete exoneration* of all Axis war criminals. It would constitute a maxim to the fascist murderers of millions: *Go, and sin once more.*

Secondly, this theory fails to distinguish between lawful and unlawful orders, thereby removing all onus from the perpetrator of a war crime even when he knows his act to be a violation of the laws and customs of war and an offense against the common law of humanity. Pro-

fessor Glueck, in a profoundly analytical chapter on "Superior Orders" in his cited work, discusses most convincingly this aspect of the question. He refers in approving context to the "Disciplinary Code of the Red Army" which, as he points out, "greatly emphasizes the duty of instant, unquestioning obedience, yet also permits the soldier to lodge complaints when ordered to do something unlawful."\*

Dr. Glueck cites in this connection a series of juridical precedents from our own history. He adduces the important case, in 1804, of *Little v. Barreme*, which involved the seizure of a foreign vessel mistaken for an American ship engaged in prohibited commerce. Ruling on the defence that the action had been taken under an act of Congress, the letter of which the defendants had believed themselves to be following, Chief Justice Marshall stated that "the instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act, which, without those instructions, would have been a plain trespass." The principle is instanced in the leading American case of *United States v. Jones*, involving an act of piracy, during the War of 1812, by members of the crew of an American ship. Commenting on the defendants' plea of obedience to their Captain's orders, the Court stated: "This doctrine, equally alarming and unfounded, . . . is repugnant to

\* Oppenheim's *International Law* (5th ed.,) 1935, Vol. II, pp. 453-54.

\* Glueck, *cited work*, p. 235.

reason, and to the positive law of the land. No military or civil officer can command an inferior to violate the laws of his country; nor will such command excuse, much less justify the act. Can it be for a moment pretended, that the general of an army, or the commander of a ship of war, can order one of his men to commit murder or felony? Certainly not . . . the participation of the inferior officer, in an act which he *knows, or ought to know to be illegal*, will not be excused by the order of his superior.\*

Disturbing, however, is the discrepancy, noted by Dr. Glueck, between the official military rules, American as well as British, and the pre-existent judicial decisions. Contrary to the intent of these authoritative decisions, the American *Rules of Land Warfare*, patterned upon a like provision in the British *Manual of Military Law*, specify ". . . Individuals of the armed forces will not be punished for these offenses in case they are committed under the orders or sanction of their government or commanders. The commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall."\*\*

It is almost beyond credence that our military *Rules* should thus offer

wholesale advance exoneration to fascist war criminals in disregard of the solemn commitments of our government and the United Nations to impose punishment on all "German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party" guilty of war crimes, even those who may only "have taken a consenting part."

Nor can we consider the provision which declares "the commanders ordering the commission of such acts" punishable, an effective basis for punishment. For, the defense of "superior orders" can be invoked, in an ascendant line, by officer after officer, leading, as Professor Glueck puts it, "to the absurd result of climbing higher and higher in the hierarchical ladder until the commander-in-chief or 'Head of State' is reached." And since "a Head of State is held by many authorities not to be amenable to the jurisdiction of foreign tribunals, we should have the Alice-in-Wonderland consequence of everybody escaping punishment for atrocities—including, in the case of the Germans, Hitler!"\*

The defence of "superior orders" was put to the test at the Kharkov trials in December, 1943. Proceeding, clearly, from the principle of differentiation between unlawful and lawful orders, the Court agreed with the contention of the Public Prosecutor:

A serviceman in the German army who sets fire to peaceful towns and vil-

\* *Ibid.*, pp. 145-7.

\*\* U. S. War Department FM 27-10 *Basic Field Manual*, 1940, p. 87.

\* Glueck, *cited work*, p. 141.

lages, shoots peaceful citizens, and forces women, children, and old men into burning houses, cannot but know that such acts constitute a violation of international law and of the laws prevailing in all civilized countries.\*

Moreover, it was revealed by the confession of the accused Nazi officers during the trial that the crimes had been perpetrated both by order of the Nazi Government and High Command and on the initiative of the accused who had given orders to their subordinates for the wholesale massacring of the Soviet civilian population.

The just and expeditious trial and conviction of three Nazi war criminals and a Russian traitor by the Kharkov military tribunal, and their summary execution, represent a decisive refutation, as logical judicially as it was effective practically, of the dogma of "superior orders"—of the dogma, too, of "territoriality of jurisdiction," of "act of State," and of sundry other learned obstacles to retributive justice.

\* \* \*

The issue of punishment of Axis war criminals is not purely and simply a question of jurisprudence. It is not a question standing by itself, or concerning this or that country by itself. *It is a vital part of the entire purpose of the United Nations to destroy fascism, decisively and irrevocably. It is part of the war*

*we are waging. Punishment is imperative, not only as retribution for crimes perpetrated, not only as a fear-inspiring example to would-be aggressors and war criminals in the future, but, above all, as a measure to destroy physically the fascist core of organized aggression laying its plans already to plunge the world into a third war.*

Who are the basic forces that seek to block the effective punishment of the fascist war criminals? They are the same forces that seek to block the decisive military defeat of those war criminals. They are the unregenerate Munichites, the Fifth Columnists, the appeasers, the negotiated-peace mongers, and the motley crowd of soft-peace pleaders. They are the rabid imperialistic elements and their political spokesmen and servitors on the floor and in the lobbies of Congress; in reactionary radio broadcasts, lectures, and publications; in the defeatist and pro-fascist press of the Hearst-McCormick-Patterson trinity of treason. They are the Soviet-hating brood of Nyes, Wheelers, Bullitts, Gerald Smiths, and their agents in the labor movement, the Dubinskys and Norman Thomases—this unconscionable junta who would share the victory of any Hitler in order to bring defeat upon the U.S.S.R.; who hope for Hitlerism in permanence to "save the world from Bolshevism"; who would pull the world down over the heads of us all, if it might only crash on

\* *Izvestia*, December 21, 1943.

the Soviet Union. And, not least, there are the muddled sentimentalists, British and American liberal spokesmen like C. E. M. Joad and Dorothy Thompson, and publications like *The Manchester Guardian* and the *New Republic*. Heroes of the bifurcated will, they come toward the ally, trampling the grapes of wrath; they stand toward the foe, gushing the milk of human kindness.

In the liberated countries, the pleas for the Nazi war criminals are inspired by the native war criminals themselves, they who comprise the traitor camp of collaborators and quislings, the pro-fascist industrialists and bankers who harnessed their peoples to toil for Hitler and sold out to the German financiers vast native holdings, the purveyors of slave battalions for the war machine of the Reichswehr, the betrayers of anti-fascists to the Nazi occupation authorities. In France it was the Two Hundred Families who worked to save Pucheu's head, and theirs is the voice prompting De Gaulle' to thwart the people's exactions of retribution for the war crimes of the traitors. In Belgium, it is the reactionary cartellists, bankers, and economic collaborators, the pro-Hitler coal barons, and the masters of the Siemens-linked A.C.E.C. electrical trust who, still at liberty, are the great power behind the Pierlot regime of "Bloody Sunday" infamy. And in Greece, it was the pro-German vested interests, the relics of the

fascist Metaxas dictatorship, the rotten retinue of the fascist dynast, the home-slinking Premiers-in-Exile, the Security Battalions of quisling General Gonatos—the entire "New Order" camp of people's jailers, traitors and war criminals left totally unpunished—who leaped forward from their rat-holes and recesses, under the protection of British arms, to shoot into the hearts of anti-fascist patriots bullets the people made for fascist hearts.

\* \* \*

But the peoples of liberated Europe, and of all the United Nations, are advancing to realize their historic democratic objective. As the guns of the coalition armies announce under German skies the nearing victory, the patriots of all the freed countries are moving forward, with rising wrath and determination, to crush the criminals of fascism. The verdict of doom upon the criminals of the fascist war is heard by the peoples of the United Nations in the advancing tread of their sons and brothers and husbands and fathers, in the roar of the planes and tanks and rifles and bombs which their efforts have made.

The court at Kharkov was the first tribunal of the world peoples' will. The just and effective punishment it meted out heralded the punishment that can and must be dealt the fascist monsters by the tribunals of the United Nations.

"The Kharkov trial," said *Pravda*,


"is of great international significance. It proclaims the triumph of justice. It testifies that the insolent bandit violation of international legal standards will not go unpunished, that there is a force in the world which will put an end to the Nazi nest of crime in Europe and restore the security of nations."

*There is a force. . . .*

It inheres in the peoples of the embattled United Nations. It surges on in the banners of the liberating Red Army and of the Allied armies closing in from the West. It is the

force that is decisively crushing the military might of the Nazi war-makers. It is the force that can and must exact full retribution from the Nazi war criminals.

The Moscow Declaration spoke the determination of the anti-fascist peoples. Punishment of the Hitlerite war criminals long condemned by the Court of Human Justice, is imperative for the consolidation of victory on the battlefield, for the security and dignity of the peoples: Retributive Justice will take over the sword of Victory.





# MARX AND ENGELS ON LINCOLN AND THE CIVIL WAR



By SAMUEL SILLEN

Karl Marx

DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER the outcome of the "first grand war of contemporaneous history," Karl Marx and Frederick Engels studied closely the issues and the conduct of the Civil War in the United States. For they recognized from the very outset that "in this contest the highest form of popular self-government till now realized is giving battle to the meanest and most shameless form of man's enslaving recorded in the annals of history."<sup>\*</sup>

In this article we are concerned with only two of the many aspects of the "titanic American strife" which Marx and Engels discussed. One is the problem of evaluating the "war aims" of the Civil War. The other is the problem of appraising the significance of Abraham Lincoln as a war leader.

Each of these problems has an immediate bearing on the political discussions of our own day. What *method of approach* did Marx and

Engels employ in dealing with them?

## WAR AIMS VERSUS "IDEAL" SLOGANS

In the opening months of the Civil War, cries of outraged idealism were raised by anti-Northern papers in England. *The Saturday Review*, for example, lamented that "The North does not proclaim Abolition, and never pretended to fight for anti-slavery. The North has not hoisted for its oriflamme the sacred symbol of justice to the Negro; its *cri de guerre* is not unconditional abolition." Other British anti-Union organs, like *The Economist* and *The Examiner*, swelled the grief-stricken chorus of those who bemoaned the absence of "idealism" and "humanitarianism" in the war against the Confederacy.

These hypocritical wailings have a familiar ring today, when Hitler himself, echoed by Senators Brooks and Wheeler, demands to know "what we are fighting for," and when certain liberals fall prey to such demagoguery.

Marx and Engels ripped to shreds the fraudulent idealism of the Lon-

<sup>\*</sup>All quotations in this article are from *The Civil War in the United States*, by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (International Publishers, 1937). This compilation includes articles that appeared originally in the *New York Daily Tribune* and the *Vienna Presse* in 1861 and 1862 as well as extracts from the correspondence of Marx and Engels during the war period.

don press. The question of "war aims" was not for them to be defined in a glittering tissue of abstract phrases. The aim of the war was to be sought in its actual content and character.

In defining the character of the war, they stressed three basic ideas:

1. The war was essentially a "struggle between two social systems, between the system of slavery and the system of free labor." In political terms, the question was "whether the twenty million free men of the North should subordinate themselves any longer to an oligarchy of three hundred thousand slaveholders. . . ."

2. The Southern Confederacy was waging an aggressive war of conquest to perpetuate and extend slavery. The national government was waging a war to defend and continue the Union, which inevitably implied a fight against the continued existence of the slavocracy, since the Slave Power had either to expand or perish.

3. The Civil War involved the fate, not only of America, but of all mankind. A victory for the Union was the precondition for "the reconstruction of a social world" in Europe as well as in America. The Slave Power was a formidable "barrier to progress" on a *world scale*. For that reason, "the workingmen of Europe felt instinctively that the star-spangled banner carried the destiny of their class."

Marx and Engels did not dispute the premise of the "war aim" critics,

namely, that the North had not undertaken the war with a view to put down slavery. Indeed, as they noted, "the United States authorities themselves have taken the greatest pains to protest against any such idea." But the founders of Scientific Socialism invited the "idealists" to consider two vastly important facts, which are obviously relevant today.

First, *the origin of the war*. It ought to be remembered, wrote Marx, that "it was not the North, but the South, which undertook this war; the former acting only on the defense." The fight for what we today call "survival" came after "an exhibition of forbearance unknown in the annals of European history," and the sword was drawn at length to save the Union.

Second, *the war aims of the enemy*. The South had "inaugurated the war by loudly proclaiming 'the peculiar institutions' as the only and main end of the rebellion." Marx added: "If the North professed to fight but for the Union, the South gloried in rebellion for the supremacy of slavery. If anti-slavery and idealistic England felt not attracted by the profession of the North, how came it to pass that it was not violently repulsed by the cynical confessions of the South?"

In short, Marx and Engels refused to raise the slogan of Abolition as the precondition for their support of the Union cause, even though they were the foremost champions of the Abolitionist principle. In this respect

they were in complete agreement with the greatest leader of the Negro people in this period, Frederick Douglass. The supreme issue was a military victory for the North that would break the back of the Slave Power.

This is not to suggest, however, that Marx and Engels believed that emancipation measures could be indefinitely postponed. On the contrary, they emphasized from the outset that all efforts "to spare the foe's most vulnerable spot, the root of the evil—*slavery itself*" could lead only to serious military weakness. This view was thoroughly confirmed by the course of events.

With their unsurpassed genius for historical analysis, they foresaw clearly that the dynamics of the war itself would create the imperative conditions for emancipation. For emancipation was inescapably necessary for rallying full support of the Northern masses, for depriving the South of its labor supply, and for utilizing the full military power of the Negroes. By November 7, 1861, Marx could write: "Events themselves drive to the promulgation of the decisive slogan—*emancipation of the slaves.*" And he noted that even the *New York World* had concluded its latest anti-Abolitionist tirade with these significant words: "If the North cannot triumph *without* emancipation, it will triumph *with* emancipation." Similarly, "events themselves" were compelling Orestes Brownson, leading Catholic spokes-

man, to write: "If we have opposed Abolition heretofore because we would preserve the Union, we must *a fortiori* now oppose slavery whenever, in our judgment, its continuance becomes incompatible with the maintenance of the Union, or of the nation as a free republican state." This cardinal change in attitude was reflected also in a statement by General Cass, who as Secretary of State in Buchanan's administration, had been violently anti-Abolitionist.

Had the slogan of Abolition been raised at the outset as a precondition for supporting the war, such forces might very likely have broken away and national unity would have been gravely jeopardized. The war-aim of Abolition was not subjectively predetermined but was contained in the dynamic character and content of a just war against the aggressive slave oligarchy. By the second year of the war it had become clear that "the first act of the Civil War—the *constitutional* waging of war" was nearly over, and "the second act, the *revolutionary* waging of war" was at hand. But it was the height of wisdom in Marx and Engels to have recognized that the second act inhered in and was matured by the first act. Non-participation in the first act would have been, as their analysis clearly implies, an act of sectarian "idealism" that could only have had the effect of imperiling the second act.

In the message of congratulation sent by the International Working-

men's Association (First International) to Lincoln on his re-election, Karl Marx, who composed the Address, wrote:

We congratulate the American people upon your re-election by a large majority. *If resistance to the Slave Power was the reserved watchword of your first election, the triumphant war cry of your re-election is Death to Slavery.* [Italics mine—S. S.]

#### LINCOLN AS WAR LEADER



Abraham Lincoln

Another spurious argument which Marx and Engels had to combat concerned the leadership of the war. Here, again, sections of the British press resorted to a species of demagoguery that is not without parallel today. *The Economist*, for example, exclaimed:

Can we forget that Abolitionists have habitually been as ferociously persecuted and maltreated in the North and West as in the South? Can it be denied that the testiness and half-heartedness, not to say insincerity, of the government at Washington have for years supplied the chief impediment which has thwarted our efforts for the effectual suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Africa; while a vast proportion of the clippers actually engaged in that trade have been built with Northern capital, owned by Northern merchants and manned by Northern seamen?

Unmasking "such pettifogging Old Bailey pleas," Marx denounced those who "cannot sympathize with the North breaking down the withering influence of slavocracy because [they] cannot forget that the North, while bound by that influence, supported the slave trade, mobbed the Abolitionists, and had its democratic institutions tainted by the slavedriver's prejudices." (Italics mine—S. S.)

Marx indicted the "masterly logicians" who could not sympathize with Lincoln's administration because they had found fault with Buchanan's administration, who could not get through their heads that "the North of yesterday was not the North of today."

Yes, it was true, that the "general formula" of American history since the beginning of the 19th century had been the increasing abuse of the Union by the slave oligarchy. The various compromise measures had marked "the successive degrees of encroachment by which the Union became more and more transformed into the slave of the slaveowner."

But each single contest that had ended favorably for the South had produced an antagonistic force in the North, and "the attentive observer of history could not but see that every new advance of the slave power was a step forward to its ultimate defeat."

Marx and Engels viewed Lincoln as the representative of a *new stage* of American history. His election

marked a decisive break with the past.

They were by no means uncritical of Lincoln. They noted his cautious legalism, for example, and they were especially sharp when he revoked Fremont's decree emancipating rebel-owned slaves in Missouri. They commented on his hesitation to dismiss the treacherous McClellan and his fighting "shy of every step that could mislead the 'loyal' slaveholders of the border states."

But they kept their eyes steadily on what they recognized and termed the "historic content" of Lincoln's role and actions. They appreciated the great trials of his administration, his growth in facing these trials, the correctness and statesmanlike decision with which he made the crucial turning-points of the war.

"President Lincoln," they noted, "never ventures a step forward before the tide of circumstances and the call of general public opinion forbids further delay. But once 'old Abe' has convinced himself that such a turning-point has been reached, he then surprises friend and foe alike by a sudden operation executed as noiselessly as possible. Thus, in the most unassuming manner, he has quite recently carried out a coup that half a year earlier would possibly have cost him the presidential office and even a few months ago would have called forth a storm of debate."

The reference here is to the removal of McClellan as Commander-

in-Chief and the replacing of Secretary of War Cameron by Edwin Stanton. At this, as at every other crucial point in the war, Lincoln showed courage and resourcefulness. By noting constantly the "historic content" of Lincoln's role, and by exposing the puniness of the "moral assassins," Marx and Engels provide a model for the correct appraisal of a people's leader in a progressive war.

Many beautiful tributes have been written to Lincoln. None surpasses in depth of feeling and in eloquence the Address of the International Workingmen's Association upon the death of that great American President:

It is not our part to call words of sorrow and horror while the heart of two worlds heaves with emotion. Even the sycophants who, year after year, and day by day, stuck to their Sisyphus work of morally assassinating Abraham Lincoln, and the great republic he headed stand now aghast at this universal outburst of popular feeling, and rival with each other to strew rhetorical flowers on his open grave.

They have now at last found out that he was a man, neither to be browbeaten by adversity, nor intoxicated by success, inflexibly pressing on to his great goal, never compromising it by blind haste, slowly maturing his steps, never retracing them, carried away by no surge of popular favor, disheartened by no slackening of the popular pulse; tempering stern acts by the gleams of a kind heart, illuminating scenes dark with passion by the smile

of humor, doing his titanic work as humbly and homely as heaven-born rulers do little things with the grandiloquence of pomp and state; in one word, one of the rare men who succeed in becoming great, without ceasing to be good.

Such, indeed, was the modesty of this great and good man, that the world

only discovered him a hero after he had fallen a martyr.

This magnificent tribute flowed from the hearts and minds of men who understood greatness of character, thought, and action because they were themselves supremely great.

# THE DANGER OF AGGRESSION IN THE LIGHT OF THE HISTORY OF WAR

By MAJ. GEN. M. GALAKTIONOV

THE SECOND World War, already in its sixth year, is now drawing to an end. One of the greatest cataclysms in history, it is characterized by the gigantic sweep of events, by the profundity of its influence on all countries of the world, by the abrupt turns in the tide, and by contradictory manifestations.

This does not mean that science cannot and should not take this complexity and variety under its purview, difficult though the task is, especially in the course of the war itself. Tasks of this magnitude are within the scope only of giants of thought and action like Lenin and Stalin, who employed the method of materialist dialectics to explain the complex phenomena of modern times and to guide the great struggle of our people.

## COMPELLING POWER OF STALIN'S WORD

Every Soviet soldier, worker, collective farmer and intellectual is

familiar with Stalin's book, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*. It draws theoretical generalizations from the vast sum of knowledge and facts, but it is easily understandable by every literate person. The compelling power of Stalin's book lies in the fact that it sets lofty and noble aims before the millions. Stalin's word leads us to victory.

In his speech on the occasion of the Twenty-seventh Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Stalin said: "... since history shows that aggressive nations, as the nations that attack, are usually better prepared for a new war than peace-loving nations which, having no interest in a new war, are usually behind with their preparations for it."

Stalin's views are of immense value for a scientific history of war beginning from the earliest times. In the final count the issue of war is decided by the relative strength of the contending sides. Stalin's doctrine of the permanently operating factors of war inspired our people with confidence in their strength and in ultimate victory. These factors are: the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the equipment of the army, and the organizing ability of the commanding personnel. These factors are of immense importance.

At the same time, Stalin warned us against interpreting relative strength formally and superficially. One may sustain a defeat even when one enjoys general superiority over

the enemy. This does not contradict the principle of relative strength, but on the contrary confirms it; for the opponent may achieve either superiority of forces on some given sector, or a temporary advantage at some given stage. We know from history that armies sometimes suffer defeat at the hands of numerically smaller armies.

Victory may be achieved thanks to superior military skill. One of the fundamental maxims of the art of generalship is that if you want to forestall your adversary, resort to maneuver and exploit the element of surprise, and thus attain superiority of forces on the sector of the main blow.

But there is another way of forestalling an opponent, one which does not depend upon military skill or valor—namely, preparing for aggression a long time ahead. The victims of such aggression may be peaceful countries with large populations, a higher culture, and even, strange though it may seem, a more highly developed art of war. Such countries are vanquished by the brute force of the aggressor only because they did not maintain large armies or had no time to deploy them when the war began.

Ancient Rome conquered the whole world in its time, including countries with such highly developed cultures as Carthage and Greece. Curiously enough, the art of war was at a higher level in these countries than among the Romans, as the

names of Alexander the Great and Hannibal eloquently testify. The Roman Empire was created by brute force and military organization of the state, which insured permanent preparedness for war.

A striking example in more modern times was Eighteenth Century Prussia. Although weaker than her neighbors, she was able to conquer large territories, thanks to the brute preparedness for war.

In 1812 Napoleon attacked Russia with the largest army of his day. Napoleon enjoyed the advantages of the aggressor; he was incomparably better prepared for war than Russia, which, not being interested in that war, delayed in preparing for it. The danger to our country was great, but it served to arouse all the forces of the Russian people. Kutuzov excelled Napoleon in knowledge of the secrets of military art. The fires of Moscow heralded the dawn of the liberation of Europe from Napoleonic domination.

In the latter half of the Nineteenth Century aggression assumed a new form, and one much more dangerous to peaceful nations. Militarist Germany mustered all her forces for the purposes of aggression, on an ever-increasing scale, taking advantage of the potentialities offered by the development of railways. It now became possible to draw up plans of war many years ahead and to build a large regular army, and furthermore, to muster in a short time an armed force many millions strong



and hurl it against a less prepared opponent. It was in this way that France was defeated in the war of 1870-71.

#### GERMANY'S AGGRESSIVE SCHEMES

But aggressive Germany was hatching far more dangerous and bloody schemes. For several decades she prepared for war with colossal intensity, in furtherance of her imperialist plans of world domination. From year to year her regular army grew, she assigned enormous sums for war preparations, developed her war industries with feverish haste, and re-equipped her army.

Did the neighboring countries against whom German imperialist aggression was directed perceive these frantic preparations for war? Of course. But here again the historical law came into play: ". . . aggressive nations interested in a new war, being nations that prepare for war over a long time and accumulate forces for it, are usually—and are bound to be—better prepared for war than peace-loving nations which have no interest in a new war. This is natural and understandable. If you like, this is a law of history which it would be dangerous to ignore." (*Stalin*).

Although measures were taken by the neighboring countries to strengthen their armed forces, they lagged behind Germany in scale, and, what is more important, in speed of preparations.

Germany's plan of war, known as the Schlieffen plan, banked upon the power of aggression. When in the summer of 1914 proposals were made for a peaceful regulation of the conflict, the German General Staff interfered and insisted that hostilities should be begun immediately: the generals feared to lose their chief advantage—the advantage the aggressor has over the not fully prepared adversary. In 1914 the vast might of the German army was hurled first against Belgium, in violation of the treaty of neutrality, and against France. The German military doctrine was to crush the adversary with a single blow of a mighty army which had been prepared for years, and to allow him no time to prepare himself to parry the blow.

As we know, notwithstanding her adversaries' unpreparedness for war, Germany's war plan of 1914 failed. This was due to the fact that three great powers—Russia, Great Britain and France—without a moment's hesitation hurled into action all the forces they had at their disposal in those early weeks of war, in order to stem the German attack. The Russian invasion of East Prussia forced the German command to transfer part of its forces from the West to the East. And once more we observe the seemingly paradoxical fact that an army which claimed seniority of place in military art in the deep sense of the term, steadily deteriorated. With the sudden change of the situation on the Marne,

the German generals, finding themselves up against difficulties, proved utterly bankrupt and lost the battle. When the initial advantages enjoyed by the aggressor began to fail, the German General Staff found itself in a hopeless situation.

After the First World War, it was clear that only firm unity among the peaceful nations and their grim determination jointly to resort to arms to bridle the aggressor were capable of averting the horrors of a new world war. But both unity and determination were lacking, in the face of Nazi Germany, which was openly arming and brazenly preparing for new aggression. Yet aggression was now far more dangerous to the peace-loving nations than on the eve of the First World War. Military technics were developing very rapidly. An aggressor country could mobilize its industry and manufacture armaments in gigantic quantities. Furthermore, the very character of military technique had changed: it combined increased power with high mobility. This made it possible to develop, with great speed and decisive results, operations against an adversary not fully prepared for defense. This was obviously to the advantage of the aggressor—who gambles upon forestalling his opponent in preparation for war—and tended to increase the effectiveness of his blow many times over.

Blitzkrieg is therefore not a fortuitous thing. Blitzkrieg is the war of an aggressor against peaceful nations.

It is the war of adventurers. Yet it would be folly not to see that blitzkrieg in the hands of aggressive adventurers is a most dangerous weapon.

#### BLITZKRIEG—WAR OF ADVENTURERS

The Nazis mobilized all the forces of the fascist state in the service of aggression, and built an army adapted for blitzkrieg. It was an army of aggression—an army of invasion, an army of vast numerical strength, equipped on a gigantic scale and specially adapted for mobility and maneuverability. The Nazis reckoned that with such an army they could finish their blitz campaigns before their opponents succeeded in mobilizing their war potential.

To this army may be contrasted the type of army which France had before the war. It was considered one of the most powerful armies in the world, but it was designed for defense. It held a place in the plans of the Allies in the West as a covering army until Great Britain, which had only a small regular army, could deploy her armed forces.

Before the war there was considerable discussion in foreign military periodicals of the terms "army of invasion" and "covering army." Stalin in his speech gives a very precise definition of these two terms and reveals their connection with the question of aggressor and peaceful nations. He says:

It is a fact that in the present war the aggressive nations had an invasion army all ready even before the war broke out; while the peace-loving nations did not have even a fully adequate army to cover the mobilization.

One cannot regard as an accident such distasteful facts as the Pearl Harbor "incident," the loss of the Philippines and other Pacific islands, the loss of Hongkong and Singapore, when Japan as the aggressive nation proved to be better prepared for war than Great Britain and the United States of America, which pursued a policy of peace. Nor can one regard as an accident such a distasteful fact as the loss of the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltics in the very first year of the war, when Germany as the aggressive nation proved better prepared for war than the peace-loving Soviet Union.

It would be naive to explain these facts by the personal qualities of the Japanese and the Germans, their superiority over the British, the Americans and the Russians, their foresight and so on.

The fact is that the historical laws defined by Stalin are operative in this war, too.

#### GERMANY'S TIME ADVANTAGE

The time advantage which Germany gained by her aggression was sufficient to enable her to achieve decisive results in the campaigns in the West. The time advantage was also considerable when Hitler Germany treacherously attacked our country. This advantage was due not to any chance circumstances, but to the

fundamental fact that Germany is an aggressor country and the Soviet Union a peaceful country. In June, 1941, Hitler Germany set in motion a huge, fully mobilized army of invasion, armed to the teeth, while our armed forces and industry had not been mobilized and our frontiers were protected only by a covering army.

Of course, there was a way, both before the outbreak and at the beginning of the Second World War, to nip Hitler aggression in the bud—namely, by forming a fighting alliance of peace-loving nations. This way, the only correct way, was proposed by the Soviet Government before the war, but its proposals were rejected.

Nevertheless, our Soviet country firmly and unswervingly pursued a policy of peace, and rejected and condemned aggression. The past few years have shown that the Soviet Union thereby gained invaluable permanent advantages over Hitler Germany, whose own advantages as aggressor proved to be temporary and fleeting. Soon after Germany's perfidious attack upon the U.S.S.R., the powerful anti-Hitler coalition was formed, whose armies have now taken up positions on the eastern and western frontiers of Germany and are rendering her defeat inevitable.

But in 1941 the Red Army fought the trying struggle single-handed, against heavy odds, against a Hitler Germany which had the resources of the whole of Western Europe be-

hind her. From this stern ordeal the Red Army emerged triumphant. In the course of the gigantic contest it eliminated the advantages of the aggressor, and, passing to the offensive, scored decisive victories.

Our covering army performed its mission in the early months of the war by giving us time in which to mobilize our armed forces and industry. Deep in the heart of the country new armies were formed which, when brought into action, made it possible to defeat the enemy at Moscow, Rostov and Tikhvin, and radically to change the situation at the front.

Long before the war, Stalin foresaw and warned us against the mortal danger of aggression to which our country might be subjected. By his wise leadership he prepared our country in every way for the forthcoming historical test. Our country entered the war morally and politically united; our industry proved completely able to satisfy the colossal demands of war; our armed forces were properly organized, swiftly learned the lessons of war and received splendid armaments in ever-increasing quantities.

In 1941 the German army was better prepared in the sense that it was mobilized and had already had considerable experience. But the course of events showed that in a deeper sense—in the sense of waging a prolonged war when all the wealth of modern armaments had been brought into action—our Army was

better prepared than the German army.

In the long run the Soviet Union proved to be stronger than Germany and the Red Army stronger than the Wehrmacht. "The history of war teaches that only those states have stood this test which proved to be stronger than their adversary in the development and organization of their economy, in experience, in the proficiency and fighting spirit of their troops, and in the fortitude and unity of their people throughout the whole course of the war." (*Stalin*).

All these advantages proved in this war to be on the side of the Soviet Union. And this was possible thanks to the gigantic effort made by our people in the ten or fifteen years preceding the war.

However, the transition from the period when Germany, as an aggressor, still enjoyed temporary advantages, to the period when the Soviet Union's permanent advantages began to make themselves increasingly felt, was not an easy one, nor one that occurred automatically.

#### RED ARMY'S IMMENSELY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN 1941

In 1941 our country was threatened by mortal danger. The advantage in time possessed by the enemy proved to be a formidable factor. Sometimes hours, not to mention days, decided the issue of titanic engagements. Under Stalin's brilliant guidance of the operations of the Red Army, problems of immense difficulty were

solved, such as had never been faced by any leader of armies before.

The aggressor's advantage was so great that even with the country's powerful reserves and resources, defensive methods were not enough. Stalin's genius realized the situation, and while playing for time, did not permit our main strategical reserves, upon which the issue depended, to be thrown into action prematurely.

But when the decisive hour came, Stalin threw the whole weight of our armies into the scales. The great battle of Moscow was fought, and, like every great decision, it was the only correct one. Our country was saved.

The aggressor's advantages had not yet been completely eliminated, but they were steadily on the wane. In 1942, at Stalingrad, a radical change took place; while in 1943, at Kursk, the last attempt of that bankrupt adventurer, Hitler, to recover his lost advantages, was foiled.

It is a highly noteworthy fact that having lost the advantages derived from aggression, the German generals proved utterly bankrupt. They had nothing constructive with which

to counter the growing perfection of Soviet strategy. The Red Army gained the advantage over the enemy in combat, but this advantage was the result of genuine military efficiency and generalship as expressed in originality of thought, effective use of the element of surprise, and skilful maneuvering.

The Red Army's heroic fight gave our Allies time in which to deploy fully their war potential. The Nazis' plans of exploiting the advantages enjoyed by aggressor nations over peaceful nations, owing to their earlier preparation for war, completely collapsed.

But one must not forget the lessons of this war, in which unbridled aggression trampled upon the liberty of peaceful nations. That is why the freedom-loving nations have lent an attentive ear to Stalin's wise words on the subjection of aggression:

It is not to be denied accordingly that in days to come the peace-loving nations may once more find themselves caught off their guard by aggression, unless of course they work out special measures right now which can avert it.

# A.F. OF L.-C.I.O.: WHAT KIND OF UNITY?

By GEORGE MORRIS

WILLIAM GREEN's rejection of Philip Murray's recent proposal for A. F. of L.-C.I.O. collaboration on vital legislative issues, once more reopens the entire question of labor unity. Green's prompt rebuff did not close the question, as is so evident by the mounting number of protests he is receiving from A. F. of L. affiliates. Furthermore, as has become quite traditional in the A. F. of L. for most affiliates not to regard themselves bound by statements of Green and the decisions of the Executive Council. This is apparent from the growing number of reports of joint A. F. of L.-C.I.O. movements on a regional or state scale.

Neither is the C.I.O. letting the matter rest. The Murray appeal has been directed to every A. F. of L. body, from locals upward. The pressing issues, as they are emerging from Congress and state legislatures, are themselves becoming the greatest driving force for collaboration between A. F. of L. and C.I.O. affiliates.

The nature of Green's reply, how-

ever, poses some serious questions that touch the very core of labor's policy, its role now and its view of the future. The answers to those questions is also the answer to the problem of what kind of unity.

## "ORGANIC UNITY" VS. COOPERATION

Green's reply contained some expert demagoguery that was quite obviously intended for the newer people in the labor movement or those not acquainted with the nine-year history of the rise of the C.I.O. and the long chain of unity attempts that have been made. Green would have us believe that it was Murray who refused to unite with the A. F. of L.

"The only way to achieve unity is to unite organically," said Green. "This is labor's greatest need now and in the post-war period, yet Mr. Murray turns a deaf ear toward it.

"Instead, Mr. Murray offers some phoney functional unity which the C.I.O. often prated about in the past. Our experiences during this war have taught us that it is impossible to maintain united labor policies and programs at the top while division, dualism and bitter discord continue in the field."

This was stated in reply to a letter in which Murray pointed out that with the reelection of the President, the people are in the "fortunate position" of beginning a new legislative year that could result in great benefits for the great majority.

Murray wrote:

Organized labor has a special interest

in seeing to it that the mandate given to the President and to the Congress by the people is faithfully carried out. . . . The plan for economic security, based on an economic Bill of Rights and envisioning sixty million jobs, can and will be achieved if the forces of labor are mobilized. . . .

The time for unity on a broad program of action has come. . . . It is too late in the day merely to talk of labor unity. It is no longer a question of the prodigal son returning to the fold nor of the disgraceful daughter being sent forth into the winter snows. That time has long passed. The promises of forgiveness or forgetfulness fall on deaf ears, on ears that do not even understand the meaning of the promises. For the young people who are in the trade union movement today, cannot remember, nor do they wish to remember, the scars of yesterday. They only see disruption and division. They are not interested in the causes. They are only interested in finding the remedy.

Pointing to the unity of labor in the election campaign that had brought such great victory on November 7, Murray called for development of that unity around the vital problems that flow from the mandate of the election.

#### EXPERIENCE ON JOINT ACTION

Thus, we have before us a proposal for an agreement of joint action and Green's counterclaim that nothing will satisfy short of "organic unity," which mean the complete fusion of the two organizations. Let us examine these two positions.

In the first place, C.I.O.-A. F. of L. collaboration, which Green presumes to call "phoney, functional unity," has existed in many fields since Pearl Harbor. It expressed itself first on the War Labor Board and in the C.I.O.-A. F. of L. joint conference at which labor gave its no-strike pledge. Until some recent disagreements, labor's unity was effective and fruitful on wage policy. The same type of unity, expressed both in agreement on program and in joint representation on various war bodies, existed and still continues, on top and in hundreds of local and regional bodies, on war production, manpower problems, O.P.A. policy, war bonds, war aid and other fields.

During the closing days of the 78th Congress, A. F. of L., C.I.O. and Railroad Brotherhood leaders united behind the Kilgore-Murray-Truman Reconversion Bill and did some vigorous, although belated, campaigning for it. We saw similar unity expressed on the 1944 tax bill and in the campaign against the Smith-Connelly Bill.

Finally, we have the combined Labor War Board consisting of A. F. of L., C.I.O. and Railroad Brotherhood representatives, which meets with the President to present labor's *united* view on various problems.

This joint action has, unfortunately, not been full-hearted everywhere, especially in the most recent months. But its result has had and continues to have, a great historic significance in this war. It has instilled a spirit

of unity behind the war effort through the ranks of the millions of rank-and-file workers and the lower organizations of the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. Labor's united stand has been the basic spur to national unity in the war. It was labor's united front on issues, limited though it was, that has so greatly contributed to its constructive role in the war and won for it such unprecedented tribute from the government, the armed forces, and the general public. Finally, it was through this unity, as elementary as it appeared to be, that labor expressed its coalition with the President and his Administration.

These relatively loose agreements on top have resulted in much closer and more effective unity in the states and cities. Combined state and local victory committees cropped up everywhere (with Mr. Green's blessing on earlier occasions). Joint campaigns developed in elections, as pressure upon Congressmen, against Sen. "Pappy" O'Daniels' Christian American Association, against state anti-labor laws, for price enforcement, and on a hundred like problems, with many notable achievements. The results on November 7 crowned the joint work of A. F. of L.-C.I.O. bodies in hundreds of localities in the country. *The A. F. of L. officials and members below took the agreements more seriously than their leaders on top.*

So powerful was this surge for unity within A. F. of L. ranks that state, county and city joint A. F. of

L.-C.I.O. action developed from coast to coast in defiance of Green's ban on such unity in the elections. It was also in defiance of the attacks upon the C.I.O.'s Political Action Committee. As is generally recognized, it is this joint action that gave a backbone to the general pro-Roosevelt camp in many decisive areas of the country.

Only one who does not see these results of three years of cooperation or has developed a cynicism toward the whole policy of labor in the war, could refer to these united actions as "phony, functional unity." In earlier days, when it suited Green, he was even boastful of labor's unity in the various fields and often spoke of its good results. As an example, we can cite the A. F. of L. Executive Council's report to the Toronto Convention in October, 1942, which dealt with the work of the Combined Labor War Board.

"All the meetings which have been held between the Combined Labor War Board and President Roosevelt," said the Council, "have been most satisfactory and productive of good results in the promotion of the war effort and in the protection of the economic, social and industrial interests of the workers of the nation."

A year later, at the Boston Convention (October, 1943), the Council said of this same Board that "these meetings have afforded labor an opportunity to present its views in order to bring about a better under-



standing on the part of the Government of the attitude of labor toward the constantly changing economic conditions which have taken place during the war period."

#### EXPERIENCE WITH UNITY TALKS

There has also been considerable experience, since 1936, in efforts to bring about "organic unity." But each conference failed because the A. F. of L. refused to recognize the basic reasons that had brought the C.I.O. into existence. The rise of the C.I.O. was the climaxing development of a long struggle within the A. F. of L. to expand labor organization to the many unorganized millions in the basic mass production industries. For decades, a bureaucratic leadership in the A. F. of L. had perpetuated itself by maintaining the control of policy and machinery within a circle of craft organizations.

Far from doing anything to organize the workers in the automobile, steel, shipbuilding, electrical, machinery, textile, maritime, aluminum, or other large and basic industries, the A. F. of L.'s leader did everything in their power to discourage their entrance into union ranks. They feared the inevitable pressure for a more advanced policy and the assertion of trade union democracy that would come with this wave of newly organized workers and industrial unionism.

At Roosevelt's first inauguration the A. F. of L.'s membership totaled

2,250,000 (1933 Convention report). The NRA opened the floodgates of labor organization. Never before had the field been so fertile and the pressure to enter the A. F. of L. so great. But, by the end of 1935, when the Committee for Industrial Organization was formed as a committee to stimulate through education and finances the organization of the unorganized *within* the A. F. of L., the membership had risen to only 3,186,000. In fact, large sections of newly organized workers were beginning to leave the A. F. of L. Far from being welcomed, they were required to scatter their ranks among numerous craft organizations and otherwise conform to outworn trade union practices. The exodus was particularly serious in the auto and rubber industries.

The bankruptcy of the A. F. of L. revealed itself most plainly in face of the opportunity for organization opened up by that period, and in face of a friendly Administration. It became most alarming in face of the news from Europe where Hitler had just risen to power and smashed a labor movement that once counted 12 million members, and its conservative officialdom with it. This is why even some conservative leaders of labor here became alarmed.

The group of twelve unions that originally formed the C.I.O., and their respective membership in 1935 follow:

United Mine Workers ..... 400,000  
Amalgamated Clothing Work-

ers .....	100,000
Ladies Garment Workers .....	160,000
Oil Field Workers .....	42,000
Flat Glass Workers .....	10,000
Textile Workers .....	79,000
Typographical Workers .....	73,000
Automobile Workers .....	25,000
Rubber Workers .....	9,000
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers .....	15,000
Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers .....	21,000
Assn. Iron, Steel & Tin .....	9,000
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>943,000</b>

Hardly had these unions made known their intention of helping the A. F. of L. to grow several-fold, when they were brought up on charges of jurisdictional infringement upon craft unions and were suspended. The first splitting act came from those now in the A. F. of L. leadership. The C.I.O. sought to return on the basis of the right to organize workers in industrial unions, with the plantwide organization of workers as the basic unit. The rights of existing craft organizations were not to be violated. Their effectiveness in many fields was not challenged. It was not until 1938, when all hopes for reconciliation were gone, that the C.I.O. constituted itself as a separate labor center, assuming the name "Congress of Industrial Organizations." It was the historic recourse to the only alternative.

Unity moves continued since 1938, too. But they crashed on the one formula that the A. F. of L. advanced

stubbornly. First, ran the formula, the organizations that left the A. F. of L. must return to the "house of labor" on the basis of the former jurisdictions. When they are inside, discussions would take place with respect to each of their disputed problems involving expanded jurisdiction, etc. After that, discussions would take place regarding the admission of such new organizations as the C.I.O. brought into existence.

The C.I.O. was to disband and leave the fate of the millions of workers it had organized to the mercy of the very clique of craft-union-based reactionaries that had expelled them. What the fate would be is hardly open to speculation, if we consider only the internecine jurisdictional wars within the A. F. of L. today, with one large industrial union in its ranks, the Machinists, contemplating to leave because of the officially sanctioned inroads into its field by other unions.

Acceptance of such a "unity" formula would have meant complete capitulation to reaction and a plea at the gates of the "house of labor" for forgiveness. The gates would have been closed to the great advance that labor has made in the past nine years. But, if the A. F. of L.'s formula was untenable earlier, it became increasingly out of the question as the years passed.

The 2,250,000 members of 1933 have grown today in the C.I.O. and A. F. of L. to 12,000,000. Formally it was division in 1935. Actually,

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it opened the way for the most extensive working class unity and the greatest advance of labor this country ever knew. Forced to give way to C.I.O. "rivalry," and further pressure within, the A. F. of L. itself had to yield in some fields to industrial union forms. As a consequence, its membership today has tripled since the exodus of the C.I.O. unions, while the C.I.O. counts 5,500,000 members.

How ridiculous the A. F. of L.'s "come home" formula is, can be seen from the above list of original C.I.O. unions. The haters actually never left the A. F. of L. The typographical workers, while out for several years in protest against the A. F. of L.'s disunity policy, are now back in its fold. The International Ladies Garment Workers Union was dragged back into the A. F. of L. by its President David Dubinsky, who, after futile efforts to split the C.I.O., reestablished his old association with the reactionary Woll-Hutcheson forces. John L. Lewis, likewise failing in his designs to split the C.I.O., has, ever since withdrawing his union, been angling to bring the miners back to the "house of labor" where he seeks to restore his old association with the reactionary forces.

Only eight of the original 12 unions, with an original membership of less than 300,000, are in the C.I.O. today. The changes that occurred could be seen from the fact that the 9,000 iron workers grew to nearly a

million in the C.I.O.'s steel union; the 25,000 U.A.W. members are 1,250,000; the 15,000 in the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union are over 150,000 now, and the 9,000 rubber workers have grown to well over 200,000.

In addition, we have such brand new organizations, born in the C.I.O., that never knew the A. F. of L., such as the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, with 700,000 members, the shipbuilders, with some 400,000 members; the seamen, with over 90,000, etc., etc.

#### THE CHANGE IN QUALITY

But the change is not only organizational and quantitative. There is a great change in policy and outlook. The C.I.O. has buried the old labor-disarming conception of "no politics in the unions" and the policy of no independent political action for labor, which had the effect of turning labor into a mere tail-end of the reactionary forces in the country. Narrowness and isolation from the national interests at large have given way to active and, often leading, trade union participation in the many fields of the American community.

In place of confinement to pure-and-simple "labor" questions, unions today are intensely interested in all matters of public concern, domestic and foreign policy. Race bars are not allowed or condoned in the C.I.O., while in the A. F. of L. there are

many important unions that still maintain Jim Crow auxiliaries or constitutional bars to Negroes. The public indignation against these discriminatory practices is now being expressed in a series of Supreme and State court decisions and F.E.P.C. rulings declaring them, in effect, illegal.

The C.I.O., pressing for genuine world labor unity, is instilling an internationalism into the ranks of American workers, while the A. F. of L. seeks to block this development. In fact, the C.I.O. has ushered in a more progressive outlook on practically every problem that arises today. No less important, is the policy of putting vigor and mobilization of strength behind a program that the C.I.O. has been building up in the labor movement.

Labor's role in the war, a role the C.I.O. has notably spurred, is the climactic expression of the policies which the C.I.O. has developed on the American labor scene. The historic campaign of the C.I.O.'s Political Action Committee in the 1944 election is emphatic evidence of labor's integration with, and powerful role among the forces of national unity.

That progressive change is not entirely confined to the C.I.O. The same "rivalry" that pressed the A. F. of L. to expand organizationally, forced many of its affiliates to advance in policy, too. This is best illustrated in the many A. F. of L. political action bodies that were

formed after the C.I.O.'s Political Action Committee took the field.

There are a number of A. F. of L. unions that especially reflect, although in varying degrees and not always consistently, this progressive influence. Quite significantly, this developed on the crest of their rapid organizational expansion. Most notable are the machinists, whose 92,000 members of 1935 have grown to 665,000; the teamsters, from 137,000 to 629,000; the hotel and restaurant workers, from 57,000 to 224,000; the maintenance-of-way workers, from 35,000 to 116,000; and the building service workers, from 27,000 to 70,000. It is in the ranks of these unions that we have seen most pronounced dissatisfaction with A. F. of L. policy and a trend for a change. But their effectiveness is weakened both by their still limited outlook and the absence among them of unity or organized initiative with respect to progressive policies. The most pronounced expression of their trend was evident in their outspoken support for Roosevelt, and an occasional willingness to cooperate with the C.I.O. on issues.

The controlling group in the A. F. of L.'s leadership, largely resting on Carpenter Boss William Hutcherson's building trades machine, is waging a two-front war—against the C.I.O. and, in a vague form, against the potential opposition that is shaping within the A. F. of L.'s own ranks. In either case, it is a stubborn refusal to give way to "streamlined"

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labor organization and the pressures for progressive policy. This accounts for the refusal to retreat from the "unity" formula which, in effect, demands that the C.I.O. commit suicide.

In the light of this background, Green's "organic unity"-or-nothing reply is a clearcut refusal to have any unity—organic or cooperative, on issues. The A. F. of L. leaders often wave their "come home" invitation to the public to give an impression that the door is open for unity. Actually, they aim to subjugate the C.I.O. For a long time they tried the policy of chiseling away pieces from it. When the International Ladies Garment Workers returned to the A. F. of L., Green declared that "unity" was closer. When the United Mine Workers left the C.I.O., he was sure that "unity" was near. A. F. of L. leaders are always on the lookout for some opposition elements in the C.I.O. whom they might break away. Quite obviously, the A. F. of L.'s officials do not desire an atmosphere under which avenues for unity could be sincerely explored.

In this respect, it is interesting to observe the change in relationship that has developed between the A. F. of L.'s controlling leaders and Lewis. When the latter, pressed by the mass upsurge of the revived miners' union for organization, temporarily traveled in a progressive direction, he was the main target of the former, and was charged with being the ob-

stacle to unity. When the war broke out and the true reactionary Lewis blossomed out once more, an affinity quickly warmed up between him and the Hutcheson-Woll defeatist group in the A. F. of L.

For a while Lewis maneuvered within the C.I.O. for a "unity" coup which would short-circuit the C.I.O.'s progress and bring about a combination of himself and the most reactionary forces in the A. F. of L. as a dominant clique over all American labor. In the months during Murray's first term as C.I.O. president, Lewis suddenly became a symbol of "unity" in the eyes of the Wolls, Hutchesons and Dubinskys. In those maneuvers he was outwitted and completely defeated by Murray and the united C.I.O. He was unable to take out of C.I.O. ranks any other than the United Mine Workers. That, as is well known, was achieved through his notorious dictatorial control over the U.M.W. Lewis discovered that the "committee" he helped put under way, has grown into a movement far beyond its original scope and far beyond the hold he thought he had upon it.

When his failure became apparent, his allies in the A. F. of L. began the process of returning Lewis to the A. F. of L.'s fold. They now needed him to strengthen the most reactionary clique. That process, however, stretched for more than two years because win-the-war forces in and out of the Executive Council resisted Lewis' readmission. At this

writing, Lewis' return is still not definite.

The course Lewis traveled resembled closely the path of Dubinsky who also started out as a champion of "unity" and ended up as a component of the most reactionary and bitter anti-unity forces in the A. F. of L.

#### JOINT ACTION FOR WHAT?

There is still another question: joint action for what? As one examines the policies approved at the A. F. of L. convention at New Orleans and the C.I.O. convention at Chicago, the difference is very striking. The agreement that does exist on some issues is seriously hampered by the disagreement on most of the basic questions.

The C.I.O. made its Political Action Committee permanent, called for strengthening of labor's coalition with the Roosevelt Administration, approved fully the Dumbarton Oaks agreement, backed the London world labor conference and called for a new international labor body, warned against a soft peace, stressed the important role of the government in the program for a sixty-million-job economy, denounced all forms of discrimination and approved a permanent F.E.P.C., and appealed for joint labor action on the vital issues confronting workers.

The A. F. of L. convention took a negative position on every one of those problems. Dumbarton Oaks was found objectionable on grounds

that bring into question its professed support of United Nations unity and a world security system. The projected London conference was opposed with a number of proposals designed to disrupt, not unite, European and Latin American labor. A soft peace was favored. The government's role in economy was denounced on the same grounds on which the N.A.M. made its attack. Jim Crow auxiliaries in unions were given a new lease of life and a permanent F.E.P.C. was approved only if unions would be exempt from its provisions. Several anti-C.I.O. steps taken, especially a campaign to amend the Wagner Act to favor craft unions, only sharpened the division in labor's ranks. As for the President, his name was not even mentioned.

If this picture is to be taken at its face value, hopes for joint action would, indeed, be remote. But fortunately, as is well known, A. F. of L. conventions, especially the small group of leaders who run them, hardly reflect the views in the local and state bodies. The recent election campaign and the results are clear evidence of that. Unfortunately, too, large numbers of local, city and state A. F. of L. affiliates show little interest in what the national leaders do. They simply shrug their shoulders and proceed locally as they please. Only a small percentage of such sentiment expresses itself in formal protest to Green and the A. F. of L. Executive Council. Unless this pres-

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sure does increase, Green, Woll, Hutcheson, Dubinsky and Co. will go on to develop their policies harmful to the war effort and our post-war objectives.

#### WHERE THE A. F. OF L. LEADERS ARE PULLING

The A. F. of L. controlling group is pulling in a direction that has nothing in common with the aspirations of either the A. F. of L. or the C.I.O. members. Their outlook on economy dovetails well into the Hooverite perspective that the National Association of Manufacturers outlined recently. They shout for "free enterprise" in the same manner, meaning that the government must be divorced completely from every aspect of economy.

They see a future that is much like the post-war 'twenties and only give lip service to "full employment." Actually they believe that heavy unemployment, open-shop attacks and a sharp drop in the membership of unions are inevitable. They favor post-war collaboration with employers, but not with those who see a possibility of a development along the path of the "Economic Bill of Rights." They are rather warming up to the most reactionary circles among the industrialists.

Back of all this is the old bankrupt strategy of agreement and friendship with reaction at the expense of the great mass of the more recently organized workers of big plants. The controlling A. F. of L.

leaders entertain the hope that in the process of reconversion to peace-time production both the C.I.O. and such unions as the machinists and teamsters will sharply drop in membership.

The sooner this perspective of the Green, Woll, Hutcheson, Dubinsky group is exposed to the A. F. of L. members in general, the more evident will it become with whom these gentlemen really want to cooperate. Also, some of the leaders who worked for Roosevelt and his program, will begin to see the folly of their passivity.

The perspective such as the President outlined in his recent message to Congress promises a big disappointment to the few schemers within the A. F. of L.'s top family. But no one will question that that perspective has the strong support of both the C.I.O. and A. F. of L. membership and the bulk of the union leaders. Therein is the basis of joint action as Murray proposed, on the immediate issues that flow from that program.

#### CONCLUSION

To summarize, therefore:

1. Unity should not be taken as an abstraction. Only a unity that promises progress for the working class and its effectiveness in the life of the nation is desirable. An "organic unity" of the type the A. F. of L. leaders have been holding out would only bring retreat for labor as a whole and decline in its strength.

2. A progressive unity would have to guarantee complete freedom of existence and continued progress for the industrial unions; democracy within the united organization; a leadership that reflects the advance that labor has made; and complete elimination of racial bars.

3. Since such organic unity is obviously improbable for some time, collaboration on vital issues is the only practical possibility and urgent necessity.

4. Those who say that nothing less than "organic unity" will do, are either ignorant of the facts, or, what is more likely, are offering that argument as a pretext for rejecting joint labor action. They know that cooperation could be only for objectives which they really do not want to advance.

5. Joint action on issues could pave the way towards an eventual condition when conferences for fusion of the C.I.O. and A. F. of L. could be constructively undertaken.

#### CONCERN OF THE NATION

The urgency of labor cooperation on vital issues that are already being discussed, is becoming apparent in many sections of the A. F. of L. Already there is evident a trend to defy Green's latest ban as had developed in the pre-election period. Such important state A. F. of L. bodies as the Pennsylvania and Washington federations, the Cleveland and Minneapolis central labor bodies, as

well as most of the large districts of International Association of Machinists, have gone ahead with a program of joint action with corresponding affiliates of the C.I.O. Furthermore, joint action is developing in numerous forms—on single issues, on local political candidates or through formally established Joint Committees which include the Railroad Brotherhoods.

It is equally obvious that joint labor action is the concern of all sections of the population, for it is the key to effective national unity.

Labor's magnificent record in the war production of our nation which has won it the tribute from the nation's leaders and from spokesmen of all groups of our population, is adequate demonstration of the generating force in labor unity. As shown above, labor's role in the national election was decisive in the victory of the pro-Roosevelt forces. How much greater would the benefit to the nation, as well as to labor, be, if this powerful force were fully united in action for the country's entire program of victory and a prosperous post-war economy? Labor has a great influence in the country. But so has the great mass of constructive-minded citizenry an influence upon the ranks of labor. This influence, too, should be brought to bear in every community.

Labor has written a glorious chapter in this war's history. It must and will continue the record and carry it further into the post-war period.

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# ALBANY BATTLEGROUND

By MAX GORDON

FORTY-FOUR STATE LEGISLATURES WENT into session last month. Some will meet for stated periods; others will continue until all business is done. In a few of the larger states, sessions are held every year. In most of the smaller ones, the legislatures meet only once every two years.

The problems facing these various legislative bodies differ, depending on the size and composition of the state, the relative strength of the forces of progress and reaction, and the extent of development of social progress.

There are, however, a whole series of basic issues which confront, or should confront, all states though not necessarily in the same form or with the same relative emphasis. Chief of these are problems that arise out of the war and the necessities of the post-war period. While these are, in the main, administrative problems, the legislatures have the task of correcting weaknesses, proposing new agencies and fields of activity essential to the war effort and voting the necessary funds.

The war tasks of the states, generally carried out in collaboration with, and at the suggestion of, the

Federal Government, are manifold. They include the whole field of civilian protection: materials preservation, such as the collection of scrap; development of local transport facilities; and problems of production and manpower. The last-named sphere includes assistance in spotting manufacturing facilities that can perform particular types of war work, promotion of manufacturing pools to handle large war orders, surveying of natural resources, training of industrial workers, development of child care centers to permit mothers to go to work, organization of labor brigades to aid farmers in getting in the crop, recruiting of army nurses, physical fitness and nutrition programs to increase industrial efficiency, and in some cases supplementing the work of the Fair Employment Practice Commission in fighting the obstacle of Jim Crow in war industries.

New York is perhaps the most advanced state in the union in the scope of its war activities, as well as in the development of social legislation.

While some of its activities appear to be effective, others have been quite ineffectual. For instance, Governor Dewey, in his legislative message in January, proudly reported that the State War Council had succeeded in establishing under its jurisdiction the grand total of 221 child care and after-school care centers in the entire state, with a total enlistment of 9,000 children. To call this chicken feed would be an understatement. Yet even this was accom-

plished only after a public pressure campaign of dimensions seldom exceeded even in this highly vocal state.

#### PRICE ENFORCEMENT

One of the great weaknesses in state war council work everywhere is lack of proper provision for use of state and local agencies to aid the Federal government in enforcing price control and rationing. Only four states—New York, Rhode Island, California and Wisconsin—even include such a provision in their War Emergency Acts. About 80 cities nationally have ordinances against violation of price control regulations.

O.P.A. has frequently emphasized that it cannot do the job of policing alone; it needs the help of state and local agencies. The New York State provision, however, has suffered from the fatal defect that there is no special penalty established for price violations. The only punishment is that provided for any infraction of State War Council rulings, a maximum of \$25 fine or five days in jail.

Unsuccessful attempts have been made by Democratic and Republican legislators alike to remedy this by amending the War Emergency Act to make price control and rationing regulations a misdemeanor. As one senator who made such an effort last year remarked, the current practice is actually an invitation to black market operations because of the absurd penalties involved.

Though there has been increasing

criticism of the state provision of late, and pressure for a change, the problem was ignored by the Governor in his 1945 message, Mayor LaGuardia, who has been extremely active in employing city agencies on behalf of price control, has been pressing for heavier penalties which he cannot enforce without state provision.

The war has brought in its train a series of new social problems facing the various states, and has affected the old ones. Thus, the necessity for aiding the returning veteran to readjust to civilian life now confronts all states. Post-war planning of public works is another immediate consequence of the war, as is the problem of reconversion of private industry. In these cases, the state's job is to complement the work of the Federal government.

But education, social security, health and social welfare also have required re-examination in the light of war and post-war needs, though this has frequently been ignored. The fact that there will be considerable transitional unemployment during the reconversion period, for instance, should compel the states to liberalize their unemployment insurance set-ups. While the widespread shifting of workers has made Federal action along those lines necessary, State reserves are now enormous because of large income and small outgo, and there is no reason why they should not be used to help tide workers over the difficult cut-back period.

Because New York State has been

the leader in the legislative field and because Governor Dewey's activities are a matter of national interest, it may be of profit to see how these various problems are being handled in that State.

#### THE GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE

The Governor presented his annual legislative program to the opening session of the Republican-dominated Legislature on January 3. At first blush, it sounded like a liberal document. Closer examination revealed, however, that the impression was due to its liberal phrases, its glib promises for the future, and its espousal of a few progressive measures for which the people have been clamoring for years and which Democrats have sponsored unsuccessfully in the past few years. The Democratic legislative leaders claimed Governor Dewey was trying to mend political fences with borrowed timber. At best, however, it was a patchwork fence constructed with a minimum amount of a very poor grade of timber.

The fact that Dewey recommended any progressive measures at all apparently swept some people off their feet, so unexpected was this phenomenon. But the Governor is, and always has been, single-mindedly devoted to the sacred cause of his own political advancement. Right now that hinges on his reelection, in 1946, to the governorship of a highly progressive state. He lost New York last fall by 315,000 votes, 90,000 more

than Wendell Willkie's losing margin four years ago. Being an astute and crafty politician, he knows that his sole hope of recouping that loss is by convincing many people that he is a progressive.

But, as will be noted in the analysis of his program, there were distinct limits to his "liberalism." The tactic pursued by Democrats, progressives and labor forces is to develop the program he handed down much further and to press for action. Efforts are being made to achieve unity of all these forces, as well as other civic groups and liberal Republicans, behind such a program.

The Governor himself has sought to demobilize the movement of the people by his now-familiar method of setting up commissions and committees to "study" problems and report later in the session, when there will be no time left to organize a popular campaign. Here are the salient issues he raised in his message and proposals toward solving them variously projected by progressive groups in the specific fields, by the trade union bodies of the C.I.O. and A. F. of L., by the American Labor Party and by the Communist Political Association.\*

#### 1. BUDGET SURPLUS

The Governor revealed that there will be a \$150,000,000 surplus in the current budget on March 31, the end of the fiscal year. He proposed that

\* The legislative status of the issues here discussed is as of mid-January, when this article was written.

it be frozen in the post-war reconstruction fund, which now has \$160,000,000. This was opposed, unsuccessfully, on the floor of the Legislature by Democrats and by American Laborite Assemblyman Leo Isacson, who insisted that part of the surplus be turned over to the financially hard-pressed municipalities to allow them to pay wartime cost-of-living salary increments to their employees. They also demanded that the surplus be not frozen until after the budget is presented so that they would have a basis for determining whether any of it would be required to help finance social needs next year.

The size of the budget surplus provides an illustration of the methods used by the Governor to deceive the public. At the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, when he presented the budget, he officially estimated that the surplus would be \$17,600,000. This was ridiculed by Democrats and others who claimed it would be closer to \$100,000,000. They charged the Governor was deliberately underestimating the surplus as a pretext for turning down requests for needed expenditures. The surplus, of course, is due largely to war conditions.

## 2. VETERANS

Governor Dewey's sole specific proposal was the establishment of a permanent State Veterans' Commission. He stated, however, that a temporary commission set up last year would submit a report to the Legis-

lature later in the session with specific recommendations.

Commission spokesman admit that they are planning nothing very significant. They take the position that care of the veteran is primarily a Federal responsibility and there is little the State can do. There are certain adjustments in State law that have yet to be made. Thus, for instance, State banking regulations have to be adjusted to permit the veteran to avail himself of Federal G.I. loans. Then there are all sorts of additional adjustments, like extending unemployment insurance credit, preserving pension and seniority rights on public jobs, etc.

An examination of laws passed by various States shows a wide variety of benefits. Some give more generous education allotments than the G.I. bill, including tuition for children of deceased or disabled veterans. Then there are loans for business, home and farm purposes beyond the Federal G.I. loans; provisions for temporary assistance to destitute veterans and their families, as well as a system of permanent assistance to destitute disabled veterans and their families and to widows and children of those who died in service; and property and income tax exemptions up to a certain point.

The New York Constitution gives absolute preference to disabled veterans in civil service appointments and promotions. A pending amendment proposes absolute second preference to non-disabled veterans for five years

after the war.

The two major problems are jobs and medical care. One State, Connecticut, has set up a veterans' re-employment commission to locate jobs for every returning veteran in need of one. As far as health is concerned, the tragic fact is that existing facilities in or out of the service are insufficient to handle the psychiatric, tubercular and other medical cases requiring hospitalization. Large numbers are discharged from the army who need this care and are not receiving it. Maine has set up a State-maintained Veterans' Rehabilitation Center to handle such cases. Other States have established special funds to pay for private facilities. New York has thus far taken no special steps, although existing public institutions are taxed to capacity and many who need the care are on the outside.

A few States have granted bonuses. There is a tendency by veterans' groups, however, to avoid a stand on this at the moment. They feel that a State will consider its obligation ended with the payment of a \$50 or \$100 bonus. They prefer to leave that for later consideration — after the war.

### 3. POST-WAR CONSTRUCTION

Governor Dewey advanced a rather grandiose-sounding plan for post-war building in his legislative message. Included was: (1) an \$800,000,000 highway and grade crossing elimination program extending over "sev-

eral years" (he neglected to mention that the Federal government is expected to supply at least \$170,000,000 toward the cost); (2) a program of \$100,000,000 for construction and repair of public buildings of various types, including State institutions, also over a period of several years; and (3) completed plans for \$50,000,000 in projects undertaken by some 450 municipalities in the State, with the State paying half the cost of the planning but no part of the actual construction. In the last-named category, the Governor also announced that another \$140,000,000 worth of projects has been approved by the State Planning Commission, while an over-all total of \$275,000,000 worth is under consideration.

It should be noted that all these projects are, as yet, merely plans at not much more than a conjectural stage. The State takes no responsibility for the nature of the various community programs or for seeing that they will actually be executed. Thus, the State program takes no account of the vital need of building up the badly run-down education plant in the larger communities, the construction of hospitals particularly in rural counties, and the development of community libraries and recreation buildings. The various communities are financially unable to handle large projects of that nature themselves.

### 4. PUBLIC HOUSING

The New York State Constitution allows the State Legislature to bor-

row up to \$300,000,000 for housing loans to the various municipalities without a popular referendum, customarily needed for floating loans. The Legislature can also appropriate up to \$5,000,000 in any one year for subsidies to make public housing available to low-income families; but it has decreed that the local community erecting a housing project must match the State subsidy.

Thus far, the State has authorized \$185,000,000 in housing loans, leaving another \$115,000,000 that can still be authorized without recourse to a popular referendum. Of the \$185,000,000 authorized, New York City has received \$135,000,000 and the rest of the State \$50,000,000.

The Governor proposed, in his message, that New York receive another \$35,000,000, leaving \$80,000,000 still unappropriated. Public housing advocates have attacked this piecemeal approach of the Governor and are insisting that the entire \$115,000,000 be allocated, so that municipalities may complete their post-war housing plans. There is a catch, however, in that the housing law provides that no one city can use more than two-thirds of the total amount allowed. Thus, New York would be entitled to only \$20,000,000 above the \$35,000,000 requested by the Governor. But the other cities are not asking for projects, partly because of the influence of real estate interests and partly because of the fifty-fifty subsidy provision. The problem is, then, to figure out means of stimu-

lating up-state public housing interest, since the cities are most decidedly in need of slum clearance.

One method suggested is to eliminate the provision for matching subsidies and to go to the people for an increase in the State subsidy to allow the State to shoulder a larger share of it. The Governor, incidentally, asked for an increase in the subsidy by \$1,250,000, largely as a result of the war-time freezing of building.

Also proposed to stimulate housing construction is a State lending program for new homes and for repairs, along the lines of the national F.H.A. and H.O.L.C. programs. To promote private building, the State has passed laws permitting certain tax exemptions or other privileges to insurance companies and limited dividend corporations, provided they meet certain requirements.

## 5. LABOR

### *a. Workmen's Compensation*

The Governor proposed that the workmen's compensation law be extended to include domestics and restaurant workers not now covered. He also said he would submit a separate report to improve the administration of the law.

There is widespread feeling among experts in the field that the ultimate source of corruption and difficulties in the workmen's compensation set-up is the fact that most compensation insurance is carried by private insurance companies. Accordingly, it has been suggested that there be a fun-

damental revamping of the entire system, with the State to do the insuring, in the same way as it insures unemployment. Under competent and sympathetic administration, the State Insurance Fund, which now carries part of the insurance, could do a job which would be as satisfactory as the unemployment insurance set-up.

Moreover, the Governor's proposal to extend coverage is considered inadequate, since many other sections are still left out, including agricultural, hospital and other white collar workers, public employes, and employes of non-profit organizations. There is also a widespread demand for increase in compensation in various categories of injury and in death benefits, as well as for inclusion of industrially-induced diseases in the compensation program.

#### *b. Unemployment Insurance*

The Governor made a strong plea for the "merit-rating" system, which means that the tax contributions of employers to the Unemployment Insurance Fund would be cut on the basis of stability in employment. Those employers who have a small labor turnover would receive a big cut; those with a large turnover would receive no reduction.

Merit-rating is a favorite device of large corporations and utility companies, which maintain fairly stable employment, to get their unemployment insurance taxes reduced, largely at the expense of seasonal and

building industries which have large turnovers.

The Governor made his plea for the measure on the grounds that there is a huge reserve in the Unemployment Insurance Fund. He made, however, no specific proposal for increasing benefit payments out of the fund.

The labor movement is insisting upon liberalization of benefits and has attacked merit-rating as unfair and as unnecessarily cutting into the Fund. Specific liberalization proposals include increase in minimum payments from \$10 to \$15 and maximums from \$20 to \$35; extension of maximum period of payments from 20 weeks to 26 weeks; reduction of the waiting time for first payments from two weeks to one week; elimination of the regulation that those who are ill are not entitled to benefits.

#### *c. Minimum Wages*

The Governor called attention to the fact that minimum wage rates fixed in particular industries under the Minimum Wage Law are now meaningless because of war conditions. He said he had ordered a study of this issue by the Labor Department. Labor circles believe, however, that the whole minimum wage system as practiced by the State should be scrapped and a wages-and-hours act patterned after the Federal law adopted, with a minimum wage of 65 cents an hour and time and a half

for all hours after forty. The Federal law does not apply to businesses that are strictly within the State.

#### 6. EDUCATION

The problem of State aid to education has been the subject of the most bitterly fought legislative battles in the State over the years. In the last few years, the fight has raged over the so-called Friedsam Formula, adopted in 1926, by which the State pays to local communities a definite sum for each pupil attending school each day. Education experts have claimed that the Formula is outmoded due to vastly expanded functions of the schools, shifting populations, and numerous other factors. Last year, the Governor held out for the Formula, which meant drastic reduction of State funds for schools, until a powerful mass movement forced a last-minute temporary concession from him. This year, he admitted the Formula would have to be revised and he has appointed a committee consisting of members of his official family to study methods of revision.

Since the committee will not report until towards the end of the session, teacher groups have decided to advance their own program of revision and to develop a popular movement for it.

Among the reforms being advocated is a formula based on registration rather than daily attendance. This reform would provide, not only enough money to relieve real estate

of an increased tax burden, the factor that moved Dewey to take action, but would also increase the amounts allotted to the various school systems by at least \$30,000,000 over the present Formula. Also proposed is the introduction of adult education, nursery schools, after-school care, and professional training in the public school system; a \$2,000 minimum wage for teachers; extension of tenure rights to all teachers in the State; the elimination of the dishonest substitute teacher racket; a carefully planned system of vocational schools; and a \$500 wartime cost-of-living pay increase for all teachers.

#### 7. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

The Governor referred, in his message, to a report of the Temporary State Commission Against Discrimination to be rendered by February 1, and urged action on it. The Commission was set up on the last day of last year's session at Governor Dewey's behest in order to sidetrack measures calling for a permanent State Fair Employment Practice Commission and a bureau of civil rights.

The Commission drafted a bill to set up a permanent anti-discrimination commission of five full-time people empowered to take action against discrimination in employment, which was outlawed in the bill. Public hearings were held in December in various parts of the State. The principle of the bill received overwhelming popular sup-



port; but many criticisms were directed at specific features, including its provision for judicial review of all commission rulings, lack of adequate penalties for violation of commission rulings, necessity to establish a "preponderance of evidence" in the courts, inability of anyone except an aggrieved person to bring a complaint, and restriction of the powers of the commission to discrimination in employment.

As a result of the hearings, the Temporary Commission has rewritten the bill to meet some, but not all, of the criticisms. Meanwhile, powerful opposition, which did not dare express itself at the public hearings, is making itself felt in Albany. It comes chiefly from large industrial circles who are trying to amend the bill so as to emasculate it. Some rail labor groups are also trying to amend the feature of the bill directed against discrimination in unions in order to kill that section of the measure. There may, therefore, be a sharp fight on the bill, despite the fact that proponents of a permanent committee believed, until recently, that it would be passed without trouble.

Another phase of anti-discrimination legislation calls for amending all State laws granting privileges to housing projects, so as to prohibit any discrimination in choice of tenants.

#### WAGES OF STATE EMPLOYEES

The Governor proposed to increase the emergency wage rises of 10 per

cent forced from him two years ago to a graduated basis ranging from 20 per cent for those making under \$1,500 to 10 per cent for those making over \$4,000. Average increase proposed for low-paid employes amounts to about \$300 above base rate, as compared with about \$150 above base rate last year. The State, County and Municipal Workers Union (C.I.O.), which has been conducting an intensive drive for the raises, in the course of which it has been reminding Dewey constantly of his election campaign statements about higher wages, has raised the demand for a flat \$500 increase. This has received the support of Democrats and other groups. The union also insists upon a \$1,500 minimum in base pay and time and a half for overtime for institutional employes instead of the current straight time.

#### 9. ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY

This is a major post-war project, affecting not only the State but the commerce of the entire nation. It would open the Midwest to ocean-going traffic. For New York, it means the development of hydroelectric power 50 per cent greater than that generated by the great T.V.A. development. This, plus the seaway feature, would change the economy of the entire north country area, leading to the development of great new industries, as has happened in the Tennessee Valley. It also means tens of thousands of jobs for years after the war.

At present, there is an agreement between the Federal government and Canada to build the project, and the whole business is embodied in the Aiken-Pittenger Bill before Congress. In December, the Senate of the dying 78th Congress defeated a measure approving it. Dewey, who has never made the slightest gesture toward aiding the project, had the gall in his message to threaten to have the State act independently with Canada if the Administration is "unwilling or unable" to carry it through.

It is generally agreed that he wants to make a political issue of the Seaway because his prospective opponent in the 1946 gubernatorial race, Sen. James M. Mead, is one of its opponents. Sen. Mead hails from Buffalo, where a large section of the labor movement and of industry fears that the project will reduce the city's role as a terminal point for traffic coming down the Great Lakes and to the New York City port by rail and barge canal. Dewey's desire to make an issue of this question two years hence means, of course, that he is not anxious to see it passed before then. As national Republican leader and governor of the state affected most profoundly by the project, he could do a great deal to effect its passage by Congress if he were so inclined.

#### 10. TAXATION

As far as state taxation is concerned, the Governor recommended the continuation of the 25 per cent

cut in the state income tax in force since 1943, and there has been no objection to this. But there is strong objection from the cities in the State to his refusal to grant more State-collected taxes to the municipalities and to recommend enlarging the taxing powers of the cities which now can tax only real estate and franchises without special legislative permission.

While the State has a huge treasury surplus, the cities are on the verge of bankruptcy. About a third of them have reached the limits of their taxing powers under the State constitution. The reason is that the State takes the lion's share of State-city shared taxes (income, excise and franchise taxes) and compels the cities to pay many expenses the State could take on. The Governor agreed to pass on this year, as he did last, the mortgage recording and utilities taxes, amounting to \$19,000,000 in all. The cities are asking that he turn over several other taxes and also permit them to level such taxes as a business turnover tax, bank tax, etc. In addition, they insist that the State assume a greater part of the relief burden, while New York City demands that it take over the financing of the State supreme court in the city, as it does elsewhere throughout the State.

#### 11. AGRICULTURE

The Governor's sole proposal here was the creation of a temporary commission to study food production and

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distribution. This, of course, is an evasion of the problem and, at best, will delay State action on behalf of the farmers for at least another year.

There are many things the State can do to assist the farmer now. For one thing, State administrators of Federal farm programs have complained that the Governor is uncooperative. If he were really interested in aiding the farmer, he would see to it that the State assist and supplement the work of the Federal agencies. Specifically, the State could help promote rural electrification cooperatives and telephone cooperatives. It could sponsor a program of State utilization of idle farm lands for experimental and conservation purposes, perhaps growing feed grains for dairy and poultry farmers. It could sponsor a program for cooperative use of farm machinery subsidizing farmers who have machinery and lend it out. It could give assistance to extension of community freeze locker facilities, and it could set up convenient, sanitary farm labor camps during appropriate seasons as a means of attracting seasonal farm labor to gather in the crops. Also, by insisting on tighter accounting methods by milk dealers, farmers' milk returns could be increased and the spread between farm prices and consumer prices reduced.

#### 12. MEDICAL CARE

The Governor dismissed this issue simply by suggesting that a commission he had set up last year be con-

tinued for another year to study the matter further. The Legislature, however, has had another committee studying the problem of public health since 1939. Actually, there is no reason for further study. The ingredients of a health insurance system have been thoroughly analyzed in innumerable public discussions. California is going ahead with the establishment of a system, and New York is in danger of losing the lead in social progress.

Several other features of New York's health set-up need strengthening. The shortage of doctors, particularly in rural areas, requires a system of medical scholarships so rigged as to give special advantage to those from rural areas. Since the recent polio epidemic there has been strong pressure for the establishment of a special polio research clinic. Also, counties are not compelled to set up health departments that meet the specifications of the State Health Department, although they receive certain privileges if they do. Medical experts believe strongly that the law should be changed in that regard and State Department specifications be made compulsory.

#### 13. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The Governor proposed the setting up of a Youth Service Commission consisting of the heads of various State departments concerned with problems of crime, health, education, and social welfare. He also linked the problem with that of crime. Un-

doubtedly, a youth commission is necessary; but it must be composed of authorities in the field devoting full time to the problem. Money has to be appropriated to promote recreational and education facilities. The problem must be divorced from agencies devoted to fighting crime.

#### 14. BALLOT LIBERALIZATION

Dewey tried hard in his legislative message to justify his "soldiers can't vote" law by comparing results with other states. It is a rather queer argument, however, which maintains that a voting law is better because it has more restrictions and is more cumbersome. If New York's soldiers voted, it is because there has seldom been seen in this country a political drive that aroused such intense popular interest and moved so many people into action. Literally millions of ballot application cards were sent to soldiers, some receiving dozens. Popular resentment against Dewey's law was powerful and expressed itself in activity to get out the soldier vote. That does not make the law a good one. It still requires amending to eliminate the requirement of a signed application for a ballot by the soldier and to extend the time allowed for return of the ballot from the soldier.

The Governor admitted that merchant marine, Red Cross and other civilian personnel connected with the armed forces ought to have a right to vote by absentee ballot, but insisted that the Constitution would have to

be amended. This means no vote until 1948. Legal authorities have agreed that the State constitution can easily be interpreted to give the soldier ballot to this personnel.

There are many other changes to be made in the election law to make it possible for greater numbers to vote, including defining literacy so as to prevent the giving of complex, fantastic tests; lifting the one-year State residence requirement; permanent registration; cutting down the pre-election citizenship period from 90 days to 30 days; extension of the vote to 18-year-olds; etc.

#### THE STRUGGLE FOR A PROPER PROGRAM

It is obvious, from this examination of what the people of the State need, that the Governor's liberalism is so much cant. What are the chances of putting across all, or a large part, of the program outlined above?

From a strictly party point of view, the State Legislature is completely dominated by the Republicans. In the Senate, the line-up is 35 Republicans and 21 Democrats. In the House, it is 94 Republicans, 55 Democrats and one American Laborite. Of the Republicans in both houses, 13 received the endorsement of the American Labor Party; of the Democrats 45 received its backing.

Last year Dewey, the potential G.O.P. presidential nominee, was able to crack the whip over his Re-

publican majority, despite strong undercurrents of opposition. Much of this opposition is latent this year and can be aroused on particular issues. This is especially true since quite a few Republicans come from New York City, where their constituencies are, in most cases, progressive. The problem inside the Legislature is to win united action between the Democrats and the progressive Republicans on the basis of a determined fight around the issues raised there.

Even more important, such united action must be organized among the people outside the Legislature, on a state-wide, city, and local community basis.

By pressing for a people's program in the Legislature, Dewey's sham liberalism will be quickly exposed and the people can gain some significant victories which will help keep New York State in front both in the war effort and in social legislation.

# THREE WARTIME FARM CONVENTIONS

By ROBERT DIGBY

ON THE HEELS of the election came the conventions of the three national farm organizations—the Farmers Union, the National Grange and the Farm Bureau. All of these farm organizations are “non-political,” much like the A. F. of L., and at none of the conventions were the elections discussed from the platform. Yet the outcome of the elections, the victory of the people over the forces of reaction, directly influenced the convention proceedings of these three farm organizations.

None of these farm organizations was, of course, politically neutral during the last election. The top leadership of the Farm Bureau and the Grange supported the anti-Roosevelt campaign, while the national office of the Farmers Union championed Roosevelt's re-election. But it would be a mistake to assume that any of these organizations is a unified body wherein the views of the national officers mirror those of the various state officials as well as those of the membership. In all of these organizations there are wide divergences of opinion, and it is common knowledge that some of the Bureau and Grange leaders supported Roose-

velt's re-election, while a small segment of the Farmers Union leadership lined up with the Dewey forces.

Earl Browder has remarked of the elections: “It is my opinion that no event in America since the time of Lincoln has had such a great effect upon the peoples of the whole world. This was an international, not merely a national event.” The recent farm conventions cannot be understood except in the light of the elections and the long campaign that was waged to turn the farmers against the Roosevelt Administration. For years the reactionaries have regarded the farm scene as a special preserve set aside for their exploitation. Most defeatist, fascist, and other disruptive groups have, at some time or another, loudly proclaimed their right to speak for the farmers. Publishers like Frank E. Gannett and Col. McCormick, industrialists like the Pews, a traitor to the labor movement like John L. Lewis, and outright fascists like Father Coughlin or Gerald L. K. Smith have all partaken in this pastime of representing themselves as the true voice of agriculture. In Congress, the coalition of reactionary Republicans and anti-Roosevelt Democrats has long made a practice of hiding its true identity and posing as a “farm bloc” whenever the issues make this subterfuge possible. Even Hamilton Fish found it convenient to cover up some of his treachery by pretending to be motivated solely by concern for the farmers.

But the reactionaries overplayed their hand with the farmers just as they did with the rest of the nation. They took the farmers for granted and tried to use the whole war-time food program as a political football for their own partisan purposes. In its first phase, the war-time strategy of the reactionaries openly called upon the farmers to wreck the nation's food expansion program by publicly opposing cooperation with the Government's plans for increasing production. Dewey's farm lieutenants, H. E. Babcock and Dr. W. I. Myers, led this campaign which ended in dismal failure. The farmers refused to heed this reckless advice. Instead they proceeded to produce as much as they could, and each year they managed to break all previous food production records.

The second phase of the reactionary strategy sought to accomplish indirectly what they could not do directly. They attempted to prevent the passage of necessary legislation and to interfere with the carrying out of Federal farm programs, while blaming the Administration for the chaos created. Although they now talked in favor of abundance, they continued to do everything possible to induce scarcity. Dewey's efforts to incite a feed panic in the Northeast and to frighten the farmers into killing off their cows, was an example of this brand of politics. But Dewey and his cohorts in Congress overestimated their own cleverness and underestimated the intelligence

of the farmers. Their wrecking activities certainly did not inspire confidence on the part of the farmers. Even though little was done to answer or expose the machinations of these disrupters, the farmers refused to rally to this program which required them to sacrifice their economic interest as well as their patriotism and which had nothing to offer them except a hate-Roosevelt platform.

The result on November 7 showed that the farm strategy of the reactionaries had failed. They did not get the big increase in the farm vote on which their rural leaders had counted to offset the pro-Roosevelt strength in the cities. The "farm revolt" which the G.O.P. high command had so often prophesied did not materialize. Not even by using the wildest anti-Communist, anti-labor and anti-Semitic propaganda were they able to stampede the farmers into joining their cause. To be sure, the lies spread by the Hoover-Dewey forces were rarely refuted in the rural areas, and many of the scars still remain; but even so, it must be recognized that the rural campaign failed to achieve its main objective. James Haggerty, Dewey's publicity chief, was reported in the newspapers as saying that, as soon as the up-state New York returns began to come in and disclosed the absence of any trend toward Dewey, the Republican high command knew the election was lost.

It was only by claiming to cham-

pion the President's war and post-war policies that the Dewey forces were able to retain the bulk of their traditional Republican farm vote in the North. Previously the reactionaries had assumed that the farmers could best be appealed to by capitalizing on petty, personal gripes—gas rationing, tire allocations, OPA restrictions, "red tape" and "bureaucracy." But it became visible, even in the primaries, that the farmers were thinking in larger terms as they cast their ballots against Senators like "Cotton" Ed Smith, Rufus C. Holman and Champ Clark, as well as Representatives of the same stamp.

The grip of isolationist ideology upon farmers has in recent years been greatly weakened. Wherever the pro-Roosevelt forces conducted a non-partisan campaign, taking the issues to the farmers, the response exceeded all expectations. Such instances were all too few in the rural areas, but where they occurred, positive inroads were made on traditional Republican stamping grounds.

It is against this background that we must look at this year's farm conventions if we are to understand the changes that have taken place.

But first, a thumb-nail sketch of these three farm organizations may be in order. The Farm Bureau, which lists its membership at over 800,000, is the most powerful of the three organizations. It speaks primarily for the big farmers: the cotton planters of the South, cash-corn

and corn-hog interests in the Midwest, and the most capitalistically developed farmers on the West Coast as well as in the East. The Grange, which lists its membership around the million mark, including non-farmers in this figure, however, represents what are popularly referred to as family-sized farmers. It is a fraternal organization, whose membership is to be found mainly in the belt stretching westward from New England and the Northeast to the Mid-west as well as on the West Coast. Politically, the Grange has been much less active than the Bureau and has tended to follow the latter's leadership on most questions of national policy. The Farmers Union, with 150,000 farm families in its organization, also speaks for the family-sized farms. Its strength has been primarily concentrated in the wheat belt, with additional support from the dairy, poultry and corn-hog producers. It has been the most progressive of the three organizations and has most consistently backed up the Administration's policies.

#### FARM ORGANIZATIONS ON WORLD COOPERATION

At their preceding conventions, these three farm organizations concerned themselves almost exclusively with domestic farm problems and paid scant attention to the question of international cooperation. This year, however, all of the farm organi-



zations gave considerable attention to the problem of international cooperation. This was especially true of the Farm Bureau and the Farmers Union. They recognized that foreign policy is also farm policy.

Ed O'Neal, president of the Farm Bureau and long a critic of the Roosevelt Administration, put aside his former partisanship and devoted the major part of his report at the Bureau convention to a discussion of international affairs. O'Neal called upon his fellow Bureau delegates to make a "new appraisal of international relations" and warned them that otherwise "we will not only fail to discharge our international obligations, but we will also do irreparable harm to our domestic economy." O'Neal declared:

Plain common sense indicates that the only course that offers any hope whatever for permanent peace is for peace-loving people everywhere to band together in a pact that proclaims to the world that they are prepared to maintain peace, *by force if necessary.*

The Farm Bureau president endorsed all of the machinery so far proposed by the delegates of the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks and at Bretton Woods, as well as the projected International Food and Agriculture Organization. O'Neal told the press beforehand that he expected fireworks to break loose from the floor when he finished his report, but none developed. Discussion on his report showed that the delegates

welcomed the new orientation, and the convention voted its approval.

#### NATIONAL GRANGE

The national office of the Grange is generally regarded as the most isolationist-minded of all farm organizations—more isolationist than most of its own state offices. But the war has wrought many changes, and the report given to the Grange convention in Winston-Salem by Albert S. Goss, the present master, is quite different from the views expressed by Louis J. Taber, former master and sponsor of the America First Committee in pre-Pearl Harbor days.

Goss devoted nearly a third of his report to international considerations. At the very outset he declared, "The time has come to plan aggressively for peace," and acknowledged that international cooperation is essential if we are to have a lasting peace.

But Goss then went on to criticize the Bretton Woods monetary proposals, the International Food and Agriculture Organization, and even the Dumbarton Oaks draft for a World Security Council. Despite his professed acceptance of general purposes, Goss' position, ratified by the Grange convention, would require a complete re-drafting of the monetary and agricultural plans submitted by the United Nations' delegates. On Dumbarton Oaks the Grange master took a more friendly position; yet even here he voiced various doubts, chiefly the fear so often raised by isolationists that the United Nations

plan for world security might impair our national sovereignty. The Grange convention thereupon went on record in favor of "an effectively implemented organization of sovereign states, including a World Court, but with the right to declare war retained solely by Congress."

#### THE FARMERS UNION

"Full participation by the United States in a world organization based on political and economic justice, governed by law and with power to enforce its decisions," was urged by the Farmers Union. It gave wholehearted and unqualified approval to the Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods conferences, as well as to the proposed international food organization (F.A.O.).

James G. Patton, president of the Farmers Union, told the convention that "the shaping of a people's peace" requires the active support and participation of the farmers themselves. He called for farmer representation at the peace table and pointed out that the farmers have a tremendous stake in the "world's deliverance." There are "two roads" open to the farmers, Patton said, one "leads back to nothing but oblivion" while the other leads forward to "peace and security."

#### POST-WAR POLICIES

After World War I agriculture suffered a prolonged crisis, which began eight years before the Great Depression engulfed the rest of the

economy. Even in the period of recovery, agriculture lagged behind, with no markets in sight for the large surpluses it had piled up. Throughout the present war the farmers have been haunted by fears of another post-war crash and new surpluses piled up. Hence, it is not surprising that they have listened with skepticism to talk of post-war abundance and that they have been slow to understand the new situation, unique in the history of capitalism.

But the American farmers have been listening with interest to proposals for post-war international cooperation and friendly trade between nations. The cotton, wheat, tobacco and other growers who must have foreign markets for their products have been particularly concerned with post-war international trade policies. They remember what happened after the last war with the loss of foreign markets, and they have no desire to repeat such folly. They have therefore been quicker to understand the economic importance of post-war international cooperation than to appreciate the implications of such a policy for our domestic economy as a whole. Many of these farmers are just beginning to see that full production for our economy, as well as for other freedom-loving nations, must necessarily be considered an inseparable part of the United Nations' policy.

The Farmers Union was the first farm organization to recognize full

production as a practical objective and to begin orienting its thinking in the direction of this goal. Subsequently, on September 3, 1943, the directors of the Farm Bureau drafted a special report, endorsing "the philosophy of abundance" and outlining some of the steps that must be taken if agriculture is to be included. But this Bureau proclamation remained on paper, and the official organ of the Bureau, *The Nation's Agriculture*, continued to publish articles of the type that appeared in its May, 1944, issue, claiming "there is full agreement" on the inevitability of colossal post-war unemployment. In utter disregard of the steps being taken by our government in concert with the United Nations for post-war economic reconstruction, the Bureau article stated, "The most optimistic figures of responsible planning bureaus and committees place the total at 8,000,000 or more . . . who will be seeking work actively, but will be unable to find it." No attempt was made at that time to reconcile such catastrophic views with the Bureau's avowed "philosophy of abundance."

The election forced the scarcity prophets to change their tune. Even the Hoover-Dewey forces had to give lip-service to post-war full production as a realistic and *realizable* objective, while themselves pretending to be its champion. The result was that back-to-scarcity theorists, like Dr. W. I. Myers, dean of the New York State College of Agriculture, who had long been "proving" the

inevitability of a post-war crash, were seriously embarrassed. Thus, the whole direction of the election campaign did much to convince the farmers that a program of post-war abundance was more than a pious hope and to show them that broad sections of the nation's economy were determined to achieve this objective.

At their conventions this year, both the Farm Bureau and the Farmers Union devoted serious attention to the economy of abundance and declared it to be the main objective of all post-war policy-making. Both stressed the need for expanding domestic purchasing power and for a large volume of friendly trade between nations, if we are to maintain our high level of wartime production. Both agreed that the backward countries must be encouraged to industrialize themselves. In short, the Farm Bureau and Farmers Union recognized the broad principles essential to the abundance objective. Even though they still face the task of adjusting their thinking on concrete, immediate problems, both domestic and foreign, to this objective, their conventions must be credited with having taken steps in the right direction.

While the National Grange also endorsed "an economy of plenty," it has not yet begun to recognize the basic principles on which such an economy must be built or to undertake the task of bringing its own program into harmony with the objective. No sooner does the Grange

platform mention the "economy of plenty" than it hastens to express fear lest such a program deprive the "American farmer" of "the American market" and, instead of concentrating on the construction of a positive program to implement the abundance objective, its resolutions seem to envisage a return to high tariff walls and two-price plans. The drafters of the Grange platform were not looking forward to abundance but were obviously looking backward to the days of "widespread depression" and "surplus." And Goss, in that section of his report purporting to deal with methods of achieving abundance, does little more than state real or fancied difficulties in the way of obtaining it, declaring, "it is altogether probable that we will not be able to maintain full production or full employment."

#### IMMEDIATE DOMESTIC PROGRAMS

No useful purpose would be served by attempting the impossible task of summarizing the hundreds of resolutions passed by these three organizations on immediate domestic programs. A few remarks on changes made this year and a comparison of their respective positions on the question of price stabilization will illustrate their positions.

*Farm Bureau:* Most significant of the changes made by the Bureau is the elimination of partisan, anti-Administration chaff from its resolutions. Their tone is more positive,

and instead of sour notes on "bureaucracy" and "governmental bungling," there is now a general awareness that cooperation between the farmers and the government must be maintained. At one point, for example, O'Neal told the Bureau convention that "Due to many factors, it is probably true that Government must have a hand in carrying out policies to maintain full employment."

On the price stabilization program, the Bureau now declares that price control must be continued into the post-war period. Many people still remember the Bureau's president as author of the famous comment, "We need a little inflation," and certainly the Bureau has dropped this position of open, head-on hostility to the stabilization program. However, it cannot be said that the Bureau has done much to integrate its thinking on domestic programs with its expressed desire for post-war abundance. On this very question of stabilization, it persists in its opposition to subsidies, endorses a tax program equivalent to that of the National Association of Manufacturers, and calls for "the retention of the Little Steel formula."

*Farmers Union:* The convention of the Farmers Union addressed itself to the problem of putting some solid farm props under the abundance platform. It drafted a farm program providing for voluntary production agreements between the farmer and the government, which

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would do much to lift the mass purchasing power of the farmers. It worked out detailed, positive resolutions to strengthen the various federal farm agencies and to extend their benefits.

It clearly recognized the importance of developing the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Seven T.V.A.'s, of passing the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, of enacting a broad program for returning veterans, and of rapidly broadening the nation's social security program. In regard to price stabilization, it voiced no direct or indirect quarrel with the government's efforts to control prices, including the use of subsidies, and it even urged that steps be taken "to prevent further land price inflation."

*National Grange:* The Grange has continued its official program, with only minor changes and insertions. Most of its resolutions are so general, however, that they do not necessarily close the door to new interpretations required by new and changing conditions. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the Grange is a loose-knit fraternal organization, whose locals have a high degree of autonomy and whose membership is, for the most part, unaware of the action taken by its leaders at congressional hearings. Despite the relatively unchanged nature of its resolutions, with their heavy emphasis on "state rights," "bureaucracy," and "governmental centralization," there are certainly new currents flowing in the Grange

ranks, as reports from some of its state conventions indicate. It should be pointed out, too, that the Grange like the other farm organizations, passed positive resolutions on the development of waterways, social security, health programs, veterans' aid and other measures which afford a basis for joint action.

With respect to the price stabilization program, the Grange disagrees with the Administration's whole attempt to control prices by applying ceilings and opposes the use of subsidies. Thus, its position on price stabilization is more inflationary than that of the other farm organizations.

#### COOPERATION WITH LABOR AND OTHER GROUPS

It is particularly significant that each of the three farm organizations passed resolutions this year pledging cooperation with labor, industry and other groups in working out post-war programs. These resolutions were not the usual perfunctory expressions of good will, such as were sometimes passed in previous years.

President Ed O'Neal of the Farm Bureau told his convention: "As a result of the colossal expansion of our industrial set-up during the war years, our productive capacity is now great enough to produce abundance for all." He took issue with those who "have thrown bricks at the success that organized groups have had in the formulation of national policies" and said: "In a democracy, organized 'pressure,' if you want to

call it that, is the only possible way for the various groups to express themselves effectively, and for that reason it should be encouraged."

Instead of fearing the rise of the C.I.O. or its P.A.C., the Bureau leader urged that "the tremendous power of the organized groups" be united for "a coordinated attack on national problems." "It can be done," he declared. Prominently featured in the Bureau's resolutions is the call:

Therefore, with all the earnestness of which we are capable, we appeal to the leaders in other groups of agriculture and the recognized leaders in labor and in industry, to join in a series of conferences in 1945 to formulate a program necessary for the establishment and maintenance of policies designed to assure large-scale production. . . .

The Farmers Union, whose president, James G. Patton, served as vice-president of the Citizens' P.A.C., also issued a call for closer cooperation with "organized labor, business and industry, such technical, professional, religious, political, civic and welfare groups as concur in the objective of abundance for all."

The National Grange likewise declared that "planning for the post-war period" must be carried out "in cooperation with labor, industry and other groups."

All of this demonstrates that the time has come for tearing down the flimsy walls that separate farmers

and workers. Labor has always been aware of the anti-labor sentiment whipped up in rural areas, but it has seldom appeared sufficiently aware of the extent to which pro-labor sentiments prevailed in the countryside. Despite the "Hillman-Browder" bogey that was conjured up for the farmers and insufficiently exposed during the election, the conventions of the farm organizations demonstrate that now the farmers are particularly anxious to have closer working relationships with labor. These conventions further indicate that there are many important issues crying out for joint discussion and action on the part of farm, labor, business, civic and other groups. Among these are: Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods, the St. Lawrence Seaway, Seven T.V.A.'s, veterans' assistance, social security, and reconversion. Conferences on a local, state and national basis would do much to strengthen national unity, to bridge the chasm between city and country, and to bring discussions of abundance down from the clouds. After all, the real test of adherence to the abundance objective must be found in what is done on the immediate, concrete questions. It is moreover, important to avoid the mistake of pre-judging organizations and banishing them permanently to a purgatory of scarcity without first exhausting every avenue of cooperation.

For half a century the farmers of America have found themselves be-

coming more and more isolated politically from progressive currents in the rest of the nation. With the industrialization and urbanization of the United States, the farmers saw their political influence wane, following the collapse of the Populist movement, and the policy of "business unionism" adopted by the rising A. F. of L. barred the way to realistic farmer-labor political cooperation. It is not altogether surprising that most requests for farmer-labor cooperation have in recent years come from the farmers. Even now, it cannot be said that labor has yet worked out the forms for making this cooperation effective although considerable headway is being made.

#### ISOLATIONISM OF THE FARMERS

While the war has greatly intensified the desire of farm people to break through their isolation, both physical and political, no solution has been generally available except to those who have gone into the armed forces or into war plants. The coalition of people's forces in the '44 elections and the contributions made by labor have, for the first time, made it possible for some of the forward-looking sectors of the farm population to see a solution ahead. Unfortunately, however, many Northern farmers, during the election campaign, were precluded from active participation in the pro-Roosevelt national coalition because of the weak-

nesses of the Democratic Party and all other organized groups comprising the coalition. As a result the pro-Roosevelt machinery for reaching the farmers was developed only in limited areas. Where this machinery was developed on a non-partisan basis, or even partially developed, the farmers rallied to the national unity camp.

This year's farm conventions offer additional evidence that large sectors of the farmers can be won to the national unity camp. The main proof of this is the farmers' expression of a far more positive attitude toward the government, which is also indicated by their call for cooperation with labor and other groups in working out post-war programs for abundance.

How can the farmers be brought into the national coalition? All of the pro-Roosevelt forces bear a responsibility for seeing to it that every available channel is used for reaching the farmers, and the approach must necessarily be non-partisan along the lines of the coalition campaign for the reelection of Roosevelt. During the campaign itself, some of the state Democratic committees in the North began to show an increased interest in the farm voters, and the National Democratic Committee encouraged these state committees to strengthen their rural apparatuses and to conduct a non-partisan campaign in the countryside. Where such measures were taken, through independent non-partisan committees or farmers-for-Roosevelt committees, the results

were positive and showed the need for continuing such forms of activity.

The Administration has done much for the farmers, whose income is now at an all-time "high" and whose debts are the lowest in the past quarter century; but it has not done enough to convince the farmers of its role in securing these gains and little to enlist the active political support of the farmers. The county and community A.A.A. committees, through which the farmers administer the federal farm program, constitute the largest farm organization in the United States. But these committees have been prevented from making their full contribution to the war food production program and to the political life of the farm communities because of the overlapping, hamstringing controls exercised by state extension services, restraints imposed by the Hatch Act, and, in the South, the domination practiced by the planters. Every step taken to liberate the Federal farm programs will not only strengthen farm unity but will also speed the process of bringing farmers into the national unity camp. While the Administration and the leadership of the Democratic Party are in the most strategic position to bring about such changes, the support of the farmers themselves, labor, anti-Hoover Republicans, and

all other forces in the national unity camp will be needed to effect the legislative and administrative changes.

Today *the* farm problem is not just a problem for the farmers. The problem is to bring broader sections of the farmers into the camp of national unity, and this is a problem for all persons and groups who recognize the urgency of strengthening our national unity. The '44 elections showed us how dangerous are the "city versus rural" and the "up-state versus down-state" contradictions. In looking ahead to the 1946 elections, we must begin to iron out these contradictions.

Immediately, we face the question of what action the Senate will take on the plans for international cooperation worked out by the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks, Bretton Woods, and Hot Springs. Approximately, nearly two-thirds of the members of the Senate come from farm states, and many others have a high percentage of farm and rural voters in their states. In order to win the fight for prompt and favorable action by the Senate, it is essential that all forces in the camp of national unity, especially the labor movement, assist the farmers in making their influence felt on the side of international cooperation and the program for post-war full production.



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