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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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- Torture in Rhodesia
- The Death of Steve Biko—
Organizer for Freedom



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COVER: Ms. Ntsikie Biko, widow of Steve Biko, and her children, Sakora (L) and Nkosinathi, at their home three days after Biko's death at the hands of the South African Security Police. The struggle continues.

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Special Reports

Catholics Charge Rhodesian Regime with Torture and Terror

*The latest report from the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe was published in London on September 21. Entitled **Rhodesia: The Propaganda War**, it documents the brutality and hypocrisy of the Smith regime. While claiming to represent and protect the people of Zimbabwe, the regime kills, tortures, and*

terrorizes black civilians in a futile effort to defeat the liberation struggle.

The report charges the Rhodesian forces with cowardice and with falsifying their casualty reports. It indicates that the regime's forces avoid contact with the guerrillas, brutalizing local civilians instead. Rhodesian army deaths are said to be under-reported, with the deaths of mercenaries and black soldiers seldom appearing in public reports.

The report's analysis of the regime's current propaganda notes the attempt to portray the guerrillas as "mad-dog communist terrorists," and agents of a foreign power. Thus the regime's vision of a 'settlement' involves maintaining the status-quo and eliminating those who would restructure society.

The Commission decided to go ahead with the publication of the report despite the arrest of four of its leading members, including Sister Janice McLaughlin, an American nun of the Maryknoll order. Sister



Rhodesian army—a policy of torture

McLaughlin was deported by the regime on September 22 after three weeks imprisonment and has returned to the US.

Excerpts from Rhodesia: The Propaganda War are presented below. The report covers several areas, including the use of systematic torture by the Rhodesian Army; the killing of civilians by Rhodesian forces; the significant increase in numbers of 'protected villages' and the hardship they cause; the nature of the regime's propaganda attempts among the rural Zimbabwean population; and the regime's security legislation. The report emphasizes the disparity between the image of a beleaguered white minority the regime seeks to present to the outside world and the reality of the brutal repression the regime is inflicting on Zimbabwean civilians.

The report includes photos of civilian victims of torture by Rhodesian forces and copies of propaganda leaflets being used by the regime. The report is available from the Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL, England.

A policy of systematic torture is pursued by the Rhodesian Army

Reports of torture at the hands of government security forces continue to be the rule rather than the exception. Talks of a possible settlement seem only to have intensified the army's resolve to harass and terrorise civilians.

Not only do the brutal methods invite retaliation, but it is questionable whether they have any effect except to make enemies of the rural population. The army already employs informers who keep it well posted on all security matters. In most cases, the army already knows the answers which it pretends to seek by ruthless interrogation. The army must also be aware that such methods tend to yield lies. When people can stand no more torture, they will agree to whatever their interrogators say, whether it is true or not.

The army is purported to be defending the local people and to be fighting to safeguard their interests. The practice of torture can hardly be the best means to convince people that the army is on their side. On the contrary, the army and police have become the

greater enemies and are hated and feared by the people.

As the guerillas continue to advance, the army has not been able to claim any significant victories. They are supposed to destroy terrorism, but they seem to fear contacts with the "terrorists" and to go out of their way to avoid them. Many reports reaching the Justice and Peace Office indicate that when the army finds out where the guerillas are located, they move in the opposite direction. After a guerilla operation, the army will interrogate and torture the local people in the vicinity instead of pursuing the guerillas. Perhaps, this is the only way the army can assert its power and at the same time avoid the risk of fatal encounters with the guerillas?

Whatever the reasons, the practice of torture has become a common event in the lives of people in the rural areas. Schools are frequent targets of interrogation campaigns. One common method of torturing students which leaves no tell-tale marks is the towel and hose method. The students are stripped naked, a towel is put over their faces and running water is sprayed in their mouths and noses through a hose. "it gives the impression of suffocating or drowning," one headmaster explained.

Any area in which there has been guerilla activity can also expect a gruelling interrogation session. The emergency powers allow the government to detain anyone for questioning up to 60 days without pressing any charges. No one is exempt, including priests and sisters who have been questioned and beaten like everyone else.

The government accuses the guerillas of victimising and intimidating the people. Most of the people would turn and point a finger at the government and declare that it is responsible for most of the terror in the country. Following [is a] recent example which helps explain why the people feel this way. The names have been omitted to protect those involved from further harassment.

Security Forces Inflicted Burns

At about 11 o'clock on the morning of 21 December 1976, Mr. P.M. was working with his wife and children on his land when a group of 24 soldiers approached, 22 Africans and 2 Europeans. One of the Europeans asked him where the "terrorists" were and Mr. M. replied that he didn't know. He had only heard they were in the area. The soldier then accused him of

harbouring the "terrorists" and beat Mr. M. on his lower back with a large stick until he fell and was then bound by his wrists with wire and tied to a tree.

Meanwhile the other soldiers had been preparing to eat and had made a fire on which some beer was boiling. The European soldier took this sweet liquid and poured 15 cups over Mr. M's head and about 5 cups over his shoulders. After the meal, the same soldier poured the boiling beer countless times over Mr. M's feet.

While this had been taking place, Mrs. M had been beaten by some African soldiers. She was then taken with her children to see her badly burned husband who had been detached from the tree and taken to the kraal. The European soldier who had tortured Mr. M then said he regretted the severity of his treatment and now thought that Mr. M had not been aware of any specific "terrorist" presence in the area. He advised him to seek medical treatment but when he was told that the nearest clinic was 16 miles away, he did not volunteer to provide transport. An African soldier bandaged Mr. M's wound and gave him some pills.

Early the next morning, Mr. M supported by his wife and brother, walked the 16 miles to the hospital. He was a fulltime patient at the hospital for nine weeks. He continues to visit the hospital even now (July) for respiratory difficulties which appear to have developed as a result of this incident. He now has trembling hands which make it hard for him to write or even hold a cup of liquid. He has difficulty focusing his eyes when reading and is unable to walk for any distance without pain. He has occasionally fallen to the ground when walking in the sun without a head covering and says that his wife now does most of the work on their land since he can no longer work satisfactorily. . . .

Civilian Deaths

One of the most deplorable aspects of the war in Rhodesia is the high incidence of civilian deaths. According to government figures, civilian deaths for 1977 alone already number 532. This is more than four times the number of government soldiers killed during the same period (129) and almost as many as the number of guerillas killed (725). . . .

While these figures are high enough, they are an underestimate since many deaths, both civilian and military, are reported to the Justice and Peace

Office that never appear in the official communiques or in the newspapers. For instance, on 6 July, members of the security forces were burning six villages in the Tanda TTL when they were attacked by guerillas and nine were killed. The incident itself never appeared anywhere, and the names of only two of the soldiers were reported the following week as "killed in action."

The fatal shooting of three children and a teacher by security forces at Kandenga School in Buhera District on 18 April also never appeared in the official communique though it was reported in the newspapers 11 days later as a "contact tragedy." . . .

Military Losses Concealed

Army deaths are also known to be underreported. It is believed that the government fears morale would be lowered if the true figures were known. The number of security forces killed in the first half of this year (129) is almost half the total number killed in the previous four years (268). Therefore, the death of mercenaries is seldom reported. These make up a sizeable proportion of the army. An army spokesman admitted in May that so many mercenaries apply the government no longer needs to recruit them. He said the greatest number of mercenaries come from America, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

The deaths of African and Coloured soldiers is also often kept quiet, and it is believed that their families are paid to keep the deaths a secret. Again it is difficult to know if all the reported "terrorist" deaths, are indeed "terrorists" or if many of them are civilians. Propaganda leaflets dropped on rural villages have warned that people who help the guerillas "are counted as terrorists and will be killed by the security forces." If this threat is kept it helps to explain the high count of guerilla deaths when reliable sources from the operational areas indicate that few contacts actually take place between the nationalist soldiers and Smith's army. . . .

Protected villages on the increase

At the last count (30 May) there were approximately 203 protected villages in Rhodesia, housing more than half a million people. These figures from informed sources on the spot are double the official government

estimates of 250,000, or "a twelfth of the total tribal population."

The figures continue to climb as the government steps up its programme to establish protected villages in almost all operational areas. During the past rainy season (March) more than 100 new villages were established which would involve about 20,000 people according to the government's estimates of 2,000 people per village. . . .

It is difficult to get accurate figures of the villages, not only because they


are going up so fast, but because they also come down just as quickly. They are popular targets for the guerillas who cut the fences, liberate the people inside and burn down the huts. At the end of May the Provincial Commissioner for Internal Affairs, Mr. Geoffrey Henson, admitted that since the beginning of the year there had been 70 guerilla attacks on the villages. This is probably an underestimate.

The guerillas have also played havoc on the village administration by attack-

Terror and death is the way of the communist terrorist in Rhodesia

See the mad dog communist terrorists forcing the children to leave their school. They are taking the children to a communist training camp in Mocambique. There the children will be starved. If they ask for food they will be beaten. If they ask if they can return home they will be taken away by the evil communist camp instructors and they will never be seen again by their friends or family. Those children who survive the starvation and beatings will be turned into the murdering mad dog communist terrorists of ZANU/ZANLA. They will return to spread terror amongst the people. Anyone who helps the communist terrorists is helping to bring terror and death to the people.

Terror and death is the way of the communist terrorists.



Rhodesian Propaganda Leaflet

C.C.J.P.

ing personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who are responsible for running the villages. On 1 July, the Minister, Mr. Jack Mussett, stated in Parliament that his department had suffered high casualties with 114 killed, 25 missing or abducted and 243 wounded. He interpreted this to mean that the villages were successfully disturbing the guerillas and said, "protected villages are proving to be a thorn in the side of the enemy." . . .

The people affected do not think much of this advantage. Few have anything to fear from the guerillas and feel no need to be "protected" from them. They are still in danger from the security forces and can be submitted to interrogation which includes torture and beating. There have been many cases of rape in the "keeps," as the villages are called locally, and District Assistants are known to confiscate the passes (situpas) of the women which allow them to move in and out of the village, and to force the women to sleep with them in order to retrieve their passes. . . .

The chairman of the Chiweshe Residents Association says that the villages do more harm than good. In a statement which he issued on 25 July for the Association, a self-help group assisting the people of Chiweshe, he described the continuing hardships of life in the protected villages. In contrast to recent government and newspaper reports that life has improved and that people's attitudes become favourable after the first two years in a village, he states that the villages continue to be extremely unpopular. "The government has lost the support of the African population tremendously due to the protected villages as well as its discriminatory laws," he declares.

His statement described some of the problems in the P.V.'s including lack of clean water, lowering of educational standards, increase of venereal disease and the depletion of natural vegetation. He suggests that the government "free people in the protected villages" immediately as proof that it is serious in its pursuit of a peaceful settlement.

Almost every week there is a feature story in the paper showing the success of a particular village and painting them in a very positive light. People on the spot give a different picture. "People have lost all hope," reported an official of the Salisbury Archdiocese who visited the Mtoko area in July where he saw people living out in the cold because their former houses had been burnt by the army and they were

still building their new homes. Some people have had to move three times. A doctor from one area reported that the people do not come for treatment when they are sick. "They say they may as well die than live in such hell," the doctor said. . . .

More than half a million people have been forced to live in such difficult conditions and to create new lives from nothing.

Propaganda attempts to isolate guerillas

The rural psychological campaign conducted by the Smith government in Rhodesia took a new twist in April with the publication of a series of propaganda leaflets designed to discredit the guerillas. Unlike previous campaigns which warned people of the punishment they would face if they assisted the nationalist soldiers, the new leaflets attack the guerillas directly and portray them as "mad-dog communist terrorists."

The one page leaflets contain a drawing and an English text on one side, with the same text in Shona and Sindebele on the reverse side. Nine have been issued so far. They are handed out to more than half a million people living in the country's protected villages, distributed at rural schools and are posted on shops and public buildings in the rural areas.

All nine bear the same basic message: Guerillas are communist terrorists and communists embody all that is evil. The leaflets accuse the "murdering mad-dogs" of every conceivable crime—kidnapping children, starving and beating recruits, infecting women with V.D., shooting old men and young girls, and engaging in every kind of brutality. "Terror and death is the way of the communist terrorists" is the theme running through the leaflets which read like standard one primers.

"They must think we're stupid," commented one man after seeing the leaflets. Another said, "we know the so-called terrorists. They are our sons, brothers and relatives. We know the government tells lies about them." . . .

Four of the nine leaflets single out the ZANU/ZAPU forces which are headed by Robert Mugabe. All nine mention Mozambique and the "evil communist camp instructors" there. The word 'communist' or 'communism' appears in almost every line and is used seven or eight times in each leaflet.

The leaflets try to convince people that the liberation movements are not

an authentic national force, but are the tools of communist agents outside the country. They also seem geared to diminish the popularity of ZANU and its leaders. They are very much in line with the directives for a national psychological campaign which were issued by the PSYAC (Psychological Action) Secretariat last October and recently revealed by David Martin in *The Observer*. These directives spell out the strategy to be used to sell a negotiated settlement to various groups of the population. According to these directives, the propaganda aimed at rural Africans should seek to isolate the guerillas from the general African population and it is stated very explicitly: "Persons who now persist in causing unrest and supporting terrorism can now be identified as the enemy of all Rhodesians because they wish to impose a foreign military dictatorship and are therefore agents of a foreign government—(use Mozambique as an example—communist terrorists)."

The new psychological warfare seems to be a last ditch effort to defeat those who would demand significant changes in the economic and social structures of the society. No such changes are envisaged by the present regime. The directives clearly state that despite negotiations the national aim remains the same and "Therefore no dramatic changes will take place to the existing pattern of life, and everyone, black and white, must be encouraged to participate in maintaining normality and the preservation of order." The propagandists were also instructed, "Emphasise that this is an achievement for moderation and responsibility and a defeat for terrorism, Marxism and extremism; therefore it is not in any sense a sell-out or a capitulation."

While the guerilla forces may be winning on the battlefield, therefore, they are to be denied the victory at the conference table. The propaganda depicts them as the enemies of the people who want to "destroy the people with sickness and death so that their evil communist masters may come from their hiding places in Mozambique and steal the country from the people."

It is doubtful whether many Africans believe such propaganda. Most say that the government is wasting a lot of time and money producing useless pieces of paper. Rather than destroying the image of the guerillas, the government publicity makes them greater heroes in the eyes of the rural majority. □

Zimbabwe In The Making

by Michael Bratton

Western Economic Interests are heavily involved in Rhodesia today. How much will they influence the future economy of Zimbabwe?

It now seems certain that the rebel Rhodesian government will not be able to postpone its capitulation to some form of black power-sharing for very much longer. The new state may emerge from the constitutional settlement now being proposed, or may take a while longer to achieve—but one thing is certain, when Zimbabweans set about constructing their future they will be confronted by very profound economic choices.

Crudely stated, the choice is as follows. On the one hand a transition to socialism may be attempted; this strategy presupposes liberation through armed struggle and its consolidation through worker-peasant control of the state and economy. On the other hand, the neocolonial alternative is available; under this option basic structural transformation of the economy would not be undertaken and the state would continue to serve the interests of domestic and international capital.

A transition to socialism appears to be the strategy preferred by many leaders of the ZANU-ZAPU Patriotic Front. A preference for a neocolonial solution lies behind the current diplomatic involvement of South Africa, Britain and the United States in a Rhodesian settlement. This is also the preference of the more pragmatic of the white settlers. The determinants of future Zimbabwean development are often assumed to lie in the choice between radical and moderate leaderships in the liberation movements. It is important to remember that there are also very fundamental constraints embodied in the structure of the inherited economy, particularly in relation to the presence of transnational corporations. These constraints will confront

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all leadership groups regardless of their ideological orientation.

The Economy: An Overview

With an economy where the value of total annual output is estimated at \$3.2 billion, Rhodesia is second only to South Africa as an industrialized power in sub-Saharan Africa. Rhodesia is the world's leading producer of high-grade metallurgical chromite ore and deposits of chrome account for one-third of known Western reserves; it also produces for export copper, nickel, gold, asbestos and other minerals. Manufacturing, which is diverse and technologically sophisticated, accounts for one-quarter of the gross domestic product. The country is self-sufficient in foodstuffs, produces more tobacco than any other country in Africa, and ranks fourth and sixth respectively in maize and cotton production. One-half of agricultural production is exported. Diversification away from dependence on a few primary agricultural products and towards the export of manufactured goods is well underway. (Chart I) Until 1973, the year after guerilla operations intensified, the gross domestic product grew by over 6 per cent annually. In short, Rhodesia has the structure of a diverse, balanced and growth-oriented economy, that even the present recession in the country's economic fortunes cannot disguise.

But ownership and control of production in Rhodesia rests with groups other than the black majority. Black Zimbabweans currently control no more than *twelve per cent* of the productive capacity of the economy. The remaining *eighty-eight per cent* is shared among domestic white and Asian capital, the settler state, and transnational capital.

Domestic capital is concentrated in agriculture, commerce and small-scale manufacturing. Transnational capital dominates mining and large-scale agriculture and manufacturing. In other words, the commanding heights of the economy are owned and controlled by outsiders; the settlers and their state operate the non-strategic and service sectors of the economy; and the bulk of the black population is relegated to subsistence production or wage-labor.

Land Distribution

The alienation of the best land (in the so-called highlands), for white agriculture is the foundation upon which

Chart I:
Rhodesia:
Composition of
Gross Domestic Product
(percentage distribution)

	Rhodesia	
	1965	1974
Agriculture	19	17
Mining	6	7
Manufacturing	19	25
Commerce	14	14
Power	5	3
Transport	9	5
Construction	4	6
Finance	6	5
Government	9	10
Services	9	8
	100	100
R \$ m.	707	1681
US \$ m.	1195	2841

the economy was built. By 1969, under the Land Tenure Act of the Rhodesian Front, 45 million acres were in white hands. The Land Tenure Act is buttressed by an argument for racial "parity" in land distribution that ignores the fact that the settler population accounts for only 5 per cent of the population. The "European areas" embrace all major infrastructural and industrial installations.

The distorted distribution of land in Rhodesia is reflected in the disproportionate dominance of white over black agricultural production. In 1975, 6200 white farm families produced \$574 million worth of commodities; 660,000 black farm families produced only \$165 million. Whites enjoy preferential access, not only to land, but to agricultural technology, management skills, credit and marketing facilities. The per capita differential in credit availability between white and black farmers is of the order of 9000:1. Most Blacks are crowded into infertile reserves and, where the "protected village" policy has been implemented because of the war, even subsistence production has been severely interrupted.

Agricultural Production

Historically, the characteristic structure of agricultural production on white land has been that of private individual tenure on 3-6000 acres. Recently, however, a shift in the structure of agricultural production has occurred. Tobacco production, limited because of the difficulty of marketing after sanctions were imposed, has been replaced by cotton, tea, citrus, wheat, rice and timber, accompanied by the emergence of plantation estates with processing plants. This type of agricultural organization surpasses the capacity to invest of individual farmers and has been taken over by transnational corporations.

For example, the Liebig corporation and the Lonrho group each operate 1½-million acre ranches in the south-west of Rhodesia. The sugar and citrus industries of the vast Triangle and Hippo Valley estates in the southeastern lowveld are controlled by South African transnationals, Huletts and Anglo-American Corporation respectively. The rise of agribusiness in Rhodesia changes the role of the white farm manager who is less likely now than ten years ago to be the owner of the property he farms. It also affects the black farm laborer whose cash remissions make up an increasingly large part of subsistence in the "reserves." The trend towards fewer farmers producing more from less land and with a smaller labor force is a reflection of the broader transition in Rhodesia from colonial primary production to industrial capitalism.

Industry and Mining

Investment in industry has come mainly from outside. Total transnational direct investment in Rhodesia stood at \$1525 million in 1974, up from \$1100 million in 1965, a 38 per cent increase since UDI. Transnational investment in Rhodesia accounted for 54 per cent of GDP in 1974 which represents a considerable Western stake in the economy despite the international economic embargo.

New capital flowing into Rhodesia after 1965 migrated to the fastest-growing and most strategic locations in the economy. *Ninety per cent* of Rhodesian mining is owned in roughly equal shares by South African, British, and American investors. In manufacturing, an *eighty per cent* transnational role is evenly split between Britain and South Africa. UDI undermined Britain's role as Rhodesia's principal economic partner, South Africa now holds



Tobacco workers—low wages, high profits

UN/Contact

that place. UDI also led to a general diversification of trade and investment sources.

Mining Expansion

The main impetus to the Rhodesian economy since UDI has come from the mining sector, the sector in which transnational capital is most heavily concentrated. The value of output from mining has almost tripled in the last decade and estimates for 1977 put the annual value of production at \$320 million. Most mineral production was exported, helping to plug the gap created by the loss of tobacco markets. Minerals contributed almost exclusively to the 60 per cent overall increase in Rhodesian exports between 1965 and 1973. Between 7-10 per cent of total Rhodesian export earnings in 1973 came from the shipment of chrome and nickel to the United States under the Byrd Amendment. [The reimposition of US sanctions early in 1977 is likely to interfere with this pattern of expansion.]

The key to expansion in mineral output and export is the central place of the transnationals in the mining sector. The large corporations have the resources for continued investment; they also control the well organized network of companies which make overseas sales possible. Transnationals have permitted the output of chrome and copper to grow steadily, the re-opening of numerous small-scale gold mines, and the establishment after 1965 of nickel as a major export commodity. Two new nickel mines were opened in 1976 alone.

An analysis of major transnational investments in Rhodesian mining confirms the predominance of British, American and South African capital (Chart 2). There is a marked concentration of ownership in the hands of a few giant corporations with interlocking interests. The pre-UDI British lead in investment in mining and industry has been diluted both by expansion of South African and American interests and by the entry of the Europeans and Japanese. For example, the \$90 million scheme to double Rhodesian iron and steel capacity was financed by Austrian, Swiss, West German and American banks. All transnationals in the mining sector have expanded operations since 1965 by reinvesting profits made by subsidiaries within the Rhodesian economy. Some are even involved in the importation of fresh capital: Lonrho's alleged US \$6.6 million infusion to the Nyaschere copper mine through company channels is an example. In 1973 South Africa's Anglo-American Corporation undertook the largest industrial project to date, a thermal power station at Wankie with a projected cost of US \$425 million, three-fifths of which was to be provided by "foreign capital."

Manufacturing

The support provided by transnational corporations to the Rhodesian economy and its illegal regime is evident also in manufacturing. The emphasis given in manufacturing in the 1950's to processing natural resources has been supplemented since 1965 by import-substitution and the

production of finished goods for export. The range of goods made in Rhodesia increased from 900 in 1965 to more than 5000 in 1977. Clothing, foodstuffs and machinery are traded, mainly to South Africa but also to Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zaire and Gabon. Capital has been found to finance 1700 new industrial projects and 1000 expansion projects in the last decade.

Moreover, the growth of the manufacturing sector has not been grounded on the importation of raw materials and components. Indeed, the economic isolation of Rhodesia after UDI has encouraged a relatively high degree of inward-directed linkages among all sectors of the economy except African agriculture. Western investors have collaborated in making the Smith regime relatively self-reliant, [although of course oil, complex chemicals, machinery and electronic equipment all still have to be imported.]

Future Development Strategies

Development planners of the future Zimbabwe will no doubt face strong pressures, from South Africa and the West, to develop through outward-directed links, rather than by concentration on expansion of any self-reliant elements in the economy. The choice

confronting national leaders and planners in Zimbabwe is a choice between swift growth and redistribution, between an expansion of the well-established transnationalized settler economy and its total transformation.

Leaders of the Zimbabwean liberation movements have yet to fully articulate positions on crucial issues of post-colonial development. At minimum, all advocate the dissolution of the Land Tenure Act, but reveal little about subsequent patterns of land distribution or organization of agricultural production. A domestic struggle may possibly ensue. In general, leaders in Muzorewa's ANC have avoided advocating nationalization of large farms, apparently favoring the retention of the existing structure of agricultural production, with managerial skills provided by whites or by a class of educated Zimbabweans. Early ZAPU documents refer frequently to the need for land reform, but there do not appear to be recent policy statements on the issue. Elements within ZANU are pushing for the nationalization and subdivision of land with production tasks taken on by smallholder peasants organized collectively.

Leadership stances *vis a vis* transnational investment are somewhat clearer: nationalization of mines, facto-

ries and estates is on the agenda of liberation movements but no details on prospective terms or management arrangements are given. Nationalization of industry elsewhere in Africa has vested ownership, but not control, in government hands. Meanwhile transnational interests are gearing up to ensure that decolonization permits business as usual. Representatives of corporate investors were active, for example, in lobbying liberation movement leaders at the Geneva Conference.

Perhaps the best indicator available of the struggle still to come are the attitudes of contending parties to the proposed US-British Zimbabwe Development Fund. On the one hand the US State Department in October 1976 met executives of twenty US corporations to encourage a flow of investment into Zimbabwe during the transition period with an eye to keeping the region in the western sphere. On the other hand the Patriotic Front has rejected any development fund that compensates white settlers or restricts freedom of economic choice of the first black government. The outcome of the struggle over Western development funding will go a long way in determining whether neocolonization awaits Zimbabwe. □

Comment

France In Africa

In late August French Foreign Minister, Louis de Guiringaud, extending recent attempts to improve relations with non-Francophone African states, paid a state visit to Mozambique, Kenya, Zambia and Tanzania.

The reception everywhere was cool, and critical. In Tanzania, the last leg of the trip, anger at France's collaboration with repressive colonial and settler regimes exploded in a student demonstration that greeted de Guiringaud as his plane landed in Dar es Salaam.

Upset by the students waving banners, shouting, chanting and singing African freedom songs the Minister alleged that "French Dignity" had been insulted, and when he received no apology, cancelled his 4-day visit, criticized the Tanzanian government, and flew home.

In the wake of his departure, an angry President Julius Nyerere described the French as "arrogant, defiant and mercantile" in their relations with Africa. Said Nyerere at a Post-Guiringaud departure news conference: "France, in its usual arrogance toward Africa, asked for an apology. Then they asked for an expression of regret. They should regret selling arms to a racist regime."

In Mozambique where people have a lively sense of political satire, the incident provoked some wry humor—including the following ironic essay, which appeared in the weekly magazine, Tempo.

The Safari

Talk about our culture to some, about the French Revolution to others.

Recall Napoleon if I am with Amin. Even speak of the Paris Commune, in the countries further south, but carefully, paying attention to what I say.

The Minister was happy. The trip the President had ordered him to make had come at the best possible time. Paris in August was an empty city, with only heat and American tourists.

Don't forget to set out my hunting suit,' he had told his wife who was packing his suitcase, 'maybe one of them will invite me for a safari.'

Africa, the old dream, the Foreign Legion marching with its slow step, the French flag unfurled in the wind. No. Now things were different. The flag was only left waving in Mayotte since its recent lowering in Afars and Issas, or Djibouti as they were now



Meeting with Mozambique's Dos Santos—hard questions asked.

Tempo

calling it. Still, one couldn't deny the French presence. In culture, in economy, in arms and even, when necessary, in the shape of soldiers sent to help some friend in trouble. It was going to be a good trip.

It wasn't.

In Zambia the climate was cold and distant. Perhaps because it had been an English colony there were difficulties of contact.

In Mozambique the worst was that bad bit of conversation with the President. Thinking about this the Minister felt a chill. The President had thrown in his face French collaboration with the Portuguese colonists, the sale of arms to South Africa and support of the Rhodesian minority. He mustn't forget to have his tie pressed—during the President's talk he had twisted it all up nervously and it was a wedding anniversary present from his wife.

And now he was on the way to Tanzania. What in the devil awaited him on this last stop? Maybe everything would go well. Maybe they would offer him the longed-for safari.

The voice of the stewardess, asking him in a respectful and sweet tone to fasten his seat belt and prepare for landing at Dar es Salaam jerked him from his meditations.

After a perfect landing the Caravelle taxied slowly up to the airport building. Looking through the windows the Minister couldn't believe what he saw. Finally a crowd was waiting for him. Finally enthusiasm!

He could see clearly a police cordon, containing the crowd with difficulty. The posters were too far away for him to read but he could hear the sound of the slogans chanted in chorus.

"Now let's see what those boys are shouting. HOME, that's it. GO HOME. But that means ..."

The Minister left the airplane worried. For the first time he had a crowd at the airport and the crowd was sending him away.

In the midst of the shouts from the demonstrators he could hardly hear the greeting delivered by his Tanzanian colleague. The Minister's gaze was fixed on the police cordon, struggling to hold back the rage of the young students. The memory of the fear he had felt in 1968, in Paris of the barricades, with students screaming equally menacing words, gave him a cold sweat.

But he was France. And France couldn't be treated like this. France couldn't be sweating with fear in the middle of an African airport. He thought of his grandfather the general, of the nephew who fought in Indochina, of the paratroopers who almost won the Algerian war, and he raised his voice. He demanded that the police intervene to disperse the crowd. He affirmed that he was France and that France demanded formal apology.

On the following day, as he entered the airplane, burning with accumulated anger, denied the apologies he had demanded, the Minister thought about how he was going to have to explain to his President that Africa just wasn't the same place it had been when they were studying in high school.

Flying over the Tanzanian forests, he thought of his hunting suit folded at the bottom of his suitcase and startled his secretary by muttering through his teeth:

Damn safari.

— translated from *Tempo* (Maputo, Mozambique), August 28, 1977



Student Demonstration: no apologies offered.

Steve Biko: Organizer for Freedom

Died in the hands of the
South African Security Police,
September 12, 1977

When Steve Biko was killed in the hands of the South African Security Police, his dying made him news, and the press carried that news in many columns. Talking about his death to Southern Africa, poet Molefe Pheto said "Newspapers are strange, why did they never write like that about his life?" And then, quietly, "You know, I wrote a poem about that, a long time ago—I would like it to be used as a memorial to Steve Biko now."

For all the men and women of South Africa who live, and sometimes die, for freedom, unreported.

Don't Write In Your Papers

Don't write in your papers
When I'm dead
Don't shed no tear
I'm just another Negro
Gone to rest from my "negroness."
I know it from Afrika
I know it in the west
I have no companion but the road
As the red bus passes me
Don't write in your papers
When I'm dead
I'm just another Negro
Gone to rest.

Building A Political Movement

"To stop us now they will have to kill us all first."

— Steve Biko, March, 1973,
in response to being served
with a banning order

In December, 1968, a group of black students met at Marianhill in South Africa to discuss the formation of an all-black student organization. Most had been participants in the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), ostensibly a multi-racial organization though its membership was 90% white. Frustrations had mounted at the NUSAS general conference the previous summer, when an all-white executive was elected.

From the NUSAS meeting the blacks had moved to a conference of the University Christian Movement (UCM), a predominately black group whose radical white members raised no objections to a black caucus in its ranks. It was there that Steve Biko, a medical student from the University of Natal (Black Section), rallied support for the Marianhill meeting.

Two of you
Hold me by my hands
Hold me by my feet
Swing once, swing twice
Let go into the junk heap
One problem less
One Negro-problem less.

I am mounds of rubbish
On the junk-heap to you
Thrown there for time to resolve me
Leave me alone in the decaying deep
But don't accuse me I smell
When we meet in Hell.

I see it everywhere
In the train systems
When no neighbour sits with me
In urine rooms
When you peep to gauge
The size of my penis
When house-boards announce "sorry no Negroes"
When girls turn left when I come right
I see it everywhere.

I cry maybe I smile
Just another Negro
With nowhere to go
Swing once, swing twice
Watch the worms gnaw at my bones
Close the file, one Negro less.

Molefe Pheto
London, 1966/67

The initial response was cautious interest. South African history had left blacks with both a feeling of inferiority and a sense of gratitude towards white liberals who defied government policy by allowing blacks into their organizations. Many at Marianhill argued that an exclusively black group would seem an acceptance of apartheid. Others had security fears. "Any formation of a purely non-white body shall be subject to a lot of scrutiny," declared one statement from the meeting, "and so the chances of the organization lasting are very little."

But by the meeting's end Steve Biko, who had neither doubts nor fears, had persuaded the participants to go ahead, and SASO—the South African Students' Organization—was formally inaugurated the following July.

There had been little political organization in South Africa since the early 1960s, when the regime had driven the peoples' organizations—the African National Congress, Pan-Africanist Congress and Unity Movement underground, smashing their structures, imprisoning or exiling their leadership. SASO broke new ground by the vigor of its ideas and the energy of its organizational tactics. With Biko as its first President, it developed a program that has played an important role in building the spirit of resistance so widespread among South Africans today.

The result has been a ferocity of repression unparalleled even in South Africa.

The ranks of every dissident organization have been thinned by bannings and detentions of people of all races, and the entire leadership of black student and community groups have been hit time after time. Political trials have sapped energy and resources. Many hundreds are already serving sentences for political offenses and thousands have been arrested. An unknown number are being detained indefinitely without charge.

The resilience of black organizations in the face of such harassment has been remarkable. "The entire leadership of SASO has been crushed," said the *Cape Times* in March of 1973, when eight leaders were banned and placed under house arrest. Another SASO official was arrested soon after, upon returning from a trip to Europe and the US.

The next year, in February, blacks were stunned when Abraham Tiro, SASO Vice-President who had fled to neighboring Botswana, was killed by a parcel bomb. And last August, SASO General Secretary Mapetla Mohapi, 29, died in detention in East London.


Meanwhile, arrests and bannings continued. Twenty-six leaders of SASO and its community counterpart, the Black Peoples' Convention (BPC), were detained in September of 1974, and thirteen more were picked up during the next two months.

Among the many SASO detainees in September, 1976, were three former Vice-Presidents, the SASO permanent organizer, the Secretary General, the Director of Publications, and three former Presidents. Numerous other SASO activists remain confined under banning orders. The BPC and various high school groups—notably, the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC)—have been similarly affected.

SASO's ability to survive in the face of such determined government repression is rooted in its origins and in the political decisions it made about the role it would play in South African liberation.

Grass Roots Organizing

From the beginning SASO devoted its major efforts to building a firm base in the black communities. It is the



Steven Biko

programs for the urban and rural masses which "will serve as a barometer to judge our own relevance," said now-detained former President, Nyameko Pityana, in 1971.

That same year, more than half the organization's \$32,000 budget went for community field work, leaving the smaller amount to cover the General Secretary's salary, annual conference and office expenses, and all member-related programs. SASO correctly predicted that it would be the organizing and outreach done in the crucial beginning stages which would determine its ability to survive an inevitable government crackdown.

Community development programs for 1972 included:

- 1) Health and research and preventive and curative medicine clinics;
- 2) Literacy projects;
- 3) Building and repair projects (homes and schools);
- 4) A pre-school program for children up to six years old;
- 5) Primary programs for children aged 6-16;
- 6) High school programs;
- 7) Vocational guidance classes; and
- 8) Leadership training courses for urban workers, emphasizing organizing skills, literacy, health problems, and general education.

The high school programs foresaw clearly the current importance of young students in opposing the government. "This is the period of initial political readiness," explained a SASO document in 1972. "Use must be made of the already existing dramatic, debating societies and high school organizations. Students should be encouraged to sell SASO pamphlets and read black literature in general. These students should also be involved in Community Development projects."

The need to involve students in community programs reflected SASO's attempts to prevent students becoming an

Steve Biko Remembered

Those who knew Steve Biko loved him. More importantly, they were changed by their association with him.

"We remember all those who died in detention," said a black South African exile last week, "and we are diminished by their loss. But it takes a whole generation to produce one person like Steve Biko."

Many of the young blacks who founded SASO were articulate, proud, witty, and capable. What Steve had in special measure, in addition, was a pervasive gentleness coupled with a complete absence of fear. People who spent time with him felt both accepted and challenged, and it was an atmosphere in which leadership blossomed. It is those qualities which cause millions to mourn him, but which also assure that his legacy will be continuing struggle in South Africa.

When SASO began its work, South Africa—its black communities in particular—was wracked by a paralyzing fear. Nine years of the black consciousness movement, however, suggest that courage, like fear, is contagious; and that when courage replaces fear, a government which rules by fear has lost its most important weapon.

Ironically, Steve Biko is now being labeled a moderate by American journalists and politicians, even while the protests he stimulated are termed "riots." Only if a belief that blacks and whites will eventually live together in a non-exploitative society is "moderate," can the label be made to stick. Equally important, Biko saw racial harmony being realized only through a radical restructuring of both economic and political relationships. And while he felt no need to abandon his soft-spoken warmth to prove his revolutionary commitment, he also made no apologies for his political positions.

educated elite, out of touch with the reality of workers and peasants. It was also a method for building solidarity among the three black communities—Africans, Indians, and Coloureds—as well as among African ethnic groups. Mixed student teams would arrive in a segregated ghetto to set up a clinic or class, demonstrating in practice the strength of unified action.

Bold Ideas

From its inception SASO also made a sharp break with many of the ideas and the caution of the multi-racial opposition groups. It took stands which are still controversial among liberal critics of the regime. For example, it has remain implacably opposed to foreign investments in South Africa, even when investors have tried to present themselves as serious forces for change. In 1972 SASO commented on the Polaroid corporation's attempt to present itself as an agent of reform: "We believe that such experiments are only designed to divide the black community along class lines—to create a new black bourgeoisie which will be resistant to the creation of a classless society."

At its second congress in 1971, SASO expressed its "solidarity with the students and the indigenous peoples of Namibia in their determination to rid themselves of [South Africa's] unwarranted occupation." It condemned African states who entered into dialogue with South Africa, warning that "Through the use of trade, aid, and with the potential use of her military power always lurking in the background,

He continually called for a recognition of ANC and PAC, the liberation movements which have shouldered arms to bring the white government down. And he frequently attacked white liberals who thought they had done their bit for liberation by having blacks to tea.

"The myth of integration as propounded under the banner of liberal ideology must be cracked and killed," he once said, "because it makes people believe that something is being done when in actual fact, the integrated circles are a soporific on the blacks and provide a satisfaction for the guilt-stricken whites."

Without the veil of liberalism obscuring their view, Biko said, "it will not be long before the blacks relate their poverty to their blackness in concrete terms . . . It is not surprising therefore that the blacks should wish to rid themselves of a system that locks up the wealth of the country in the hands of a few." And that, he suggested, meant that "any black government is likely to be socialist."

Those of us who knew Steve Biko will remember him as a revolutionary, possessed by a dream. Many have spoken eloquently about him, but perhaps none more prophetically than white newspaper editor Donald Woods, just after Biko was detained last year: "Make a note of the name Steve Biko and remember it well. One way or another it will be writ large in the South Africa of tomorrow.

"He is not the first potential prime minister to be detained without trial in this country—but I hope they treat him well while he is inside, because he has a remarkable memory. And so have his friends."

— Tami Hultman
Reed Kramer

South Africa is intent on establishing Black client states" in a policy "designed to consolidate the economic capitalism of South Africa."

To those who yelled "Red scare" SASO replied, "Communism might be a threat to capitalism and Western interests, but *apartheid* and its racism is a threat to humanity and the dignity of man."

SASO has consistently opposed any form of cooperation with the government-established Bantustans, the small fragmented reserves slated for eventual independence by *apartheid* planners. Feelings on that issue run so strong that SASO's third President, Temba Sono, was relieved of his position and drummed out of the organization when he made a speech suggesting negotiations with Bantustan leaders like Zulu chief Gatsha Buthelezi. Up until that time, Sono had been a highly popular and effective official.

The Movement Grows

"The importance of the SASO stance is not really to be found in SASO per se," said Steve Biko, "for SASO has got the natural limitations of being a student organization with an ever-changing membership. Rather it is to be found in the fact that this new approach heralded a new era in which blacks are beginning to see with greater clarity the immensity of their responsibility."

The black consciousness movement quickly became so solidly established among the population that police reprimands

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Overview

TINY ROWLAND SETS UP SMITH TALKS WITH KAUNDA

— *Observer* (London), October 2, 1977

CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY IS TRAINING RHODESIANS FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE

— *New York Times*, September 27, 1977

Elsewhere in this issue our review of the Anglo-US plan for a Rhodesian settlement points out that the proposals are far more concerned with protecting the interests of large-scale national and international business operations than with providing a better economic future for the Zimbabwe people.

If evidence was needed of the direct and active role being played by such business interests in attempting to shape the future of Zimbabwe, it was neatly provided by the two news stories headlined above.

The *New York Times* article referred to a scheme to train black Rhodesians in American corporate-style thinking. Devised by E. F. Andrews, vice president of the Pittsburgh-based Allegheny Ludlum steel company, the program will provide future Zimbabwe leaders with expertise in "economics and economic development, cost benefit analysis, management and information systems, manpower planning, etc."

The readers of *Southern Africa* will remember that for years Andrews was one of the chief lobbyists in Washington opposing the reimposition of sanctions on Rhodesia by repeal of the Byrd Amendment. Allegheny Ludlum produced stainless steel, with a large component of Rhodesian chrome; it wanted its cheap chrome to keep coming.

So did Union Carbide, owner of chrome mines in Rhodesia, another vehement opponent of sanctions, and now co-sponsor of the leadership training project.

According to Dean Davis of the Carnegie-Mellon University Graduate School of Urban and Public Affairs, "Mr. Andrews, who had traveled to Rhodesia frequently, felt that with majority rule coming it was essential to educate Africans in governmental operations."

Nothing if not pragmatic, Ludlum, Carbide and company, having failed to prevent majority rule by their years of sanctions-busting and Smith support, now seek to mold it to their own needs.

But equally revealing of corporate intervention was the report on Tiny Rowland's activities. Rowland, a

multimillionaire, controls the conglomerate Lonrho, a financial group with vast interests in Africa, including gold mining in Ghana, sugar and tea plantations in Swaziland, copper in Zaire, platinum and coal in South Africa, and mines and factories in Rhodesia.

According to the *Observer*, Rowland was responsible for arranging secret talks in Lusaka at the end of September between Rhodesia's Prime Minister Smith and President Kaunda of Zambia. Smith and his party flew to Lusaka in a Lonrho plane. No one was very eager to talk about the conference—first official Zambian reaction to journalists' probes was the statement, "The meeting never took place." But commentators have speculated that apart from overall discussions on settlement plans, talks may well have turned to choosing a suitable leader for a future independent Zimbabwe.

This is not Lonrho's first venture into Zimbabwean politics. The company privately claimed that it played an important role in setting up the constitutional talks held between Smith and ZAPU head Joshua Nkomo in 1975-76. One of Mr. Nkomo's advisors in those talks was a senior British lawyer, R.A.K. Wright. Wright, who also advised Nkomo at the 1975 Victoria Falls meeting with Smith, Vorster and President Kaunda, has frequently acted as Lonrho's lawyer on major issues in London.

Political manipulation is intrinsic to Rowland's style. Long accused of sanctions-busting, in June 1977, in an attempt to improve its image in Zimbabwean eyes, Lonrho filed a lawsuit against Mobil and several other oil companies, for supplying fuel to Smith's Rhodesia in violation of UN sanctions. Rowland has frequently sought to cultivate certain kinds of political influence. Udi Gecagca, son-in-law of Kenya's President Kenyatta, has served as Lonrho's east African director. Litho Moboti, uncle of Zaire's President Mobutu, was appointed to the board of Lonrho's Belgian subsidiary. And in 1974 the company actually held a short-lived appointment as economic consultant to the Organization of African Unity.

One political connection Rowland might like to bury is the company's friendly relationship with UNITA in the mid-1960s—a relationship which included providing an airplane to UNITA president Savimbi to attend the 1975 Addis Ababa OAU conference on Angola.

Like Allegheny Ludlum and Union Carbide, Lonrho obviously plans for a long future in Zimbabwe. In 1976 the company chairman, Lord Duncan Sandys, told the annual stockholder meeting, "I have no doubt that in Rhodesia, as elsewhere, we shall be able to establish good relations with any new administration, and help in any way we can in the further development of the immense resources of that country."

update



SOUTH AFRICA still has many friends . . . at a conference on plural societies held in Cape Town (May), it was agreed that the attempt to introduce universal franchise in a single South African state would result in the destruction of democracy. Dr. Alvin Rabushka, of Stanford University, said that one-man-one-vote would lead to domination by the largest black nation of all other communities—black, white and brown. Dr. Edward Fort, black chancellor of Wisconsin University, described the one-man-one-vote formula as simplistic and naive.

South Africa's black unemployment is now estimated at 1.5 million, with additional blacks being laid off at the rate of 1,000 a day. The figures are the result of continuing studies by Prof. P. J. van der Merwe of the University of Pretoria.

As of the end of 1976, the estimated active black work force in the country was 7.5 million.

New figures released by the SA Reserve Bank show that R649 million (R1.00=\$1.16) in long term capital flowed out of the country during the first six months of 1977, compared with a net inflow of R528 million in the second half of 1976 and R1.71 billion in the first half of 1976.

The net outflow of short-term capital from the private sector amounted to R767 million between mid-1976 and mid-1977.

Gross domestic product grew by only 1% during the 12-month period.

While agriculture grew by 28%, and non-gold mining by 10.5%, commerce and industry showed a 5.5% decline and construction was down 10%.

Among the perceived bright spots in the economic picture was the fact that cuts in imports and sharp increases in exports have improved the balance of payments. Gross domestic savings

were higher, lessening the importance of foreign capital.

The US is now accounting for more than half of overseas sales of Krugerrands, according to a report in the *Star*. This compares with an estimated 15% of total sales in 1975.

West Germany is the other major market.

The coins are fetching higher prices than they did last year, but indications are that the number of coins sold may not reach the 1976 figure of 2.9 million.

The latest pitch to Americans is to buy Proof Krugerrands, which trade at several times the price of regular Krugerrands. Only a limited number of Proof Krugerrands are struck each year. Plans are afoot to set up a special trading board for the coins in New York within the next few months.

Bantustan Minister Gatsha Buthelezi was prevented from speaking at the segregated black campus of the University of Durban-Westville by students protesting his complicity with the apartheid regime as chief of the Kwazulu bantustan. Carrying placards that read "Gatsha, is there an alternative to total liberation?" "Puppets on a String" and "What is this pseudo liberal nonsense?" students booed when members of Buthelezi's organization Inkatha walked onto the stage. Buthelezi left without making an appearance saying "I will only face the risk of being insulted again."

"Every time Buthelezi goes abroad and speaks against the government, he aids their attempt to present themselves as democratic," said a member of the Black People's Convention (BPC). "He is their showpiece." Buthelezi has made numerous trips to western countries where he has advocated increased foreign investment in South Africa, a position directly opposed to that of the BPC, SASO, ANC and PAC.

About 1,000 leaflets calling for the deportation of US diplomats from South Africa have been found scattered on the streets of Pretoria. So far, there's no clue as to their origin.

Concern is rising over white South Africans' growing penchant for guns. A total of 1.2 million guns are licensed to private individuals, most of them white.

Black, Asian and coloured applicants for gun licenses undergo an intensive screening, while white applicants are rarely refused.

Ammunition is no problem. Despite a 1961 UN embargo on arms and ammunition exports to South Africa, 90% of the ammunition for the country's handguns is estimated to come from abroad.

One South African psychiatrist has been quoted as saying that, "Society here is aggressive, with a masculinity fetish. I should say that apart from any question of their technical ignorance, 75% of this white community are psychologically unfit to have firearms."


Virtually the entire editorial staff of the South African magazine *To The Point International* (published in Belgium) was fired in August after complaining that the magazine was being used as a propaganda vehicle for apartheid and the South African regime.

Seven British journalists, five of whom were fired and two others who resigned, said that they were forced to print "racist propaganda" sent from the South African edition of the magazine. *To The Point* was started in 1972 by Afrikaner businessmen and its first editor, Dr. Eschel Rhoadie, is now Secretary of the South African Department of Information. The magazine is widely believed to be at least partly financed by the Department of Information.

To The Point International has undertaken an aggressive promotion campaign in the US and conservative Michigan publisher John McGoff, who is a director of the magazine, has reportedly been interested in putting out a US edition.

West Germany has quadrupled its credit guarantees for exports to South Africa during the last 18 months, despite official government opposition to apartheid.


Some 300 German firms now have subsidiaries in the country, with substantial investments in all major industries.

 **IN NAMIBIA** the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of SWAPO, claims to have killed 154 South African troops in May and June. PLAN also says it destroyed a South African air base on the eastern front.

SWAPO reports that a government radio broadcast in May said 240 South African soldiers had left the border area because of mental illness.

SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma has called for immediate replacement of the South African troops with a UN peace-keeping force.

West Germany has announced that it will close its consulate in Windhoek. The closing is to take place in October.

 **DESTRUCTION IN MOZAMBIQUE** caused by Rhodesian army attacks has been described as shocking by a UN fact-finding team. The team leader said in Maputo that the attacks showed a "systematic pattern," with enemy troops concentrating on the destruction of communications lines. He also said not a single building was left standing in Mapai.

The team's report will be presented to the UN Secretary-General. Member states will be asked to help Mozambique.

The UN High Commission for Refugees has provided a total of 130 tons of clothing, footwear, blankets, medicines, and food for the 32,000 Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique. The UNHCR is continuing its appeal for international aid for the refugees.


Workers in Mozambique's National Airline, DETA, have started forming producer cooperatives at their workplaces. About 200 workers in Maputo have been clearing a site in preparation for breeding chickens and other small animals. Other projects are to follow, all financed by workers themselves.

A project aimed at promoting agricultural production is underway in five of Mozambique's ten provinces with

assistance from the Food and Agricultural Organization. FAO technicians are helping with the organization of experimental stations and other undertakings.

Mozambique and Cape Verde have agreed to establish a joint commission which will meet at the end of this year to review the implementation of cooperation and friendship agreements between the two countries.

A general agreement on cooperation was signed last year.

 **RHODESIA** will lose 500 jobs with the closing of Rio Tinto pilot ferrochrome smelter.

Rio Tinto said a major ferrochrome project would be viable if the price rose slightly. However, it said it doesn't want to make a major investment decision, given the country's political situation, the depressed world steel market, and the tough line being taken by the US on economic sanctions. It said the US is not only honoring sanctions itself but is dissuading European and Japanese steel producers from breaking the ban.

Ferrochrome exports have been an important foreign exchange producer for the Rhodesian regime.

Ferrochrome producers other than Rio Tinto have also been reported to have laid off workers and cut back production.


American nun Janice McLaughlin was deported by Rhodesian authorities on September 22 after three weeks imprisonment under security laws charged with "spreading alarm and despondency."

She was a member of the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace and had helped prepare the commission's latest publication, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War* (reported on in this issue).

Interviewed enroute to the US she said, "I support the side of the freedom fighters in the war. I feel it's unfortunate that it has come to this stage, but I think that it's come to the point where it's impossible to bring about change without the war, and I support change."


An American deserter from the Rhodesian army says many US mercenaries are becoming "bored and disillusioned." The deserter, Stephen Drevitts, said in Johannesburg that about 1,000 Americans are involved in the fighting.

Drevitts described the majority of them as "looking for adventure and stopping the march of communism at the same time."

 **ZAMBIA SAYS** that one of the 18 companies it is suing for damages resulting from violations of sanctions against Rhodesia has replied to the charges, denying liability. Zambian officials declined to name the company.

Zambia also said it has sent letters to oil companies operating in Rhodesia, Britain, France and the US, notifying them of claims the government intends to make against them for supplying oil to Rhodesia while denying supplies to Zambia. Zambia's claims against the oil companies total \$6.4 billion.

In a related development, President Kaunda has called on OPEC countries to block oil supplies to Rhodesia in order to put teeth into settlement efforts.

 **ZAIRE's** foreign minister, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, has been tried and convicted on charges of treason. He was accused of knowing in advance of the planned Shaba invasion but failing to tell President Mobutu. Also arrested was the spiritual head of the Lunda tribe of western Shaba.

Karl-I-Bond was sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by President Mobutu.

 **SWAZILAND** will get its first rail link with South Africa under an agreement recently signed in Cape Town. Work is expected to be completed in two years. The line will run from Phuzomoya (already linked to Maputo by rail) to the South African border town of Golela, which is on the line to Richards Bay.

news briefs

EEC Code on South Africa Rejected

The Dutch Federation of Industries has joined its German counterpart in criticizing the European Economic Community code of conduct for businesses operating in South Africa.

The code was adopted at a meeting in Brussels last month, and goes beyond a similar program initiated in the US by black businessman Leon Sullivan. For example, the EEC code calls for recognition of black trade union rights.

The European business leaders maintain that the code is unworkable since they cannot go counter to existing South African laws. Their reaction is likely to strengthen the argument of critics such as the European trade unions, who say that voluntary codes are ineffective and serve to whitewash the continued support given by the corporations to the South African system.

Resistance Unabated In South Africa

Anti-government demonstrations proliferated throughout South Africa in the wake of Steve Biko's September 12 death while in police custody.

Students in many townships are boycotting schools and confrontations with police have resulted in hundreds of arrests. Clashes took place outside Pretoria between students and officials of the Bantu Administration Department, which is responsible for Africa education. Some 400 students marched in Grahamstown, resulting in the jailing of 97. And 245 students from the University of Fort Hare were convicted of violating the Riotous Assemblies Act by holding a memorial service for Steve Biko.

In Soweto itself only 300 out of some 27,000 high school students have registered for classes, and over three-fourths of the township's teachers have resigned in sympathy. With over 26,000 militant high school students on the streets, the approaching southern hemisphere summer could be a long, hot one for Soweto, particularly since students now have such strong adult backing.

Congress to 'Adopt' South African Prisoners

An ad hoc Congressional group led by Representative Thomas Downey intends to work on individual cases of South African political prisoners. The group is modeled on another Congressional association called "Prisoners of Conscience," which monitors cases of prisoners in the Soviet Union.

The South African group's first case is likely to be that of Peter Jones, the Publicity Secretary of the Black People's Convention, whose whereabouts and condition are unknown. Jones was arrested along with Steve Biko on August 19.

The New York-based Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa is urging Americans to ask their own Congressional representatives to support the group's inquiries.

Turnhalle Dissolved, Talks Stalled in Namibia

South Africa's recently-appointed Administrator-General for Namibia, Justice Martinus Steyn, has informed the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference that its secretariat is being dissolved, and that no further financial assistance from the state would be forthcoming.

The Conference, which was a central element in South Africa's plan for Namibian independence without participation from the UN or the SWAPO liberation movement, will hold its final meeting in mid-October. It is thought that black members of the conference will form a new political party and compete in anticipated elections in alliance with the newly-formed Republic Party, which is headed by white politician and former Turnhalle chairman Dirk Mudge.

Western diplomats in New York, meanwhile, continue to consult with SWAPO on the latest South African proposals for a negotiated settlement in Namibia. The key unresolved issues are a schedule for the withdrawal of South African troops, a timetable for elections, and the wording of an agreement that can be accepted both by

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South Africa and by SWAPO and the UN.

Rhodesian Army Targets Front-Line States

Rhodesian troops mounted yet another attack on Mozambique last month, a search and destroy mission in Gaza province about 40 miles from the Rhodesian and South African borders.

The invasion was the first major incident since Rhodesian troops captured Mapai in late May and occupied the Gaza province town for five days.

Rhodesia's security forces are maintaining a campaign of harassment against Botswana and Zambia as well, apparently to demonstrate its military strength during the current round of settlement talks. Both Zambia and Botswana have reported the aerial bombardment of border posts by Rhodesian planes, and both have tightened security in anticipation of further attacks.

While the Rhodesian government wants to demonstrate that it's still a force to be reckoned with militarily, the white regime is also making efforts to appear a reasonable participant in the Anglo-American settlement initiative.

After characterizing the Anglo-American proposals initially as "crazy," Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith recently indicated a change in his position. Smith told a BBC television audience that he might accept universal suffrage under some circumstances. He also invited British and UN representatives to come to Salisbury for talks.

Rhodesia to Prosecute Catholic Critics

Rhodesian authorities have charged three members of the Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice with violations of the "law and order and official secrets acts."

The three, Commission chairman John Dreary, Brother Joseph Du Puis, and Father Dieter Scholz, helped produce the Commission's recent report on the treatment of rural Africans—a document that has stirred controversy since its publication abroad. They will face trial on December 5.

The report alleges that torture is commonly used by Rhodesian troops to intimidate villagers and that the mass resettlement campaign undertaken by the government has brought misery to those affected.

continued from page 12

sals served only to widen its scope. Young people restricted to rural areas used their new homes as bases for further organizing. Biko and other activists banned to the eastern Cape province built the Zanempilo clinic in 1975, with funds raised by the BPC as part of its Black Community Programs. By last summer the clinic had two resident doctors, five nurses, five midwives, a community health worker, and a social worker, and recently extended services by opening two "out stations," in addition to a relief aid project and a leather workshop to provide local employment.

Despite the recent detention, banning and banishment of staff members, the clinic has continued, and the 10,000 people it serves have refused to attend an official health center the government opened nearby.

Protecting the Organization

There are now signs that the black consciousness movement is developing new tactics to meet the crackdown. Leaders of the Soweto Students' Representative Council have been prominent among the thousands of high school students arrested or exiled during the last year. But when the last public set of officers, including President Sechaba Montsitsi, was detained on June 10, Soweto students issued a statement that future leaders would operate clandestinely.

The South African government is clearly facing a revolutionary situation. Parents not already won by the student's arguments have been galvanized by the brutality unleashed against protestors. Dissidents fill the jails, thousands have left to join the liberation movements in an armed struggle, and still the open defiance inside the country continues.

Yet not even the most optimistic government opponent believes the struggle in South Africa is nearing its end. SASO has always warned its members that victories would be sporadic and hard-won, and that commitment and discipline were essential ingredients. And despite its emphasis on self-reliance, the black consciousness movement has recently accelerated its pleas for external support.

Leaders of the BPC have told reporters that international pressure may be partially responsible for less violent tactics



George Cohen
Pan African Students Organization of America leads demonstration in New York.

used by police against demonstrators in recent weeks. They feel South Africa is walking the thin line between preventing resistance activities from surging ahead, while not using methods which will embarrass Western allies over their economic and military support.

It is a line which will be maintained only temporarily, if blacks continue to build the power of their resistance. "The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed," said Steve Biko in 1971.

The South African experience suggests that courage, like fear, is contagious. And that when courage replaces fear, a government which rules by fear has lost its most important weapon. □

Nationalists Plan Clampdown On Social Welfare Initiatives

In the midst of the continuing turmoil in South Africa it is easy to overlook little publicized government actions that can have far-reaching effects. On July 8 three such draft bills were read in the white Parliament under misleadingly innocuous titles: the Social Workers and Associated Professions Act, the Fund Raising Act, and the National Welfare Act. A broad spectrum of groups in South Africa are reacting to the bills with alarm, pointing out that they will give the regime total control over all social work and social welfare activities.

The significance of this move by the Nationalists lies in the upsurge of voluntary self-help projects in black communities stimulated by the black

consciousness movement and the student rebellions. There are projects concerned with, for example, literacy, health and nutrition, and housing. There has been an awakening of initiative and determination to transform the repressive status quo at all levels. A significant aspect of these efforts has been an eagerness by white groups to look to black leadership in these programs and give their support to community-based activities.

All Aid Illegal

It is these efforts that the regime wants to restrict. The proposed bills would make it illegal for any person or group to give *any* form of aid—material or otherwise—to another person without government consent,

or to solicit any form of aid for others without government approval.

The first bill would require all social workers to be registered as professionals. Persons without formal training could not be registered and could therefore be prohibited from doing social work of any kind, including, as critics have noted, giving out pieces of birthday cake at a party, or more seriously, helping the families of political prisoners, in any way.

The second bill would require special permits to raise funds for any social welfare purpose. The third bill would establish government welfare boards to regulate all social welfare activities. The boards would control the right to appeal to the public for

funds or to request government funds, to be raised by a new tax.

Curbs on Church

The scope of these bills is so broad that even religious activities could be regulated, with the government deciding which churches are needed to service a community's spiritual needs and which religious welfare activities are appropriate.

This proposed legislation in effect constitutes a massive extension of laws passed several years ago which give the white regime control over foreign contributions to South African organizations. Groups declared "affected organizations" by the regime can already be barred from receiving funds from abroad. Now the mechanism of apartheid is to control all voluntary domestic social welfare activities.

The three draft bills are expected to be finally passed in parliament after September 30. To date there appears to have been surprisingly little international comment or opposition to this further strengthening of the regime's already draconian powers. □

Guerrilla Bases Raided

South African security police claimed on August 29 to have broken up a guerrilla network and foiled an "invasion" plan. Brigadier Johann Coetzee said that heavily armed police had raided guerrilla bases near Durban and Johannesburg capturing a number of guerrillas and Soviet-made arms. The security police claimed to have obtained information on scores of guerrilla recruits training outside South Africa and their underground network.

According to the *Rand Daily Mail*, security sources alleged that the organizers of the guerrillas included Joe Slovo of the African National Congress in London, along with sociologist Ruth First and British activist Polly Gaster.

Thousands of South African police have been deployed recently on patrol along the border with Mozambique. And the police have set up a special task force to combat urban guerrillas, with members selected mainly from veterans of South Africa's occupation forces in Namibia.

Two large-scale trials are expected to start soon in Natal, but police have not disclosed the number of alleged guerrillas being held. □

Deaths In Detention

The murder of Steven Biko has focused world attention on one hideous aspect of the South African regime—the deaths of scores of people while in the hands of the security branch of the South African Police. No one outside the SA Police and other Pretorian high circles knows for sure how many people have died in detention. Those admitted to have died between 1963 and 1971 total 22—their deaths have been officially attributed to 'suicide,' 'natural causes,' 'slipped in shower,' 'fell down stairs,' 'natural causes,' 'fell — floors' from police buildings.

The grisly toll is far greater. South Africa's Minister of Police, Justice and Prisons James T. Kruger acknowledged in Parliament that 117 people detained under laws *other than security laws* had died during 1976. Official death figures in this category for 1975 are 92.

There are no recorded deaths of detainees under security legislation from 1971 until 1976. Since March 1976 known deaths of men held under terms of security laws amount to 24. Included are two from South Africa's puppet Transkei. The following list is compiled from United Nations, South African press and South African human rights organization sources. Names, ages, dates of death and official reasons are recorded:

Masobiya Joseph Mdluli, 50	19 Mar 76	'application of force to neck' (photos of body show severe beating; four policemen acquitted of blame)
Mapetla Mohapi, 25	5 Aug 76	'suicide by hanging'
Luke Story Mazwembe, 33	3 Sep 76	'suicide by hanging' (trade unionist dead two hours after arrest)
Dumisani Isaac Mbatha, 16	25 Sep 76	'natural causes'
Feneul Mogatusi, 22	28 Sep 76	'natural causes'
Zungwane Jacob Mashabane, 22	5 Oct 76	'suicide by hanging' (university student at whose funeral attended by 5,000 people the police shot 7 dead and wounded 51)
Edward Mzolo, 40	9 Oct 76	not given (badly beaten)

Angola

MPLA Examines May Coup

In a report that reads rather like a taut espionage mystery, the Political Bureau of the MPLA has released its version of the events leading up to the May 27 attempted coup in Angola. The 30-page report, published recently, is the most detailed account yet of what the MPLA has called the factionalist activities of the coup's leaders, Nito Alves and Jose Van Dunen.

While the document asserts that the coup attempt failed because it received

little or no support from the Angola's workers and peasants, it does give some indication of the depth of the factionalism that had divided the MPLA itself. It is extraordinarily frank for a document of its kind in assessing the weaknesses within MPLA that provided the plotters with fertile soil in which to spread their divisiveness.

The report also charges that Western intelligence agencies were involved with the plot although it fails to

William Namodi Tshwane	26 Jul 76	not announced until 14 Oct 76 when police told family he had been buried 'and nothing can be done about it'; shot by police, died in custody; official reason 'justifiable homicide'
Ernest Mamasila, 35	17 Nov 76	'suicide by hanging'
Thabo Mosala	30 Nov 76	'internal hemorrhaging ulcer' (an opposition leader in Transkei)
Joyi Twasifene	—	no known details; Transkei
Wellington Mlungusi Tshazibane, 30	11 Dec 76	'suicide by hanging' (Oxford educated mining engineer)
George Botha, 30	15 Dec 76	'jumped 6 floors down stairwell'
Dr. Nanaoth Ntshuntsha, 43	8 Jan 77	'suicide by hanging'
Lawrence Ndzanga, 52	8 Jan 77	'cardiac failure'
Elmon Malele, 52	20 Jan 77	'stroke'
Matthews Mabelane, 22	15 Feb 77	'fell from 10th floor ledge' at the John Vorster Sqaure police building
Aaron Khoza, 45	29 Mar 77	'suicide by hanging'
Phakamile Mabija, 27	7 Jul 77	'fell from 6th floor of police station,' allegedly trying to escape
Elijah Nkwenkwe Loza, 59	1 Aug 77	'died in hospital three weeks after suffering stroke'; in maximum security detention since 27 May 77; under banning order since Nov 76
Dr. Hoosen Haffejee, 27	3 Aug 77	'death consistent with hanging'; 25 abrasions over body
Bayempin Mzizi, 62	14 Aug 77	police say he was found hanging from cell window bar
Steven Biko, 30	12 Sep 77	causes not yet explained; police aver he had been on one week hunger strike; pathology reports indicate serious brain injuries

Reprinted with thanks from a statement issued by Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, 25 September 1977.

provide any specific details. "The coming months will bring to the surface the concrete facts of imperialist intervention in this conspiracy in which pseudo-leftism served as a screen for imperialist participation," the report states.

Early Moves

The coup leaders began their activities inside MPLA almost as soon as the Portuguese dictatorship fell on April 25, 1974. "It was a time of ideological indecision among some of the youth," the report relates, "who had access to a flow of revolutionary literature which they avidly devoured and immediately applied to the Angolan context as the cure-all for every political problem."

As various "committees" sprang up within the now legal MPLA, Alves and Van Dunen formed a study group basing their analysis initially on the writings of Enver Hoxha, the Albanian Communist leader, but quickly mov-

ing on, by early 1975, to an analysis inspired by Mao-Tse-Tung—an "incoherent analysis of classes of Angola," according to the report, "nothing more than a simplistic transposition" of Mao's theory.

Reflecting what appears to be long repressed frustration on the part of MPLA's leaders, the report says the

group quoted the writings of Lenin and other Marxist writers "to justify this or that position of the factionalist group."

Facing a threatening military situation that the report says "took precedence over MPLA's organizational problems and the need for ideological clarification," the Political Bureau admits to a "certain passivity" towards the factionalists, who attacked the caution of MPLA's leadership in issuing analysis "not based on a serious study of Angloan social realities" as "rightist," "social democratic," and later as "Maoist," after the Chinese position became clearly one of support for FNLA and UNITA, "anti-Soviet," and "anti-communist." The report admits that these charges affected both "honest militants" and diplomats from friendly countries, not identified specifically, who were often besieged by the group.

The report relates repeated attempts on the part of the coup leaders to gain control of MPLA over the past three years—from the Lusaka Conference of MPLA in Zambia in September 1974, through the constant placing of loyal factionalists within the civil service, the MPLA's Revolutionary Instruction Committees (the cadre training groups), and ultimately to the attempts to control the movement's Mass Organization Department and the army, FAPLA. These efforts are related in detail in the report, tracing the precise moves of many of the individuals involved as the strength of the factionalists grew.

Extending Tentacles

Ultimately, the report admits, the plot reached high into the upper echelons of the movement to include Provincial Commissioners, the top government officials, in five of sixteen provinces, as well as a significant number of military commanders.

Coup Leaders

Afrique-Asie



Nito Alves



Jose van Dunem



Cita Vales



Monstro Imortal

After the end of the 1976 Second War of Liberation, and especially after the Central Committee's October 1976 decision to curb Alves' growing strength by abolishing his major power base, his Ministry of Internal Administration, from the new government [see *Southern Africa*, June/July 1977], the factionalists turned to sabotage. The Provincial Commissioners "prohibited the free movement of goods" and hampered the distribution of imported consumer goods on which the government had spent precious foreign currency to alleviate some of the food shortages in the country. The report says that the commissioners even, at times, prevented the marketing of peasants' produce.

By late 1976, MPLA leaders realized increasingly that factionalism would be a problem that they would have to confront directly. The report asserts that in its fight against factionalism, "the movement's leadership always tried to win back the factionalists," a tactic used in past factional disputes. "It therefore always avoided administrative measures, preferring the method of discussing the problem through MPLA bodies."

Fanatical Phraseology

Mistaken by the factionalists for softness or even weakness on the part of the leadership, the method failed. "When honest militants tried to promote ideological debate, they were faced with the same hollow and increasingly fanatical phraseology, which could not stand up the slightest to militant analysis but which confused people and undermined any possibility of drawing benefit from meetings designed to clarify matters."

Above all, the report charges that the factionalists avoided at all times a discussion of concrete Angolan reality. "In their speeches, their writings, their statements at meetings," the report continues, "never was there the slightest indication of their economic concepts, or any reference to the acute problems of Angola's economy." The factionalists instead "misled people with vague and wordy promises of a bookish socialism which did not demand any sacrifice and which was 'easy' to build with quotations from the great classics."

As the tension mounted during the early months of 1977, MPLA decided to undertake an investigation of Alves and Van Dunen. With the date approaching in late May when the report was to be issued, the factionalists decided to attempt to take power.

But even as late as May 21 after President Agostinho Neto announced that the two were expelled from MPLA and even as MPLA leaders knew privately of a plot to overthrow the government, "the decision to recover those 'strayed sheep' for the MPLA" according to the report, "was explicit. Even here the MPLA's philosophy of giving erring militants an opportunity to mend their ways was respected."

Foreign Interest

Although the report does not detail external involvement in the coup planning, it does assert that "imperialist espionage agencies and especially French agencies and their European allies" moved quickly to take advantage of MPLA's factional disputes. The report also states that for several days before the coup attempt, Zairean and South African troops massed in increasing numbers on Angola's northern and southern borders.

Furthermore, the report says that both Mobutu Sese Seko, the president of Zaire, and Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's

leader, have made statements in favor of the coup. "In London a strange representative of Alves announced that he was going to Paris to meet UNITA elements," the report states, adding "Western chancelleries were optimistic as to the advantages the success of the coup would provide for capitalist interests."

The Political Bureau admits that "with the coup attempt of May 27, our structures are somewhat shaken." Still, MPLA's leaders persist in looking to the future—to continual increases in production and slow but constant revival of the economy; to the organization of education and health and the battle against illiteracy; to the planning of studies in preparation for MPLA's congress later this year. Already, reports the Political Bureau, it has embarked on a "broad movement of criticism and self-criticism throughout the movement," designed to "make it possible to uncover and correct some of the weaknesses which facilitated the factionalists' maneuvers." □

Still Under Fire

Despite the absence of hard evidence linking the West to the coup attempt, there is no doubt that the campaign to destabilize MPLA continues, both by overt acts of hostility along its borders, and unfriendly reports in the press.

Receiving little press coverage in the West, two communiqués released by the Angolan Ministry of Defense in July charge that South Africa has stepped up its military activity on Angola's southern border. Following at least seven incidents in May and June, the Defense Ministry says South Africa shot down a transport plane over the Angolan town of Kuangar on the Namibian border. Twelve people were killed. The next day the South Africans bombarded the town of Calueque to the west with artillery, causing many casualties. Calueque is near the Cunene river dam project.

Paulo Jorge, Angola's Foreign Minister, sent telegrams protesting the incidents, to both the Secretary General of the OAU and the UN. Denying that the attacks were carried out by UNITA, as the South African press and radio had claimed, Jorge said that public opinion had been "deluded by camouflage neo-colonialist and expansionist aggressive intentions."

Still the attacks continued. In late July the Ministry of Defense announced that South African troops had occupied Kuangar "with the aim of destroying our young Republic and thus hampering the irresistible advance of SWAPO combatants." The Ministry also said that Calueque and Santa Clara in the south and Caianda in the east, had been attacked.

Again the South African press claimed that these attacks were the work of UNITA, and this time their assertions could almost be seen as a prologue to a series of seven front-page articles on UNITA which appeared in the *Washington Post* in mid-August. The articles relate a seven-month trip inside Angola with UNITA by Leon Dash, a black reporter who also traveled with UNITA and wrote a four-part series in 1973.

Dash's eyewitness accounts of several guerrilla attacks and his bold conclusion that the guerrillas "effectively occupy the southern half of the country" is certain to enhance the international impression of UNITA strength. Yet the South African claim that UNITA has occupied Kuangar was the only time that UNITA appeared to control any town of any size.

Dash's articles, a mass of detail of guerrilla life and conversation, are carefully constructed to give the impression that UNITA has great strength without the facts to back up the assertions—almost as if people would react, "if the *Washington Post* let him write this many words about it, it must be important."

And even within Dash's accounts, some details tend to contradict the image of the guerrillas as a disciplined movement capable of greater political and military strength than MPLA.

Dash says that "the rigid discipline" that he saw when traveling with UNITA in 1973 "has deteriorated today." He says "overall their morale is high," but goes on to point out "they are plagued with desertions, disobedience, alcoholism, stealing and at times the abuse of married women living in their military camps."

Dash relates charges of MPLA attacks on civilians, but also reports UNITA's policy of attacking civilians who live in MPLA controlled areas. He notes that UNITA had to destroy the village of Chitembo to get the people to leave after the murder of a group of villagers cultivating their fields failed to provoke and exodus. He recounts that it is UNITA policy to take few prisoners, and cites the killing of 12 MPLA soldiers by putting them in a

hut and setting fire to it.

Civilians are constantly mistrusted by UNITA guerrillas who take them prisoner after successful UNITA attacks. Several times UNITA members expressed frustration at the loyalty peasants show toward the Luanda government which, UNITA says, has "bought" their support by providing them with basic necessities like blankets, salt and sugar.

The political motives of UNITA cadres focus on anti-communism, opposition to the presence of whites and mestizos in the MPLA government (Agostinho Neto is married to a Portuguese," one woman told Dash, "and wants to help Portuguese people more than black people."), and most of all a strong attachment to ethnic and regional ties, a policy denounced by MPLA as tribalism.

While failing to mention current South African ties with UNITA, Dash frankly refers to their invitation to the South African invasion force in 1975, and to training of UNITA in early 1976 by French mercenaries flown into Angola on six-month CIA contracts.

Dash's partiality for UNITA leads to some strange contradictions. Thus for instance he quotes UNITA militants characterizing MPLA as a movement lacking in concern for the general population "Neto is rich, and all rich

people don't know how poor people are suffering," one militant announced during a UNITA congress held to proclaim the southern half of Angola, the 'Black African and Socialist Republic of Angola.' "If Neto had had good people in his government all of your children standing here would be studying and have good clothes. You are not because he has Portuguese in his government." At the same time Dash admits MPLA successes in winning support of the local population in the south by offering services such as education, health care and protection from guerrilla attacks—but implies that this is some kind of "bribery", and not a genuine part of MPLA's program.

Yet he is forced to admit that while such efforts have not eliminated UNITA's base of support, the lines of division run deep within villages and even within families.

Long time readers of the US press, who have often sought in vain for a short column of news on a major development in the struggle for liberation have expressed concern at the implication of the Dash series. Seven articles devoted to legitimatizing the strength of UNITA have raised once again the question of possible US or western intervention against MPLA. □

Mozambique

Mozambique Sets Election Plans

The provisional Mozambique People's Assembly, meeting for the first time, has approved plans for national elections later this year. The provisional Assembly, which met on August 31 and September 1, has a membership of 207, including party and government officials, and others chosen from the armed forces, mass organizations and population at large.

As provided by the Constitution, the first elections for the new Assemblies are to be held within a year of the third congress of the ruling FRELIMO party, which took place in February. The elections will be organized in stages, beginning with local assemblies on September 25, and culminating in the election of the national People's Assembly by December 4.

The elections will be by universal adult suffrage, with a minimum age of

18. Excluded from the process are individuals who were identified with colonialism. Nominations will be by party committees, or by dynamizing groups in jurisdictions where party committees have not yet been created.

Local elections are first held at workplace or residence, where candidates are known personally to the electors. Then the local assemblies so chosen will choose delegates to electoral conferences, which will meet to elect district and provincial assemblies. Finally, the provincial assemblies will elect the delegates to the People's Assembly.

In introducing the election law to the provisional People's Assembly, President Samora Machel spoke of the victories achieved by the Mozambican people since independence, noting, for example, that:

- The number of primary school pupils has risen from 696,000 before the nationalization of education in 1975 to 1,300,000 today;
- In Maputo Central Hospital alone the number of children who had consultations in the first six months of this year was 35,448 compared with 3,537 in the same period in 1973;
- Following the nationalization of rented buildings, rents in Mozambique are among the lowest in Africa.

He emphasized that these and other measures had been taken thanks to the power of the working classes, the workers and peasants. The election of the assemblies "means the consolidation of class power—people's power." There was no neutral state power, he stressed, as bourgeois theorists would have it, but the power of a class. In Mozambique the exploitative minority

was being suppressed, while the broad masses enjoyed increased democracy and liberty.

Reiterating the themes of a party document on national problems that has been circulated around the country (see *Southern Africa*, September, 1977), Machel stressed vigilance against enemy sabotage and the correction of internal weaknesses. "When we draw attention to shortcomings," he said, "many simply point out that they are the result of the activities of

the enemy without thinking about the inadequacies of their own work."

Along with shortages of food and other supplies and attacks from neighboring Rhodesia, Mozambique has faced the problem of overcoming bureaucratic inefficiencies inherited from the colonial administration. FRELIMO regards the creation of the assemblies as a key step in institutionalizing popular control, especially at the local and regional levels.

The assemblies, it was emphasized,

must "dedicate themselves to the solution of the concrete problems of the people's life. . . . They should have the constant preoccupation of controlling the functioning and efficiency of the state services at their level."

Also decided by the Provisional People's Assembly was a new fiscal policy, designed to simplify the collection of taxes, and provide more favorable treatment for lower-paid workers and peasants organized in cooperatives. □

Namibia

South Africa Seizes Walvis Bay

Even the marginal pressures the US and its four companions on the United Nations Security Council, Britain, France, Canada and West Germany, have exercised in recent months have been sufficient to send Pretoria into a towering rage. In August Prime Minister Ballthazar Vorster asserted that the United States government was practicing 'strangulation with finesse' against this regime. But in spite of the purported Western-South Africa tough talk, Vorster has just completed a fine piece of garroting in the International Territory of Namibia—with only the faintest peeps of demur from Washington.

No Longer Namibia


After months of warning, Pretoria on August 31 issued a proclamation stating that as of September 1, 1977, the enclave of Walvis Bay would cease to be part of Namibia and would belong to South Africa. This followed the enactment by Parliament of the South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act and its signing into law by the South African State President on July 1. At the same time, Pretoria took over a dozen rocky islets along Namibia's coastline between Walvis Bay and the Territory's southernmost tip at the mouth of the Orange River—the Penguin Islands, populated only by seals. The US State Department declared, "We regard this unilateral move by South Africa as untimely and unhelpful in terms of the negotiations currently under way on the transfer of power in Namibia." UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim termed the move "unfortunate."

Only Deepwater Port

Walvis Bay is Namibia's only deep-water seaport along the Territory's entire 100-mile forbidding coastline. Its six-mile-long, sandy-bottomed harbor is protected by a neck of land and Walvis easily accommodates ocean-going vessels, a substantial fishing fleet which harvests rich catches from the Benguela current surging up from the Antarctic, and a major South African naval base. Walvis is fifth in importance of the seven ports controlled by the South African Railways and Harbours Administration. In January 1976, 95 vessels called at the port, handling 144,000 metric tons of cargo, landing 93 thousand tons and carrying away 49 thousand tons. In the financial year 1973/74, Walvis transited a million and a half tons of products, over a third of them outgoing. International shipping lines to and from southern Africa, Europe, Japan and the United States call regularly at the port.

Walvis provides oil bunkering, fresh water, electric loading cranes. Special loading facilities take care of the steady flow of copper, lead and zinc ores and semi-processed treasures from the American-controlled Tsumeb Corporation deep inside the Territory. The first ore from the Rossing uranium mine is beginning to flow through the increasingly active port, which is also used for the export of agricultural produce, such as karakul furs. The fishing industry with onshore processing factories adds to the center's busy life.

By contrast, the small fishing town of Luderitz, farther down the coast,



has a rocky and unprotected river mouth, and would be economically unfeasible to widen and deepen. Walvis Bay is the only viable seaport along the Skeleton Coast from Mocimedes in southern Angola down to the vicinity of Cape Town.

The port and settlement of Walvis (an early name meaning 'whale') Bay takes in a 434-square-mile area. Walvis Bay, according to official estimates as of June 30, 1977, has a total population of 26,689 persons; 11,589 Africans, 10,500 whites, and 4,600 Coloureds.

Strategic Position

The enclave includes the seaside resort and residential town of Swakopmund a few miles to the north and an important South African air base at Rooikop, where the occupying South African Defense Force conducts extensive desert warfare and artillery exercises. The infant South West Africa Defense Force now being constructed

under South African military command might be trained at this facility, but, even more important, it will provide South Africa with a base for its own troops, right in Namibia, even after the country becomes independent.

A highway starts at Walvis and runs inland to Namibia's capital city of Windhoek in the center of the Territory. A rail line leads to Swakopmund then cuts upcountry, with one track reaching up to Tsumeb and a southerly line going to Windhoek, thence on across the barren landscape into the South African Republic.

Just outside the enclave a couple score kilometers lie the Rossing uranium pits. Extensive surveys indicate that a vast area of desert to the east of Walvis Bay contains seemingly limitless uranium lodes, all to be exploited in the near future. Walvis Bay is the mouth of an enormously richly filled bottle and South Africa now has firm grip on the cork.

History

In the late 1800s a British sea captain laid claim to Walvis Bay in the name of Queen Victoria. In 1884 the Cape Colony annexed the enclave, still only a small fishing and way station. South Africans assert that when the Cape Colony became part of the Union of South Africa, Walvis also became part of the Union. Pretoria claims never to have given up sovereignty of the enclave, hanging on to Walvis as the Germans colonized the vast reaches of its South West Africa part of the Kaiser's empire.

After World War I, when the mandate over the former German colony was handed by the League of Nations

to the British crown to be exercised by the Union of South Africa, South Africa began its voluntary transfer of sovereignty over Walvis Bay to Namibia by effectively incorporating the enclave into the Territory. Administration was lodged in Windhoek, the enclave was subject to territorial legislation and it became part of the constituency of a South West Africa member of the South African Parliament. For 55 years Walvis Bay has been an integral part of the International Territory of Namibia.

Balthazar Vorster is not only adamant about grabbing Walvis Bay, he is reportedly more exercised over that than any other issue that has been mentioned during the course of the present negotiations (which the West insists are not negotiations) between the five Western Security Council powers and the South African regime. It was reported that the UN Council for Namibia wanted the matter of Walvis brought to the Security Council, and Vorster, in a fiery speech to a crowd in the heart of Afrikanerdom, declared "I want to say that if this report is correct and the Security Council decides to condemn South Africa for its claim to jurisdiction over its own territory or disputes South Africa's claims in any way I see no merit at all in any further discussions with the Five."

SWAPO Opposes Annexation

There is little indication that the West will pursue the issue. Namibians on the other hand recognize Pretoria's tactics and understand that their hard-fought-for and long-suffered-for independence would be gravely crippled

by South Africa's seizure of Walvis Bay. The South West Africa People's Organization has persistently raised the issue, and SWAPO's administrative secretary in Lusaka Moses Garoeb stated: "We shall not compromise with anybody on Walvis Bay. We are engaged in an intensified armed struggle for the liberation of Namibia, and Walvis Bay is part of our country."

Even delegates of the South African-sponsored Turnhalle talks—now in abeyance but extant as a developing political party—have voiced concern over the future of the port, although their declarations have been muted of late. The United Nations stands by the position that Walvis is part and parcel of Namibia. The Namibia National Front, a confederation of groups within the Territory, takes a similar position.

Seeds of War

Walvis Bay in South African hands sets the stage for future conflict between Namibia, whether independent after elections operated and controlled by the lawful interim authority, the United Nations, or by a Turnhalle-dominated (and therefore South African-controlled) government, and the Pretoria regime.

Namibia would be virtually isolated from the world with its only port in South African hands and with existing rail lines leading only into the apartheid state.

If Walvis Bay is not wrenched from South Africa before a Namibian government comes into being, then the seeds of yet another war inevitably lie gestating in southern Africa. □

Zimbabwe

New Round of Anglo-American Proposals

"I would be misleading you if I were to express any undue optimism about this visit," Rhodesian leader Ian D. Smith said on the eve of a final session with British and American negotiators in late August. Despite Smith's well-known intransigence, and the fundamental demands of the Patriotic Front, the Anglo-American team led by British Foreign Secretary David Owen and American UN Representative

Andrew Young has maintained throughout the formulation and release of the latest settlement proposal a facade of just such "undue optimism." In this at the very least, the team has apparently taken a lesson from its predecessor on the Rhodesian question, Henry A. Kissinger.

The proposals, published simultaneously on August 31 in London, Washington and Salisbury, call for:

1. Surrender of power by the Smith regime and a return to legality.
2. An orderly and peaceful transition to independence sometime during 1978.
3. Free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage.
4. The establishment by Britain of a transitional administration with the

task of conducting elections for an independent government.

5. A United Nations presence, including a UN military force, during the transitional period.
6. An independence constitution.
7. A development fund, which would be dependent on the implementation of the settlement as a whole.

Other features of the proposals were the maintenance of the present judiciary, including judges who have sentenced liberation fighters to death; the accepted legality of all the laws made by the Smith regime during the transition period; the maintenance of at least part of the Smith army; a continuing role for the present police force during the transition period and finally Clause 5 of the proposed constitution, which includes a provision on "protection from deprivation of property."

Not Thrown Out

Reactions from all sides were cool, providing little basis for the official optimism. But Ambassador Andrew Young told Representative Diggs, at hearings in Congress on September 7, "I count it successful that we can talk with all consider controversial and not get thrown out anywhere. Everyone agreed with just enough of the plan to keep things going." Young went on to say that "everyone agreed that it was in everyone's interest to go to the United Nation's to ask the Secretary General to appoint a representative to sit with the British representative to attempt to negotiate a ceasefire."

By September 28 the plan was indeed being presented to the Security Council. At their Maputo meeting which ended September 24 the Front Line States had cleared the way for this step. They approved the proposals, with some reservations, as a "basis for further negotiations" despite "a lot of negative points" that they said left "many questions unanswered."

Most hostile to the proposals were the liberation movement representatives of the Patriotic Front. Among serious questions raised was the order of attack itself. "By attempting to negotiate a constitution before negotiating an end to the war, they have put the cart before the horse," said Callistus Ndlovu, US-based representative of ZAPU, one of the two groups that make up the Front.

Smith, on his side, notwithstanding some possible flirtations with the proposals, is also forging ahead with his own plan—another "internal settlement scheme" to install black puppets in a minority-controlled government.



Patriotic Front leaders Nkomo, Mugabe —not acceptable terms.

His recent land-slide re-election by Rhodesia's quarter million whites has provided just the sort of political capital it was intended to create, giving Smith his "mandate" to reject an outside plan in favor of his own home-grown scheme.

South Africa has indicated clearly that it will not pressure Smith to accept the Anglo-American proposals, creating serious problems for London's overall strategy.

Patriotic Front Positions

For its part, the Patriotic Front has carefully pinpointed sections of the plan that it cannot accept, without fully rejecting the whole. In a joint statement issued in Lusaka on September 14, Front spokesmen from both ZAPU and ZANU, the other nationalist organization in the alliance, said the alliance opposed four key points in the plan, which was advanced in the form of a fairly comprehensive constitution for a transitional period in Zimbabwe:

- the role of a British commissioner during a transition period;
- a UN peacekeeping force in Rhodesia during the transition;
- the continued use of the white Rhodesian police force and the minority government's court system;
- the formation of a new army.

As anticipated prior to its release, the biggest stumbling block in the new Anglo-American plan — on both sides—lies in the proposals regarding the future composition and control of the police and military. The plan calls for:

The establishment by resolution of the Security Council of a United Nations Zimbabwe Force whose role may include: 1) the supervision of the cease-fire; 2) support for the civil power; 3) liaison with the existing

Rhodesian armed forces and with the forces of the Liberation Armies. According to the plan

The primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order during the transition period will lie with the police forces. They will be under the command of a Commissioner of Police who will be appointed by and responsible to the Resident Commissioner. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations may appoint liaison officers to the police forces.

The proposals also call for

The formation, as soon as possible after the establishment of the transitional administration, of a new Zimbabwe National Army which will in due course replace all existing armed forces in Rhodesia and will be the army of the future independent state of Zimbabwe.

This is apparently one key instance in which, according to ZANU representative Tirivafi Kangai, "the proposals really call for Britain to come and recolonize, not decolonize. The resident commissioner, Kangai said in a recent interview, "would come to resume all the powers of a colonial administrator. We cannot accept such a position."

The appointment of Field Marshal Lord Carver, recently retired British Chief of Defense Staff, as the resident commissioner has re-inforced African doubts about Britain's intentions. Carver played a central role in suppressing the national liberation struggle in Kenya during the so-called Mau-Mau uprising.

On the eventual integration of Patriotic Front forces with Rhodesian security forces into a so-called Army of Zimbabwe, Kangai said, "We cannot work with a military that is now torturing people in the countryside. Such forces do not change overnight." Rather, Kangai said, the front would continue to demand the dismantling of the Rhodesian army and the Smith administration, and the surrender of power or "serious negotiations" toward that end. "Ian Smith has not reached that point yet," he added.

On the proposed UN peacekeeping force Kangai said, "We have high regard for the UN and some of its agencies, but we feel very uncomfortable as far as the peacekeeping force is concerned." Kangai cited the instance of UN forces in the Congo in 1960, when "the result was the destruction of [Patrice] Lumumba's progressive forces and Lumumba himself by the UN's 'peacekeeping' force." ZAPU

A Plan for Dependency

The State Department and the American press have presented the Anglo-American plan as an exercise in applying democracy. By a simplistic emphasis on the politics of the settlement, they have obscured the combination of economic preconditions and inducements that would direct an independent Zimbabwe along the path of dependent capitalist development.

The formal proposals lay out the following economic requirements:

1) Zimbabwe will be a capitalist state. The proposed bill of rights will "guarantee the right to private property." To head off any move toward nationalization, the bill of rights permits expropriation only on "specific groups of public interest," and then only with "payment of adequate compensation."

2) The proposal's strategy for development is based on orthodox development theory which employs industry as the motor of development and places heavy emphasis on foreign capital. The plan emphasizes the industrial sector over agriculture, pointing out that the "modern sector" "accounts for the greater part of Rhodesia's export earnings, internal revenues, domestic production of consumer goods, and wage employment of Africans." In accordance with a "trickle-down theory" of development, there is little direct attention given to how to raise the living standard of the poorest part of the population or equalize the distribution of wealth.

To provide foreign capital under strict controls, the Zimbabwe Development Fund offers a \$1.5 billion carrot. This Fund will be available *only* to a government which comes to power as a result of the Anglo-American settlement scheme. It is suggested that the

Fund "could assist . . . [in planning] development prospects consistent with the political changes which will have taken place without disruption of the economy." The Fund will be controlled by the representatives of the donor countries to the World Bank, giving the US and Great Britain a veto power, with their combined 55 percent contribution. The US clearly sees maintaining an economy in Zimbabwe open to its penetration as a very high priority; the US contribution of \$520 million (40 percent of the total) equals 11 percent of US aid to all African countries from 1962-75.

3) The Anglo-American proposal will help foreign capital expand its interests in Zimbabwe. Foreign companies have been denied free access to Rhodesia since the sanctions precipitated by UDI. Now they are eager to take advantage of the investment and trade opportunities in an economy which has, ironically, been strengthened and diversified by protection of sanctions.

Lifting sanctions will be the necessary first step to allow foreign trade and capital inflows. This will happen as soon as Rhodesia reverts to colonial status and a British transitional administration is put into place.

The Fund will then work directly to promote foreign private investment and trade, which the proposal assumes will be needed in "substantial" amounts to promote Zimbabwe's development. "Efforts [of the Fund] should encourage commercial capital flows, especially in extractive, processing, and manufacturing industries, supported as appropriate by national export credit and investment insurance agencies." In addition, the plan suggests that donor countries might tie their contributions to the Fund

to requirements for purchasing goods they produce.

The plan also intends to ensure the continuance of a skilled workforce for foreign investors. The Development Fund will in part "provide support for" unspecified programs "designed to encourage [white] skilled labor and managerial personnel" to stay. Recognizing that most whites will choose to leave, however, the Constitution requires payment of pensions to civil servants which can be freely remitted abroad. In addition, the Fund would include large training programs for African managers and technicians.

4) The development of an African class of small businessmen and civil servants which would share the interests of foreign capital is a high priority. A description of "Possible Program Areas" of the Fund which was submitted to Congress in May says "expanding blacks' participation in the business sector should be a special concern of both the government and the Fund." The Fund should consider projects for "technical advice and support services for African-owned small businesses, and loans to African individuals to purchase existing business establishments." The document circulated to Congress also suggests various patterns of transfer of land to small, private African ownership, including government-backed mortgages. It fails even to consider possible benefits of collective cultivation. In addition, according to the "Possible Program" document, the Fund would provide training for African civil servants: "The Fund could, in the initial period, also co-ordinate bilateral development assistance, especially in the training of Africans in technical and administrative skills." □

representative Ndlovu added to this: "We cannot accept this aspect of the plan because the UN force would not be a neutral force, but a force to protect certain interests." All evidence of the intentions of Washington and London indicate that the force would

be made up of units from Western countries and from pro-Western nations in Africa.

Growing Unity

One important development to come out of the proposals was the

chance it gave Front partners to construct a unified response. Both representatives quoted in this report, from the Zimbabwe African People's Union and the Zimbabwe African National Union, are quick to point out that the communique issued in Lusaka Sep-

tember 14 was neither ZANU nor ZAPU-directed, but a Patriotic Front position. "We are much closer together than we were at Geneva," ZANU representative Kangai said, referring to the 1976 talks at which Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo appeared in the alliance for the first time.

The first line of business, according to both officials, is to construct a military unity. "We are moving toward

that goal," ZANU's Kangai says. "We still receive our communiques from ZANU's Central Committee, but we consult very closely with the ZAPU representative here, and there is close communication in Africa." Plans are now being finalized for all training of ZANU and ZAPU forces to be carried out jointly in one country—Tanzania.

The second stage in this unification effort, ZAPU's Ndlovu says, is with the political wings—an attempt to move

closer to "a common ideology, a common approach."

What would such a front look like in practice?

"Structurally speaking, it would look almost like the Palestine Liberation Organization," Callistus Ndlovu says. "There are various groups within the PLO, and some of them sometimes make independent moves. But in the end we would have the complete fusion of the two organizations. □

U.S. Scene



Rhodesia Information Office Keeps Going

The Carter Administration is pulling back on one symbolic pressure on the Smith regime.

In the spring the US helped draft a Security Council resolution passed in May stipulating that all countries should freeze bank accounts used by the Rhodesian government to transfer funds to its overseas information offices. The Treasury Department then informed the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington of its intention to freeze its account at an unspecified time in the future.

But now Congressional Republicans and the *Washington Post* have come down on the side of the RIO, on grounds of freedom of speech and Smith's willingness to participate in negotiations. So the Administration has postponed action against the office indefinitely. State Department sources indicate they will wait until such action would cause less harmful conservative backlash, which means a delay at least until the Senate ratifies the Panama Canal Treaty in 1978.

AID Begins New Southern Africa Study

AID started a new \$1 million study on US assistance to countries in southern Africa in August. AID Africa Bureau chief Goler Butcher is keeping

close tabs on the project, in hopes of avoiding public criticism which greeted a similar \$365,000 study last year that AID contracted out to the African-American Scholars Council.

The study should be completed by January, so the Administration can use it to answer Congressional conservatives who seriously threatened authorization of \$100 million for southern Africa for FY 1978.

Liberals in Congress are also preparing for the next fight. Frank Ballance and Connie Freeman, both staff of Senator Humphrey's Foreign Assistance Subcommittee, spent the August recess in southern Africa, gathering material to justify assistance to majority-ruled states and a US contribution to the Zimbabwe Development Fund.

Nuclear Co-operation On Course

The international row over a possible South African nuclear test in August has apparently not hurt South Africa's chances of getting continued nuclear help from the United States.

The Soviets began the August incident, expressing concern that South Africa was about to explode a nuclear device in the Kalahari desert. High-level diplomacy followed, involving US and European pressure to halt the test. On August 23, President Carter announced he had received assurances that South Africa does not "intend to develop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose . . . now or in the future."

Carter's encouraging statement contradicts official US intelligence sources quoted, in the *Washington Post*, as certain South Africa was planning a nuclear test. Carter's optimism brought American press praise for successful western-Soviet collabora-

tion, rather than any concerted demand for an end to nuclear support for Pretoria. Indeed American opposition to an African call to end all such collaboration, at the Lagos UN anti-apartheid conference, suggests that the US has no intention of going in that direction.

Carter's press statement was strangely limited. He said the US "will . . . renew our efforts to encourage South Africa to place all their nuclear power production capabilities under international safeguards and inspections . . ." (emphasis added) This leaves open the question of US attitudes to international safeguards on South Africa's research reactor and proposed commercial uranium enrichment facility.

The research reactor gives rise to the greatest military concern, for it could already be producing weapons-grade uranium. The Carter Administration is reportedly considering a "don't-look-back" policy toward South Africa's nuclear development, under which it would not question past activity at this plant, which South Africa has never opened to international inspection, if South Africa agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The commercial enrichment facility should come on stream in 1986, making South Africa a major western energy supplier. South Africa will soon be seeking advanced computers and nuclear technology for the construction of this plant, much of which could best be acquired in the United States.

The Administration is completing a Presidential Review Memorandum on nuclear relations with South Africa. Judged by the response to the testing incident, prospects for ending nuclear collaboration do not look good.

Physician Fights South African Suit

The policies and legitimacy of the South African government were challenged recently in the Ohio Franklin County Municipal Court where a suit was brought against Dr. Mohammed Edwards, a 'coloured' South African medical doctor by the South African authorities. A rally, called by the medical committee for human rights, was held in front of the court house, to demand that the suit be dropped.

Edwards, who is in the process of becoming a US citizen, is chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology at Grant Hospital in Columbus, Ohio. He received his medical degree in South Africa and worked as an intern for 18 months before coming to New York City to be trained in anesthesiology at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine. During that time, he met and married a nurse from South Africa

who is white. They have two sons aged seven and four.

The South African government recently made an attempt to force Edwards to return to South Africa to practice medicine for three years of pay a total of \$2,458.42 in repayment for money loaned him to complete his medical training. The action against Edwards was brought by the Hospitals Department of the Provincial Administration of the Cape of Good Hope. A local attorney, Steven L. Gardner, was contracted by the South African Consulate General to file the suit on behalf of a New York City law firm.

Edwards decided to contest the suit on the grounds that "I consider that I have repaid the government with my services. I think the government is illegitimate. I cannot support it when people there are suffering." He said that he worked in South Africa for 18

months at a wage half that paid to European doctors and feels he owes the country nothing.

Edwards' attorney claimed that the contract signed by the doctor is unenforceable and against the policy of the US and Ohio. He said that his research showed that if Edwards returned to South Africa, he would "be subject to discrimination and restriction in every facet of his personal and professional life": he would be permanently separated from his wife and children; he would be required to live in an area designated for 'coloureds' only; and would receive a salary far below that of an equally-trained and experienced white physician.

At the beginning of September, the attorneys for South Africa offered to dismiss the case. Edwards refused to accept this offer unless South Africa pays him damages for his trouble. □

U.N.

World Conference for Action Against Apartheid

The World Conference for Action Against Apartheid, jointly sponsored by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Nigerian government, met in Lagos from 22 to 26 August 1977. The Conference, one of the largest and most important gatherings ever in opposition to South Africa's apartheid regime, drew prominent personalities from all over the world. Nigeria was chosen as the venue for this first major anti-apartheid conference to be held in Africa, because of that government's growing commitment to support of the liberation struggle in South Africa. The Conference was attended by representatives of 112 governments, over 50 non-governmental organizations, and the liberation movements of South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Palestine.

Governmental representation was at the highest level, with General Obasanjo of Nigeria, President Kaunda

of Zambia, and the Prime Minister of Norway attending, as well as the foreign ministers of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Niger, Guyana, Cuba, and Australia. The United States was represented by UN Ambassador Andrew Young. The liberation movements were also strongly represented. The large African National Congress (ANC) delegation was led by President Oliver Tambo, and included the Deputy Secretary-General Duma Nokwe, the editor of *Sechaba* and recent escapees from South Africa, such as Mac Maharaj, former leader of Umkonto we Sizwe and Robben Island veteran, student leaders Nkosazana Dlamini (SASO) and Tebello Motapanyane (SASM), and Jane Phakathi, former Transvaal director of the Christian Institute. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was represented by Acting President Potlako Leballo and Director of Foreign Affairs David Sibeko; the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front by co-

chairmen Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe; and SWAPO by President Sam Nujoma.

Many influential international anti-apartheid organizations and groups active in the struggle against racism and in support of the liberation movements sent representatives to Lagos. From the US came Congressman Charles Diggs, Judge William Booth for the American Committee on Africa, and Richard Lapchick for the American Co-ordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society. The list of participating organizations included the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, the International Defense and Aid Fund, Amnesty International, the World Council of Churches, the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, the International University Exchange Fund, anti-apartheid groups from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Western Europe, as well as trade unions,

women's groups, student groups, and others. The main purpose of the Conference was "to consider concrete measures for the implementation of the Program of Action formulated at the Havana Seminar (of May 1976), as well as the decisions taken by the UN General Assembly at its thirty-first session." The Conference was to concentrate on measures relating to "the isolation of the South African regime, assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements, and the promotion of collective security against acts of aggression by the South African regime." Governments and organizations were invited to announce at the Conference their pledges of political and material support to the liberation movements in South Africa.

The strategy adopted by the organizers of the World Conference aimed at achieving the maximum possible consensus in opposition to the apartheid regime, including commitments on some issues from the Western powers which have hitherto provided most of the political, military and economic support for the Vorster regime. At the same time, the organizers were determined that there be no backtracking on the Program of Action adopted by the Havana Seminar in 1976, and on various UN and OAU resolutions on apartheid. Because of the conflict inherent in this two-pronged strategy, the main documents produced by the Conference are somewhat contradictory, representing two very different levels of commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle.

A Cautious Plenary Declaration

On the one hand, the Conference plenary at which all governments were represented, adopted a Declaration moderate in tone, although it actually embodied the most advanced positions taken to date by the Western powers. The text of the Declaration was thrashed out in long back-room meetings of the conference Steering Committee, which included the Foreign Ministers of Mozambique, Cuba and Nigeria, the South African liberation movements, the chairmen of the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid, Committee of Twenty-four and Council for Namibia, and the OAU Administrative Secretary-General. Canada represented the Western countries, which had already been consulted on a preliminary draft before the conference. The Declaration falls short of existing OAU and UN General Assembly resolutions on several

issues. It is silent or vague on the need for mandatory economic sanctions, recognition of the legitimacy of the liberation movements and of armed struggle, definition of apartheid as a crime against humanity subject to an international Convention, and the extension of the sports boycott to countries which participate in sporting events in South Africa.

Nevertheless the Declaration represents a significant advance over previous formulations acceptable to the Western powers on the following points: the recognition of the "inalienable right to self-determination" of all the people of South Africa, and the acceptance of the principle of majority rule; recognition of "the inalienable right of the oppressed South African people and their national liberation movement to resort to all available and appropriate means of their choice to secure their freedom," and a call to all governments, organizations and individuals to provide them "all appropriate assistance"; an unconditional rejection of the "bantustans"; a call on the Security Council to adopt a mandatory arms embargo; a call on all states to stop all nuclear co-operation with South Africa, whether by state agencies or private corporations; a call on all states to enact legislation against mercenaries; and an endorsement of 1978 as the International Anti-Apartheid Year.

Report of the Commission

The second main document of the Conference is the report of the Commission. It was originally intended that the Commission be a Commission of the whole including all delegates at all levels, holding meetings at the same time as the plenary. The Commission was given the mandate to elaborate concrete proposals for further action, with particular reference to increased assistance for the liberation movements and the implementation of the international boycott against South Africa. The Commission had two co-chairmen, Mr. Olof Palme, former Prime Minister of Sweden, and Ambassador Leslie Harriman, chairman of the UN Committee Against Apartheid, and a number of vice-chairmen, including both governmental and non-governmental representatives. A number of countries raised political objections to the aims of the Commission and/or to the prominent role given to the anti-apartheid groups, and this, coupled with the technical problems of servicing two large meetings, led to the Commission remaining a rather

limited body. Meetings were attended principally by representatives of the more progressive countries, the liberation movements, the support groups and other non-governmental organizations. Thus, the report of the Commission reflects a much more advanced consensus on the goals and methods of the struggle against apartheid.

Action Proposals

The main points made in the Commission's report are that the liberation movements are the authentic and legitimate representatives of the people of South Africa; that armed struggle is the only means left to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements to achieve their liberation; and that increased assistance, including military assistance, should be provided in order to enable them to carry out the struggle. The report calls on the UN Security Council to adopt mandatory measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter not only on the question of military collaboration, but also on nuclear and economic collaboration. The UN is also urged to consider ways of enforcing its Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

The Commission urged the recognition of the "third party principle" in sports, (i.e. boycotting countries, such as New Zealand, which have sporting contacts with South Africa) and its inclusion in the proposed Convention on Apartheid in Sports. The Commission also adopted detailed proposals to end any mercenary activities in South Africa and any collaboration by police and intelligence agents. It called on all groups to organize international campaigns against nuclear collaboration and for the imposition of mandatory military and economic sanctions against South Africa, and for the release of all political prisoners, in particular those currently on trial in South Africa.

Because of its controversial nature, the report of the Commission was not formally put before the Conference for adoption. Instead, it was referred to the UN Committee Against Apartheid which has already endorsed it and is expected to include all its recommendations in its annual report to the General Assembly, to be issued shortly.

The Declaration and the report of the Commission and other documents and statements made at the conference are available from the United Nations Center Against Apartheid, New York, NY 10017. □

action news notes

IF YOU'RE IN NEW YORK . . . OR PLANNING A VISIT . . . *Survival*, a play dealing with prison life in South Africa, has opened at the Astor Place Theater, 434 Lafayette St., New York. The cast is composed of four young black South African actors.

MAKING A RAQUET . . . Protests against South African participation in the US Tennis Open included a prayer vigil on September 3 and a demonstration on September 11, finals day, at Forest Hills. The demonstration drew about 150 people, including Arthur Ashe and New York City Council President Paul O'Dwyer.

O'Dwyer previously had introduced a council resolution, which was passed unanimously, urging that the lease for Louis Armstrong Stadium, future site of the Open, be negotiated with a clause that prohibits the presence of South Africans.

BANK CAMPAIGN . . . The United Auto Workers has agreed to participate in the campaign to end all US bank



George Cohen

Forest Hills Demonstration

loans to South Africa. The union plans to withdraw all funds from any bank engaged in such loans.

The United Electrical Workers has withdrawn its \$4 million payroll account from Chase Manhattan Bank and adopted a resolution at its national convention opposing US investment in South Africa.

DO YOUR CHRISTMAS SHOPPING EARLY . . . The American Committee on Africa is selling 1978 calendars illustrated with 12 anti-apartheid posters selected from entries in a recent competition. The calendars are \$4 each, with discounts available

on bulk orders. The address: 305 East 46th St., New York, NY 10017.

The New York joint board of the Furriers, Leather and Machinery Workers had withdrawn all funds it had deposited with several New York banks which make loans to South Africa.

The Sisters of Charity of New York withdrew funds it had deposited with Citibank.

APPLE POWER . . . The New York City Council unanimously passed a resolution calling on the governor, the mayor, and "all businesses, persons and individuals" not to do "any business with white South Africa and to cancel any and all contracts" with the South African government.

The resolution calls for the city and the state to publish lists of all corporations with economic interests in South Africa with which they have contracts currently in force.

The resolution was introduced by Councilman Frederick E. Samuel of Harlem.

CONDOLENCES . . . Those wishing to express their condolences to the family of Steven Biko may write to them at 698 Leiteyville, Kingwilliamstown, South Africa.

GOOD AS GOLD . . . May Co., which operates nine stores in Cleveland, agreed to stop selling Krugerrands after an hour-and-a-half picketing effort by about 25 members of the South Africa Liberation Committee. May's jewelry departments had been selling the coins as \$450 necklaces.

The Liberation Committee previously had convinced Colonial Coin Co., also of Cleveland, to stop selling the coin.

The following letter, sent by the Embassy of South Africa, was received by the president of Notre Dame University along with a voluminous mass of misinformation and propaganda. Similar letters were likely sent to presidents of many other institutions. We urge our readers with university and college connections to look into the situation, to refute such material where found, and to let us hear their experiences.

The Rev. T. M. Hesburgh
President
University of Notre Dame

Dear Rev. Hesburgh,

Individuals and groups have for some time now applied pressure on various universities in this country to sell their stock of American business corporations involved in the Republic of South Africa.

You might have been approached by groups who profess to act solely on behalf of the peoples of South Africa. However, all South Africans, whether black, white, brown or Asian, would be adversely affected by a business withdrawal. Most affected would be the very people these groups allegedly wish to protect.

I hope you can spare a few moments to read the attached background on economic, political and social progress in South Africa.

Please do not hesitate to call on me if I can be of any further assistance.

Yours sincerely,

Carl Noffke
Information Counsellor

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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