

southern africa

Vol. VIII No. 2
February 1975



TEXT OF OPTION 2 OF NSSM 39

Secret

FEB 10 1975

OPTION 2

Premise:

The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the black states (a total of about \$5 million annually in technical assistance to the black states) help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change. Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these must be maintained at an acceptable political cost.

General Posture

We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible—albeit small and gradual—moderation of white policies. Without openly undermining the U.N. and the UN on Rhodesia, we would be more flexible in our attitude toward the Smith regime. We would make these Portuguese policies as suggesting further changes in the Portuguese territories. At the same time we would take diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and major rule aspirations in the south are not attainable by violence and that their only hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with white-dominated states. We would emphasize our belief that closer relations will help to bring change to white states. We would give increased and more flexible economic aid to black states of the area as they indicate their intent to develop and to give them more positive political leadership to reduce tensions. We would encourage economic assistance from South Africa to the developing black nations.

This option accepts at least over a 3 to 5 year period, the prospect of unrequited U.S. initiatives toward the whites and some opposition from the blacks in order to develop an atmosphere conducive to change in white attitudes through persuasion and persuasion. To encourage this change in white attitudes, we would indicate our willingness to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule, provided that they assure broadened political participation in the reform by the whole population.

The various elements of the option would stand as a whole and approval of the option would not constitute approval of individual elements out of this context.

Operational Examples:

- Enforce arms embargo against South Africa but with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes.
- Permit U.S. naval calls in South Africa with arrangements for non-discrimination toward U.S. personnel in organized activity ashore; authorize routine use of airfields.
- Retain tracking stations in South Africa as long as required.
- Remove constraints on EXIM Bank facilities for South Africa; actively encourage U.S. exports and facilitate U.S. investment consistent with the Foreign Direct Investment Program.
- Conduct selected exchange programs with South Africa in all categories, including military.
- Without changing the U.S. legal position that South African

Occupancy of South West Africa is illegal, we would play down the issue and encourage accommodation between South Africa and the U.N.

—On Rhodesia, retain consulate; gradually relax sanctions (e.g. hardship exceptions for chrome) and consider eventual recognition.

—Continue arms embargo on Portuguese territories, but give more liberal treatment to exports of dual purpose equipment.

—Encourage trade and investment in Portuguese territories; full EXIM Bank facilities.

—Establish flexible aid programs for the black states of the region; respond to reasonable requests for purchase of non-sophisticated arms but seek no change in Conte amendment.

—Toward African insurgent movements take public position that U.S. opposes use of force in racial confrontation. Continue humanitarian assistance to refugees.

—Increase information and exchange activities in both white and black states.

PROS

1. Encourages existing tendencies to broaden relations between black and white states and thus reduce tensions—South Africa's relations with Zambia's trade and sub rosa political contacts with South Africa and Portugal.

2. Preserves U.S. economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states and would expand opportunities for profitable trade and investment.

3. Relaxation of the U.S. stance toward the whites could help lift their present economic misery; and it would encourage elements among the whites feeling and seeking African relationships with black Africa.

4. U.S. economic support and economic aid offer the black states an alternative to the recognized risks of mounting communist influence.

5. Increased aid would also give us greater influence to caution the black states against violence and give them a tangible stake in accepting the prospects of gradual change.

6. Would reduce a major irritant in our relations with Portugal, and afford the Cabral government opportunity for liberalization.

CONS

1. Relaxation of the U.S. stance towards white states could be taken by the whites as a vindication of their policies. Many black states, led by Zambia and Tanzania, probably would charge us with subordinating our professed ideals to material interests and tolerating white-regime policies.

2. There is a serious question whether pro-Western leaders of the black states could continue to justify their stance to their populations if the U.S. officially declared its opposition to current liberation efforts. Radical and communist states would be the beneficiaries.

3. Unilateral U.S. relaxation of sanctions against Rhodesia would be a highly visible violation of our international obligations and would be damaging both to the U.S. and to the U.N.

4. The current thrust of South African domestic policy does not involve any basic change in the racial segregation system, which is anathema to the black states. There is virtually no evidence that change might be forthcoming in these South African policies as a result of any approach on our part.

5. Requires extensive diplomatic and economic involvement in a situation in which the solution is extremely long-range and the outcome doubtful at best.

6. It is doubtful that the additional aid contemplated would be sufficiently great to influence the black states in the direction indicated.

U.S. Secret
policy Exposed

CONTENTS

VOL. VIII, No. 2

February 1975

1.	Feature: Secret Documents on Southern Africa Exposed	4
	by Tami Hultman and Reed Kramer	
2.	South Africa	7
	WHITE POLITICIANS DISCUSSING NEED FOR CHANGE	
	The National Party	
	The United Party	
	The Progressive Party	
	BLACK POLITICS	
	Federation Receives Partial Support	
	Gazankulu-Lebowa Unity (Gazanbowa?)	
	Zululand	
	Bophutatswana	
	ECONOMICS	
	DEVELOPMENTS ON THE LABOR SCENE	
	Continued Unrest	
	The Search for Mine Labor Continues	
	Training for Black Workers	
	Economic Community in Southern Africa?	
	Investment in the Bantustans	
	SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF TRENDS	
	The South African-Western Alliance	
	"Detente" in Africa?	
	Uranium Diplomacy	
3.	Namibia	12
	At the United Nations	
	In the Wake of the Resolution	
	the Struggle Continues	
	Britain Speaks on Namibia	
	Inside Namibia	
	In Washington	
4.	Zimbabwe	14
	Zimbabwe Settlement?	
	Guerrilla News	
5.	Portugal and Africa	16
	ANGOLA	
	Negotiations in Angola Continue	
	Demonstrations in Luanda	
	Aid to UNITA	
	MOZAMBIQUE	
	On the International Front	
	At the Cabora Bassa Dam	
	Further Consolidation of Power	
	FRELIMO Tackles Internal Redevelopment	
	REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU	
	The Struggle Continues: Building the New Government	
	Foreign Relations	
	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	
	PORTUGAL	
	Internal Affairs	
	The U.S. and Portugal	
6.	Neighbors	20
	Lesotho Political Trial	
	Criticisms of the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce	
	King Moshoeshoe's Visit to Tanzania	
	Economic News From Botswana	
	The Question of Malawian Mine Labor	
	Border Incident and Zambia	
	Mixed Economic News from Zambia	
7.	United States and Southern Africa	22
	Top State Department Official on Africa to be Replaced	
	House Action on Sanctions Bill Aborted	
8.	At the United Nations	24
	Liberations Movements Granted Permanent Observer Status	
	Portugal Submits Timetable for Decolonization	
	Security Council Sets Namibia Deadline	
	Security Council Asked to Meet Again on South Africa	
	General Assembly Condemns US, Calls for Majority Rule in Zimbabwe	

9. Action News and Notes	26
UNITED STATES	
POLITICAL/EDUCATIONAL ACTION	
Ashe in South Africa-Projects and Criticisms	
Support for SA Human Rights Day Rallies	
<i>Washington Post</i> Criticized by Local Group	
Lutheran Leaders Speak out on Namibia	
Short Notes	
ECONOMIC ACTION	
ACOA Calls for More Action Against Rhodesian Tourism	
Bank Campaign-Update	
INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS	
Liberation Support	
Churches	
Sports and Culture and Education	
Labor	
Boycotts, Campaigns	
10. Book Review	30
Jordan K. Ngubane, <i>Ushaba: The Hurtle to Blood River, a Zulu Umlando</i>	
11. Resources	31
12. Update	35

See page 34 for OVERVIEW

OUR COLLECTIVE

jose aica	tshediso monnapula
eric arnould	gail morlan
wendy aronoff	don morton
charlie ebel	antonio neves
jennifer davis	patricia nute
carolyn fleuhr-lobban	marie orth-pallavicini
lynn goodwin	angela passaro
peggy halsey	dipankar ray
janet hooper	david robinson
tami hultman	susan rogers
paul irish	christine root
bill johnston	melba smith
reed kramer	tim emith
richard leonard	jinni stroman
richard lobban	john stroman
edgar lockwood	stephanie urdang
mary mcannally	mary lee wiley
bill minter	
ruth minter	

SOUTHERN AFRICA is published monthly, except for a double issue July-August by the New York Southern Africa Committee. Our two addresses are: Southern Africa Committee, 244 West 27th Street, Fifth Floor, New York, N.Y. 10001 and P.O. Box 3851, Durham, North Carolina 27702, (919) 682-7342 For subscriptions and further information about the magazine, write to New York.

All subscriptions run from January to December. Those readers subscribing later in the year will be sent back issues to January, or after June, readers may opt for the 7 month subscription. Subscription rates are \$6.00 per year for individuals; 7 month subscription from June is \$4.00; Institutions are \$18.00 per year; cost per copy is 50¢ for regular issues, \$1.00 for double issues; airmail postage (add subscription rate); South and Central America: \$9.50 per year; Africa, Asia, Europe: \$12.50 per year; prisoners free. If unable to send \$6.00, please write to us for other arrangements.

Secret Documents on Southern Africa Exposed

by TAMI HULTMAN and REED KRAMER

On February 18, 1970, in his annual foreign policy address to Congress, President Richard Nixon touched on the southern African situation. In words little different from those of his predecessors, Kennedy and Johnson, he said the United States can neither condone nor acquiesce "in the racial policies of the white-ruled regimes" and he expressed his government's firm stand for "the principles of racial equality and self-determination."

There was little in that address to indicate a new direction in American policy towards southern Africa. But only shortly before that speech, Nixon had approved National Security Decision Memorandum 38 (NSDM 38), which secretly outlined a shift in strategy towards the white regimes—a policy labelled "communication" by its defenders and "Tar Baby" by inside critics who feared that once begun it could never be discarded.

That the Nixon-Kissinger approach to southern African problems involved closer ties with the white regimes is no news to any observer of African affairs. But, the fact that the strategy was deliberately planned in careful detail has now come to light with the leak of a secret study prepared for Kissinger and Nixon in 1969. On April 10th of that year, Kissinger issued National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39), which directed the Secretaries of State and Defense and the C.I.A. Director to undertake "a comprehensive review of U.S. policy towards southern Africa (south of Congo K. and Tanzania)." The NSSM 39 study, prepared by representatives of those agencies, with assistance from others including Treasury, Commerce, and the space administration (NASA), was completed in August and laid the basis for NSDM 38, prepared at Kissinger's direction a few months later.

The authors have obtained a copy of the NSSM Study, marked "Secret" at the top and bottom of each page, which includes 76 pages of text and 40 pages of appendices.

NSSM Options Outlined

NSSM 39 surveys five options for U.S. southern African policy, ranging from close cooperation with the minority regimes to non-involvement in the region altogether. The first option called for a closer, open association with the white rulers to preserve and expand U.S. economic, strategic, and scientific interests in the area.

Option 2 was less extreme: "Broader association with both black and white states" to influence the whites towards moderation and discourage violence supported by the black states. Option 3 was essentially the same policy pursued in the 1960's: limited ties with the whites, continuing aid, trade, and investment with the black nations. Options 4 and 5 would have pushed the U.S. further in condemnation of minority rule, or called for as

complete a disengagement as possible from both the black and white governments in the sub-continent.

The discussion of Option 2 in the NSSM study begins with a premise which some might term racist: "The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them." It is a two-fold strategy: "selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes" to encourage moderation; and "more substantial economic assistance to the black states [to] help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence for peaceful change."

Under Option 2, U.S. policy would assume a more flexible attitude toward the Smith regime, accept Portuguese policies as suggestive of further change in the colonies, and undertake a greater effort to convince black states that violence is counter-productive.

The authors of Option 2 foresaw a wait of at least 3 to 5 years before whites could be seen to respond and blacks would be willing to listen. They suggested that a change in white attitudes could be hastened by an indication of American willingness "to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed process towards majority rule, provided they assure broadened political participation in some form by the whole population."

The NSSM Study prompted dissension among policy-makers. The State Department's Bureau of African Affairs fought to maintain present policy (Option 3 in NSSM) and argued that a stronger pro-white tilt would have negative repercussions in the rest of Africa. Defense strategists, who were at that time becoming more concerned about security in the Indian Ocean, wanted closer links (Option 1) with South Africa because of its strong navy and convenient ports, and with Portugal because of the U.S. Azores base. National Security Council staff members advanced Option 2 as the "middle position" which would preserve U.S. interests in both black and white Africa and which offered some hope of influencing both sides to avoid extreme positions.

At the White House, Nixon advisors wanted to do nothing to upset corporate investors in southern Africa, since they include almost all the major U.S. companies and important Nixon campaign contributors. In December, 1969, Nixon convened the National Security Council to discuss southern Africa. He heard the positions of most of those present—CIA Director Helms, Vice President Agnew, Henry Kissinger, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and several other advisors. The President's conclusion: Option 2 was the best for Nixon diplomacy. In February, Kissinger had it set down in the top-secret NSDM 38.

Option 2: Policy Into Practice

In specific terms, the NSSM Study outlines a number

of suggested actions for implementing Option 2. Placed side-by-side with U.S. policy decisions during the past five years, there is little doubt that Option 2 set the guidelines.

First, Option 2 called for continued enforcement of the arms embargo against South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, but with one important alteration: "liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes." A few months after Option 2 was adopted, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Donald Newsom, described the altered embargo policy. Speaking in Chicago on September 17, 1970, he said: "In accordance with the principles of the embargo we do not, for example, license military aircraft or large transport aircraft for military use, but would consider licenses for limited numbers of small unarmed executive civilian type aircraft."

The State Department denies that any executive-type jets have been licensed for sale to South Africa since the 1970 announcement. "We just haven't had any applications," an official says. But government statistics show that exports of some types of aircraft have soared. Between 1967 and 1970, sales averaged \$31 million a year, but in 1971 they totalled \$70 million, rising to \$80 million in 1972. A number of Bell Helicopters have also been licensed for sale, and according to some reports they are being used to patrol South Africa's northern borders.

In the case of Portugal, the most important embargo relaxation came with the sale of several large jet aircraft to the government-owned airline—planes which have been used extensively to ferry troops to and from the African wars. Approval for the sale of two Boeing 707's was given in 1970, and since then several other Boeing jets, including two 747 jumbos, have been licensed for sale. Both South Africa and Portugal have been major purchasers of defoliants and herbicides similar to those used in Vietnam.

A second area of action suggested under Option 2 in the NSSM Study was increased propaganda and visitor exchange programs in both the black and white states. Military exchanges were recommended as part of "selected exchange programs with South Africa."

Although exchange visits involving South African military personnel are supposedly still taboo, the South African Defense Force Chief, Admiral Biermann, paid a "private visit" to Washington in May, and his schedule included talks with two highly-placed Pentagon officials, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (America's highest-ranking soldier), and Secretary of the Navy William Middendorf. In January 1974, South African Information Minister Connie Mulder met with the chief of the Pentagon's International Security Agency, whose responsibilities include arms sales and Indian Ocean strategy.

The State Department's Africa Bureau first refused Biermann a visa on grounds his visit would constitute a violation "in spirit" of the arms embargo. But several influential Senators took up the matter with Kissinger aids, and the Secretary of State overruled the Bureau and granted the visa.

Option 2 also suggested encouraging U.S. trade and investment in South African and the Portuguese colonies, lifting restrictions on government-backed loan facilities for South Africa, and making available full loan facilities for Angola and Mozambique. Shortly after the Nixon administration took office, a review of Export-Import Bank's loan policies toward South Africa resulted in easing the limitations which had existed. U.S. businesses



Herbicide destruction in Angola.

seeking to export products to South Africa are now eligible for medium-term loan guarantees (maximum 10 years) rather than short-term only (5 years maximum) as before. In Angola and Mozambique, where there never were restrictions, Ex-Im loans have been granted for sales of various types of heavy equipment, small aircraft, and numerous other items.

In early 1972, during a meeting in the Azores with Premier Caetano, President Nixon announced a \$435 million aid package for Portugal as part of the agreement on the U.S. base there. The \$400 million Export-Import credit which was included in that aid amounted to eight times the amount of Ex-Im credit Portugal had received the previous 25 years since World War II, and was greater than the total Ex-Im credit extended to all African countries during the same period.

The official posture on investment in South Africa has been to "neither encourage nor discourage" U.S. firms from going there. Full commercial facilities, however, are maintained to assist U.S. corporations at U.S. consulates in Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape Town. And the level of direct U.S. capital invested in South Africa has grown more than 35 per cent in the past five years. In 1973, the State Department undertook a program to encourage American investors to upgrade wage and benefit practices for their black employees. And much energy has gone into the campaign, which seems aimed at providing apartheid can be destroyed by economic growth.

Only two Option 2 recommendations on South Africa have not been followed. The ban which was imposed in 1967 against U.S. Naval visits to South Africa—after black American sailors faced discrimination in Cape Town—has not been lifted, as the NSSM Study proposed. And, the NASA tracking station in South Africa is to be closed at the end of 1975, even though a NASA memo attached to NSSM 39 argued that the facility should be retained "as long as required"; apparently NASA decided that embarrassment over their presence there was more important than the facility itself.

On Rhodesia, Option 2 recommended retention of the Salisbury consulate, gradual relaxation of sanctions, and

possible eventual recognition of the Smith regime. Pressure to keep the consulate open came largely from the C.I.A., which wanted to protect its intelligence-gathering operation there. But in January 1970, two important C.I.A. operatives were arrested by Rhodesian police—perhaps tipped off by British intelligence. About the same time, Prime Minister Harold Wilson intensified pressure on Nixon to close the consulate, which was accredited to the U.K. government. With the C.I.A. network destroyed, Washington relented and closed the mission in March.

Easing of sanctions began in September 1970, when the administration reversed a decision of its predecessor and allowed Union Carbide to import 150,000 tons of chrome ore purchased before sanctions regulations were put in force in the U.S. The Johnson administration's refusal was based on the provision in the regulations which imposed sanctions "notwithstanding prior commitments." But, Union Carbide's president was a Nixon friend—was later appointed ambassador to W. Germany and then given high Defense and State Department posts—and the chrome ruling was popular in the pro-Rhodesia and pro-South Africa corporate lobby in Washington.

Soon after, that lobby further weakened sanctions through legislation which exempted certain minerals from the embargo. Though publically on record in opposition to the so-called Byrd Amendment, the Nixon White House did little to persuade moderate and conservative Senators to vote against it. The following year, it came as no surprise when Rhodesia was visited by Clark MacGregor, who during the Byrd Amendment fight was the White House official responsible for convincing Congressional members to support the President's programs. Fresh from his job as Nixon campaign manager in the 1972 elections, MacGregor told Ian Smith he expected U.S. recognition for his regime in a short time. His forecast was firmly denied by the State Department, but many observers believe that had Watergate not intervened, the Nixon administration might well have moved closer to Salisbury, as MacGregor predicted and Option 2 recommended.

On Namibia, Option 2 called for no change in the stance which regarded South African occupation as illegal. But, it recommended that the issue be played down and accommodation between South Africa and the U.N. be encouraged.

An apparent deviation from Option 2 came in May 1970, when the U.N. ambassador Charles Yost announced that the government would forthwith discourage U.S. investment in the territory and would not back Americans investing after 1970 if they later faced retribution from a Namibian government. However, the U.S. delegation at the U.N. has refused to join the Council for Namibia and has resisted moves to strengthen that body's power. The American ambassador was one of the most enthusiastic promoters of the new ill-fated U.N.-South African dialogue on Namibia; and the Treasury Department refused to remove tax credits granted to U.S. corporate investments there.

Effects and Limitations of U.S. Policy

During a September 1970 speech in Chicago, Assistant Secretary Newsom offered a clear description of the administration's new Africa policy, labelling it *communication*. "Communication does not mean acceptance," he said. "It means, in a sense, a greater challenge than isolation." Further, he noted, "It could mean that greater hope could be given to both blacks and whites who seek



Dr. Connie Mulder—South Africa's propaganda chief.

another way [than violence]."

Some of the first to sense that "greater hope" were members of the South African government. President Fouché, opening the 1970 Parliamentary session, welcomed Washington's new stance, particularly condemnations of violence as a way to solve Africa's problems. Though its supporters believe Option 2 could strengthen the hand of moderate whites, the right-wing National Party leader, Connie Mulder has perhaps derived more political benefit from "communication" than any other South African politician. His two visits with U.S. vice-presidents—Agnew in 1971 and Ford in 1974—have boosted his standing at home where he aspires to become the next prime minister.

Interesting, however, "communication" clearly did not include high-level talks with liberation movements. In 1972, Kissinger and his aides rejected a proposal that they meet with Amílcar Cabral during his U.S. visit. That coolness continued even after the P.A.I.G.C. became the widely-recognized government of Guinea Bissau. In May, the U.S. cast a lone vote against admission of Guinea Bissau to the World Health Organization, and it was one of the last nations to recognize the new government.

The most recent public expression of the pro-white policy was the Security Council veto which helped stop South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations. Ironically, though the veto has brought strong criticism from many African nations, U.S. officials are expecting it to get them increased leverage in Pretoria. There has been no indication that such influence would be used to force major reforms, though; more likely it will be applied to bring the end of "petty apartheid"—the crude expressions of racial discrimination which make it so embarrassing to be a South African supporter. Now, U.S. diplomats are hoping that there will be an improved outward posture and no more short-sighted acts like the refusal of visas to critical black Americans.

Most important, U.S. strategists have apparently drastically altered their assessment of South Africa's military importance since NSSM 39 was written. According to the study, U.S. interests in southern Africa were not considered "vital to our security." The reason given for U.S. military interest in air and sea routes around South Africa was "the uncertainty of overflight rights in northern and central Africa." Currently, U.S.

planners take a much more serious view of security in that region. Drew Middleton, the *New York Times's* Pentagon correspondent and a man with very good sources in the U.S. military, reported recently that American strategic planners now consider the sea lanes around Africa "the most important naval area in the world." The *Washington Post's* Cape Town staffer reports that the United States is "now in firm agreement with the South African authorities on the need to protect the Cape sea route." If the U.S. position in southern Africa took a pro-white bias before the area was considered strategic, what can be expected with this growing pre-occupation in Washington over the "Soviet threat" at the Cape?

Option 2 has produced many problems in the rest of Africa. The pro-white leaning of Washington has tempted even friendly African states to classify the U.S. with the 'bad guys' from South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. In Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau, the people can hardly be expected to feel grateful to a country who supported their old oppressors.

Yet, in Washington the mood remains optimistic. Kissinger told African delegates at the U.N. recently that independence came to Guinea Bissau "non-violently"—as the U.S. has always said it should. The liberal *Washington Post*, one of Nixon's severest critics, in a recent editorial

credited the policy of "communication" with contributing to the ferment which led to the April coup in Portugal. And recent talk of detente in southern Africa between South Africa and Zambia is viewed as a success of Option 2.

But such thinking is discounted by more informed observers. There is democracy in Portugal today because the people of Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique were willing to fight and die for their freedom. "Communications"—a kind word for compromise—may have contributed to reforms in South Africa, but there is no evidence that the reign of terror that is the true *apartheid* is any less brutal today than in 1970.

Those who take the view, as expressed in the NSSM 39 Study, that the whites are the only ones who can effect change in southern Africa may point to Option 2 as a success. But that is the same kind of trust in technological supremacy which led to the belief that bombing would bring Hanoi to its knees. It is a view which discounts the will of a people to be free. Clearly, the mass struggle by the majority of southern Africans for true liberation will continue, whatever decisions Washington may take.

Tami Hultman and Reed Kramer

South Africa

WHITE POLITICIANS DISCUSSING NEED FOR CHANGE

The National Party

Ever since the change in Mozambique and specially after Mr. Vorster's now well known "Give us six months" speech at Nigel, white politicians in South Africa had been vigorously discussing the need for moving away from naked racial discrimination in the country. Those who hoped that visible changes might be forthcoming were however disappointed by Mr. Vorster's speech at Zeerust, where he explained that his Nigel statement did not mean that South Africa will go "upside down" in six months. Many interpreted this as double talk or a retreat from the previous commitment to change.

At the Orange Free State Provincial party congress, Mr. Vorster said that while he will not ignore world opinion, he will not do exactly as he is told either. He reiterated his intention to scrap "unnecessary discrimination" but to continue "differentiation" between races and the policy of separate development.

In recent days, the need for change has also been stressed by prominent cabinet members like Dr. Hilgard Muller, the Foreign Minister, Mr. P.W. Botha, the Defence Minister, Dr. Piet Koornhof, the Sports Minister and Dr. J.C. Mulder, the Minister of Interior. It seems that some disagreements may exist in the party, regarding this call for change. Mr. Ben Schoeman, a former Transport Minister and a potential candidate for State President is believed to be one of those cool towards such a move.

The United Party

Natal is the only province in South Africa in which the United Party controls the administration and the provincial council. Also the leaders of the United Party in

Natal had been much more conservative than those in other provinces. However there is some indication, that some change of attitude may be on the way in the United Party in Natal, where there have been indications of some relaxation of petty apartheid. Mr. Grayham McIntosh, a United Party M.P. from the province held a report-back session with Black members of his constituency. This is believed to be the first time that a white M.P. has taken such a step.

Also, the Natal United Party recently had its provincial congress in which the national leader Sir de Villiers Graaf reiterated the party's call for a multiracial consultative council.

The Cape provincial congress of the party was also held recently. But in contrast to Natal congress, the Cape congress was a battleground between the two factions of the party, the "reformists" who want some change and the "old guard". Even Sir de Villiers Graaf admitted that the party was divided but said that in the present crucial time, party members should not quarrel over such petty differences and warned the "extremists" of both sides. Several newspapers however felt that the differences were not petty but fundamental. The congress ended in a compromise with the election of an "old guard" provincial leader and a somewhat reformist deputy leader.

Some U. P. "liberals" feel that the gap between the two factions of the party is too wide to be bridged and have formed a group called the Realignment Movement. The objective of the group is to persuade fellow reformists to make a complete break with the party. It is believed that this group had been responsible for mass resignations by United Party branch and divisional executives.

Progressive Party

At the national congress in Bloemfontein, the party liberalised its policy concerning the use of public amenities and facilities and the ownership and occupation of property. The party now demands abolition of segregation in all such spheres. According to the party's previous position, individual communities would decide whether they wanted segregation. The congress also decided that the party's present position that the right of franchise should be determined not by race, but by education and income qualification (which would effectively screen out most Blacks) will be reviewed. Many delegates expressed the opinion that voting right at local and provincial levels should be universal.

The congress invited a few African, Indian and Coloured leaders to attend. However, due to government intervention, the "mixed" session had to be held at a church instead of at the President's Hotel where the rest of the proceedings were held.

BLACK POLITICS

Federation Receives Partial Support

"Summit" talks are becoming the order of the day in South Africa. In one such "summit" 6 Bantustan leaders met members of the United Party's Constitutional Committee at Jan Smuts Airport. The discussions lasted 6 hours and a joint statement was released after the meeting. In it the leaders affirmed their support for the idea of federation, because "federation is a practical method of satisfying the aspirations of all the population groups within a single economically indivisible country." According to reports, the participants also debated the United Party proposals for the transition towards and realization of a federal constitution.

The only two Bantustan leaders absent from the "summit" were the Chief Ministers of the Transkei and the Ciskei. Paramount Chief Kaeser Matanzima of the Transkei refused to attend because, he said, he saw no sense in negotiating with a non-ruling party. In any case, the idea of federation can hold little appeal for him since he is determined to seek independence for his Bantustan from South Africa within the next five years.

Gazankulu-Lebowa Unity (Gazanbowa?)

Dr. C.N. Phatudi, Chief Minister of Lebowa and Prof. Hudson Ntsanwisi are scheduled to have a series of talks to discuss the possibility of uniting their Bantustans. Both the 'Homelands' are situated in the northern Transvaal with some areas contiguous. At the first meeting the main topic discussed concerned friction at the joint borders, particularly relating to education. Among the things agreed upon was that schools on the borders should have facilities for teaching both North Sotho and Shangaan, the languages of Lebowa and Gazankulu respectively. January's meeting was to be held near Pietersburg in the northern Transvaal, and would be attended by both the cabinets.

Within Lebowa itself constitutional changes are imminent to replace the unitary legislative assembly by a bicameral one to accommodate an upper house of chiefs and a lower house for commoners. A constitutional committee was drafting a bill for presentation to the assembly. The committee would also draft another constitution.

Representatives of the Lebowa Bantustan Government also met Mr. M.C. Botha the Minister of Bantu Administration to discuss the possibility of transferring

further power to Lebowa. It is believed that the Lebowa leaders asked the Minister for the right to establish two new departments under Bantustan control—health and economic affairs. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, Dec. 1974)

Zululand

The Government has once again indicated its displeasure with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi by refusing his request for greater self-government for his Kwazulu Bantustan. In a letter to the Kwazulu government Mr. M.C. Botha outlined the reasons for his refusal. He said that a self-governing territory must have clearly defined boundaries and Kwazulu will only have these when the new districts in Natal have been apportioned. He also turned down a request that political parties be banned until independence was achieved. Furthermore, Mr. Botha wanted more information about the date the Kwazulu election would be held.

The recalcitrant Buthelezi has proved to be the least pliable of the Government-sponsored Bantustan leaders and the Government has tried in numerous ways to mute his criticism. The official reason given for the refusal is spurious in that the self same deficiencies in Bophuthatswana were not considered in the same light. (*Comments and Opinion*, Nov. 22, 1974)



Gatsha Buthelezi.

Bophuthatswana

In a move clearly designed to end the internal strife within his ruling Bophuthatswana National Party, Minister Lucas Mangope announced his intention of forming a new party—the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party, at a rally in Mafeking. This move follows Mangope's futile efforts to expel two chiefs from party and cabinet. Mangope had been at loose ends with Chief Moeloane and Chief Toto for about a year. Last year in April he made an attempt to revoke their party membership but desisted for financial reasons when the two chiefs took the matter to court. "We would not have spent funds on legal battles" the Chief said. He next excluded them from the cabinet but since he is not empowered to dismiss any ministers he had to put the matter before the State President. No decision had

made when Mangope opted for his new idea. The new party is to hold its first conference in January. All the people at the rally, including 41 members of the assembly and the leading chiefs joined the new party. It is almost certain that the new party will form the next government in the Bantustan. (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 1974)

ECONOMICS

DEVELOPMENTS ON THE LABOR SCENE

Continued Unrest

The January issue of *Southern Africa* reported on a series of incidents in which workers were killed, and went on strike and were penalized for their action. Such events continue. Four mine workers died and 78 were injured in mid-December at Impala Platinum's Bafokeng mine. Three of the dead were from Malawi, and about 2,000 Malawian workers refused to go back to work and demanded to be sent home following the fighting that resulted in injuries and death. (New York Times, Dec. 18, 1974)

One hundred and ninety-eight Randburg municipal workers were accused of going on an illegal wage strike on November 1. They were charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act for breach of contract. Six of the workers were found not guilty and acquitted, while the others were fined \$28 or 20 days. An additional 89 workers who also went on strike and who refused to return to work were found guilty, fined the \$28 or 20 days, and were sent back to their rural reserves. (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 1974)

The Search for Mine Labor Continues

As many as 75,000 additional black underground miners are needed immediately to enable the gold mines to operate at 100 percent capacity. As of late November, they were operating at only 78 percent capacity with an underground force of 274,000 compared with 322,000 a year ago. According to A.W.S. Schumann, president of the Chamber of Mines, the situation is going to get worse before the decline is reversed.



A road in Lesotho is built by women—the men are digging in South Africa's mines.

To solve the problem, a number of things are being done. Additional miners are being sought from Rhodesia, as many as possible, "without disrupting Rhodesian employers."

For the first time, the Chamber of Mines has obtained Government approval to recruit urban South African Blacks for the mines. In a major policy statement,

Workers at a strike meeting.



Schumann spelled out the implications of this new policy. "From today," he said, "we must cease to think in terms of a Black labour force which will continue indefinitely to be migratory and unskilled. . . . We must begin to think in terms of a Black labour force which must consist increasingly of Blacks who have adopted mining as a career." This will necessitate better pay, better advancement possibilities, and job security. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 16, Nov. 23, 30, 1974)

Training for Black Workers

The British Trades Union Congress will contribute about \$21,000 to the Institute of Industrial Education in Durban for a course to train African shop stewards. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 7, 1974)

In Soweto, the huge African township outside Johannesburg, state-supported facilities are being completed to train Africans in industrial woodwork, plastics, welding, brickwork, mechanical practice, and electrical work. The Soweto center is the first of at least six such centers that are being built at Pretoria, Durban, Maritzburg, Port Elizabeth, the East Rand, and Vanderbijipark. The development of these centers is an indication of the government's recognition of the need for more skilled black workers. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 7, 1974)

Economic Community in Southern Africa?

South Africa's Minister of Finance, Dr. Diederichs, has predicted the possibility of a vast economic community spreading over the whole of southern Africa and beyond. In spite of political action against South Africa, such as the dramatic attempt to expel S. A. from the U.N. and the subsequent General Assembly resolution forbidding South African participation, Diederichs expressed optimism about South Africa's economic future. Citing the customs union already functioning between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, as an example, he said, "There is no reason why we cannot co-operate in economic affairs with our neighbors to our mutual benefit." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974)

South Africa has already made initial contact with at least three states to the north: Zambia, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast. Each of these states has a particular reason for being interested in economic cooperation with South Africa. Zambia has suffered because of the sanctions against Rhodesia. Political considerations aside, there would be at least short term benefits to Zambia from cooperating with the Republic. Specifically, according to the Johannesburg *Star*, Zambia would have greater access to the relatively cheap South African industrial goods, and would have the prospect of drawing South Africa into cartels aimed at keeping up the price of raw materials—a great concern to Zambia with its dependence on copper exports.

In the case of Senegal, inflation and drought have hurt badly. The major export, peanuts, will not bring in needed capital as the crop failed, producing less than half the predicted yield. The rice crop is expected to be equally poor. Senegal's budget deficit this year is expected to be \$84 million, or about one third of the total budget. The country badly needs help, and South Africa might be willing to give it if Senegal agreed to play a significant role in easing relations between the rest of Africa and the Republic.

The Ivory Coast is in a less severe but similar situation, with serious inflation which has forced a 30 percent rise in the minimum wage, an increase the Ivory Coast cannot really afford. Cooperation like that between Senegal and

South Africa is clearly a possibility. As the Johannesburg *Star* reports, these "states have an incentive for believing the leopard is indeed changing its spots." (Nov. 30, 1974)

There are other signs of increased cooperation between South Africa and its neighbors. Malawi is borrowing \$26.6 million to finance the construction of a rail line from the capital city of Lilongwe to Mchinji on the Zambian border, and a South African firm will be the contractor. In late November, a 17-man trade mission from Reunion visited South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 30, 1974)

Of perhaps greatest interest is the relationship between South Africa and Mozambique. Dr. Diederichs stated that he did not see events in Mozambique as negative and that South Africa wished to live in peace with black and white states. He also mentioned, however, that Mozambique is extremely dependent economically on South Africa. This dependence takes many forms, and some forms of the dependence are double edged, most obviously that of the labor supply from Mozambique to South Africa. Mozambique clearly cannot cut that supply immediately, having no alternative jobs for some 160,000 miners. But, South Africa also needs those miners to dig its gold and coal.

Not only do Mozambicans mine the ore, much of it is shipped out through the port of Lourenço Marques. In fact, about 90 percent of Mozambique's through traffic, in both directions, on the railways and in the harbor, is South Africa. South Africa, by ceasing to use Lourenço Marques, could destroy the capital's economy. In the short run, South Africa needs that port, but with the development of Richards Bay, St. Croix, and Saldanha Bay, South Africa could eventually stop transporting goods through Mozambique. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974; *Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Dec. 1974-Jan. 1975)

South Africa has praised the "realism" of African leaders willing to do business, comparing them to "many of the homeland leaders." The terms of business will be the same: economic development will proceed unhindered as long as it undergirds the white South African's ability to remain in absolute political control.

INVESTMENT IN THE BANTUSTANS

Western Europeans are being encouraged to invest in South Africa's Bantustans, by the Bantustan leaders, and by their own representatives, sent to South Africa to investigate possibilities. Ciskei leader, Lennox Sebe spent two weeks in Europe in late November. He has interested a Stuttgart watch making firm in assembling up to 100,000 alarm clocks a year in the Ciskei, in addition to assembling watches from imported components at Dimbaza. Sebe approached Daimler-Benz to persuade the car-making firm to make upholstery in the Ciskei rather than importing it from Germany. An offer by the Berlin School of International Development to give free courses to 15 Ciskei civil servants in budgeting, accounting, and management has been accepted. There are strong possibilities that a Milan textile firm will start a factory at Dimbaza. And France has made offers of scholarships for Ciskei residents to study medicine and technical subjects. (See *Southern Africa*, Jan. 1975 for background on Bantustan investment.)

The United Kingdom South Africa Trade Association sent Sir Arthur Snelling on a month long fact finding tour to South Africa. Snelling is a former British Ambassador to South Africa. He returned home to advise at least six

British companies to invest in the Bantustans. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974)

One of the attractions for investment in the Bantustans is, according to KwaZulu Chief Gatshe Buthelezi, "problem-free labour resources." This seems to include the added attraction, from the investors point of view, of low costs for that labor. The basic weekly wage is sometimes as low as \$5.50, with an average weekly wage in one Bantustan being \$10.75. Many employers offer no pension fund, medical assistance, transportation, or paid sick leave for black employees. (*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, Oct. 11, 1974)

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF TRENDS

The principal trends in South African foreign relations during 1974 have been the intensification of the economic, political and military alliance between the South African regime and the western powers, the continued attempt by South Africa to "normalize" its relations with the Black African governments in order to establish its position as a major neo-colonial power in Africa, and the expansion of South African economic and political ties to other Third World regions. Behind these trends is one basic objective: the survival of the apartheid system—the continued economic exploitation and political oppression of the overwhelming Black majority for the benefit of the White minority rulers of South Africa.

The South African-Western Alliance

The South African-Western Alliance became more open this past fall. During the 1974 UN session, South Africa's Western allies—the US, UK, and France—used their power to attempt to maintain South Africa's position in the UN. Mr. Ove Guldberg, the Danish Foreign Minister, successfully used his influence to pressure the Common Market countries, and Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland to vote against South Africa's exclusion from the UN. The US Ambassador to the UN, John A. Scali not only attacked the UN General Assembly's exclusion of South Africa, but defended the South African regime's reaction to its exclusion. Mr. Donald Easum, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, termed the UN action "highly unfortunate". In November, the South African Secretary for Information, Dr. Eschel Rhoodie, lobbied in Washington D.C. for the White South African Government. During December Pierre Salinger, an associate of the Kennedy clan, was in South Africa. As Britain moves out of Simonstown South Africa will no doubt look to the U.S. and its NATO allies to fill the gap. Recently the US has agreed to sell six Hercules C-130 Transport airplanes to Safair. Last October the British Royal Navy conducted joint maneuvers with the South African Navy and Air Force, and the French Navy paid an "official" visit to South Africa. Recently, the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brand-Fourie, visited France. Early in 1975 France will be shipping Mirage F1 jet fighters to South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 23, 30, Dec. 7, 1974; *New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1974; *Daily Standard*, Dec. 11, 1974; *Washington Post*, Oct. 21, 1974; *Guardian*, New York, Nov. 13, 1974; *Financial Times*, London, Nov. 14, 1974; *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Nov. 13, 1974; *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 14, 15, 1974; *SABC*, Johannesburg, Nov. 29, 1974; *Comment And Opinion*, Pretoria, Nov. 22, 1974; *WBAI*, New York, Dec. 3, 1974)

The recently revealed *National Security Memo* has

exposed that since 1970 the US has been strengthening its ties with the South African regime. Why? The National Security Council (established by the 1947 National Security Act and consisting of the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Head of the Council of Economic Advisors, the National Security Advisor, and other consultants appointed by the President who represent corporate interests) serves to integrate the political, military, and economic aspects of US foreign policy—with the economic usually dominant. Around 300 American multi-national corporations have over \$1 billion in investments in South Africa, and Ken Owen reports (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 1974) that this American stake in the South African economy is growing. Therefore, the major American corporate interests have a stake in the maintenance of the apartheid system which insures that there will be plentiful supply of cheap labor and high profits. The continuation of apartheid and the oppression of Black South Africans benefits American corporate interests. This situation of profiting from apartheid also applies to South Africa's other political-military allies—UK, France, West Germany, and Japan—who have a major stake in the maintenance of the stability of the South African economy and the apartheid system.

South Africa, in order to camouflage the complicity of its western allies in the maintenance of apartheid, has embarked upon a calculated propaganda campaign to mislead western public opinion. The South African propaganda machine views western public opinion as something to be manipulated to serve its own goals, or as stated by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (Johannesburg, Nov. 7, 1974): "the constructive approach for South Africa is . . . to convert it [western public opinion] to our own purpose—to use it to *accelerate the momentum of our own policies* [italics added]" Therefore there is considerable propaganda flowing from South Africa which continually stresses the idea of "change" and the apartheid "Bantustan" policy is being dressed up as "Multi-nationalism." But "change" actually means no change. In November Prime Minister Vorster stated that "I have made no promises of change in our domestic policy, separate development is our policy. I am not going to change it because our critics here and elsewhere demand it." (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 13, 1974) Apartheid and the "Bantustan" policies will continue, with the Government pushing them towards "independence." (see *Southern Africa Dec.*, 1974, for a commentary on this "independence" policy) (*Times*, London, Nov. 8, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 9, 1974; *Washington Post*, Dec. 23, 1974, *New York Times*, Dec. 23, 1974; *Africa*, London, Dec. 1974; *SABC*, Johannesburg, Nov. 19, 1974) In other words, the only change South Africa seeks is a weakening in world opposition to its apartheid regime.

"Detente" in Africa?

South Africa wants to "normalize" its relations with the Black African states in order to find new markets for its manufactured goods—goods unconsumed domestically because of the depressed wages of Black South Africans—and to neutralize African opposition to the apartheid system. Therefore, Prime Minister Vorster, accompanied by a 15 person delegation, visited Abidjan, Ivory Coast where, according to South African press reports, West German diplomats arranged his meeting with Felix Houphet-Boigny (President of the Ivory Coast) and



Leopold Senghor (President of Senegal). However the Ivory Coast Minister of Information, Laurent Dona-Fology, denied the reports and the Senegalese Government was silent. Additionally, the *Guardian* (London, Dec. 2, 1974) reports that diplomatic contacts might have been made with Gabon, Zaire, Tanzania, and Nigeria, with US and Western European diplomats acting as intermediaries. (*Observer*, London, Nov. 10, Dec. 1, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Dec. 5, 1974; *Times*, Dec. 2, 1974; *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Dec. 2, 1974; *Los Angeles Times*, Dec. 3, 1974; *Today's British Papers*, Dec. 6, 1974; *New York Times*, Dec. 2, 1974)

The Ian Smith regime of Rhodesia presents a major obstacle to the achievement of current South African objectives in Africa. In order to restore Rhodesia's position as a buffer zone, protecting the apartheid

heartland, Prime Minister Vorster is pressuring Smith into accepting a "compromise" which would allow some political power to be "shared" with the Africans. Since Portugal's withdrawal from Africa, Vorster sees that the interests of his regime would be better served by conservative African politicians (like Banda of Malawi) than by Ian Smith. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 7, 1974; *Knoxville Journal*, Dec. 5, 1974; *New York Times*, Dec. 20, 1974; *Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Nov. 15, 1974)

Uranium Diplomacy

South Africa, in particular the monopolies of Anglo-American and Rio Tinto Zinc (a British based corporation which has many inter-locking directorships with Anglo-American), controls the third largest source of uranium ore in the world. Iran and Brazil seek to develop nuclear technology in order to electrify the remote towns of their respective countries, but both these countries lack a domestic source of uranium ore. Thus a common interest has developed between South Africa on one hand, and Brazil and Iran on the other. (One must note that these three regimes use similar police techniques to maintain the economic exploitation of the majority of their populations, with the Brazilian regime having a policy of engineering a rapid decrease in the standard of living of its poor and of exterminating the Indians of the Amazon region.) In exchange for South African uranium, Iran provides South Africa with 40 per cent of its oil supply, and this occurs despite the Arab oil boycott placed upon South Africa. With regard to Brazil, in March 1974 the South African Foreign Minister Muller and Chief of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Johnson attended the inauguration of the Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel. Last June both the South African and Brazilian legations were raised to embassy status. (Richard E. Bissell, "Hope Won't Make the Cape Good," *Armed Forces Journal International* Nov, 1974; "AEC" WBAI, New York, Dec. 29, 1974) With the increasing popularity of nuclear technology, South Africa, in the future, will be using its uranium ore as a bargaining agent to expand its political influence in the Third World.

Namibia

AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The UN Security Council on December 17, 1974, unanimously passed a resolution which inches the UN and South Africa closer to a showdown over the latter's illegal occupation of Namibia. (See United Nations Section)

IN THE WAKE OF THE RESOLUTION

In London, UN Commissioner for Namibia Sean Mac Bride predicted "The South African Government realises that they have to reach a decision on Namibia soon, and it is my guess that they will be willing to have talks with SWAPO, the South West Africa People's Organization, within the next two months to discuss the formation of a government . . . It is significant that countries normally more favorable to South Africa—like Britain, America and France—did not veto this resolution" (*Star*, Johannesburg, December 21, 1974).

The commissioner, who on December 8 was presented with the Nobel Peace Prize for 1974 in Oslo, stressed there could be no partitioning of Namibia by the device of bantustans. "This would just not be good enough—there must be total independence."

South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller said that the Security Council resolution had placed South Africa's membership in the world body more and more in the balance (*Star*, Johannesburg, December 21, 1974), appending the ritual phraseology that the South African government has never succumbed to threats. Muller continued the line about the inhabitants of the territory having to decide their future for themselves, re-intoning the slogan "all options remain open".

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

Sam Nujoma, president of SWAPO, declared that his



Sam Nujoma, SWAPO President

organization intended to intensify its military activities in Namibia (*Daily News*, Dar-es Salaam, November 2, 1974). At a news conference in Stockholm, the president said that South Africa had sent "strong reinforcements to the Namibia-Angola border since the April coup in Lisbon". *Anti-Apartheid News*, London, in its December 1974 issue, states that SWAPO "has reported increasing military activity and the establishment of several new bases by South African forces" in northern Namibia, at Grootfontein, Onuno, Ondangua airport and at Ruacana on the Kunene river near the giant hydroelectric project.

The *Washington Post* on December 30, 1974, reports that in Paris a SWAPO official declared that guerrilla activities will not be halted until South Africa is willing to negotiate the territory's independence.

BRITAIN SPEAKS ON NAMIBIA

Foreign Secretary James Callaghan told the House of Commons that "the Government's review of its policy towards southern Africa had concluded that the occupation of Namibia by South Africa was unlawful, that its mandate to administer the territory was no longer in force and that it should withdraw" (*Times*, London, December 5, 1974). This stale disclosure—"the much-heralded review seems to have given birth to rather a small mouse", the news item comments—was further described: ". . . Mr. Callaghan said the Government did not accept that the Security Council resolutions relating to the territory were mandatory. He did not accept an obligation to impose sanctions nor to take active measures of pressure to limit, or stop, commercial or industrial relations with Namibia".

(Not to be overlooked in "industrial relations with Namibia" is the Rossing uranium mine near the seaside city of Swakopmund, "the biggest uranium mine in southern Africa [testimony of Yoko Kitazawa before the UN Council for Namibia, New York, November 6, 1974] and developed by Rio Tinto Zinc Company, a British-based multi-national, a major shareholder. Rossing is due to come into production in mid-1976 and in addition to exports will supply South Africa's rapidly building atomic power and military strength.)

The *Washington Post* of January 5, 1975, reporting on a meeting in South Africa between Callaghan and Vorster,

says "Vorster expressed displeasure at Callaghan's meeting earlier in the week in Zambia with exiled leaders of the South West Africa People's Organization . . . South Africa regards Callaghan's meeting with the black nationalist leaders, in which he expressed sympathy with their cause, as improper and undiplomatic, government sources here say"

INSIDE NAMIBIA

SWAPO has announced that it would resign from the nine-organization Namibia National Convention (*Star*, Johannesburg, December 7, 1974). Axel Jackson Johannes, a SWAPO official in Windhoek, is quoted as saying that other groups in the Convention had failed to co-operate with SWAPO. The news item continues by stating that Mr. Peter Meushihange, SWAPO's secretary for external affairs, said in New York that his organization was no longer a member.

The *Johannesburg Star* on November 23, 1974, relates how Mr. Dirk Mudge, National Party official, stated at a public meeting "that measures to relax discriminatory legislation were already being considered". He didn't get too specific, but "said certain hotels would be licensed to accommodate Blacks".

Axel Johannes' responded at a 1500-person rally in Katutura township, Windhoek with "is it freedom to sleep in a hotel?"

IN WASHINGTON

Representative Andrew Young (D-Ga) "has urged the United States Government to take the lead in forming a United Nations force to occupy South West Africa" (*Star*, Johannesburg, December 21, 1974) The Atlanta legislator spoke before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at the same time that outgoing Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum testified after his recent trip to southern Africa. The *Star* reports "When Mr. Easum observed that the South African Government had recently stated its willingness to accept the will of the peoples of South West Africa, the young Congressman retorted: 'South Africa has nothing to do with the matter. South Africa shouldn't be there'. Mr. Young "visited South Africa at the suggestion of Arthur Ashe, the tennis player, and reportedly made a good impression there as a moderate and constructive critic". ■

Zimbabwe

ZIMBABWE SETTLEMENT?

The following article by David Martin is reprinted from *The Observer*, London, December 15, 1974.

"Rhodesia's nationalists, now united under the banner of the African National Council, plan to hold their first congress in March, to agree on a new constitution, elect leaders and draw up policies. Ideally they hope that constitutional talks aimed at ending the nine-year Rhodesian deadlock will be delayed until after the congress.

"Nationalist leaders here make it clear that constitutional talks would, in their view, be premature before the congress, which is to be held inside Rhodesia. But although they insist that reports of a February conference are speculation, they say that, if necessary, they are prepared to hold the constitutional meeting before the congress.

"If this becomes necessary, the enlarged ANC executive, which, in addition to the original 23 members, now includes four people from each of the three guerrilla fronts, will appoint a negotiating team likely to be headed by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) president, Mr. Joshua Nkomo.

"The Zimbabwe declaration of unity,' signed here on Sunday, lays down that the congress will be held within four months, and in this period the ANC's president, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, will chair the enlarged executive. However, it is generally thought that the congress will elect Mr. Nkomo as the new ANC leader.

After 10 years of trying to get the rival nationalist groups together, the declaration dissolving ZAPU, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) and drawing them together within the ANC is a crucial strategic achievement at a time when Mr. Ian Smith's fortunes are ebbing.

"Yet, at the moment, that is all it is, and undue optimism that a settlement is in the offing is dangerous. On the contrary, what has occurred secretly behind the scenes in the past eight days gives cause for pessimism and indicates that, on present positions, initially constitutional talks could end in total deadlock.

"On Wednesday night Mr. Smith, in his broadcast to the nation, said: 'Terrorist activity in Rhodesia will cease immediately and the proposed constitutional conference will take place without preconditions.' On the surface that is essentially true, but it is deceptive.

"In the first place a communiqué from the four nationalist leaders meeting here added a further point: 'As a demonstration of our sincerity, all freedom fighters will be instructed, as soon as a date for negotiation has been fixed, to suspend fighting.' Mr. Smith had demanded that the guerrillas should lay down their arms and withdraw, but all that has been agreed is an 'informal ceasefire' or standoff, with both sides staying in place, pending the outcome of the constitutional talks.

"Even more important is the question of preconditions. Last Saturday, after three of his officials had been here to see the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana, Mr. Smith rejected the African proposals because the demand

for a constitutional conference on the 'basis of immediate majority rule' was unacceptable.

"South Africa's Prime Minister, Mr. John Vorster, hastily intervened, and early this week a delegation arrived here from Pretoria, led by the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Brand Fourie. They brought the news that Mr. Smith had agreed to release the detained nationalists, and a compromise was then worked out to get round Mr. Smith's objections.

"This was simply that neither side would set preconditions before the constitutional conference, or rather, that they would withhold them until the meeting began. But this has done no more than paper over the gaping void between the positions of Mr. Smith and the nationalists, for the latter's demands which caused last weekend's deadlock remain unchanged and uncompromising principles.

"Since Mr. Smith's men were here eight days ago and the Rhodesian Prime Minister's Saturday statement, reports from southern Africa have tended to blame Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere for the deadlock. But all he did at the meeting with Rhodesian officials was to spell out three nationalist demands—or, as they then were, preconditions.

"These were: majority rule was not negotiable; immediate independence was also not negotiable; all that was negotiable was the machinery for the transfer of power to the African majority. This was what Mr. Smith rejected, but it remains the nationalist conference position.

"This week the Tanzanian Government newspaper, the *Daily News*, in an official editorial (which virtually means a policy statement for President Nyerere) responded bluntly to Mr. Smith's rejection. If the principle of no independence before majority rule 'is not accepted, then the basis for Rhodesian constitutional talks does not exist. Therefore fighting will be continued and will be intensified.'

"Since then there has been the compromise on no preconditions, but the principles remain the same, giving rise to considerable pessimism among Rhodesian nationalists. 'Don't expect anything from the constitutional conference,' one leader told me. 'If it takes place at all, I am convinced on the present evidence that it will end in deadlock.'

"That may be unduly pessimistic, for Mr. Vorster has already demonstrated that he can exert considerable pressure on Mr. Smith. Even so, the differences are enormous. Nationalists talk of an acceptable agreement bringing majority rule in between six and 18 months, but although Mr. Smith has dropped his 'not in my lifetime' position, there is no sign that he is thinking of anything so immediate.

By allowing the detained nationalist leaders to fly here and now releasing them, he has made enormous concessions. His two conditions to the Zambian envoy, Mr. Mark Chora, a special assistant to President Kenneth Kaunda, were that there should be a cease-fire and that there must be unity among the nationalists. But Mr. Smith made it quite clear that he did not believe the latter



Smith and Vorster meet in Port Elizabeth.

condition could be met.

"From the nationalist side there were a number of demands, including the release of all detainees and political prisoners, the revocation of death sentences passed on captured guerrillas, an end to the state of emergency and the lifting of the ban on ZANU and ZAPU.

"Thus the Africans have generally fulfilled their side, and although Mr. Smith has only announced the release of detainees and his willingness to attend a constitutional conference, he may have made further concessions which it would not have been politic to announce publicly.

"Sources say he has agreed, although expressing grave reluctance, to Britain chairing the conference, but there could be objections from Salisbury to its being held in London. A 'neutral' venue may have to be found, and nationalist sources mention as possibilities Geneva or Mauritius, but insist that Malawi would not be acceptable to them.

"African circles believe that Japan and European countries which have been breaking United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia must now fully apply them if the conference is to make progress, and that South Africa has a critical role to play in keeping up the pressure on Mr. Smith.

"The alternative is increased guerrilla warfare. The lull in the fighting between now and the conference will be more to the advantage of the nationalists than Mr. Smith, giving them time to mobilise, train and acquire arms if an escalation of the war becomes inevitable."

A few days after the talks in Lusaka, Smith released 100 political prisoners, and Sithole and Nkomo returned to Rhodesia, but not to jail. During this period a statement was made by the British Government "that James Callaghan, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, does not intend to become involved in any way in the proposed constitutional talks unless both sides invite him to do so. (*The Observer*, London, Dec. 15, 1974). Since then, at the beginning of January, he made a trip to southern Africa, meeting with heads of States including Prime Minister Vorster in Port Elizabeth, South

Africa. Smith refused permission for any of the African leaders to leave the country to meet with Callaghan. (*New York Times*, January 5, 1974) [See Update, page 35]

President Nyerere said [prior to the Lusaka meeting and call for a ceasefire] that African states would now give more military aid and guerrilla training to Zimbabwe because of the victories in Mozambique and Angola. Zambians continued to suffer from the hostilities, as landmines were laid along its border with Rhodesia. More than 20 Zambians have lost their lives and many others have been wounded by such acts of aggression by the Rhodesians. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 30, 1974)

GUERRILLA NEWS

More guerrilla activity is reported in the northwest. Homes of farmers have been hit in the Doma and Karoi areas. There are no tribal trust reserves here which provide cover and protection for the guerrillas, as in the northeast. One farmer near Karoi said he felt they were under a state of seige. More than two-thirds of the police reserves are out in the field on duty or on alert.

In the eastern Highlands, near the Mozambique border town of Umtali, new guerrilla activity is expected. This area is rugged terrain, well-suited to guerrilla warfare. A military camp has been established in Inyanga, to the north of Umtali, in anticipation of new incursions from Mozambique. Umtali may be designated a garrison town. Whites there are unable to sell their homes, and many white apartments are empty. Tourism in this gorgeous and usually popular area is way down, as is trade across the border with Mozambique.

The northeast border area has been the site of 350-400 guerrillas moving in from bases in Mozambique. Four guerrillas were killed there recently, according to Rhodesian government reports, bringing the total to 478 killed since December, 1972. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 30, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Nov. 27, 1974)

[prior to the Lusaka meeting & call for a ceasefire] President Nyerere said that African states would now give more military aid and guerrilla training to Zimbabwe because of the victories in Mozambique and Angola.

Zambians continued to suffer from the hostilities, as landmines were laid along its border with Rhodesia. More than 20 Zambians have lost their lives and many others

have been wounded by such acts of aggression by the Rhodesians. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 30, 1974)

portugal and africa angola

NEGOTIATIONS IN ANGOLA CONTINUE

Portugal's Foreign Minister Mario Soares proposed on November 25 that the three liberation movements hold a series of talks on neutral territory to settle their differences and attempt to form a provisional government. Recently, the Azores Islands have been mentioned as a possible site. Soares had met earlier with FNLA representatives in Tunis in an effort to speed up the negotiations for the decolonization of Angola, which so far has been mired in divisiveness and conflict among the three liberation movements. Soares was quoted as saying that "... we must move quickly in the process of decolonization as time may not always favor the liberation movements and the progressive forces in Lisbon." (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Nov. 9, 1974)

On November 25, Holden Roberto of FNLA and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA announced that they will form a military and political alliance, and urged the divided MPLA to heal its organization and join the alliance. (*International Bulletin*, November, 1974) [see Update, page 35, for important new developments] A reconciliation of the factions in the MPLA seems further complicated by the statement of Andre Petroff, a spokesman for MPLA's Neto group in Dar Es Salaam, claiming that Daniel Chipenda, the leader of an opposing faction, had planned to assassinate Neto last August. Petroff gave no further details, but MPLA sources said that the assassination was planned to coincide with a visit to Zambia by Neto for talks with President Kaunda. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 1974)

Vice-Admiral Rosa Coutinho, the "Red Admiral," who is chairperson of the ruling junta in Angola, was in Portugal early in November for talks which are to lead to the formation of the transitional government in Angola. Coutinho was away during the attempted coup of last October. However the Armed Forces Movement in Luanda announced that all of the coup planners have been identified and arrested. Later in November, Admiral Coutinho began a move against a band of mercenaries which are alleged to be in the south of Angola. The mercenaries are reported to be hiding in the hills surrounding the resort town of Sa da Bandeira. The national origin of these mercenary troops has yet to be determined. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974) At this point it can be said with some certainty that the Armed Forces Movement wants Portugal to get out of Angola, and any military reversal at this time could delay the already slow-moving progress for Angola independence.

DEMONSTRATIONS IN LUANDA

Some of the militancy and ideology of the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal has been felt in Luanda. Large numbers of Angolans stormed the Luanda Town Hall while its municipal council was in session and demanded the dissolution of the council to be replaced by "true representatives of the people." (*Radio Clube Portugues*, Lisbon Commercial 0001 gmt, Oct. 17, 1974) The demonstrators carried MPLA flags and signs reading "Down with the Fascist Clique." President Coutinho met the demonstrators' demands and appointed a provisional administrative commission. The ruling junta has also fined Angola's prestigious newsweekly *Noticias* approximately \$3700 for biased reporting of the resignation of President Spinoza in Portugal. *Noticias'* account cast doubt on the existence of a rightist plot and ridiculed the intervention of the Armed Forces Movement against the conspiracy. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Oct. 17, 1974)

AID TO UNITA

Uganda's President Idi Amin has donated approximately \$45,000 to UNITA, announcing that this is the largest amount ever given by Uganda to a liberation movement. The announcement took place during a meeting with Amin and Jorge Sangumba and Dua Kakumba, representatives of UNITA. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Oct. 12, 1974) Amin also offered Kampala as a base for joint military operations by all of the liberation movements. The offer was made to representatives of MPLA whom Amin met in Brazzaville in October, 1974. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 19, 1974) Meanwhile, a UNITA spokesman in Luanda, Dr. Fernando Wilson, has assured South Africa that if UNITA came to power in Angola it would adopt a policy of non-intervention with its southern neighbors and specifically Namibian liberation groups would not be given assistance. Wilson is quoted as saying, "When we fought our war of liberation against colonialism we did so from our own country. We expect liberation movements in Namibia to do the same." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 1974)

mozambique

ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT

Regular flights of East African Airways now link Mozambique with its African neighbors. FRELIMO has



IN MEMORY OF

EDUARDO MONDLANE

assassinated february 3, 1969

"—he made the birth of our nation possible"

(FRELIMO)

invited many Tanzanians to visit Mozambique to see how the men and women of FRELIMO are building the new nation. Tanzania has supported the liberation movement for years. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 13, 1974)

Dr. Joaquim de Carvalho, a FRELIMO representative, has been the leader of the first official delegation to Portugal. On this visit he indicated that his government would likely apply UN sanctions against Rhodesia until majority rule was a reality. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 30, 1974)

Messages of support have reached Lourenco Marques from the Socialist Unity Party in the German Democratic Republic, and Australia has offered technical and financial aid, (*Daily World*, New York, Dec. 11, 1974; *Marches Tropicaux*, Paris, Nov. 15, 1974)

The Secretary of State for African Affairs of the United States, Donald Easum, has promised to send financial aid specialists to Mozambique under the AID program. FRELIMO has not yet commented about this offer. (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, Nov. 22, 1974)

South African firms have proposed an agricultural and tourist scheme for the Zambesi River valley, and another firm intends to ship railroad signal equipment. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 7, 1974; *Marches Tropicaux*, Paris,

Nov. 1, 1974) Mozambican miners returning from South Africa have been complaining about the harsh and dangerous conditions in South African mines; many want to stay in Mozambique rather than return. (*Luanda Radio*, 1130 gmt, Oct. 7, 1974)

AT THE CABORA BASSA DAM

For years FRELIMO sought to interrupt the flow of workers and materials to one of Africa's great hydroelectric projects. With the transitional government in power the project now has their full support. Sluice gates have been closed, and the lake has begun to fill to its 2,000 square mile capacity. Although it will take two years to reach capacity electricity will be produced in April, 1975. (*Daily Telegraph*, London, Nov. 25, 1974) South Africa expects to receive power four months earlier than expected. Later a sardine fishing industry is planned. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, Dec. 7, 1974)



FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

FRELIMO continues to advance its new administration with the installation of key personnel. Now the following posts are in FRELIMO hands: Governor, Southern Lourenco Marques District; Governor, Cabo Delgado; Mayor, Lourenco Marques; Mayor, Matola Municipality; Administrator, Lourenco Marques District; and Governor, Beira. Alberto Mendonca, the Governor of Beira has said that he has "come to serve the people" and his enemies are "racialism, tribalism, and regionalism." (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 31, Nov. 15, 1974)

FRELIMO TACKLES INTERNAL REDEVELOPMENT

The already difficult tasks ahead were complicated by the episodes of reactionary violence against FRELIMO, reported in previous issues of *Southern Africa*. These resulted in the exodus of numbers of Portuguese settlers, many of whom occupied skilled positions which now have to be filled. Certain key posts in areas such as energy and transport were left vacant, but now with the help of Portuguese and FRELIMO soldiers, who are working together harmoniously, these difficulties are being overcome. (*Daily Telegraph*, London, Nov. 4, 1974) Some supply shortages are still known but the harbor handling capacity has been restored to near normal conditions. The new government has been seeking some emergency wheat from South Africa for short-term relief aid (*Times*, London, Nov. 20, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 1974) In the wake of violence, tourism has decreased, but should soon return to normal levels. As an economic measure Christmas bonuses for civil servants have been cut while auditing continues (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 7, 1974)

Minor acts of a criminal nature have spotted the past months. Two explosions of hand grenades were noted in a Beira servant's quarters and at a dancing party in Lourenco Marques. At least seven were injured in these unrelated incidents (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 30, 1974) Acts of theft, smuggling of rare coins and gold, illegal off-shore fishing, illegal arms possession, and tax evasion have been reported but other than these incidents complete calm has prevailed. A sugar company executive and a hostile journalist have both been exiled to Portugal for their opposition to decolonization. The flow of refugees to South Africa has slowed down once it was learned that they are experiencing difficulty in being absorbed in the neighboring nation (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 7, 23, 30, 1974; *Marches Tropicaux*, Paris, Nov. 15, 1974)



A colonial legacy—unequal housing—poses an urgent task for the reconstruction program.

Samora Machel, FRELIMO President, has emphasized the need for all Mozambicans to work together for reconstruction since Portuguese colonialism left an inheritance of "economic anarchy". One of FRELIMO's goals for reconstruction is to develop its oil industry since Mozambique has little coal of its own (*Times*, Lusaka, Nov. 8, 1974; *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, Sept. 27, 1974)

In order to gain further confidence in the new administration Portuguese Admiral Victor Crespo has offered compensation to those who lost material or property during the recent riots (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 1974) In an other action, a joint FRELIMO-Portuguese team has rounded up at least 300 prostitutes in Lourenco Marques and sent them for rehabilitation (*International Herald Tribune*, Paris, Nov. 16, 1974) The Newspapers, *Voz Africana* (Beira), and *Voz de Mozambique* (Lourenco Marques) will become the official organs of FRELIMO as its rule becomes firmly established (Lisbon Radio, 1200 gmt, Sept. 23, 1974)

republic of guinea-bissau

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES: BUILDING THE NEW GOVERNMENT

Since independence, the PAIGC has been working quietly and diligently on formulating new internal and foreign policies. President Luis Cabral has said that the Republic of Guinea-Bissau plans to develop the best relations of solidarity and friendship with those nations which provided aid during the years of armed struggle. Cabral also indicated that the greatest possible effort will be made toward the realization of African unity through work in the OAU. He stressed that Guinea-Bissau was a member of the non-aligned nations and sought peace and



President Luis Cabral.

liberation for all the peoples of the world. Since one third of Guinea is Islamic, comrade Cabral noted his nation's support for the 'brother Arabs'. (*Revolution Africaine*, Algiers, Oct. 25, 1974)

In regard to domestic economic policy President Cabral has announced that state controls will be instituted on all trade to insure proper distribution and price control of goods. A Central Bank will be established at some time in the future. It is unclear whether the nation's finances will be linked to the Portuguese escudo or to the peso system which has been discussed. Controls are expected to curb the CUF and Ultramarino trade monopolies which have been the chief agents for the former colonial economy. Urgent measures have been taken to study the proper exploitation of timber and agricultural resources (*Africa*, London, Dec. 1974)

A theme of decentralization of administration is also apparent by having each region designate members to the national popular assembly. The Portuguese had only one secondary school, but PAIGC plans to have one in each of the towns of Bissau, Bafata, Canchungo, and Bolama. Many years ago Bolama was the capital of the country and the PAIGC plans to rejuvenate this town by establishing a center for teaching and national culture. The governor of the town is Francisca Pereira, one of the leading women in the Party. The PAIGC schools and hospitals in neighboring Senegal and Guinea will be maintained for the time being (*Marches Tropicaux*, Paris, Nov. 1, 1974)

Foreign Relations

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has allocated \$100,000 of aid to Guinea-Bissau for 1974-76 for various educational and agricultural needs. This grant will be administered by the World Council of Churches (*Africa*, London, Dec. 1974) The West German organization, World Solidarity Action Committee, has become its nation's first group to give

substantial aid by providing ten rice-hulling machines to free women from this time-consuming and tedious work (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, Oct. 14, 1974) The first team of Portuguese doctors has arrived in Bissau to begin their assignments in teaching and medical care. As a member of UNESCO, Guinea-Bissau should also receive other international support in education.

Ministerial contact with the British government has been established in Dakar, and West Germany has suggested that the EEC nations appoint a joint ambassador to Guinea-Bissau (*West Africa*, Lagos, Nov. 11, 1974)

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

In a further advance of the decolonization of Portuguese Africa a final date has been set for the independence of Sao Tome and Principe in the Gulf of Guinea. The colonial status of the archipelago will be liquidated on July 12, 1975. This agreement was reached during talks in Algiers between the Portuguese Minister for Interterritorial Coordination, Antonio de Almeida Santos, and Miguel Trouvado, executive committee member of the MLSTP (Liberation Movement of Sao Tome and Principe). A provisional island government was set up in early December (*New York Times*, Nov. 27, 1974; *Providence Journal* (RI), Nov. 28, 1974)

The islands have a population of some 76,000 people in an area of 372 square miles. The tropical climate usually insures reliable production of cash crops which should help provide a firm economic basis for independence (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 27, 1974)

PORTUGAL INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The building of a democratic workers' state has been initiated in Portugal. The new political parties act formalizes the requirements for political organizations to participate in the elections which will take place in early April. Each party must have 5,000 members over 18 years of age; there are no restrictions on policy or platform. (*Messageo*, Italy, Nov. 1, 1974) The colonial press has been shut down, and the publication of a book by former Prime Minister Caetano has been halted since the workers refused to set type for publications by the fascist government. (*International Herald Tribune*, Paris, Nov. 21, 22, 1974)

Many of the older military officers who served fascism have been dismissed, and the rank of General was posthumously awarded to Humberto Delgado who died at the hand of an assassin of the PIDE secret police. (*International Herald Tribune*, Paris, Nov. 20, 1974)

THE U.S. AND PORTUGAL

Amidst persistent rumors of intense covert CIA activity in Portugal, Portuguese Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal has said that although there is no firm evidence "that there must be fire if there is so much smoke" (*Tempo*, Italy, Oct. 9, 1974) Meanwhile Stuart Nash, out-going US Ambassador to Portugal, has encouraged Henry Kissinger to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and not act with too much haste while the situation is so delicate. Secretary Kissinger continues to be very concerned about the situation since no conclusive agreement has been reached regarding United States access to the Azores Islands which figured importantly in the supply of war materiel to Israel during the most recent Middle East hostilities. The new US Ambassador, Frank Carlucci

viva la democraCIA



denied any role for the CIA in Portugal when questioned by Representative Michael Harrington and Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. Despite these denials, the Portuguese weekly, *Vida Mundial*, has noted that the US Embassy has tripled in size since July and the CIA Assistant Director, General Walters has visited Portugal twice since the April coup. A member of the US Embassy political bureau, James Hermann, was arrested for trying to incite airline workers to strike. This occurred just two days before a rightist coup attempt. The infamous CIA "coup ship" the *Apollo*, was anchored in Lisbon harbor for intelligence gathering but then departed for the Madeira Islands, but thousands of demonstrators on the islands forced it to leave. This same ship was stationed in Chile and Greece during their recent coups (*Muhammad Speaks*, Chicago, Dec. 13, 1974) In a frank statement the former West German leader, Willie Brandt indicated that American authorities would not intervene "unless in an exceptional situation." This expression was not elaborated. (*A Provincia de Angola*, Luanda, Nov. 9, 1974)

In the United States, Senator Edward Kennedy, having many Portuguese constituents, has called for US support of \$55 million in loans and aid to Portugal which is "struggling to create democratic institutions." A variety of other measures of support were suggested. Kennedy suggested that half of the aid would go to Portugal and half to Portugal's former African territories (Kennedy press release, Dec. 4, 1974)

With efforts at decolonization moving ahead, the Portuguese government has been praised at the United

Nations. For years the fascist rulers had received continual abuse and criticism because of the dictatorial and colonial systems.

In the beginning of December, Secretary of State Kissinger received Portuguese President Costa Gomes in Washington. Sources indicate that Costa Gomes warned Kissinger that American isolation of Portugal would only push it further to the left. Since the United States rulers do not favor such a development, a program of economic assistance in housing, agriculture, transportation, education and health is coupled with US investment guarantees of \$20 million for private American financing (*Journal Bulletin*, Providence, Dec. 14, 1974)

This liberal move to thwart the sharpening contradictions in Lisbon may have come too late. Portuguese military forces carried out a pre-dawn raid against six prominent businessmen who were charged with "grave acts of economic sabotage." Six others escaped arrest and fled. These men are accused of transferring more than \$1.6 million out of Portugal without permission (*Journal Bulletin*, Providence, Dec. 14, 1974) In order to maintain the element of surprise, Portuguese Premier Santos Gonsalves did not alert other cabinet members. IN initiating a purported campaign against monopolies the government has precipitated a split between those who have favored a go-slow program versus those who want to continue with the social and economic revolution (*New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1974) ■

Neighbors

LESOTHO POLITICAL TRIAL

In its trial of 32 alleged supporters of the Congress Party for high treason, the government prosecutor has described a meeting of Congress Party members in December 1973 at which a "letter from Tanzania," suggesting that the government intended to establish a one-party state and murder its political opponents, was supposedly read. Ntsu Mokhehle allegedly urged those present to overthrow the government by force, and the date of January 7, 1974 was supposedly chosen for attacks on police stations all over the country. Chief

Justice Mapetla adjourned the trial to November 25 to give the defense time to prepare its case. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 1974)

CRITICISMS OF THE LESOTHO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Lesotho's Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Joel Moitse, sharply criticized the white-dominated Chamber of Commerce for sabotaging Lesotho's agricultural marketing system and exploiting the farmer by seeking to monopolize trade. Moitse cited the establishment of



Ntsu Mokhehle, President of the Basutoland Congress Party.

co-operatives and new marketing organizations as government-initiated steps to help the farmer. Just prior to his statements, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce had criticized the government for lack of consultation with the private sector and noted the sharp drop in Lesotho mohair and wool production since 1970. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974)

KING MOSHOESHOE'S VISIT TO TANZANIA

Heading an 11-man team, King Moshoeshoe of Lesotho arrived in Dar es Salaam to a red carpet welcome from President Nyerere, Premier Kawawa and other party and government leaders. Speaking at a banquet given in his honor, the king declared that apartheid had only exacerbated problems and that his country would never accept "glorified Bantustan" status. He praised developments in Mozambique and Zimbabwe and called for South African withdrawal from Namibia. Nyerere praised the king for his courage and called for greater collaboration between the two countries.

ECONOMIC NEWS FROM BOTSWANA

Speaking at the opening of the Botswana Parliament, President Seretse Khama told his fellow citizens to expect a more modest rate of development in the coming years than had been previously anticipated, due to setbacks in the copper, nickel, and diamond-mining operations in Shashe, declining customs transfers, inflation and probably reduced aid from the industrialized countries. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974) The Botswana Government has warned striking ban workers and their employers that private sector salaries are not to exceed pay for similar work in the public sector and the Parliament has agreed to seek a \$7-million loan from the oil-exporting Arab states to build two large oil storage depots capable of containing a supply for one-and-a-half to two months. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 30, 1974) Botswana has decided to take over its section of Rhodesia Railways, dealing a new blow to the fortunes of the Smith regime. It also appears that the direct Rhodesian link with South Africa via Beit Bridge will not now be fully operational until some time in 1975. (*Afro-American News*, January 1975)

THE QUESTION OF MALAWIAN MINE LABOR


The Malawian Minister of Labor, Mr. W.B. Deleza, recently arrived in Johannesburg but refused to comment on the purpose of his visit, except to say that he was "in transit." There was speculation that he might be contacting the Chamber of Mines about the Malawian labor supply. Since the death of 74 Malawian workers in a plane crash in April near Francistown, Botswana, Malawi has terminated the supply of workers. Black underground workers in South African gold mines are now down to 78 per cent of stated requirements. The termination has, however, also constituted a drain on Malawi's foreign earnings. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 7, 1974)

BORDER INCIDENT AND ZAMBIA

A Salisbury resident, Mr. James Brian McDonnell, recently drove his car through the border post at the Kariba Dam, crossed into Zambia, and then turned around and went back to Rhodesia. Accompanied by his cook, he was shot and hit by Zambian troops but is reported in "satisfactory" condition in a Salisbury hospital. No explanation has been offered for the incident. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 1974)

MIXED ECONOMIC NEWS FROM ZAMBIA

Zambia hopes to be self-sufficient in sugar production in 1975 and to reap substantial profits from exports by 1979. This year, at the Nakambala estate at Mazabuka, 4,000 workers produced 66,000 tons of sugar on over 7,000 hectares. The Zambian Sugar Company hopes to obtain a loan of \$14 million from the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank in order to increase production to 150,000 tons by 1979. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 30, 1974) Britain has agreed to increase its aid to Zambia for 1974-5 by about 4 per cent to \$11.9 million to allow for rising costs. Among other items, this aid pays salaries of 1,555 British nationals working in Zambia (650 with the Ministry of Education, 360 in industry and technology, 270 in public administration, 120 in rural development, 100 with the Ministry of Health and 55 at the University). (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974) President Kaunda recently conscripted into the army 1,000 workers at the Government vehicle-repair workshops in Lusaka. The step, designed to provide "hard work, discipline and meditation" for the workers, was based on "disgusting" revelations of laziness and theft in the workshops. (*Star*,



Johannesburg, Nov. 30, 1974) Since the closing of the Rhodesian border by Ian Smith, Zambia has been having great difficulty in getting its copper to world markets. Copper is piling up at the wharfs of Lobito and Dar es Salaam. The Tanzam highway and railway are now closed for repairs in Tanzania. Lusaka is considering two possible additions to its network of outlets: a railroad line from the copper mines of Lumwana in the west to link up with the Benguela railway, and the development of the port of Nacala in Mozambique for a road outlet through Malawi.

(*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 30, 1974) The *Tanzanian Daily News* (Dar es Salaam, Dec. 3, 1974) gives a different picture, however, of the Dar outlet, noting that Zambian Minister of State Ndugu Mwale praised the Tanzanian authorities for expediting the movement of his country's imports and exports, including a record total of 52,000 tons for the month of November. Mwale said that there was relatively little pile-up at the port.

UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA

TOP STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ON AFRICA TO BE REPLACED

The story is out in Washington that Donald Easum will be removed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to be replaced by Nathaniel Davis, US Ambassador to Chile during the right-wing coup there. While the White House has not yet made an official announcement of the change, both major Washington newspapers carried the news in mid-December in stories about a number of major State Department personnel changes. The change does not bode well for US policy toward southern Africa.

High level State Department officials have privately told reporters that Easum's dismissal resulted from his disagreement with Kissinger over US policy towards southern Africa. Indeed, the change in the State Department's highest Africa post seems to bring into the open a private long-standing dispute between the Africa Bureau, which the Assistant Secretary heads, and Kissinger and his close advisors. This split was exemplified by internal politicking on several recent policy decisions concerning South Africa. In October, the Africa Bureau hoped to get a US abstention at the United Nations on the question of expulsion of South Africa, but the Secretary of State overruled them with a veto. The Bureau also tried this fall to oppose Kissinger's inclination to grant a visa to Admiral James Johnson, Chief of the South African Navy, for a "private" visit to Washington.

Easum's personal role in these disputes is little known, but was brought more to the fore by his recent trip to southern Africa. Easum took the occasion to make adamant statements of the US desire for change in southern Africa in general, and specifically, the Administration's support for the Congressional effort to repeal the sanctions-breaking Byrd Amendment. Perhaps more significant than his public statements about US policy, however, was his understanding of the seriousness about an end to white rule in southern Africa (on the part of leaders of independent Africa.) Easum stressed this perception in a hearing on his trip before the House Subcommittee on Africa on December 12. He explained that his predecessor, David Newsom, found African leaders primarily concerned with their own economic development, while he perceived that they were equally concerned about decolonization and racial equality in southern Africa. That this view challenges the basis of Kissinger's policy for southern Africa is demonstrated by the recently-revealed 1969 southern Africa, which defined

US interest as promoting less opposition by black states to minority rule on the continent, in order to allow continued profitable US involvement in the white-ruled states. (See *Southern Africa*, November, 1974)

South Africa is likely to be delighted by Easum's removal. South African diplomats have long been irritated by the "hard line" of the Africa Bureau. The Secretary of Information, Dr. Eschel Rhoodie, recently orchestrated a campaign against the Africa Bureau (which he characterized as having a "Sharpeville mentality", a reference to the 1960 massacre of South African blacks by the white police), using members of the US Congress and the South African press. It would not be surprising if Rhoodie took Easum's removal (after less than one year in that post) as a personal success story in trying to influence US policy toward his country.

Probably the clearest symbol that Easum's removal signals a renewed US aim to accept and support continued white rule in South Africa and perhaps new neo-colonialist maneuvers in the rest of the area, is the background of his likely successor, Nathaniel Davis. As US Ambassador to Chile from 1971 to 1973, Davis co-ordinated US support for the ouster of the popularly-elected socialist administration of Salvador Allende. He oversaw the work of the CIA "coup team" there, and had similar previous experience in Guatemala, where he served from 1968 until his appointment to Chile.

The actual removal of Easum as Assistant Secretary for Africa is expected in the early months of 1975. Davis' appointment will have to be confirmed by the Senate, which reconvenes in mid-January. It is expected that Easum will be nominated to be US Ambassador to Nigeria. (*Washington Star-News*, Dec. 16, 1974; *Washington Post*, Dec. 17, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 7, 1974)

HOUSE ACTION ON SANCTIONS BILL ABORTED

On December 19, just one day before adjournment of the 93rd Congress, the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives pulled the Rhodesian sanctions bill off the calendar for the seventh and final time this year. Thus, Senate passage of the bill in December, 1973, and House Foreign Affairs Committee approval in July, 1974, was voided, since all unfinished legislation is scrapped at the end of each Congressional session.

On one level, the aborted effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment culminated a long political struggle within Congress. During the past two years, the Rhodesian

sanctions bill became a surprisingly controversial bill. It was the most serious effort by liberals to close one major loop-hole in US compliance with sanction against Rhodesia, opened in 1971 by passage of the Byrd Amendment. The issues for them were the credibility of US policy toward minority rule in southern Africa, support for the United Nations, and the damage done to US economic and political relations with independent Africa by its violation of Rhodesian sanctions. On the other side, a coalition of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans tried to block the sanctions bill, motivated by a desire to maintain US industry access to Rhodesian minerals and, for some, to continue outright political and economic support for the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia.


Inside Congress, the fight over sanctions was as much a test of stamina as a political struggle, over the issues involved. The anti-sanctions forces, with the status quo on their side, chose a strategy of obstruction and delay, hoping to outlast and outmaneuver the liberals, who are generally known more for their commitment to causes than for their persistence in going after legislative victories. The bill's proponents in the House knew they could never be sure of a victory on such a controversial measure before bringing it to a final vote. So they constantly weighed their chances of success, pulling back again and again in August, September, and December, hoping to get additional middle-of-the-road support to clench a victory.

The sanctions proponents' indecisiveness continued until the very end of the session. After requesting a vote three times and then pulling back, the sponsors again asked the Democratic House leadership for a vote during the last days of the session.

On December 19, the Speaker made a surprise announcement that the sanctions bill would be the next order of business, interrupting an already crowded agenda. Immediately the bill's opponents caucused around the Speaker, assuring him that they would fill up every minute of the three hours of scheduled debate. Since the end of the session was only a day away, and the House still faced six hours of debate on the Rockefeller nomination to the Vice-Presidency, the leadership was sympathetic to dropping the bill. Finally, Congressman Fraser, the floor manager of the bill, agreed to withdraw his request for a vote.

Behind the internal Congressional struggle, the issues were more concretely defined by the outside forces lobbying for the bill. A strong coalition of civil rights groups, unions, and church groups worked consistently in support of the bill through the Senate and House fights. Perhaps most importantly, major unions, including the AFL-CIO, Steelworkers, United Auto Workers, and Communication Workers, put more effort into the sanctions bill than they have ever given to any policy issue concerning southern Africa.

A strong lobby worked on the other side to maintain the Byrd Amendment. The most important interest group behind this coalition was the steel industry and, to a lesser extent, the ferrochrome industry, which are the direct beneficiaries of the chrome and ferrochrome imports from Rhodesia. They called in an alliance of steel-consuming industries as diverse as mining, costume jewelry, and food processing. The steel industry could also count on the lobbying efforts of representatives of the white regimes themselves.



Despite continued protests the U.S. Congress fails to act on sanctions.

While the campaign to repeal the Byrd Amendment was in effect defeated by never coming to a final House vote, the two years of Congressional focus on Rhodesia were not devoid of political significance. The rule of the white minority regime in Rhodesia is considerably less stable than it was a year ago. This is due mainly to the progress of the Zimbabwean liberation forces, the defeat of Portuguese colonialism, and the apparent weakening of South African interest in propping up the Smith regime. However, serious consideration of tightening sanctions implementation by the United States may have been one more sign to Smith of his insecurity.

Congressional sponsors of the sanctions bill seem willing to continue this pressure if negotiations do not soon bring significant concessions inside Rhodesia. They further believe that the new Congress, with a 44-member Democratic increase in the House, will bring greater chances of passing the bill. Representative Fraser said in December that he intends to introduce the bill "the first day of the new session." He said that he has received assurances from Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Thomas Morgan that the bill will get through Committee swiftly next year, and from Speaker Carl Albert that it will be brought to the floor without obstruction. (*Wall Street Journal*, Dec. 20, 1974; *Washington Post*, Dec. 20, 1974) ■



LIBERATION MOVEMENTS GRANTED PERMANENT OBSERVER STATUS

In one of the most significant resolutions adopted at the twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly decided to invite representatives of the national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) "to participate in the relevant work of the Main Committees of the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs, as well as conferences, seminars and other meetings held under the auspices of the United Nations which concern their countries." The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, including financial provisions, to ensure the effective participation of the movements. This decision considerably expands the participation of the movements in the work of the Organization, granting them a status similar to that achieved by the Palestine Liberation Organization at the recent session. (United Nations Document, A/RES/3280 (XXIX); *Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974).

PORTUGAL SUBMITS TIMETABLE FOR DECOLONIZATION

At the beginning of December, the Portuguese Minister for Interterritorial Co-ordination, Antonio de Almeida Santos, reported to the Special Committee of 24 and to the Fourth Committee (on decolonization and trust territories) on progress made by Portugal towards decolonization. According to the timetable submitted by de Almeida Santos, the Cape Verde Islands will have their own Assembly to draw up a constitution by March 1975; Mozambique will become independent on June 25; Sao Tomé and Príncipe on July 12, 1975; and Angola will have a transitional government by the middle of August, 1975.

De Almeida Santos is the third high-ranking member of the Portuguese Government to report to the General Assembly this year. Like the President, da Costa Gomes, and the Foreign Minister, Mario Soares, who preceded him, he appealed for an end to economic and other sanctions against Portugal by the UN and the OAU, in view of Portugal's progress towards decolonization. He also urged the UN to provide assistance for the territories after independence. Subsequent to this visit, the General Assembly adopted a resolution instructing the specialized agencies and other institutions associated with the UN to resume co-operation with Portugal, and the Secretary of the OAU indicated that the African countries might soon reconsider their boycott of Portugal.

In its resolution, the General Assembly also invited all Governments, United Nations bodies and other institutions to contribute to the process of decolonization through moral and material assistance to the peoples of the territories. Other resolutions adopted by the Assembly specifically called on the developed countries and on all organizations of the United Nations development system, particularly the international financial institutions, to grant economic, financial and technical aid to Guinea-Bissau and to the territories still under Portuguese domination, with particular urgency given to assistance to FRELIMO to help it during the pre-independence period.

It has already been announced that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will establish an office in Lourenço Marques early in 1975.

The Assembly pledged its continued support for, and solidarity with, the liberation movements, reiterating that the movements are the authentic representatives of the peoples concerned. It reaffirmed that the national unity and territorial integrity of the former Portuguese colonies must be preserved, and warned against "the subversive and criminal activities of the fascist and reactionary groups . . . which are attempting to obstruct independence," requesting the Portuguese Government "to continue and to strengthen its efforts to put an end to all such activities."

In another decision, the Assembly approved the report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Reported Massacres in Mozambique (established by the Assembly last spring, after disclosures on atrocities perpetrated by Portuguese troops in Tete), which in particular asks the present Portuguese Government, and the transitional Government in Mozambique, to bring the guilty to justice, and calls for compensation for the criminal acts committed against the people of Mozambique by the former Portuguese Government. (United Nations document A/9939; United Nations press releases GA/5186, GA/EF/1579; *Tanzanian Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 27, 1974; *New York Times*, Dec. 5, 1974).

SECURITY COUNCIL SETS NAMIBIA DEADLINE

On December 17, the Security Council voted unanimously to demand that South Africa make a "solemn commitment" to give up Namibia.

Resolution 366 states demands hammered out after a quarter-century of struggle:

— that South Africa comply with the UN's decisions and that "it recognizes the territorial integrity of Namibia as a nation, such "solemn declaration" to be addressed to the Security Council;

— that South Africa "effect the withdrawal . . . of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations";

— that, pending the transfer to "comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; release all Namibian political prisoners", including detainees, whether in Namibia or South Africa: "abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands"; and "accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment".

A deadline of May 30, 1975, was set "for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance . . . and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter".

Mention of economic sanctions against South Africa—which sends shudders throughout Pretoria and among Western delegations (US Mission delegate Barbara M.



South African military units active in the Caprivi defy U.N. resolutions.

White told the UN "that the United States believed sanctions 'would not be an effective means' of inducing South Africa to alter her racial policies" (*Times*, New York, December 17, 1974)—was shelved for the time being. The wording "appropriate measures" hangs in the air.

The resolution is weaker and vaguer than the one originally sponsored by the African members of the Council, which called for sanctions against South Africa unless independence was granted to Namibia by March, 1975. The sponsors apparently compromised in order to avoid another veto by the Western Powers. (The United States, Great Britain and France used their veto power to prevent South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations in October). Nevertheless, the South African Foreign Minister immediately declared that South Africa was considering withdrawal from the UN as a result of the Security Council decision.

The General Assembly had earlier approved several recommendations contained in the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia and already endorsed by the Fourth Committee (on decolonization and trust territories). The Assembly reaffirmed that the national liberation movement of Namibia, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), is the "authentic representative of the people of Namibia," and authorized financing an office for SWAPO in New York and defraying the expenses of a SWAPO representative when on any mission authorized by the Council for Namibia. The Assembly reiterated its call for a boycott of South Africa to force it to withdraw from Namibia, and for complete support for the independence struggle of the Namibian people. The United Nations specialized agencies were requested to give assistance to SWAPO and to ensure its participation in their work. In terms of the Assembly's decision, the United Nations will set up a radio transmitter in an independent African state to broadcast to the people of Namibia, and an Institute for Namibia in Zambia to prepare Namibians to take over the administration of their country after independence.

The Assembly also voted to enlarge the Council for Namibia and to extend the appointment of Sean McBride as the Commissioner for Namibia for a further one-year term, until December 31, 1975; (United Nations press

release GA/5186; *Washington Post*, Dec. 18, *Los Angeles Times*, Dec. 18, *New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1974).

SECURITY COUNCIL ASKED TO MEET AGAIN ON SOUTH AFRICA

The General Assembly adopted several resolutions aimed at maintaining the momentum in the campaign against South Africa reached with the rejection of South Africa's credentials, the expulsion debate in the Security Council and finally the refusal to allow South Africa's participation in the Assembly proceedings. In one of the resolutions, the Assembly requested the Security Council to consider measures against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter (which deals with "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.") Only the United States delegation voted against this resolution, claiming that it would not be an effective means" and indicating that the US would veto such a resolution if it was introduced in the Security Council.

The Assembly expressed its concern over the veto in the Security Council to prevent South Africa's expulsion, and called on France and Great Britain to end all military collaboration with the apartheid regime. Other significant provisions in the resolutions adopted include a call for a campaign against collaboration with South Africa, especially as regards banks and multinational corporations, immigration, and cultural, educational, scientific and other contacts. The Assembly recommended South Africa's exclusion from participation in all United Nations-affiliated organizations and conferences, and recognition of the liberation movements. It also called on States and organizations not to recognize any Bantustan authority or institution. (United Nations document A/RES/3324)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONDEMNS US, CALLS FOR MAJORITY RULE IN ZIMBABWE

In a resolution on the question of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, the Assembly condemned the United States for its continued importation of chrome in violation of the sanctions, and called on the United States Government to repeal legislation permitting such importation. The Assembly called for strict enforcement of UN sanctions, in particular by preventing white emigration

and by forbidding the operation of the Rhodesian airlines and of tourist and information offices, and by invalidating passports and other documents for travel to Rhodesia. The Assembly also reiterated its conviction that the scope of sanctions should be widened and requested the Security Council to meet on the issue as soon as possible.

In another resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed the principle "that there should be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe and that any settlement

relating to the future of the Territory must be worked out with the full participation of the genuine political leaders and the leaders of the national liberation movements." The Assembly reaffirmed its support for the struggle of the Zimbabwean people under the leadership of the OAU-recognized movements, and called for moral and material assistance to the movements. (United Nations press release GA/T/2088, United Nations document A/9940). ■

action news and notes



POLITICAL/EDUCATIONAL ACTION

ASHE IN SOUTH AFRICA—PROJECTS AND CRITICISMS

The South African Committee for Fairness in Sports ran a full two page advertisement in the *New York Times*, in which Arthur Ashe's picture appeared as one of several examples of so-called multi-racialism in sports. Tennis pro Ashe played in Johannesburg in November for the second year participating in the South African Open Championships. While there, Ashe announced that he will set up an "African Tennis Fund" to aid Africans and Coloureds, saying that it was "necessary" to have such segregated funding "until such time as facilities for tennis are

available on an equal basis for black South Africans." (*African News*, Durham, Nov. 28, 1974) Ashe hopes to raise \$1 million within a five year period, and launched the project with a tennis festival in South Africa. He plans also to obtain money from multinational corporations with investments in South Africa, citing IBM and General Motors as possible sources.

Arthur Ashe was refused a visa to play in South Africa for several years. The South African Government must have realized that Ashe would be very useful in helping to build an image of non-racialism in sport, however, and finally granted him a visa. Ashe seems to have reconciled himself to be used in this way. While in Johannesburg, Ashe said, "I know that admitting Black players only to certain tournaments is like putting icing on a cake, but there has to be a start somewhere and the situation can only improve from here." (*Daily News*, Dar, es Salaam, Nov. 19, 1974)

Ashe has not only justified his own participation in South African tennis games, but has criticized India's refusal to play South Africa in the Davis Cup Tennis finals.

Ashe has been criticized by numerous anti-apartheid and black groups for playing in South Africa despite a call for an international sports boycott. A spokesman from the American Committee on Africa, Ray Gould stated, "We feel that Mr. Ashe is terribly misguided in his efforts to bring about a rapprochement between White and Black in South Africa. . . The South African government has far more to gain from Arthur Ashe's participation in their sports program [than Ashe has]." Commenting on the possibility of corporate gifts to Ashe's new tennis fund, ". . . it gives the corporations an opportunity once again to throw in a few dollars of 'conscience money,' and it allows them to continue their own practices of separate but unequal. We feel that he [Ashe] is so far off the mark . . . that it is readily conceivable that the small step forward he feels he is taking, is really a step in the wrong



Arthur Ashe: playing South Africa's game.

direction." Gould also severely condemned Ashe's criticism of India, and announced that ACOA would protest the US Davis Cup team's plans to host the South African team this month. (*Daily World*, New York, Dec. 19, 1974)

South Africa has used tennis as a prime example of its flexibility concerning sports, welcoming international black tennis players like Ashe and Australia's Goolagong, to add the black element to the sport, while not allowing South African Blacks full participation in the sport, much less in the society.

Another aspect of the same policy has been the welcome mat laid out for black entertainers. Recent visitors revealed their differing reactions to South Africa. American born singer Josephine Baker, (now a French citizen) called apartheid a "shame" and "sickening" while in South Africa. Pop singer Lovelace Watkins said he would not mention politics but would only "try to make people happy" in South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974) Regardless of their private opinions about South Africa, the sports people and performers first of all make money for themselves and the South African entrepreneurs who sponsor them. Secondly, they fit into the South African attempt to create the image of a change of heart within the apartheid system—a change which is not even one of Chris Barnard's transplants.

SUPPORT FOR SA HUMAN RIGHTS DAY RALLIES

A number of church and peace groups in the US sent telegrams and messages of support to the Committee for Human Rights in South Africa on the occasion of their first public event. Rallies were held in the cities of Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth on December 8, two days before International Human Rights Day. Messages were sent by the Black Methodists for Church Renewal, the New York Community Church and Church of the Ascension, the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the World Federalists and a number of individuals. (Press Release, ACOA, Dec., 1974). The American Committee on Africa helped organize the messages of support which were publically requested by the SA Human Rights Committee. The Committee issued a statement which said that its purpose was to inform people about the real situation in South Africa, the government's non-adherence to the UN Human Rights Charter, the plight of political detainees and to show that "fundamental change in South Africa is needed . . . not the piecemeal rationalization programmes of Vorster and Botha [the South African Ambassador to the UN]." (Press Release, ACOA, New York, Dec. 3, 1974)

WASHINGTON POST CRITICIZED BY LOCAL GROUP

An ad hoc group, the Project on Southern Africa, has been established to monitor the media on Africa or, in the words of one of its members, to be a "truth squad" concerning Africa. One of its first actions was to protest the factual inaccuracies which came out in a series of *Washington Post* editorials on South Africa. The paper generally defended US policy of support for South Africa and opposed South Africa's suspension from the UN. The group, located in the capital city, consisted of spokeswoman and lawyer, Golar T. Butcher, formerly with Congressman Diggs' Sub-Committee on Africa; Courtland Cox, Secretary General of the Sixth Pan African Congress (which was held in Dar es Salaam during the summer of 1974); Sylvia Hill, the North American

coordinator of the Congress; Mel McCaw of the African American Institute; Charles Cobb of Howard University; Florence Tate of the African Services Bureau; Dan Mathews of the African Bibliographic Center and others. After the group met with the paper's editor the *Post* agreed to carry a differing view on its opinion/editorial page. (Press Release, Nov. 19, 1974)

LUTHERAN LEADERS SPEAK OUT ON NAMIBIA

The executive committee of the Lutheran Council in the USA sent an Open Letter to President Gerald R. Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and UN Ambassador John Scali on November 20, 1974, urging a "generous funding commitment for the Namibia Institute", due to open in Lusaka early in 1975; "concurrence with the principles of" the Council for Namibia decree to protect Namibia's natural resources from foreign exploitation; to consider joining the Council for Namibia; and "strong support for congressional legislation governing American corporations that operate in Namibia".

SHORT NOTES

The African Youth Movement for Liberation and Unity held an evening meeting on National Liberation and Peoples' Powers on November 23 in New York. Much of the conference focussed on Ethiopia and Eritrea, but the situations in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau were also covered.

The Committee for a Free Mozambique held a fund raising party on December 16 to collect funds for its FRELIMO Photographic Equipment Project. Approximately \$500 was raised through admission contributions and an auction of African artifacts.

The Pan African Students Organization in the Americas (PASOA) held a demonstration on December 7 in front of the UN urging South Africa's expulsion from the world body. PASOA will hold a conference in March. John Akpan, President of the New York Chapter of PASOA commented, "We African students who are outside the reach of apartheid understand what a huge psychological advantage that [SA's expulsion from the UN] would give to our brothers and sisters who are fighting for their liberation on the continent." (*Daily World*, New York, Dec. 13, 1974)

ECONOMIC ACTION

ACOA CALLS FOR MORE ACTION AGAINST RHODESIAN TOURISM

Following an initial call by several church groups for protests against agencies allowing US tourism to Rhodesia (see *Southern Africa*, December, 1974), Judge William Booth, the President of ACIA, has urged groups and individual to challenge tourist and travel agencies. He said in a release issued on December 2, "The white minority government of Ian Smith is about to topple . . . there is no legitimate justification for sending American tourist dollars to help subsidize Rhodesia's racial oppression." *For more information write to ACOA, 164 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016. Order the Corporate Information Center Brief on Rhodesian Tourism, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10027.*

BANK CAMPAIGN—UPDATE

The successful citizens campaign against certain US banks involved in loans to the South African government or its agencies has not abated. A delegation sponsored by

the Central Atlantic Conference, United Church of Christ, is also including representatives of the United Virginia Bankshares and Champaign and ACOA met with the President of United Virginia Bank, Richard Dilworth and the International Vice President, Thomas Carr in mid-October. Following the meeting, Mr. Dilworth sent a letter to the CAC conference minister, Sidney Lovett noting:

(1) "Since the controversy surrounding this loan arose, we have not made any new loans to the Republic of South Africa, although we have been offered opportunities to do so; and (2) We have never indicated any intent to renew the present loan. . ."

Persons representing local churches, community groups and ACOA met with First Pennsylvania Bank Chairman James Bunting, December 3. Mr. Bunting confirmed the bank's new policy of no future loans to South Africa, for businesses there or the South African Government. He noted the bank had \$13 million in outstanding loans, mainly to corporations such as General Motors for business operations in South Africa.

A delegation sponsored by the National Council of Churches, including national church and ACOA representatives, met with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the European American Banking Corporation, Harry Ekblom and Klaus Jacobs, respectively, on December 12. European American recently acquired the bankrupt Franklin National Bank of New York, the largest on Long Island, N.Y. It has been involved in an extensive public relations campaign in the metropolitan area since the takeover.

The bank confirmed new involvements in loans to the government-owned SA Iron and Steel Corporation for huge expansion of the Saldhana Bay complex. The representatives denied knowledge of the money lent intended for Rhodesia's Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO) and noted the Treasury Department sent a representative to investigate the sanctions violation. They noted the sharp downturn in the Euro-dollar market was decreasing their involvement in South African and other loans, while competition for these loans is increasing. The bank does not intend to change its position on these loans. (ACOA, *Background paper*, New York, Dec. 17, 1974)

INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

LIBERATION SUPPORT

Students in Great Britain are involved in two major campaigns: on disinvestment by university and local authorities from companies involved in Southern Africa, and on fund-raising for the liberation movements. There was considerable focus on the latter in November and December; at Newcastle University a sponsored hitch-hike was undertaken by over 20 people and about \$500 was raised. An exhibition of Zimbabwean paintings raised a further \$35. The students union donated \$25 and a blood donation session was scheduled for January 26, 1975. At the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, liberation movement leaders led several special engagements and over \$500 was raised at these events. At St. John's College, York, there was a sponsored walk, a special poverty luncheon and "folk evening" on November 8 which raised over \$350. Other student unions taking part in the week's activities were Gloucester College of Art and Design, Southampton, Manchester University (which collected 95 pints of blood), Rachel

MacMillan College of Education, and Lancaster University. London School of Economics and Leeds University Students Union held a joint "alternative lunch" and jumbo sale and raised over \$700. Union officers at Birmingham Polytechnic donated a day's salary from union officers for the liberation movements. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Dec. 1974-Jan. 1975)

Also in November a leading charity group, the "War on Want", strongly criticized the British Government and charities for failing to give support to African liberation movements. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 21, 1974) Also in October the "Aktionsgemeinschaft Solidarische Welt" in Berlin became the first German organization to promise large-scale aid to Guinea-Bissau. It is sending ten rice-hulling machines to Guinea-Bissau. (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, Oct. 14, 1974) Further, employees of the President's Office in Tanzania donated approximately \$20,000 to the African Liberation Fund and pledged to contribute contributions until all of Africa is liberated. (*Daily Nation*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 8, 1974)

The Arab Fund for Loans to Africa is extending a loan of \$250,000 to Guinea-Bissau. Albania has established diplomatic relations with Guinea-Bissau, a move which may bring concrete economic support to the new nation. (*Washington Post*, Nov. 17, 1974)

Once again the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has pledged full support to the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe until Smith's illegal regime is brought down. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 12, 1974) The OAU has made provisions for a big boost in funds to all the African liberation groups, with the prospect of even more money to come in 1975. More than \$1,500,000 has already been allocated for the first quarter, with FRELIMO being the major recipient and SWAPO second. (Johannesburg, Dec. 7, 1974)

Canada's Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies (TCLPAC) has been actively fundraising this year in support of famine relief for the Cape Verde Islands. This project was chosen in consultation with PAIGC. They secured \$15,000 each from Oxfam Quebec and Oxfam Canada, as well as \$3,000 from Oxfam Belgium which has been sent to PAIGC. In addition they raised \$5,000 from a cinema of solidarity series and other fundraising activities. Now that the territories are no longer colonies, the Committee will be turning its efforts to the rest of southern Africa as well, and has changed its name to the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC).

CHURCHES

The Christian Peace Conference (CPC) has come out with official support for revolutionary violence "if it is the only democratic method left for the oppressed to liberate themselves from colonialism and other evils." (*Daily Nation*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 20, 1974) Canon Burgess Carr, secretary-general of the All-Africa Conference of Churches has long urged African Christians to support liberation movements, and the National Christian Council of Kenya is attempting to make concrete steps in that direction. The Council has begun a major campaign of education and liberation movement support in Kenya by observing Sharpeville Day and Frelimo Day, and asking representatives from FRELIMO, SWAPO, and ANC in for special occasions. (Letter from the National Christian Council of Kenya to SAC, Nov. 6, 1974) Tanzania's Minister for Foreign Affairs has urged the church in



Rev. Burgess Carr.

Tanzania to give more assistance to the liberation movements. (*Sunday News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 17, 1974)

A new row has erupted among churches in England, especially within the Church of England, over whether it should make a grant of \$7,500 to the ecumenical Christian Concern for Southern Africa (CCSA) group which is involved in studies of financial investments of British churches in South Africa. The British Council of Churches has recommended that its member churches support CCSA, and currently the Roman Catholic, Methodist, Quakers, and a few others are doing so. (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 22, 1974)

The World Council of Churches has adopted a boycott of the following banks with operations in white-dominated Southern Africa: The Deutsche Bank, West Germany; The Societe Generale, France; The Midland Bank, U.K.; Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank N.V., Netherlands; The Societe General de Banque S.A., Belgium; and The Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Austria. (WCC letter, Geneva, October, 1974)

SPORTS AND CULTURE AND EDUCATION

A protest led by Prof. Dennis Brutus took place against the World Amateur Baseball Tournament in Austin, Texas in November. Brutus protested the presence of the South African team in the tournament in a formal statement which he shared with the United Nations Special Committee of Apartheid. Brutus is a South African in exile in this country who is also President of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee. He protested the lack of any non-white players on the South African team. (*Tampa Tribune*, Nov. 18, 1974)

The International Skating Union has appointed five South African officials as figure-skating judges for 1975-76, (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 23, 1974) while the International Swimming Federation is maintaining its ban on South African and Rhodesian participation in world

swimming events. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1974)

The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (CSSA) has appealed to Britain to cancel all sports relations with South Africa, and Kenya has decided to continue its ban on all sports competitions against Britain until it stops competition with South Africa. (*Guardian*, London, November 1974) Uganda has also broken all sporting ties with Britain, largely over the recent British Lions' rugby tour of South Africa. (*Times*, London, Nov. 13, 1974) New Zealand has refused to admit a team from the all-white Johannesburg Diggers Rugby Club into the country. Halt All Racist Tours (HART) of New Zealand has also protested a tour of South Africa by New Zealand's Hutt Valley softball club that took place in September. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1974)

The Communist Party of Albania led an occupation of a stadium in Brescia where the British Rugby team was scheduled to play South Africa and Italy December 11. (*Agence France-Presse*, Nov. 20, 1974)

LABOR

The Universal Postal Union has decided to exclude South Africa from its meetings and to invite the OAU to take part in the union's work. The postal union is one of the oldest international organizations, and has representatives from virtually every country in the world. (*The Washington Post*, May 29, 1974)

A letter signed by Danish trade unionists and political parties has been sent to over 400 political prisoners from South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Trade unions signing the letters include the Metal Workers Union, unions in the building and textiles trade, and members of the Danish Communist Party and Young Communist League. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, September 1974)

Representatives of the Swedish Labor Confederation and the Confederation of Trade will visit South Africa in early 1975 to assess the labor situation in five Swedish-affiliated industries: Asea, Electrolux, Alfa-lvala, SKF, and Atlas Copco. The two trade unions stressed their solidarity with South African workers in the companies and said they backed their claims for better work and social conditions. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 27, 1974)

BOYCOTTS, CAMPAIGNS

The British Anti-Apartheid Movement continues its two-pronged thrust against investment in white-dominated Southern Africa, and its support for liberation movements. As a special focus on the latter, it continues to educate and organize around support for political prisoners. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Sept., Oct., Nov., and Dec.-Jan. issues, 1974-1975) A similar over-all thrust is envisioned in Australia where Neville Curtis, banned former president of the National Union of South African Students (from 1969-71) has been appointed as full-time organizer of a national anti-apartheid campaign by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid.

In Britain, Labour MP's are launching a campaign to curb British Airways' profitable trade with Rhodesia. According to the *Guardian* they are considering whether to ask British Airways to close their Salisbury office. (*Guardian*, London, Nov. 27 and 28, and Dec. 29, 1974) Nigeria has refused to allow British Airways to stop at Lagos en route to South Africa. (*Times*, London, Nov. 21, 1974)

British Columbia celebrated United Nations Day by

scratching South African wines and liquors from future Canadian stock lists. (*The Colonist*, Victoria, October 1974)

Students in a number of places are leading campaigns to get South Africa expelled from the United Nations. Nigerian students made representations to their government leaders to sponsor an ouster move within the UN (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 4, 1974), and Tanzania has strongly condemned the U.S., France, and U.K. for vetoing South Africa's expulsion. Thousands of Tanzanian

youth demonstrated against this use of the veto by the UN Security Council. (*Sunday News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 17, 1974)

The Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement is focusing its sanctions campaigns on Rhodesian tobacco imports into Holland. One-third of Dutch tobacco imports come from Rhodesia—6000 metric tons per annum. The anti-apartheid group has a bill before the Dutch parliament to enforce sanctions against the tobacco. (Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement newsletter, Nov. 1974) ■

books

Jordan K. Ngubane, *Ushaba: The Hurtle to Blood River, A Zulu Umlando*, Three Continents Press: Washington D.C. 1974. hard, \$12.00 soft, \$5.00

Ushaba (Enemy) is Ngubane's first attempt at novel writing in English. The novel is written in the Umlando genre which, according to the author, is a form of writing unique to the Zulus. In this form the umland, or narrator, intersperses the story with lengthy political tracts to place the incidents described in a socio-historical setting and to air his political views. Hence the book invites criticism both as a work of art and as a statement of Ngubane's political opinions.

The novel can be seen as a description of the clash between two ethnic-national groups. The two antagonists are the Africans and the Afrikaners who are locked in a life-or-death struggle. The symbolic focus of the struggle is the legendary battle of the Blood River, in which the trekking Afrikaner farmers decisively crushed the power of the mighty Zulu empire built by Shaka and Dingaan. The novel purports to show how the struggle has continued ever since, albeit under different forms and with new weapons. The imagery of this struggle is sustained throughout the book. This elemental struggle between two opposing cultures is sometimes obscured and veiled by liberalism and other "white ideologies" which are trying to coopt the Africans into the system of "white values." In Ngubane's view the basic problem in South Africa is the irreconcilable clash between a world view finding expression in the culture of the Afrikaners and derived from a Judaeo-Roman-Greek heritage and the culture of the Africans which is in the final analysis based on the "Buntu Ideal."

The story, if it can be called so, consists of disparate incidents in the lives of a select number of characters who have to a varying degree become disillusioned with the racially structured hierarchy in South Africa. Scenes of humiliations are described which are shown to have made the Africans very bitter. As a result many of them have become adherents of the ideology represented by "Buntu Ideal." Rapid conversion to this world view among the Africans was bringing about a concomitant unity of thought and action. There is a corresponding weakening of the forces on the side of the Afrikaners who are shown to have been thrown into disarray by the rising tide of a united African resistance.

The story itself is marred by an almost unbearable

monotonous repetitiveness. Over and over it is stressed that "Buntu Ideal" is a larger, broader and older truth than the "white value system." Every meanness and calousness on the part of any of the white character in the story is attributed to this ubiquitous "Judeo-Greek-Roman value system." Despite the almost continuous evocation of this "Buntu Ideal" there is suprisingly little discussion as to what this ideal is supposed to embody.

A more serious shortcoming exhibited by Ngubane is his almost ahistorical view of the developments of ideas and culture. Although the Afrikaners' outlook on life has of course been affected by its Judeo-Greek-Roman origin it has undergone radical changes under the impact of particular socio-economic forces that obtained in South Africa. Culture is a dynamic and not a static reality; the development of the African culture has been similarly affected by the coming of the European settlers. The settler invasion has added a new dimension to the African experience and his culture has to change in response to the new challenges. Culture is never a finality and keeps expanding. African cultural development has been stunted and distorted by the colonialists, but that is no reason to assume that all the cultural features present in the pre-colonial society were progressive and deserving of adulation.

Because of the oversimplification and reduction of the South African problem to exclusively a clash between two cultures the writer develops a Manichean view on ethical issues. Hence, the tendency to see everything in terms of this fundamental, all-embracing issue of Black and White. The struggle becomes an armeggadon in which one side completely annihilates the other at one stroke. Change is no more a process but an event; the defeat of the Whites.

Ngubane himself was a liberal in the fifties. His abandonment of liberalism is not an isolated event but forms a part of the trend among certain Black intellectuals in South Africa to reject all ideology. Any kind of opposition to the government is accepted as valid. The rationale is that the extremely repressive nature of the South African government and the immense difficulty involved in overthrowing it justifies any kind of opposition, including opposition through government-created institutions such as Bantustans. The danger in this kind of reasoning is that it can be used by many opportunistic leaders to rationalize their maneuvering which in effect represent narrow interests. ■

PACKET OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. Order from the Center for the Study of Power and Peace, 110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002. Only \$2.50 for the packet of Center Surveys on Southern Africa which include: *Portugal's Colonies: Colonial History and the Azores Treaty; Portugal Colonies: Liberation Movements; South Africa and Apartheid; Rhodesia: White Supremacy; Resistance to Apartheid: South Africa and Namibia; Drought and Famine in West Africa; Liberation Movements in Portuguese Africa: Overview and Guinea; Liberation Movements in Portuguese Africa: Angola and Mozambique; Rhodesia: History, Sanctions, Resistance and Zambian Border Closing; Rhodesia: The Byrd Amendment and U.N. Sanctions*

TOURISM IN RHODESIA; Breaking Sanctions. A Corporate Information Center Brief (October, 1974) giving background on Rhodesia, UN and US Sanctions, the role of Tourism, Rhodesia's illegal activities in the US, US laws and sanctions, and American tourist agencies involved in Rhodesia. Action ideas, lists of tourist agencies. Order now from the Corporate Information Center, Room 566, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10027. 1-10 copies, 60 cents each, bulk rates available.

DO YOU USE A TRAVEL AGENCY WHICH SUPPORTS RHODESIAN RACISM?????

To find out write to the United Church of Christ, attn. Don Morton, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10027.

CASE STUDIES ON 4 US COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA. Detailed information on the South African activities of Control Data, IBM, ITT, and Motorola focusing on issues such as size of investment, control exercised by the US parent company, sales to the South African military, level of African employment, and whether or not the company is vital to South Africa. A 15 page study emerging from the Action for World Community group, 1424 Sixteenth St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 which has activated interest in the local Washington school board's and government's policies towards purchasing contracts with companies like the above which are involved in South Africa. For more info, write Action for World Community.

CATALOG, SOUTHERN AFRICA TODAY. A complete list of all materials available through the Africa Fund, 87 entries and order form. Books, pamphlets, periodicals on Southern Africa both from the Fund, ACOA and other national/international sources. Write for your free copy now. Winter, 1975. Africa Fund, 164 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016.

NEW FACT SHEET. STOP BANKING ON APARTHEID. Summary of US loans to South Africa, citing American banks' involvement, and article reprint on one campaign against the Maryland National Bank by Richard F. Fernandez. Order from ACOA, 164 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

SOLIDARITY WITH THE AFRICAN PEOPLE



A strikingly beautiful poster, designed by a Cuban artist and produced by the Venceremos Brigade. 18" x 24" in size, it is printed in many vibrant colors and conveys a message of militant solidarity.

\$1.00
(\$.75 apiece for
bulk orders of 10 or more)

Enclosed is \$ for posters entitled:
"Solidarity with the African People"

Name (please print) _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

Organization _____

mail to
VENCEREMOS BRIGADE - National Office
GPO Box 3169, New York, N.Y. 10001

MEDICAL & HEALTH SERVICES IN MOZAMBIQUE,
Report by Jennifer Davis after a visit to Tanzania and half a week at the FRELIMO Americo Boavida Hospital in Mtware. Information on the hospital, medical services training, health care inside Mozambique and the future need for continued assistance to health projects in Mozambique. Order the report from the Africa Fund, 164 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016.

LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, a publication of the Southern African Liberation Committee, 1118 S. Harrison Road, East Lansing, Michigan 48823. Facutal background sheets on each country in Southern Africa, US corporations in South Africa, maps, graphics. Mimeo. Contact SALC or phone for infor-

mation on local action projects (517) 332-0861.

NEW BROCHURES:

On the African Liberation Support Committee, includes some information on ALSC's political position and program. Write New York City Wide ALSC, PO Box 239, Lefferts Station, Brooklyn, NY 11225

"Say NO to Apartheid Now", by the Action for World Community, 1424 Sixteenth St., NW, Washington, DC 20036. Short background on South Africa, role of US investment, call for action against corporations such as Control Data, ITT, IBM and Motorola. (For story see *Southern Africa*, November, 1974)



SUPPORT THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION

Send beautiful and informative
NOTE CARDS

Printed by the
Africa Information Service

Each card is a photograph taken in Mozambique or Guinea-Bissau and contains a quotation on a particular aspect of the social revolutions being waged in those countries. Ample space is provided for personal notes, messages or greetings to friends and correspondents.

50¢ per card — \$5.00 for a set of 14

Inquire for bulk sales

Africa Information Service
244 West 27th Street
New York, New York 10001
212-691-5240


THE WOMEN'S STRUGGLE IN GUINEA-BISSAU

Slide/Talk Show

Stephanie Urdang will talk and show slides about her recent four week visit to Guinea-Bissau to any group interested. She met and talked to many women about their experiences in fighting "two colonialisms"—Portuguese and men.

She can be contacted through:

Southern Africa Committee
244 West 27th Street
Fifth floor
New York, New York 10001
(212) 741-3480



Samora Machel, Mozambique: Sowing the Seeds of Revolution

A BOOKLET RECENTLY PUBLISHED BY THE
BRITISH COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM IN MOZAM-
BIQUE, ANGOLA AND GUINE

The speeches of Samora Machel, FRELIMO president, collected here present the theory and practice of consolidating a people's struggle under Mozambican conditions.

Available from:

Committee for Freedom in M, A and G
Top Floor
12 Little Newport Street
London WC2 AH 755
England

Overview

"I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts"

Virgil

It is an old political truth, and one vividly illustrated by Africa's own experience in the last 15 years that liberation does not come as a gift bestowed by either enemy or friend. Only conscious organized struggle can ensure the final victory of the people's cause, true national independence.

"The past and present experiences of various peoples, in the present situation of national liberation struggles in the world (especially in Vietnam, Congo, and Zimbabwe) . . . show us not only that compromises with imperialism do not work, but also that the normal way of national liberation, imposed on peoples by imperialist repression, is armed struggle."

—Amilcar Cabral, 1966
"The Weapon of Theory"

This is not to say that negotiated settlements lead inevitably to a betrayal of the people's freedom. But the settlement must reflect the realities of the power relationships between oppressor and oppressed. Thus the settlements which have now brought independence to Mozambique and Guinea Bissau confirm the strength of the liberation movements and the weakness of the Portuguese. Liberation was fought for and won; it has come as a direct consequence of the confrontation between the two contending forces inside the country concerned. The "terms" of the final settlement could be dictated by FRELIMO and the PAIGC. The strength which enabled those movements to win final victory, their ability to mobilize a united population in the years of armed struggle, will play a vital role in the inevitable struggle that lies ahead—the struggle for a second victory—the construction of a society based on social justice, equality and freedom from exploitation.

The situation that seems to be developing around the proposed "settlement" for Zimbabwe looks disturbingly different. It appears increasingly likely that ZANU and ZAPU, the movements which have displayed expanding

strength in the last few years, are not going to be given the time or the space to build the conditions necessary for a true victory for the Zimbabwean people. There are sobering indications that the regional "Big Powers" in Southern Africa—South Africa on the one hand and several independent African countries on the other—are attempting to dictate a "solution" designed to serve their own immediate interests rather than those of the Zimbabwean people.

It appears that Smith and the Zimbabwean movements are both being pressured to reach some agreement by those external forces which have traditionally been regarded as their respective allies.

For reasons that may be very different, neither Vorster nor Presidents Kaunda, Khama and the other regional Heads of State want an extended war in Zimbabwe. Vorster can make life very difficult for Smith. The withdrawal of South African troops, the closing of the precious railway line, the sealing off of Rhodesia's economic links to the outside world are potential weapons that could well be used to persuade white Rhodesia to be "more reasonable." By the same token the Zimbabwean liberation movements are forced to rely considerably on the sympathetic support of neighboring independent African countries.

The atmosphere of detente currently pervading Southern Africa poses serious problems for the freedom of action of the Zimbabwean liberation movements. The latest example of this "toenadering" (coming together) is the first ever visit by a South Africa Broadcasting Corporation news team to Zambia—at the invitation of the Zambian Government. The team received a friendly welcome in Lusaka, the *Zambia Daily Mail* commenting that opinions had to be exchanged between the two countries and ascribing the differences between Zambia and South Africa to "faulty communications."

It is possible, of course, to read too much into the rhetoric of first visits. Yet the danger for Zimbabweans of finding the voices of their nationalist movements effectively muted in the name of improved "communications" between Zambia and South Africa is a danger that now seems disquietingly close. •

Congressmen Take Controversial South African Tour

Seven congressmen took a two week tour of South Africa last month, despite the opposition of State Department officials who privately term the visit a triumph for the South African Information Department. The seven—six Republicans and one Democrat—received military and intelligence briefings while in South Africa, and visited an atomic energy plant, an aircraft production, a naval base, and an underground communications center.

At the same time, Michigan representative Charles W. Stenholm, the black Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Africa, was denied a South African visa, and declared *persona non grata* by Pretoria.

Independence for Portugal's Island Colonies Worries U.S.

Portugal has handed over power in Sao Tome and Principe to an African transitional government consisting of liberation movement members and one Portuguese official. The provisional administration will govern until independence in July.

The second December independence agreement negotiated with the Portuguese creates a PAIGC-dominated transitional government in the Cape Verde Islands. The islands are slated for final independence July 5th, and negotiations with the Republic of Guinea Bissau will almost certainly be the result of a planned referendum.

Because of the islands' strategic position, US diplomats pressured the Portuguese government to delay independence for Cape Verde. The American government fears that a PAIGC government in Cape Verde will allow the Soviet Union to put a military base there.

Primary Talks Under Way in Zimbabwe

Representatives of the African National Council and the Smith government have held several rounds of primary talks to establish ground rules for the proposed Rhodesian Constitutional Conference. Negotiations have been slowed, however, by what each side claims is a violation by the other of the December Lusaka agreement. The Smith government claims that nationalist leaders have broken the accord by failing to enforce a ceasefire, while the ANC charges the government with going on its promise to release all political prisoners.

The Workers Strike South African Gold Mine

Twelve thousand Lesotho mine workers went on strike at South Africa's Vaal Reef gold mine complex in early January, in protest of a new Lesotho government policy requiring that 60% of miners' wages be deposited in the banks to earn interest until the miners' return. Anglo-American mining company currently deposits about half the miners' earnings in South African banks, but the miners receive no interest.

The Lesotho government says the miners have no objection to the policy, and blames the trouble on factors in the pay of Anglo-American. The government says the mining company agents may have been aided by untitled Lesotho schoolteachers and civil servants who have gone to work in the mines because of a Lesotho government freeze on their salaries.

Although Lesotho says it intends to keep its wage policy, the South African government has threatened to stop recruiting in Lesotho unless the dispute is settled. To back that up, the Chamber of Mines is going ahead with plans to recruit 50,000 new mine workers from within South Africa. The government will offer South African miners higher wages, possible family housing at the mine site, and the option of returning to the area of recruitment instead of to a Bantustan.

Getty Pulls Out of Namibia

Getty Oil Company has announced the termination of a three-company oil exploratory mission off the coast of Namibia. The operation was being conducted by a Getty subsidiary, in conjunction with subsidiaries of Phillips Oil and Continental Oil Company.

A Getty spokesman said his company is withdrawing from Namibia because of the "unsettled political situation" in Southern Africa. Continental announced in November that it intended to end its Namibian operations because of shareholder pressure.


Angola Slated for Independence

Angola has been given a formal promise of independence for this November following six days of negotiations in southern Portugal. The independence agreement, which marks the end of a fourteen-year armed struggle in Angola, was signed by members of the Portuguese government along with representatives of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA.

Before independence, Angolans are to elect a constituent assembly to choose a President and write a constitution. Until then, a Portuguese Governor-General will oversee a twelve-member cabinet and a three-man Presidential Council.

The Councillors will represent the three Angolan liberation movements. The Portuguese and the movements will each choose three cabinet ministers, and all will contribute to an integrated army. ●

**DID YOU RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TO
SOUTHERN AFRICA?**



Note new rates for 1975 listed below:

- Individuals: \$6.00
- Institutions: \$18.00
- Optional ½ year (7 months): \$4.00
- Airmail (postage only, add subscription rate):
- South and Central America: \$9.50
- Africa, Asia and Europe: \$12.50
- Prisoners: Free

If you are unable to send \$6.00, please write to us for other arrangements
60¢ per issue; \$1.00 per double issue

- New
- Renewal
- Gift
- Change of Address (*enclose label)

Name _____

Address _____

From (if gift) _____

Give a Friend a Gift Subscription...

Southern Africa Committee
244 West 27th Street
Fifth Floor
New York, N.Y. 10001

**RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA
SUBSCRIBE NOW FOR 1975**

BULK RATE
U. S. POSTAGE
PAID
NEW YORK, N. Y.
PERMIT No. 1613

6
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. LIB.
SERIAL DEPT.
EVANSTON, IL. 60201