

10 YEARS OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE

by Sol Dubula

“The people’s patience is not endless. The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices – submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa.”

In these stirring words 10 years ago on December 16, 1961 Umkhonto we Sizwe – the Spear of the Nation – proclaimed its existence. In every major centre throughout the country organised bomb attacks against government property heralded the introduction of a new element in the revolutionary strategy to overthrow white supremacy.

This small beginning signalled a fresh path which historically speaking was consistent with the tradition of earlier armed resistance to foreign conquest by the African people. From now on, however long and arduous the task, the liberation organisations had committed themselves to the preparation of conditions in which popular armed force would play a significant role in the destruction of white power. It is appropriate on this anniversary to reflect on some of the experiences we have gained and the lessons we have learnt in the hard school of practical revolutionary struggle.

The Campaign of Sabotage

The sabotage campaign of the early 60s served a special purpose and was never advanced as a technique which would on its own lead to the destruction of the State or even do it serious material damage.

Its purpose was to lay the foundation for higher forms of military activity of the guerrilla type. There was the need to create an experienced professional military apparatus which would form the core of future guerrilla forces; the need to demonstrate that the movement was making a sharp and open break with the processes of the previous period which had correctly given emphasis to militant struggle short of armed confrontation; and the need to provide an effective method for the overthrow of white supremacy through planned rather than spontaneous activity. As stated in the Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress "all three needs were served by this convincing evidence that our liberation movement had correctly adjusted itself to the new situation and was creating an apparatus actually capable of clandestinely hitting the enemy and making preparations for a more advanced phase. The situation was such that without activity of this nature our whole political leadership may have been at stake both inside and outside the country and the steps which were simultaneously taken for the recruitment and preparation of military cadres would have met with less response".

New Situation – New Tactics

Long before December 16, 1961, Umkhonto we Sizwe under the direction and guidance of the political leadership took steps both inside and outside the country to prepare personnel in all aspects of the art of popular armed struggle. What triggered off this shift in policy? It was in response to a rapidly changing situation.

Broadly speaking it has always remained true that the character of the alien rule which was imposed on the indigenous people could not be broken without insurrectionary methods of one sort or another. There has never been a point in time at which it could realistically be expected that the white minority would surrender its racial privilege without a violent struggle. After the military defeat of the long-drawn-out wars of resistance by the African people in the first period of white conquest, every attempt by the people to assert their demands was met by brute repression. Yet it was only in the 60s that both the Communist Party and the ANC included in their perspectives preparation for armed struggle.

Did this change in strategy reflect on the correctness of the tactics which had been employed in previous decades? Certainly not. The

earlier tactics arose out of the objective realities of the earlier period. Neither the internal nor the international situation had yet matured to the point where violent insurrection or direct preparation for armed struggle could realistically be placed on the agenda.

By the 60s the picture was beginning to alter in several respects. In the international field the isolation of South Africa reached a high peak. In Africa itself the imperialist control of the continent was being undermined as one country after another was attaining independence. This had several consequences. For the first time since the colonisation of the continent the prospects of self rule were firing the imagination of the African people throughout Africa, the south included. In the second place, friendly borders were creeping closer to the territories of the beleaguered South with prospects of vital practical aid from the newly emergent states. For the first time in modern Africa successful armed struggles were waged, first in Algeria, then in Guine-Bissau, Angola, and, some years later, Mocambique, as armed national liberation forces challenged and beat back enemies with overwhelming superiority of military and material resources.

On our own front the political ferment which the country had witnessed in the previous decades reflected itself in the increasing militancy of the people. Our large working class had reached new heights of militant expression in the struggles of the 50s. The general strike drew into political action hundreds of thousands of factory workers who risked jobs and security to demonstrate against white supremacy. Mass protests, bus boycotts, anti-pass campaigns followed one upon the other. Deliberate defiance of laws and angry, and sometimes violent, spontaneous retaliation against police brutality were symptoms of the changing mood.

Turning Point

Sharpeville was a turning point, not because the shooting down of unarmed demonstrators was unique in South Africa's history nor because the organisers introduced any new element into the methods of struggle: there had been worse massacres and the organisers of the demonstrations, despite their subsequent claims to have been the innovators of new forms of struggle, had been at pains to direct the protests into explicitly peaceful channels. The PAC leader Sobukwe

The leaflet summoning the All-In African Conference at Maritzburg in 1961 where Nelson Mandela – making his first public appearance after the expiry of his banning order – launched the campaign for a general strike in protest against the new Whites-only Republican constitution due to be introduced on May 31.

wrote to the Chief of Police advising him that he and his followers would present themselves for arrest on March 21st 1960 and expressed the hope that "you will co-operate to make this a most peaceful and disciplined campaign". No, the massacre at Sharpeville was a turning point, not because it devised a new approach but because from that point onwards the white state geared itself for total mobilisation to smash the liberation movement; and from that point onwards a new emphasis had to be given to the revolutionary struggle.

It was not only in the urban areas that the growing revolutionary mood showed itself. In the countryside the 50s had produced impressive evidence that despite centuries of repression the peasantry was not submissive but possessed a capacity for action to the point of armed resistance. In Sekhukhuneland the peasantry, partly armed, doggedly resisted the attempts by the authorities to replace the traditional leaders of the people with government appointed servants, the so-called Bantu Authorities. In Zululand similar resistance was encountered. The peasant struggles of the Pondo people reached great heights: by March 1960 a vast popular movement had arisen; unofficial administrative units were set up, including People's Courts. From the chosen spots in the mountains where thousands of peasants assembled illegally, came the name of the movement – Intaba, the Mountain.

Inevitably a heightened state of political ferment gives rise to unplanned and spontaneous eruptions. These harm the revolutionary process only if they are unconnected with the main stream of struggle or if they come to dominate its course. Many of these eruptions were directly stimulated by the climate prepared by the movement's achievement in stirring larger and larger sections of our people into struggle. The Pondo revolt, for example, was not directly organised by the ANC. It had its origins in local grievances but its aims soon became the attainment of basic political goals enunciated by the movement in general, and the leaders of Intaba came to adopt in essence the full programme of the ANC. The violent clashes which were occurring in the Cape and elsewhere were signs of growing revolutionary militancy. Despite the fact that they were unplanned and spontaneous outbursts, and even exhibited certain negative and harmful features, they expressed the preparedness, courage and patriotism of those who took part in such actions as the stoning

of police stations. The SACP recognised that “those acts of desperate retaliation have a positive side although (in themselves) they cannot succeed in their objectives and although they invite heavy reprisals, setbacks and temporary defeats. For, from these defeats the people are drawing the conclusion not that resistance is futile but that it should be planned, purposeful and principled. The leaders of the African liberation movement have not merely taken a negative or critical attitude towards the Poqo-type outbreak. They have acknowledged that exclusively non-violent methods are no longer of use”. (*The Revolutionary Way Out*: statement of the Central Committee, March 1963.)

Against the background of these, and many other events, including the outlawing of the liberation organisations and the use of undisguised administrative and physical terror against any militant opposition to white rule, there was a growing disillusionment on the part of the majority of our people with the prospect of achieving their liberation by protest action which did not include armed and offensive activity of one sort or another.

Thus, when the movement in the early 60s began to alter the emphasis of its approach, it was reflecting the radical changes which had come about both in the camp of the enemy and among the people; and these were changes which the movement had itself helped bring about by the calibre of the leadership it provided in the preceding period.

The very success of the tactics of the mass mobilisation which were followed in the earlier period had helped to create the new conditions in which the conflict had now to take place.

The new Programme of the SACP adopted in 1962, whilst opposing undisciplined acts of individual terror and rejecting theories that all non-violent methods of struggle are useless or impossible, states that:

“The Communist Party considers that the slogan of ‘non-violence’ is harmful to the cause of the democratic national revolution in the new phase of the struggle, disarming the people in the face of the savage assaults of the oppressor, dampening their militancy, undermining their confidence in their leaders . . .

. . . today they (the people) are left with no alternative but to defend themselves and hit back, to meet violence with violence. The Nationalists are forcing a solution upon South Africa in which

patriots and democrats will take up arms to defend themselves, organise guerrilla armies and undertake various acts of resistance, culminating in mass insurrection against white domination."

The Enemy Hits Back

The introduction of the armed perspective in the political struggle has far-reaching consequences. It would be a mistake to regard it as just another tactic in routine mass work. Even when it does not pose the question of an immediate nation-wide uprising, it does amount to a qualitative break with the traditional methods of mass political action and mobilisation and it influences directly or indirectly every aspect of political and organisational activity.

The enemy, as was to be expected, responded with unprecedented ferocity in an attempt to destroy those connected with the new policy. The effective carrying out of this policy depended upon a number of factors including the capacity of the movement to maintain and intensify the high level of active militancy amongst the people, to guard and extend its internal organisational structures, and upon the readiness of the outside world and in particular of the emergent nations of Africa to isolate South Africa still further and to give material help and supply the considerable resources necessary to translate some of the projects into reality.

As it turned out the steps taken to safeguard the movement against the enemy's inevitable onslaught proved inadequate. In the international sphere there was a tendency to be over-optimistic and to underestimate the tenacity of external imperialist forces in support of the racist regime. And on the African continent the period following political independence exposed internal weaknesses and tendencies which were to create unexpected obstacles in the way of the prosecution of our aims.

In the result, in the middle 60s, both the internal and external situation became relatively less favourable for the implementation of previously determined tactics in the unfolding of the struggle. The course which has been charted is a difficult and protracted one. It has had its high points and low points. But the complexities we face ought not to blind us to the fact that as in the early 60s, so now, any policy of struggle which does not include as one of its basic planks the preparation for armed action is wrong and will

condemn both the people and the movement to political impotence. Of course, the changes which took place in the immediate post-Rivonia period – more particularly the weakening of the movement's internal organisational position within the country – presented new problems which the liberation movement has worked to overcome. But it remains true that the overthrow of white power in our land can only be achieved by a people's armed struggle: i.e. an armed struggle with mass participation and support. The Central Committee of the SACP in the political statement adopted at the 1966 Plenary Session said:

“The correctness and feasibility of this general policy decision were not and are not dependent on the success or failure of any particular scheme or operation. Looked at in broad perspective it remains true that the freedom of our country will have to be wrested in armed struggle and that preparation for such struggle is essential to victory.”

This does not mean that every political action must necessarily be an armed action. It does mean that every political action, whether armed or not, must be regarded as part of the build-up towards a nation-wide confrontation leading to the conquest of power.

Armed Struggle and Political Mobilisation

No overt guerrilla activity has yet taken place in our country. In 1967 and 1968 units of Umkhonto we Sizwe did engage the enemy in Zimbabwe. This is not the place to attempt a balanced assessment of the Wankie, Sipoleli and other campaigns. Suffice it to say that these events were of tremendous historical significance. It was the first time that the military units of Umkhonto we Sizwe engaged the forces of the enemy in armed combat. In this baptism of fire the modern armed pioneers of the liberation movement showed their capacity to engage the enemy and hurt him. The heroism and nobility of those who fought and died, Communists and non-Communists amongst them, have earned them a place of unchallenged honour in the saga of our drive to liberation. Those who emerged from the battles have added immensely to the storehouse of our revolutionary experience in the future battles to come.

Some of the negative experiences of the Zimbabwe campaigns reaffirmed in practice one of the most salient features of popular

armed struggle and that is that it is the culmination of a many-sided process involving political reconstruction, mass political leadership in town and country by means of organisation, propaganda, education, agitation etc., and organised armed activity drawing in more and more people as time goes on. As correctly put in the Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress: "When we talk of revolutionary armed struggle we are talking of political struggle by means which include the use of military force". All our activities whether directly military or political are calculated to help bring about a situation in which insurrectionary conditions will mature. The development of these conditions and the point at which they mature depends upon the activities of the liberation movement as only one factor. It also depends on social and economic developments both inside and outside the country over which no single political movement has absolute control.

At what point then, do professional armed groups become active? Here there is a certain dilemma. Experience (the Zimbabwe campaign included) has taught us that without internal organisation, mass mobilisation and mass support, armed activity becomes strangled. We have correctly rejected the 'pure detonator theory' which is based on the belief that the localised military actions of professional armed cadres automatically generate growing resistance and support from the people. But on the other hand to postpone all armed activity until political mobilisation and organisational reconstruction have reached a level high enough to sustain its more advanced forms, is to undermine the prospects of full political mobilisation itself. Experience of South Africa and other highly organised police states has shown that until the introduction of a new type of action it is questionable whether political mobilisation and organisation can be developed beyond a certain point. Given the disillusionment by the oppressed mass with the old forms of struggle, demonstration of the capacity of the liberation movement to meet and sustain the challenge in a new way is in itself one of the most vital factors in attracting their organised allegiance and support.

Thus we have been taught to avoid two extreme positions – in the *one case* the pure detonator theory and in the *other case* the pure reconstruction theory which implies that no organised armed activity should be undertaken until we have mobilised the people politically

and recreated advanced networks of nationwide organisation. *The first* has within it the seeds of a dramatic adventure which could be over before it started. *The second* holds out little prospect for the commencement of armed struggle and the conquest of power in our lifetime.

In our conditions the armed struggle and the political struggle are essentially one and complement one another. They cannot be tackled chronologically and the movement's concrete planning must ensure the necessary balance and blending of both sides of this essentially single struggle. This has meant an intensification of the movement's efforts in the sphere of reconstruction, propaganda and general agitation throughout the country as evidenced by the increasing intensity of internal propaganda drives.

Creating a core of trained professional armed cadres, putting them into the field with adequate logistical support and a minimum amount of contact to enable them to sustain their operations in the initial period, requires independent planning. It cannot be the overnight response to a sudden twist in the political situation. In this sense military planning, as opposed to political planning, has what one might term some mechanical aspects which inevitably involve making certain static assumptions about the future. If operations go smoothly and according to plan the beginnings of action will be the result of a deliberate decision. If not they could be triggered off by the need of the armed group to defend itself against enemy attacks. The exact moment in time therefore when actual armed action occurs will not necessarily always coincide with the most favourable local or even national situation. For this reason it is unrealistic to tie the movement's planning for the commencement of operations in the chosen regions to the probability of the emergency of a special local or national crisis, or to regard it as the culmination in each case of a full programme of propaganda or organising work.

Above all it is necessary to stress once again that the most important task which faces the movement as a whole is the intensification of the level of political mobilisation and mass struggle in every part of the country because in the last resort it will only be against such a background that armed activity can take root and spread. Thus successful armed actions are only one of the factors in the process of helping to bring about conditions in which the whole people move towards the conquest of power.

The Terrain of Armed Activity

In our situation where is the main terrain of armed activity? The ANC's Strategy and Tactics document answers that "the main physical environment (of guerrilla struggle) in the initial period is outside the enemy stronghold in the cities, in the vast stretches of our countryside". The experience of other people's struggles and our own conditions confirm the correctness of this approach.

Armed activity in its initial phases cannot take the form of a head on collision with enemy forces. Militarily there is a vast imbalance between the resources available to the enemy and to the people. The survival of armed groups and their growth therefore demands the use of techniques and tactics which will compensate for this imbalance. Given its popular character and a population which increasingly sides with and shields the armed group whilst at the same time opposing and exposing the enemy, this imbalance can be neutralised by the skilful use of tactics such as surprise, mobility, tactical retreat and other methods which combine to prevent the enemy from bringing into play its superior fire power in any decisive battle. In short, the beginnings of popular armed activity in our type of situation *takes the form of a guerrilla struggle* in which the special tactics employed aim to ensure that no individual battle is fought under circumstances unfavourable to the guerrillas.

In general guerrilla type struggles have in their initial phases taken root in the rural areas. The reason for this is obvious. The guerrilla group is a full-time professional armed unit which pops up now here, now there, and which if it is to survive, has to maintain continuously its cohesion and mobility. The guerrilla group must not be confused with the armed auxiliaries or the part-time combat groups or civilian defence, all of which have an important role to play at various stages of the struggle both in town and countryside. Because of the imbalance of military strength the guerrilla group, in order to survive and maintain its cohesion and mobility, has in general to operate away from the urban complexes in which the enemy is strongest and is most highly organised and centralised. It has to operate in terrain in which the basic population from whom it draws its strength is in the overwhelming majority.

Are there special conditions in South Africa which require us to take another look at the emphasis on the countryside in the opening

phases of the guerrilla struggle? Of the colonial and semi-colonial territories in which guerrilla wars have been fought there are none in which the urban working class forms such a significant portion of the oppressed population both numerically and politically as in South Africa. More than this, it is a working class whose political consciousness and whose history of militant struggle places it in the undisputed vanguard position of our democratic revolution. The mass upsurge in the 50s which embraced the country areas had its inspiration in the political ferment which was taking place in the main urban centres. In South African conditions it is therefore unthinkable that the main character of the armed confrontation will be a peasants' war despite the fact that the majority of the oppressed population is on the land either as peasants or as rural proletarians.

If all this is true, should the emphasis not be on urban rather than rural guerrilla struggle right at the outset? We believe not. The important factors mentioned do not alter the reality that in the initial phase organised fulltime guerrilla groups with fire power can only operate successfully in the vast stretches of our countryside. The terrain of armed struggle is chosen for us by objective conditions, only one of which is the political significance of the urban proletariat. This reality explains why in other countries — the Soviet Union, France, Yugoslavia, etc. — where the working class occupied an equal if not greater position of importance in the political correlation of forces, the main terrain of organised guerrilla warfare was outside the urban complexes. The fact that the terrain of guerrilla operations in its early stages is in the countryside does not of course imply that the rural population (whose support must be won if victory is not to evade us) is the most significant revolutionary force.

There are examples of struggles — Ireland, Cyprus, pre-1948 Palestine — in which an urban type of guerrilla warfare was the predominant form from the start. But in all these cases the military operations against the enemy were directly against an army of occupation stationed in overwhelmingly hostile territory in both town and countryside. Whilst in one sense it is correct to regard the whole oppressing minority in South Africa as a sort of army of occupation, the analogy has limited application. The guerrilla group in Dublin could move and act in its city surrounded by overwhelming support

against the uniformed occupiers. In South African cities the main operations would have to take place in terrain in which the overwhelming majority of the white people can be expected to be fanatically hostile to the guerrillas who have to move along enemy determined routes surrounded by his regular forces and his auxiliaries consisting of the whole white population.

This does not mean that there is no place for any form of military activity in the urban centres. In fact, *this is essential even from the start*. The enemy should be continuously harassed in the towns by small combat groups who carry out sabotage and other special actions; groups which obtain supplies and money and which recruit cadres for the guerrilla struggle and organise and encourage civilian resistance to enemy action against the urban population. But this activity is of a special type and although it is in support of the guerrillas, the use of the phrase 'urban guerrilla warfare' to describe it should not serve to place it on a par with guerrilla struggle in the countryside which is the main form of people's military activity in the initial phase of our popular armed struggle.

Political and Military Leadership

Our liberation movement has always rejected the view that once armed struggle is on the agenda there should be a separation between the military and political leaderships, or if there is, that the military leadership should be primary.

Of course the art of military struggle requires the formation of special organs staffed by skilled and talented personnel who devote themselves almost exclusively to the creation of armed groups, coordinate their actions and generally supervise the many-sided implementation of the movement's military perspectives. But everything we have said about the relationship between the military and political struggle demands that at all stages the political organisation should remain supreme. It is of course true that once in the field the tactical tasks of the guerrilla band can only be advanced effectively by those engaged in actual fighting, and no group of leaders sitting outside of the situation can hope to provide successful day to day leadership. But it is equally true that the overall conduct of revolutionary strategy cannot be carried out effectively by the isolated armed band. The complex and challenging art of revolution and the determination of

its tactical and strategic tasks from time to time requires a political leadership which not only provides the broad guidelines for the conduct of the military struggle itself, but relates it to the overriding task of the political mobilisation of the people as a whole, the never-ceasing interplay and positioning of class forces both nationally and internationally, the interaction of objective and subjective factors and so on. This remains true even when the armed struggle becomes the predominant form.

The army must at all stages remain the instrument of the political movement and any tendency to the contrary will introduce all the unhealthy features of militarism. An armed struggle which is not "ennobled by the enlightened and organising influence" of the correct type of political leadership "becomes frayed, corrupted and prostituted". (Lenin). The revolutionary armed struggle is no more and no less than a political struggle by means which include the use of military force, and the victory for which we are striving has as its aim the conquest of power by the people led by its political vanguard and not by an army. Of course, as the armed struggle begins to play a more and more important part in our overall strategy, the main task of the whole political leadership centres more and more on the successful implementation of military objectives. But at all stages it remains a political leadership answerable to the political organisation which is primary, and not to the army, which is its instrument.

The unavoidable and necessary separation between the military and political organs creates special problems which must be solved and tendencies against which we must continuously guard.

The Domino Theory

Our struggle is a direct and integral part of the struggle going on in all the unliberated territories in Africa and is also bound up with the overall struggle against imperialist domination on our continent. South Africa has been embraced by Western imperialism as a bastion against the spread of true independence and as one of the chief instruments of imperialist dominated diplomacy in many parts of Africa. Whether it be through direct military presence (as in Zimbabwe), close military and financial collaboration (as in Angola and Mocambique), direct economic and political domination (as in some of the former High Commission territories), or indirect erosion of the

national integrity of some independent territories by various financial and economic devices (as in Malawi), it is clear that the minority regimes in Southern Africa have come to regard the survival of foreign rule generally and, in particular, white rule in the South, as indivisible.

Every pronouncement on the question by representatives of our own racist regime makes clear that South Africa regards its immediate strategic borders as extending to the northern-most points of Angola, Mocambique and Rhodesia.

Against this background it is clear that an important strategic connection exists between the efforts of the guerrilla forces in every part of occupied Southern Africa and effective progress on the people's front is closely bound up with increasing collaboration between all the liberation organisations in the area.

The strength of the enemy in alliance with its foreign supporters has from time to time encouraged the suggestion that the liberation of Southern Africa should be approached as a project to be achieved in geographic stages — the so called domino theory. First Mocambique, so the argument runs, then Angola, then Rhodesia and then South Africa. Such proposals, however well motivated, would in fact play into the hands of the common enemy. Nothing would suit him better than to be able to concentrate his superior material and military resources in a single area undiverted by a need to defend his rear.

Such an approach stands in basic contradiction to the fundamental tenet of popular armed struggle that the enemy must be stretched and deprived of opportunities to mobilise his superior material resources in a restricted area.

It is in any case doubtful whether the character of popular armed struggle makes it feasible for any forces other than indigenous ones to make a meaningful direct contribution to the struggle in given areas. Amongst the disadvantages which faced those units of Umkhonto we Sizwe which were engaged by the enemy in Zimbabwe was the need to operate in unfamiliar geographic, cultural and social surroundings even though the ethnic and linguistic connection between sections of our people and those in Zimbabwe are historically closer than with the Portuguese territories. On the other hand the enemy which cannot and does not rely on local popular support can by the nature of the tactics which he is forced to employ, concentrate and deploy his forces outside his own territory with greater effectiveness.

There can be little doubt, and Rhodesia has already demonstrated this, that when Portuguese rule in Angola and Mocambique reaches a point of crisis, Caetano's friends in South Africa will be only too ready to intervene on a massive scale. South African government leaders have said as much. Mr T. A. J. Gerdener, the Administrator of Natal, on the occasion of the establishment of the Mocambique Soldiers' Comforts Fund said that to fob off terrorism as the actions of a few thousand disorganised and ill-trained insurgents was dangerous and irresponsible and that it was time South Africa realised that if the 80,000 soldiers whom Portugal had in Mocambique and Angola had to be withdrawn tomorrow, South Africa would become involved in the "terrorist war" within weeks. He said further that South Africa would have the fullest justification "to extend its Rhodesian front against terrorists to the two Portuguese territories".

The capacity of the enemy to extend the fight and commit their forces on a large scale to any of the other territories and even their capacity to render assistance short of Rhodesian type direct intervention will ultimately depend upon events within South Africa and in particular on the extent to which the South African revolutionary forces take root and threaten internal stability. To adopt the stage by stage approach would present the enemy with an inestimable advantage which, for reasons already given, would not be compensated for by an artificial "internationalisation" of the national struggle in so-called "priority" areas. Every part of the unliberated South is a priority area and victory will be assured when the common enemy is stretched in meaningful combat over all parts of the sub-continent. As stated in the resolution adopted by the 1970 Augmented Meeting of the Central Committee of the SACP:

"The common enemy of the liberation of the African people of the sub-continent is Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mocambique, white minority rule in Zimbabwe, above all the apartheid exploitation systems of South Africa and Namibia, which together constitute a unified base of white-controlled domination and exploitation and, simultaneously, imperialism's strongest base in Africa.

"This system of race exploitation will be defeated by the assaults of the revolutionary struggle by the peoples of these countries spearheaded by the guerrilla armies of ANC, ZAPU, SWAPO, MPLA

and FRELIMO, operating each in their own specific conditions in their own countries, and forging close fraternal links and collaboration between the different fighting movements.”

The 10th Anniversary of the establishment of Umkhonto we Sizwe – the armed wing of the liberation movement – is an important milestone in the history of our people. It is a time not only for tribute to those who have already fallen but for rededication to the unfinished tasks of the South African revolution whose victory will have significance not only for the South African people but for the whole African continent and the world struggle against imperialism.

